Bissau: palavras, muitas palavras, de Ramos Horta

BAN RECOMMENDS ADJUSTMENT IN UN MISSION IN GUINEA-BISSAU TO HELP RESTORE ORDER, STABILITY New York, May 9 2013 2:00PM The mandate of the United Nations political mission in Guinea-Bissau, which last year underwent a military coup, should be adjusted to support a two-phase process for the full restoration of constitutional order and medium-term stability in the country, according to a report by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented to the Security Council today. “It is important that the United Nations system and subregional, regional and international partners work together to support a responsible, legitimate and effective State, operating under the rule of law and able to provide security, essential services and economic opportunities to its people,” according to the report. The recommendations presented to the Council by Jose Ramos Horta, Special Representative for the Secretary-General and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), who led an assessment of the Office’s mandate that was reflected in the text. Soldiers in Guinea-Bissau – a West African country with a history of coups, misrule and political instability since it gained independence from Portugal in 1974 – seized power on 12 April 2012. The coup d’etat came ahead of a presidential run-off election that was slated for 22 April between Carlos Gomes Júnior and a former president, Kumba Yala, prompting calls from the international community for a return to civilian rule. According to the Secretary-General’s recommendations, the first phase of the restoration of constitutional order and stability would culminate presidential and legislative elections, and focus on creating “a political environment built on confidence and non-interference in the electoral process.” The second phase proposed by the Secretary-General, which would conclude at the end of the term of the next elected government, should focus on post-election stability, on strengthening of State and democratic governance institutions – notably security, justice and defence – and on the functioning of both central and local State structures. The current mandate of UNIOGBIS, which was established in 2010 to replace the previous peacebuilding support office known as UNOGBIS, which in turn was put in place in 1999 after an 11-month civil war, expires at the end of this month. -----Muita parra e pouca uva. Ou, pelo menos, muito pouca indicação concreta do que se poderá fazer no imediato, nos próximos seis, sete meses. "Criar um ambiente político baseado na confiança e na não-interferência no processo eleitoral". Era tão bom, não era? Mas não creio que já se tenha avançado muito nesse domínio.

Bissau: PAIGC ou PAIGB?

Se a Guiné-Bissau fosse um país normal, estaria nesta altura a decorrer em Cacheu o VIII Congresso do PAIGC, cuja liderança é disputada por Aristides Ocante da Silva, Braima Camará, Carlos Gomes Júnior, Domingos Simões Pereira, José Mário Vaz e Vladimir Deuna. No entanto, como a Guiné-Bissau não é de forma alguma um país normal, não estamos a receber boas notícias do Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), criado oficialmente a 19 de Setembro de 1956, por pessoas como Amílcar e Luís Cabral, Aristides Pereira e Fernando Fortes. Se a Guiné-Bissau fosse um país normal, com quase 40 anos de vida, estaria agora a ser governada pelo PAIGC e a ser presidida provavelmente pelo que é ainda o líder desse partido, Carlos Gomes Júnior, que neste último ano tem vivido exilado, porque um golpe de estado deixou as eleições presidenciais a meio. Enquanto Angola está a ser governada pelo MPLA, oficialmente formado alguns meses depois do PAIGC, a Guiné-Bissau encontra-se nas mãos de um conglomerado de militares e de traficantes que de forma alguma sabem ou querem saber o que seja a legalidade democrática. "O Estado da Guiné-Bissau não conhece o seu lugar; é desorganizado e incompetente", reconheceu recentemente um dos candidatos à liderança do PAIGC, José Mário Vaz, que já foi ministro das Finanças e depois do golpe do ano passado viajou para Portugal, como outros dos seus compatriotas. O Estado guineense é desorganizado e incompetente porque nasceu torto, nunca tendo uma série de combatentes pela independência aceite a liderança de Amílcar Cabral, que acabaria por ser assassinado, devido ao ódio de certos negros aos cabo-verdianos. Amílcar e Luís Cabral nunca conseguiram consolidar o sonho de uma Guiné e um Cabo Verde a caminharem juntos para a independência e o desenvolvimento. Essa foi apenas uma miragem dos dois irmãos e de poucas mais pessoas. No dia 14 de Novembro de 1980 João Bernardo Vieira, "Nino", afastou Luís Cabral da Presidência da Guiné-Bissau e deu o pontapé de saída para a completa ruptura entre os dois ramos do PAIGC, que de modo algum poderia continuar a ser o partido essencial de dois territórios tão diferentes como o são a Guiné e Cabo Verde. Se o dito PAIGC desejasse agora ser verdadeiramente coerente com o que sempre tem sido a prática de muitos dos seus militantes, eliminaria de vez o nome de Cabo Verde da sua designação e passaria pura e simplesmente a ser o Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau (PAIGB). Tal como Aristides Pereira e Pedro Pires souberam tão bem, depois do golpe de "Nino", criar o Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (PAICV), Carlos Gomes Júnior e os demais candidatos à liderança de um partido de nome errado deveriam ter a coragem de encetar agora um tempo inteiramente novo, muito mais promissor. Uma vez que nem o dito PAIGC nem o Partido da Renovação Social (PRS) têm credibilidade suficiente para gerir a Guiné-Bissau, depois de tudo aquilo a que se tem assistido nos últimos anos, talvez um PAIGB significasse como que um começar de novo, um recomeço. O povo da Guiné-Bissau necessita de passos arrojados; e de políticos que saibam colocar os militares no seu devido lugar, de servidores da República; para que não estejam permanentemente a interferir na vida do próprio país. Já se perdeu demasiado tempo para que continuemos a assistir a mais do mesmo. Esta é uma mensagem de esperança, para que os guineenses se libertem definitivamente de pessoas como Bubo Na Tchuto, António Indjai, Ibrahima Papá Camará ou, até mesmo, Kumba Ialá. JH

