Bissau: negociatas transcontinentais

Bissau, Guiné-Bissau, 23 Jul – O interesse da Geocapital, de Stanley Ho, em ter um banco na África de língua portuguesa era há muito conhecido mas, sem sucesso nas primeiras abordagens a Angola e Moçambique, o “rei” do jogo de Macau chegou agora à Guiné-Bissau. A “newsletter” Africa Monitor avança que a Geocapital comprou 60 por cento do Banco da África Ocidental (BAO), onde terá entre os seus associados o empresário guineense Carlos Domingues Gomes. Do capital do BAO saem Montepio Geral e Banco Efisa, duas instituições financeiras portuguesas, e ainda Sequeira Braga e Carlos Gomes Júnior, político e ex-primeiro ministro da Guiné-Bissau, além de empresário. O banco guineense, de acordo com a mesma fonte, é dos poucos bancos comerciais a operar no país, e tem a mais-valia de poder ser utilizado na expansão para outros países da região. Isto porque, à luz dos acordos existentes, está autorizado a abrir sucursais nos países-membros da União Económica e Monetária da África Ocidental (UEMOA) – Benim, Burkina-Faso, Costa do Marfim, Mali, Níger, Senegal e Togo. Este é o segundo negócio de monta conhecido à Geocapital na Guiné-Bissau, depois da concessão de um complexo turístico com casino na ilha Caravela, no arquipélago dos Bijagós, considerada Reserva Ecológica Biosférica pela UNESCO. Stanley Ho chegou a apresentar em Cabo Verde um projecto semelhante ao almejado para os Bijagós, de hotel e casino, mas este não foi aprovado pelas autoridades, que invocaram reservas quanto ao local escolhido, um ilhéu fronteiro à capital, Praia. O complexo da ilha Caravela foi objecto de uma visita a Bissau de Almeida Santos, o advogado e ex-presidente da Assembleia da República portuguesa, que tem surgido ao lado de Ho e da Geocapital noutras “frentes”, nomeadamente em Moçambique, onde a “holding” tem importantes projectos no Vale do Zambeze. Antes da concretização do negócio na Guiné-Bissau, a Geocapital já tinha tentado a abordagem aos mercados financeiros de Moçambique e Angola. No caso angolano, a empresa virada para investimentos na África de língua portuguesa terá travado o investimento na criação do Banco Angolano de Negócios e Comércio (BANC) depois de lhe ter sido recusada a atribuição de uma licença de exploração de jogo, segundo adianta o Africa Monitor. Em concreto, a Geocapital pretendia autorização para explorar um casino no novo hotel de cinco estrelas “Rosa Linda”, empreendimento cuja primeira pedra foi lançada em Junho. No BANC, a empresa de Stanley Ho e outros investidores tinha como parceiros influentes personalidades angolanas, como José Pedro de Morais e Kundi Paihama. Este último, militar de carreira, explora dois pequenos casinos em Luanda, nos hotéis Tivoli e Marinha. O projecto do BANC estava virado para a comunidade chinesa, prevendo a intervenção em investimentos no sector privado, através de concessão de crédito ou tomada de participações, um modo de funcionamento semelhante ao da linha de crédito criada pelo governo chinês para Angola. Em Moçambique, a Geocapital esteve perto da compra do Banco de Desenvolvimento e Comércio (BDC), relatando então a imprensa moçambicana que Almeida Santos, na condição de advogado da Geocapital, teria inclusivamente contactado o presidente moçambicano, Armando Guebuza, no sentido obter uma aprovação célere à operação, então dependente do Banco de Moçambique. Depois da ruptura das negociações e afastamento da Geocapital, os portugueses do Montepio Geral passaram os sul-africanos do First National para a frente no negócio. A Geocapital chega à Guiné-Bissau numa altura em que o país procura emergir de uma prolongada crise política, contando para já com importante apoio da comunidade internacional, nomeadamente da União Europeia e da China. Recentemente, a Guiné-Bissau recebeu o compromisso de ajudas num montante total de que supera 21 milhões de euros, da parte de cinco entidades diferentes, incluindo 4 milhões da China, que estabeleceu um protocolo de apoio financeiro com o país. Viu ainda o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) prometer que vai tentar mobilizar “com carácter de urgência” 30 milhões de dólares, junto da comunidade internacional, para ajudar às necessidades imediatas e à reconstrução do país. O BAO deverá contar com forte concorrência do banco africano Ecobank, que recentemente começou a abrir sucursais na Guiné-Bissau. Esta instituição financeira firmou recentemente com o governo guineense um acordo que prevê que passe a receber os pagamentos efectuados nas alfândegas do país, que representam perto de 75 por cento das receitas fiscais. Esta associação tem em vista aumentar a colecta e introduzir maior transparência, rigor e disciplina no processo. (macauhub) Macauhub Julho 2007

