Bissau: Presidenciais e legislativas marcadas para 16 de Março

Considerando a dinâmica do processo de Transição em curso, o Acordo Político e o pacto de Transição, revistos pela Resolução nº 1/PLN/ANP/2013, que permitiram a marcação das eleições para o dia 24 de Novembro de 2013, Decreto Presidencial nº 07/2013, de 28 de Junho. Considerando os instrumentos jurídicos que suportam a Transição impõem o recenseamento de raiz de todo o Cidadão Eleitor que, por si só, aumenta de forma significativa o montante financeiro para o efeito. Considerando o que os esforços desenvolvidos pelos órgãos de soberania no sentido da realização das eleições ficaram comprometidos, essencialmente devido à falta de disponibilidade financeira capaz suportar o acto eleitoral na data prevista. Tendo em conta que o orçamento das eleições apenas ficou assegurado a pouco mais de 30 dias do prazo agendado, graças às contribuições decisivas da Conferência de Chefes de Estado da CEDEAO, da República Federal da Nigéria, da República de Timor e da União Europeia. Considerando que os factos elencados tornaram tecnicamente impossível a realização das eleições a 24 de Novembro e consequentemente equacionou-se uma nova data para a realização das mesmas. Cumpridas que foram as imposições constitucionais, auscultação do Governo de Transição, os partidos políticos com e sem assento parlamentar e outras forças vivas da Nação, o Presidente da República de Transição considera, preenchidos os pressupostos que permitem com segurança a marcação da nova data das eleições gerais no País. Acresce ainda que da articulação e colaboração intensa com a Comissão Nacional de Eleições e o Gabinete Técnico de Apoio ao Processo Eleitoral, foram dadas as garantias técnicas em como estão reunidas todas as condições para a realização das eleições no primeiro trimestre de 2014. Assim, ouvido o Governo, os partidos políticos e a Comissão Nacional de Eleições, o Presidente da República de Transição decreta, nos termos do Artigo 70˚ conjugado com a alínea f) do Artigo 68˚, ambos da Constituição da República, o seguinte: Artigo 1˚ É fixado o dia 16 do mês de Março do ano de 2014 para a realização das Eleições Presidenciais e Legislativas, dando sem efeito a anterior data fixada pelo Decreto Presidencial nº 7/2013. Artigo 2˚ Este Decreto Presidencial entra imediatamente em vigor. Bissau, 15 de Novembro de 2013 Publique-se. O Presidente da República de Transição Aladge Manuel Serifo Nhamajo --------- Logo no início de Outubro tivera o cuidado de notar neste blog e em outros locais que as eleições guineenses nunca poderiam ser antes de Março de 2014. JH

Líbia: A pertinácia de um comentário com dois anos e meio

Os por alguns considerados "liberais" Barack Obama e Hillary Clinton meteram-se durantes estas últimas semanas numa aventura líbia que poderá acabar muito mal. Porta-aviões norte-americanos cruzam o Suez e aproximam-se da Líbia, onde a oposição ao coronel Khadafi é muito heterogénea e, ameaça, se acaso levar a sua por diante, mergulhar o país numa nova Somália, há 20 anos sem rei nem roque. Há que ser claro e não falar com subterfúgios: o sistema político-social vigente na Líbia não é de forma alguma perfeito, mas correr o risco de o substituir por uma anarquia, um caos onde ninguém se entenda, não poderá até ser pior. O senhor Barack Obama, tão precocemente galardoado com um Prémio Nobel da Paz, por se ter suposto que iria resolver os conflitos do Iraque e do Afeganistão, meteu-se agora com a França e o Reino Unido numa jogada de alto risco. Sob o pretexto humanitário de que Muammar Khadafi estava a tratar muito mal alguns dos seus compatriotas, Paris, Londres e Washington decidiram castigá-lo, destruir-lhe os aviões e apoiar activamente a estranha amálgama dos seus adversários internos. Perante o desconforto da Alemanha, da Turquia e da Rússia, a França sarkoziana e os seus amigos anglo-saxões meteram-se numa grande alhada, quando os Estados Unidos e o Reino Unido ainda não tinham conseguido descalçar as botas iraquiana e afegã. A bacia do Mar Mediterrâneo é hoje em dia uma zona mais perigosa do que o era no início deste ano de 2011. A Europa Meridional recebe cada vez mais refugiados. A União Europeia, que já tinha tantas outras dores de cabeça, não sabe o que fazer. A quem é que poderá servir tamanha precipitação, como a que estamos a assistir desde que caíram os presidentes da Tunísia e do Egipto? Temo muito que não seja a uma grande parte dos líbios; nem sequer aos malteses e aos italianos cujas praias estão a ser inundadas por legiões de pessoas em fuga. Jorge Heitor 3 de Abril de 2011