Tunísia:as fraquezas da transição para a democracia

Après une semaine d’affrontements et de traque de groupuscules jihadistes, les évènements de Jebel Chaambi contraignent les autorités tunisiennes à voir la réalité en face : la menace terroriste doit être prise au sérieux. Il aura fallu 7 jours de traque et 9 blessés graves parmi les forces de l’ordre pour arriver à débusquer de leurs maquis 37 terroristes, dont 20 (et parmi ces derniers, 11 Algériens) sont encore retranchés sur le mont Chaambi, selon les dernières informations rendues publiques par les ministères de l’intérieur et de la Défense, mardi 7 mai. Bien que Lotfi Ben Jeddou, ministre de l’Intérieur, affirme que les terroristes ont tous été identifiés, l’anxiété n’est toujours pas retombée en Tunisie, où l’on parle désormais de complot contre la sûreté de l’État. Les affrontements entre jihadistes armés et forces de sécurité dans la réserve naturelle de Chaambi, à 15 kilomètres de Kasserine (Centre Ouest) et à quelques encablures de l’Algérie, soulignent que la menace terroriste ne s’est pas évaporée après la révolution, bien au contraire. Déni Les autorités algériennes, ainsi que les habitants de la zone frontalière, avaient pourtant alerté les autorités sur l’existence de camps d’entraînement. Mais le gouvernement tunisien avait, en décembre 2012, préféré nier la réalité. Organisées, équipées, bien encadrées et déterminées, les recrues des mouvements jihadistes bénéficient clairement de soutiens financiers et logistiques ainsi que de complicités locales. Reste que si les événements de Chaambi retiennent l’attention parce qu’inédits et spectaculaires – les flancs de la montagne ont été truffés de mine anti personnel -, le terrorisme n’est pas nouveau en Tunisie. Depuis les accrochages de Rouhia, en mai 2011, et de Bir Ali Ben Khlifa, en février 2012, les combattants salafistes ont mené différentes opérations, au premier rang desquelles l’attaque de l’ambassade américaine en septembre 2012. À plusieurs reprises, ils ont également pris les armes contre les représentants de l’ordre, affirmant ainsi leur rejet total des institutions et de l’État. Contrebande Ces groupuscules armés, liés la nébuleuse terroriste internationale, dont Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi), visent une déstabilisation régionale au nom de la volonté divine supposée d’instaurer un califat. Or la Tunisie est confrontée aux faiblesses inhérentes à la phase de transition démocratique dans laquelle elle est engagée. La dissolution, au lendemain de la révolution, de la direction de la sécurité de l’État, la suspension de la loi anti-terroriste, le maintien de l’état d’urgence qui implique une mobilisation constante de l’armée, la circulation de quantité importantes d’armes de contrebande et l’absence de fermeté du gouvernement à l’égard des extrémistes ont créé un terrain favorable à la prolifération de groupuscules jihadistes. Mais une chose est désormais certaine : les forces de l’ordre ne sont pas partisanes. Leur comportement patriote et républicain, malgré leur sous-équipement et leur manque de formation, est à saluer. ________ Par Frida Dahmani, à Tunis Lire l'article sur Jeuneafrique.com : La Tunisie face au péril jihadiste