Bissau: o mistério da ilha Caravela

"Acabei por não estranhar o mais recente investimento de Stanley HO, a compra de 60 por cento do Banco da África Ocidental (BAO), onde terá entre os seus associados o empresário guineense Carlos Domingues Gomes. "Este é o segundo negócio de monta conhecido à Geocapital(empresa de Stanley Ho) na Guiné-Bissau, depois da concessão de um complexo turístico com casino na ilha Caravela, no arquipélago dos Bijagós, considerada Reserva Ecológica Biosférica pela UNESCO. "O complexo da ilha Caravela foi objecto de uma visita a Bissau de Almeida Santos, advogado e ex-presidente da Assembleia da República portuguesa, que tem surgido ao lado de Ho e da Geocapital noutras “frentes”, nomeadamente em Moçambique, onde a “holding” tem importantes projectos no Vale do Zambeze. "Com todos estes investimentos, espero que a Guiné possa sair do clima de instabilidade que tem vivido desde 1998 e voltar a ser um local apetecível para todos os seus nacionais assim como, para o investimento estrangeito no país". Isto escreveu, há alguns anos, um enigmático blogger Ma Si Ka (ocidenteoriente.blogspot), no seu blog Ocidente Oriente Crónicas da Irmandade. -- Dá para, uma vez mais, chamar a atenção para os negócios de Stanley Ho e dos seus amigos portugueses em terras da Guiné-Bissau. Nomeadamente nas ilhas dos pobres Bijagós.

Nigéria: 326 milhões de habitantes

Uma grande parte da evolução da África Ocidental, durante as próximas décadas, vai depender da Nigéria, que tende a ser a quinta potência mundial, em termos populacionais, com uns previsíveis 326 milhões de habitantes, em 2050, segundo dados das Nações Unidas e de Washington. A Nigéria, um parceiro comercial da China, poderá em grande medida determinar, para o bem ou para o mal, a evolução de todo o espaço compreendido entre a Mauritânia e os Camarões. Da forma como ela conseguir gerir as relações entre civis e militares, entre muçulmanos do Norte e cristãos do Sul, entre centenas de etnias, umas maiores, outras menores, dependerá em grande parte o que vier a acontecer no Níger, no Togo e nos demais países da África Ocidental. A tendência dos militares para, ao longo dos anos, se terem aproveitado muitas vezes das fragilidades existentes entre os civis e um certo pendor para a corrupção marcaram muitas vezes os primeiros cinquenta anos de uma federação independente que aspira a ter um lugar de membro permanente no Conselho de Segurança da ONU. Agora, o Movimento de Emancipação do Delta do Níger (MEND), por alturas do Biafra de há quatro décadas, é mais uma das dores de cabeça do país, que rivaliza com Angola na primeira linha da produção de petróleo a sul do Sara. Já lhe têm chamado a maior democracia de toda a região, mas isso é apenas baseado no número dos habitantes e não na qualidade das instituições, que deixam a desejar, apesar de se elegerem os membros das assembleias estaduais, os governadores dos estados, os senadores, os deputados e os presidentes. A Nigéria ainda terá de provar se está ou não à altura das circunstâncias.---- Isto escrevi eu, há mais de um ano e meio, para o anuário Janus de 2011/2012, que só viria a ser publicado em finais do ano passado. Mas tanto este pequeno apontamento como o resto do trabalho efectuado a convite do Professor Doutor Luís Moita mantêm-se infelizmente actuais. Nomeadamente no referente aos tráficos que passam pela Guiné-Bissau e pelo Mali.

E depois de Mugabe?

Politics are fast becoming a heady mix of military muscle-flexing, metaphysics and Machiavellianism, especially the politicking of those who would succeed President Robert Mugabe. The President’s visible ageing is both a strength and a weakness: his experience and continuing sharp intelligence indicate ongoing protection by the ancestral spirits and caution against direct challenges. Yet his occasional public stumbles and frequent disappearances to Singapore for medical treatment give the lie to the assertion by some sycophants that he will not die but will metamorphose into a lion spirit – like the Kaguvi and Nehanda spirit mediums who mobilised the first resistance to British colonialists in the 1890s. The pretenders are growing bolder in putting down their markers, all the same. Africa-Confidencial.com

A liderança do ANC

The battle for succession in the African National Congress is getting nastier as its outcome looks more uncertain. Supporters of the main protagonists fight their battles, firstly within the ANC structures, then in the security services, the courts and the state broadcasting service. For months, the main contest was between national President Jacob Zuma, who seeks re-election as ANC President, and the party’s Deputy President, Kgalema Motlanthe. Now, the field is opening up, with Human Settlements Minister Tokyo Sexwale and business tycoon Cyril Ramaphosa emerging as serious contenders. Even long-term backers of Zuma now concede that he might not be able to finish a second presidency but argue that he is needed to steer the party through the next few troubled years. ANC traditionalists abhor such personality contests in the party and the contenders remain coy about their plans. The leadership contest doesn’t formally start until October and will be decided at the party’s elective conference in December at Mangaung (formerly Bloemfontein), capital of Free State. Of the three challengers, the gentlemanly Motlanthe looks the most committed; Sexwale and Ramaphosa could still strike a deal with the Zuma camp which could, on paper, leave them as heirs apparent in five years’ time. Africa-Confidential.com

Bissau: Zamora na Gâmbia

Former Guinea-Bissau armed forces chief Jose Zamora Induta has fled to a neighbouring country following the coup in his troubled country last month, officials said on Saturday. A local government official in Senegal said Induta, who had voiced fears for his life after another top military official was assassinated, had arrived with three other people in the Casamance region earlier this week and had since left for Gambia. The official said Induta and his unnamed companions had stayed in a hotel in the main Casamance town of Ziguinchor overnight Thursday and had left for Banjul the following morning, denying earlier reports they had been arrested. A Guinea-Bissau army officer said Induta had fled to Senegal along with elections commission chief Desejado Lima Da Costa and Fernando Gomes, who was interior minister in the government overthrown in the latest coup last month. He said all three had taken refuge in the European Union mission in the capital Bissau following the coup and had crossed the border into Senegal without authorisation. A diplomatic source in Bissau who is close to Gomes said he and Induta had reportedly already arrived in Gambia. Induta was ousted as military chief two years ago by General Antonio Indaj, considered the man behind the April coup, which was launched in between the first and second rounds of a presidential election. Induta sought refuge in the EU mission after the murder of former military intelligence chief Samba Djalo on the day of the first round vote on March 18. He was joined there by Da Costa and Gomes after the April 12 coup. The army vowed Wednesday to return to its barracks after transitional authorities formed a new government including a colonel who joined the coup but excluding the former ruling party. A regional peace force has also started deploying in the country -- which has become a hub for cocaine smuggling from Latin America to Europe -- in an attempt to help the transitional authorities stabilise it and organise elections in a year. AFP