RCA: no centro do sofrimento africano

Presa di posizione della Chiesa locale sulla grave crisi del paese e sui comportamenti dei ribelli di Seleka. Duro monito al presidente Michel Djotodia e all’ambasciatore di Francia Serge Mucetti. Con due lettere – una rivolta all’ambasciatore di Francia in Centrafrica, Serge Mucetti, l’altra direttamente al presidente della Repubblica centrafricana, Michel Djotodia, entrabe inviate il 23 aprile – , mons. Dieudonné Nzapalainga, arcivescovo di Bangui, mons. Désiré Nongo Aziagbia, vescovo di Bossangoa, e mons. Cyr Nestor Yapaupa, vescovo coadiutore di Alindao, hanno espresso preoccupazione e indignazione per quanto sta accadendo. Nella lettera al presidente Djotodia, intitolata “Mai più. No all’impunità”, si sottolinea: «L’ora è grave. Le popolazione delle città del Centrafrica sono sottoposte a stupri, saccheggi, estorsioni, rapine, vandalismi e altri misfatti orchestrati da elementi di Seleka (così si chiama, in lingua sango, la colazione dei vari gruppi ribelli, ndr). Perché non condannate questi fatti? Fino a quando starete in silenzio?». I vescovi, dopo aver fatto una lunga lista, delle sfide che la nazione deve affrontare (mettere in sicurezza il paese, far funzionare al meglio gli organi di transizione, disarmare i combattenti e accantonarli all’interno di strutture militari, rimpatrio dei mercenari ciadiani e sudanesi, recupero dei beni rubati e inviati in Sudan e Ciad…), si soffermano sulla «coabitazione tra centrafricani di religione cristiana e di religione musulmana. Un po’ ovunque nelle zone occupata si raccolgono testimonianze simili. Seleka è costituita in gran parte di musulmani stranieri e di alcuni musulmani centrafricani. La popolazione musulmana è stata in gran parte risparmiata dai saccheggi. Come spiegare l’accanimento di Seleka contro i beni della Chiesa?». Ed ecco specificato l’accanimento: «Aggressione fisica di preti, religiosi e religiose. Impedita la libera circolazione a numerosi agenti pastorali. Colpi di arma da fuoco nella cattedrale Notre Dame de l’Immaculate Conception di Bangui, al termine della celebrazione della domenica della Palme. Saccheggio delle radio cattoliche a Bambari e Bossangoa. Furto sistematico di automobili e moto». Concludono i vescovi: «Esigiamo da parte vostra una riparazione per tutti i beni della Chiesa rubati, saccheggiati, vandalizzati. A questo riguardo la Commissione episcopale giustizia e pace le farà pervenire un dossier completo». Ancora più dura la protesta rivolta all’ambasciatore di Francia: «Eccellenza, le sofferenze del popolo centrafricano sono inammissibili. Come capire il vostro silenzio che potrebbe essere interpretato come complicità? Ci aspettiamo che lei metta in campo la sua autorità per una soluzione pacifica di questa crisi e perché ricordi alle nuove autorità di Bangui e alla comunità internazionale i loro impegni. Tra questi promuovere il rispetto dei diritti umani e vegliare sul rispetto degli accordi di Libreville». (informação comboniana)

Bissau: a desgraça continua

Quando, em Fevereiro do ano 2000, Kumba Yalá Kobde Nhanca, líder do Partido da Renovação Social (PRS), tomou posse como Presidente da República da Guiné-Bissau, alguns julgaram precipitadamente que terminara a era do PAIGC, que em 24 de Setembro de 1973 proclamara unilateralmente a independência. Kumba batera por larga margem o então Presidente interino Malam Bacai Sanhá, mas o seu mandato não chegou ao fim, tendo-se ele depois exilado no Reino de Marrocos, enquanto Sanhá se tornava Presidente, para um mandato que não levaria até ao fim. O PRS vencera as legislativas de Novembro de 1999, mas a sua passagem pelo poder foi efémera; e no último acto do género efectuado no pequeno país já o Partido da Renovação Social não conseguiu mais do que 25,3 por cento dos votos, face aos 49,8 do velho Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), criado por Amílcar e Luís Cabral. Aquilo que há 13 anos se julgava um marco na vida dos guineenses, a entrada em funções de um Presidente e de um Governo não saídos do PAIGC, foi apenas uma fase transitória; e em meados de 2011 o primeiro-ministro era mais uma vez o actual líder do partido dos Cabrais, Carlos Gomes Júnior. Luís Cabral, primeiro Presidente, filho de um cabo-verdiano e de uma portuguesa, foi derrubado em 1980 por um guineense de etnia papel, João Bernardo Vieira, que por duas vezes viria a ser violentamente afastado do poder, respectivamente em 1999 e em 2009. Da última foi mesmo barbaramente assassinado. Depois das esperanças de 1999 e de 2000 de que alguma coisa estaria a mudar na Guiné-Bissau, veio a triste realidade de que nada mudou substancialmente, devido à inexistência de condições objectivas para uma melhor governação. A realização de eleições presidenciais e legislativas tem sido ali uma simples panaceia, conforme muito bem afirmou o sociólogo guineense Carlos Lopes, pertencente aos quadros superiores das Nações Unidas. Ainda não se realizaram reformas profundas, não se desmantelou o enorme aparelho de segurança e não se fez justiça, de modo que não houve democratização. Nem em 1999, nem em 2000 nem em 2009. Antes tudo se complicou ainda mais com a ascendência de uma série de traficantes. O país, de 36.125 quilómetros quadrados, continou subdesenvolvido e, em última instância, à mercê dos militares saídos da estrutura de guerrilha que alcançou a independência mas não conseguiu adaptar-se aos novos tempos e garantir um futuro pacífico. Os duros militares guineenses conseguiram derrotar as Forças Armadas Portuguesas, forçaram o saneamento dos cabo-verdianos que chegaram a ocupar cargos ministeriais, derrotaram os senegaleses que em 1998/1999 intervieram na guerra civil, ao lado de João Bernardo Vieira, e continuaram renitentes a quaisquer tentativas de modernização e de submissão ao poder civil. Fossem elas patrocinadas pela União Europeia ou por Angola. Entrementes, alguns desses militares, hoje em dia pessoas com bem mais de 50 anos, deixaram-se envolver com cidadãos latino-americanos em questões de tráfico, fosse ele de drogas ou de armas. Por tudo isto aqui exposto, com um Presidente da República e um primeiro-ministro interinos, não inteiramente senhores de si, mas antes reféns de oficiais das Forças Armadas eivados de vícios, temos que estar sempre preparados para que da Guiné-Bissau nos continuem a chegar más notícias. Notícias de golpes, de conjuras, de assassínios e de eleições adiadas, ou malogradas, sabotadas a meio, sempre fizeram parte do quotidiano guineense. Há mais de 30 anos. JH