Bissau: sombras chinesas

It took Beijing years to get its “old friend” back into fold, but in 1998 the Bissau government ditched Taiwan and restored full diplomatic ties with the PRC. Since then, the PRC has decided not to take any more chances with Guinea-Bissau and has steadily expanded its presence in the country – despite the fact that China has hardly any immediate economic interests at stake. China’s initial objective is to engage Guinea-Bissau to the furthest extent possible in order to minimize the possibility of a Taiwanese return. Beijing aims at completely eradicating the Taiwanese influence, and particularly any diplomatic or political presence, from the Portuguese speaking world. This is consistent with China’s overall policy of isolating Taiwan to the further extent possible. Over the longer term, China may gain access to important oil reserves, if Guinea-Bissau’s hopes for major discoveries pan out. Restoring ties with Guinea-Bissau was an important win for China, and in the years since, the PRC has intensified its efforts to isolate Taiwan worldwide, targeting Taipei’s most committed and long-time supporters, such as the central America sates who had been loyal to Taiwan for decades. In June 2007, Costa Rica, after 58 years of relations with Taiwan, finally abandoned its old friend and established diplomatic ties with China. In the Portuguese-speaking world, China has succeeded in isolating Taiwan from all but one of the eight of members of the Cumunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa (CPLP, Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries), and judging by Beijing’s continuous efforts in relation to Africa’s tiny Sao Tome and Principe, it may be just a matter of time before Taiwan is completely pushed out of the lusophone world. In order to prevent a return of Taiwan to Guinea-Bissau, and to preserve its hard-won victory there, China has launched a major aid effort in the country. At the same time, it is emphasizing that its “sincere and friendly help” will be a long term commitment. This approach should assure that Taipei does not stage a comeback through its “check book diplomacy.” In November 2006, China announced it was going to fund the construction of a massive dam in Guinea-Bissau, 200 kilometers from the capital Bissau at a cost of $60 million. The Ceba River dam, the first such structure in the country, will be vital to sustaining Guinea-Bissau’s agriculture-based economy and meeting its future energy needs. Other major infrastructure projects include a deep water port in Buba, to be the country’s largest such facility, the rehabilitation of Guinea-Bissau’s two main highways, and the construction of a bridge over the Farin River. As in other African countries, the PRC has also funded very visible and symbolic buildings that greatly contribute to enhancing its prestige and visibility as a major player. Under its ajuda amigavel e gratuita (free and friendly help) assistance program, China has offered to build the national parliament building, rehabilitate the presidential palace that was damaged during the 1998 civil war, and construct a six-story central government building, the largest project in the capital. Beijing is also putting up a 1000-unit public housing project. In August 2007, funding was announced for additional construction, including a justice palace and the rehabilitation of schools and health facilities. Other assistance includes the provision of 100 scholarships for local students to attend Chinese universities, and $400,000 in humanitarian assistance to the northern areas of the country along the border with Senegal, where a significant refugee problem still remains as a result of the civil war. A 2,000 ton gift of Chinese rice was much welcomed in view of the exorbitant price of the staple crop in the local market. It allowed the regime to address the most basic immediate needs of the population while buying vital time for further shipments to arrive. This Chinese gesture may have prevented serious civil unrest, and it certainly enhanced China’s image in the eyes of the government and people. In August 2007, this first rice shipment was followed by an even larger one of 30,000 tons. To help stimulate Guinea-Bissau’s economy, China has exempted 442 of its products from Chinese tariffs. Beijing has provided funds for direct budget assistance to Guinea-Bissau, including a $4 million donation to assist the government in paying delayed salaries to its civil servants and $1.2 million donation to help the country host the CPLP heads of state summit in Bissau in July 2005. China has also assisted Bissau with some of its diplomatic representation expenses in Beijing by providing its diplomatic mission with vehicles and office equipment. Large numbers of public servants and some military officers are expected to head to the PRC for training, and the numbers of Chinese assistance personnel in Guinea-Bissau are expected to increase, particularly in the areas of agriculture, health and fisheries. The health sector is another area where China has provided useful and much needed assistance. In addition to sending medical