Bissau: O libelo contra António Indjai

APRIL 18 (WASHINGTON) – - DEA Administrator Michele M. Leonhart and Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today the unsealing of charges against Antonio Indjai, the head of the Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces, for conspiring to provide aid to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (the “FARC”), a South American paramilitary group long designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”), by storing FARC-owned cocaine in West Africa; conspiring to sell weapons, including surface-to-air missiles to be used to protect FARC cocaine processing operations in Colombia against U.S. military forces; and conspiring to import narcotics into the United States; Indjai has been the subject of a United Nations travel ban since May 2012 as a result of his alleged participation in the April 2012 coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau. Indjai’s co-conspirators Manuel Mamadi Mane and Saliu Sisse were apprehended in a West African Country on April 4, 2013, and thereafter transferred to the custody of the United States and transported to the Southern District of New York for prosecution. Co-conspirators Rafael Antonio Garavito-Garcia and Gustavo Perez-Garcia were apprehended in Colombia on April 5, pursuant to Interpol Red Notices, and remain in Colombia pending extradition to the United States. The case is assigned to U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff. “Today’s indictment reflects DEA’s commitment to securing our nation and protecting our citizens" Leonhart said. "These charges reveal how Indjai's sprawling drug and terror regime threatened the national security not only of his own country, but of countries across the globe. As the head of Guinea-Bissau's Armed Forces, Indjai had insider access to instruments of national power that made him an allegedly significant player in West Africa's dangerous drug trade. Partnering with individuals he believed to be part of a terrorist organization like the FARC served to expand Indjai's criminal activities and the damage he could cause. Due to our worldwide reach and unrelenting efforts, DEA and our partners took decisive action against this narco-terrorist and his network of facilitators." U.S. Attorney Bharara said: “As alleged, from his position atop the Guinea-Bissau military, Antonio Indjai conspired to use his power and authority to be a middleman and his country to be a way-station for people he believed to be terrorists and narco-traffickers so they could store, and ultimately transport narcotics to the United States, and procure surface-to-air missiles and other military-grade hardware to be used against United States troops. As with so many allegedly corrupt officials, he sold himself and use of his country for a price. The charges against Indjai, together with the recent arrests of his co-conspirators, have dismantled a network of alleged narco-terrorists, and once again showcased the extraordinary work of our DEA partners who, at great personal risk, travel across the globe to investigate and make arrests in these cases in order to protect the American people and American interests here and abroad.” According to the Indictment against Indjai that was unsealed today and previously unsealed Indictments against his co-conspirators: Indjai became the head of the Guinea-Bissau armed forces in June of 2010. Beginning in the summer of 2012, he and his co-defendants communicated with confidential sources (the “CSs”) working with the DEA who purported to be representatives and/or associates of the FARC. The communications occurred by telephone, over e-mail, and in a series of audio-recorded and videotaped meetings over several months in Guinea-Bissau. During meetings in Guinea-Bissau beginning in June 2012, and continuing through at least mid-November 2012, Indjai, Mane, Sisse, Garavito-Garcia, and Perez-Garcia agreed to receive and store multi-ton shipments of FARC-owned cocaine in Guinea-Bissau. The defendants agreed to receive the cocaine off the coast of Guinea-Bissau, and to store the cocaine in storage houses there pending its eventual shipment to the United States, where it would be sold for the financial benefit of the FARC. The defendants further agreed that a portion of the cocaine would be used to pay Guinea-Bissau government officials, including Indjai, for providing safe passage for the cocaine through Guinea-Bissau. Also during those meetings, Indjai, Mane, Sisse, and Garavito-Garcia agreed to arrange to purchase weapons for the FARC, including surface-to-air missiles, by importing them into Guinea-Bissau for the nominal use of the Guinea-Bissau military when in fact they intended to provide the weapons to the FARC. For example, on June 30, 2012, during a recorded meeting in Guinea-Bissau with the CSs, Mane, Sisse, and Garavito-Garcia agreed to assist in the distribution of FARC cocaine by facilitating its shipment to Guinea-Bissau inside loads of military uniforms, and by establishing a front company in Guinea-Bissau to export the cocaine to the United States. In addition, Mane agreed to assist in obtaining weapons for the FARC by arranging a meeting with Indjai. On July 2, 2012, at a recorded meeting with the CSs in Guinea-Bissau, INDJAI agreed to facilitate the shipment of cocaine to the United States through Guinea-Bissau and to procure weapons for the FARC, including surface-to-air missiles, knowing that the weapons would be used to combat United States forces operating in Colombia. During a recorded meeting in Guinea-Bissau with Mane, Sisse, Garavito-Garcia, and Perez-Garcia on November 13, 2012, a Guinea-Bissau military official advised one of the CSs that Indjai would be ready to execute the weapons transaction once the FARC brought money to Guinea-Bissau, and that the anti-aircraft missiles to be sold to the FARC could be used against United States helicopters operating in Colombia. * * * Indjai has been charged with one count of conspiracy to engage in narco-terrorism; one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, knowing or intending that the cocaine would be imported into the United States; one count of conspiracy to provide material support and resources to an FTO; and one count of conspiracy to acquire and transfer anti-aircraft missiles. Count One carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years in prison and a maximum penalty of life in prison. Count Two carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years in prison and a maximum penalty of life in prison. Count Three carries a maximum potential penalty of 15 years in prison. Count Four carries a mandatory minimum of 25 years in prison and a maximum potential penalty of life in prison. The charges and investigation of these defendants were the result of the close cooperative efforts of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the Special Operations Division and the Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support Team of the DEA, the DEA Lisbon Country Office, the DEA Bogota Country Office, and the U.S. Department of Justice Office of International Affairs. This prosecution is being handled by the Office's Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys Aimee Hector and Glen Kopp are in charge of the prosecution. The charges contained in the Indictments are merely accusations and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. DEA ---------------------------------------- Como é que um Presidente e um Governo interinos podem manter em funções o general Indjai, sem dele se tornarem cúmplices?