teams, a crucial gesture considering the country’s limited numbers of doctors, the PRC has given medical supplies and equipment. China’s main health project is the rehabilitation of the Canchungo regional hospital, 70 kilometers from the capital, at a cost of $3.5 million. In 2006, Guinea-Bissau become the first country to sign a deep water fisheries agreement with China, opening the door for large numbers of Chinese fishing vessels to operate in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Currently there are at least six Chinese vessels working offshore, including two large freezer ships. The fisheries agreement has raised some concerns among environmentalists due to the unique nature of the country’s coastal ecosystem. The region of greatest concern is the Bijagos archipelago, which UNESCO has declared a Biosphere Ecology Reserve.. Environmentalists worry that the Guinea-Bissau navy will be unable to monitor the large numbers of Chinese fishing vessels expected to be eventually deployed. Currently the country possesses just two patrol boats at an uncertain state of operational readiness to cover a 350 kilometer coastal area with 80 islands and reefs. In order to dispel concerns, China has offered to assist the country’s navy by providing patrol vessels, communication equipment, and training. Other defense-related assistance includes the rehabilitation of the main military hospital, the construction of a residential area for military officers, and the repair of various military installations damaged during the civil war. However, it is the oil sector that seems to be of greatest interest for both China and Guinea-Bissau. Since the last years of Portuguese colonization, there have been numerous reports of significant oil reserves along the coast. In the 1960s and 1970s, various French and American oil companies were reported to have approach the Portuguese government for oil concessions. However, the fascist and isolationist Portuguese government of the day, with economic policies that had made Portugal the poorest nation in Western Europe, resisted such moves. Today, Chinese experts are expected to start major seismic studies and other tests shortly to fully assess the true potential of the reported oil reserves. Like the deep fisheries agreement, the oil exploration plans have raised environmental concerns, and there are fears that some of the areas where reserves may be located are too close to the Bijagos. If significant oil reserves are indeed found in or near the Bijagos, will an impoverished Guinea-Bissau be able to resist the temptation to drill? Or will it choose to protect its environment and one of he world’s natural treasures? This remains to be seen. While most Chinese investment in Guinea-Bissau is through enterprises linked to the Chinese government, some major Chinese private investors are beginning to take notice of the country’s potential. Macao casino tycoon Stanley Ho has invested in a casino on Caravela Island in the Bijagos archipelago. One may wonder about the wisdom of building a casino in a UNESCO-protected area and about the benefits of building casinos generally in one of the world’s poorest nations. Another major investment by Ho was the purchase of a 60% stake in Guinea-Bissau’s only viable bank, the Banco da Africa Ocidental (BAO). It is perhaps worth noting that Beijing’s increasing commitment in Guinea-Bissau comes at a time when the United States has significantly reduced its presence. The State Department describes U.S.-Guinea-Bissau relations as “excellent,” but the U.S. embassy was closed in 1998 during the civil war and has not reopened. Guinea-Bissau has no embassy in Washington. The mutual lack of official representation in the two capitals is regrettable, particularly in view of the growing importance of Guinea-Bissau as a transit point for the narcotics trade from Latin America to Europe. The issue may well become a source of contention between Washington the European Union (EU) on the one hand, and Bissau on the other. Some observers have argued that Guinea-Bissau can now be described as a narcostate, with officials at the highest levels believed to be involved in the illicit drug trade. This fact has been admitted by the Bissau government itself, with the minister of interior acknowledging that senior military officers have participated in the trade. However, this acknowledgement may represent just the tip of the iceberg, since many observers believe that high officials beyond the military are also involved. If both Washington and the EU put pressure on Guinea-Bissau to stop the narcotics flow into Europe and beyond, as seems likely, what will be the impact on the country’s relations with the PRC? Beijing seems to be very aware of the endemic narcotics problem facing Bissau and believes it to be a manageable risk that will not affect its overall objectives. China is most likely to adopt its usual line that it does not interfere in the domestic affairs of other counties and continue business as usual, just as in the case of Burma. Loro Horta Centro de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais, 5 de Outubro de 2007