Bissau: o caso de Buba e de Tchamy Yalá

APR 04 (WASHINGTON, D.C.) - DEA Administrator Michele M. Leonhart and U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara of the Southern District of New York announced that five defendants – Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, the former head of the Guinea-Bissau navy; Manuel Mamadi Mane; Saliu Sisse; Papis Djeme; and Tchamy Yala – arrived in the Southern District of New York on April 4, 2013. In a related action, Rafael Antonio Garavito-Garcia and Gustavo Perez-Garcia, both Colombian nationals, were arrested in Colombia today pursuant to Interpol Red Notices. Mane, Sisse, Garavito-Garcia, and Perez-Garcia are charged with conspiring to engage in narco-terrorism; conspiring to import narcotics into the United States; and conspiring to provide aid to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (the “FARC”), a South American paramilitary group long designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”), by storing FARC-owned cocaine in West Africa. Mane, Sisse, and Garavito-Garcia are also charged with conspiring to sell weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, to be used to protect FARC cocaine processing operations in Colombia against U.S. military forces. Na Tchuto, Djeme, and YALA face charges of conspiring to import narcotics into the United States. Na Tchuto has been designated a drug kingpin by the U.S. Treasury Department. The five defendants in New York were presented in U.S. Magistrate Court today. On April 4, 2013, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) Special Operations Division (SOD), Bilateral Investigative Unit (BIU) Narco-Terrorism Group (NTG), working in conjunction with the DEA Lisbon Country Office and the DEA Bogota Country Office concluded a long-standing undercover operation conducted in Guinea-Bissau and elsewhere. The operation consisted of two separate undercover investigations. During the firstpart of the operation, Na Tchuto, Djeme, and Yala were arrested on April 2 by the DEA Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (FAST) and the NTG off the coast of West Africa while onboard a vessel under DEA control in international waters. During the second part of the operation, Mane and Sisse were apprehended on April 4 in a West African Country and transferred thereafter to the custody of the United States. Na Tchuto, Djeme, Yala, Mane, and Sisse were transported to New York for prosecution. Garavito-Garcia and Perez-Garcia remain in Colombia pending extradition to the United States. DEA Administrator Michele Leonhart said: “These DEA arrests are significant victories against terrorism and international drug trafficking. Alleged narco-terrorists such as these, who traffic drugs in West Africa and elsewhere, are some of the world’s most violent and brutal criminals. They have no respect for borders, and no regard for either the rule of law or who they harm as a result of their criminal endeavors. These cases further illustrate frightening links between global drug trafficking and the financing of terror networks. Thanks to the skilled work and bravery of our agents and law enforcement partners, these criminals will face accountability in a U.S. court for their heinous deeds.” Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said: “The narco-terrorism conspiracy alleged in these indictments shows the danger that can grow unchecked in far away places where unfortunate circumstances can allow narcotics traffickers and terrorism supporters to transact unseen at great risk to the United States and its interests. The link between narcotics traffickers and terrorists, their financers and supporters, needs to be broken wherever it is found. But thanks to the extraordinary efforts of our DEA partners, who have for years attacked the narco-terrorism threat, this conspiracy was thwarted and we can claim yet another victory in our unrelenting campaign against those who would harm Americans and American interests abroad.” According to the Indictments against Mane, Sisse, Garavito-Garcia, and Perez-Garcia unsealed today: Beginning in the summer of 2012, the defendants communicated with confidential sources (the “CSs”) working with the DEA who purported to be representatives and/or associates of the FARC. The communications occurred by telephone, over e-mail, and in a series of audio- recorded and videotaped meetings over several months in Guinea-Bissau. During meetings in Guinea-Bissau beginning in June 2012, and continuing through at least mid-November 2012, Mane, Sisse, Garavito-Garcia, and Perez-Garcia agreed to receive and store multi-ton shipments of FARC-owned cocaine in Guinea-Bissau. The defendants agreed to receive the cocaine off the coast of Guinea-Bissau, and to store the cocaine in storage houses there pending its eventual shipment to the United States, where it would be sold for the financial benefit of the FARC. The defendants further agreed that a portion of the cocaine would be used to pay Guinea-Bissau government officials for providing safe passage for the cocaine through Guinea-Bissau. Also during those meetings, Mane, Sisse, and Garavito-Garcia agreed to arrange to purchase weapons for the FARC, including surface-to-air missiles, by importing them into Guinea-Bissau for the nominal use of the Guinea-Bissau military. For example, on June 30, 2012, during a recorded meeting in Guinea Bissau with the CSs, Mane, Sisse, and Garavito-Garcia agreed to assist in the distribution of FARC cocaine by facilitating the shipment of cocaine to Guinea Bissau inside loads of military uniforms, and by establishing a front company in Guinea Bissau to export the cocaine from Guinea Bissau to the United States. In addition, Mane agreed to assist in obtaining weapons for the FARC. On or about July 3, 2012, during another recorded meeting in Guinea Bissau, Mane, Sisse, and Garavito-Garcia met with the Confidential Sources and a Guinea Bissau military representative and discussed the benefits of using Guinea Bissau as a transshipment point for cocaine obtained in South America and destined for the United States, the process for offloading the cocaine once it arrived in Guinea Bissau, and the nature of the weapons to be supplied to the FARC to combat American forces in Colombia, including surface- to-air missiles and AK-47 assault rifles with grenade launchers. On August 31, 2012, during a recorded meeting in Bogota, Colombia, Garavito- Garcia and Perez-Garcia agreed to facilitate the receipt of approximately 4,000 kilograms of cocaine from the FARC in Guinea Bissau, approximately 500 kilograms of which would later be sent to customers in the United States and Canada. During a recorded meeting in Guinea Bissau with Mane and Sisse that took place on November 13, 2012, a Guinea Bissau military official advised one of the CSs that the weapons transaction could be executed once the FARC brought money to Guinea Bissau and that the anti-aircraft missiles to be sold to the FARC could be used against United States helicopters operating in Colombia. According to the Indictment against Na Tchuto, Djeme, and YALA also unsealed today: Beginning in the summer of 2012, the three defendants engaged in a series of recorded meetings in Guinea-Bissau with confidential sources (the “CSs”) working with the DEA who purported to be representatives and/or associates of South American-based narcotics traffickers. In an early meeting in which the defendants discussed the shipment of ton-quantities of cocaine from South America to Guinea Bissau by sea, Na Tchuto noted that the Guinea Bissau government was weak in light of the recent coup d’etat and that it was therefore a good time for the proposed cocaine transaction. In further meetings, Na Tchuto, Djeme, and Yala agreed to assist the CSs by receiving a two-ton load of cocaine that would be transported to Guinea-Bissau by boat and stored in a warehouse for distribution to Europe and the United States. For example, on November 17, 2012, Na Tchuto, Djeme, and YALA met with two of the CSs in Guinea- Bissau and discussed importing 1,000 kilograms of cocaine into the United States. Also during the meeting, Na Tchuto offered to utilize a company that Na Tchuto owned to facilitate the shipment of cocaine out of Guinea-Bissau. In a previous meeting, Na Tchuto stated that his fee would be $1,000,000 per 1,000 kilograms of cocaine received in Guinea Bissau. (Texto da entidade norte-americana de combate às drogas, DEA)