Síria: Uma cabeça cortada por engano

An al-Qaeda affiliated rebel group in Syria is reported to have asked for forgiveness after beheading a fellow rebel in a case of mistaken identity. A video recently posted online showed members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) brandishing the severed, bearded head of a man. They said was an Iraqi Shia caught fighting on the government side. But other rebel fighters watching the video recognised the man and said he was one of their commanders. In a separate development, activists said a senior figure in another Islamist rebel group had been killed in an air strike near Aleppo. Youssef al-Abbas of Liwa al-Tawhid was reportedly meeting the brigade's leader, Abdul Qader Saleh, and another senior figure, Abdul al-Aziz Salameh, at a rebel-held air base on Thursday when he was killed, according to the opposition Aleppo News Network. It said Youssef al-Abbas, also known as Abu al-Tayyeb, was Liwa al-Tawhid's intelligence chief, but the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights described him as the group's financial officer. Mr Saleh and Mr Salameh were wounded in the attack. ANN reported that they were taken to a hospital in Turkey and were in a good condition. Video footage posted online by activists purportedly showed Abu al-Tayyeb's body being transported to his hometown of Mareh. Prayers The video of the beheading shows two ISIS fighters in Aleppo province - one holding a knife - brandish a severed, bearded head, denouncing their victim as an Iraqi volunteer for President Bashar al-Assad's forces. They decry his immorality, saying he is a heathen - one of those who have threatened rape of men as much as women. BBC Arab affairs analyst Sebastian Usher says horrifying videos like this stream out of Syria every day from the rebel and government side - each with the aim of sowing terror. What makes this one stand out, he adds, is that other rebels watching the video recognised the beheaded man. Members of the hardline Islamist rebel group, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, said he was not a government fighter at all, but one of their own. They said he was a commander called Mohammed Fares Maroush. He is believed to have been wounded in the recent battle for Base 80, south of Aleppo, with government forces and was being taken for medical treatment by rebel fighters. But our correspondent says he seems to have thought he had been captured by government militiamen from the much feared shabiha. The militia is dominated by Alawites, members of the president's heterodox Shia sect. Mr Fares is reported to have offered prayers that would have made him seem a Shia rather than a Sunni - and therefore on their side. This was heard by ISIS fighters, and in the growing atmosphere of sectarian hatred, he was then subjected to his savage fate, our correspondent adds. The Daily Telegraph quoted ISIS spokesman Omar al-Qahtani as conceding the error. According to the newspaper, he alluded to a saying by the Prophet Muhammad that Allah forgives those who kill a believer by mistake. BBC

Nigéria, a maior economia africana

New trends in trade and finance will change political as well as economic ties on the continent In the coming weeks, some statisticians in Abuja could shake up Africa’s economic and diplomatic hierarchy. The boffins look set to chart the rise of Nigeria’s economy to become Africa’s biggest by the end of next year. At the same time, this would confirm the relative economic decline of South Africa and more recently, of Egypt. Nigeria, with a population of 170 million compared to South Africa’s 50 million, has been growing at about 7% over the past decade, compared to SA’s average growth rate of around 3.4%. All the usual scepticism about the composition of statistics is necessary, although the quality of data collection in Nigeria has improved significantly over the past five years. The rise of Nigeria to the position of Africa’s biggest economy, coupled with its long established position as the most populous African state, will have diplomatic and strategic implications. It also points to a new pattern in economic growth and trade relations within the continent. Nigeria’s economic expansion reflects a wider growth trend in the middle of Africa. Historically, the best economic performers were either in North Africa or South Africa itself. Now those economies are seeking to boost their trade with the rest of Africa, which includes its fastest growing economies. These trends are confirmed by the statistical rebasing exercise which Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics is carrying out with technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. That means a recalculation of the sources – such as agriculture, services and information technology – of the country’s economic growth. The statisticians’ report is likely to show a massive upward adjustment in gross domestic product similar to that of Ghana in 2010 which increased the size of its economy by 60%. The centre of the exercise in Nigeria is the rebasing of GDP based on output and consumption patterns being updated from 1990. Two decades ago, the booming service sector, such as mobile telecommunications, the ‘Nollywood’ film industry, financial services and retail, were either far smaller or did not exist. Nigeria expects to release new figures early next year and early estimates point to at least a 40% rise. This would increase Nigerian GDP in 2013 – US$270 billion in 2012, according to the IMF – to $400 bn., against projected total South African GDP this year of $392 bn. These raw numbers do not detract from the depth and sophistication of South Africa’s financial markets, infrastructure, institutional strength and corporate governance, versus Nigeria’s oil- dominated economy but they do underline that it is losing relative strength. Jolting the markets The revised growth figures may also jolt the markets. Nigeria’s launch this year of a $9.3 bn. oil refinery and petrochemical plant financed by local and international banks serves as an important pointer to the future direction of African economies. For the rest of Africa, it’s not a life-changing development. South Africa and Nigeria will continue to account for about half of all Sub-Saharan Africa’s economy activity. For Nigeria, a larger economy means higher per capita GDP – $2,178, compared to $1,556 in 2012 – but still well below South Africa’s $7,404. It also means lower tax revenue relative to size of GDP. For South Africa, the figures represent a symbolic loss, although it would play the part of Africa’s United States (with a far higher per capita income and more sophisticated economy) to Nigeria as Africa’s China (which is due to become the world’s biggest economy within a decade). Regardless of the pecking order at the top, intra-regional trade and financial links have grown rapidly in recent years, but the regional economic communities are a long way from achieving integration among their member countries or with each other. The economic as well as political balkanisation of Africa has been a tremendous brake on progress. South Africa still shapes the structure of trade within Africa. For at least twelve African countries, exports to South Africa represent more than 1% of their GDP. Meanwhile, frustrated by slow growth at home, South African companies are investing in and stepping up trade with the rest of Africa. Growing financial links facilitate this: both South African (still easily the market leaders) and Nigerian banks are expanding their operations throughout Africa. In 2003, there were three Nigerian banking subsidiaries in the rest of Africa. Now there are 44 in 33 countries. South Africa’s Standard Bank, with its Chinese partner, is one of the leading African institutions. There are budgetary consequences from these cross-border ties. South Africa and its neighbours are in the Southern Africa Customs Union: half of the customs revenue within the SACU zone goes to the neighbouring states. That makes their fiscal fortunes dependent on the health of South Africa’s trade sector. Similarly, Nigeria’s trade with the rest of West Africa is of growing importance. In the regional grain markets, a 3% increase in Nigerian inflation could spark a 1% increase in inflation in its regional trading partners. Economic performance between South Africa and the rest of Africa has been diverging, with the continent benefiting from stronger macroeconomic management, fast growing trade with Asia and higher inflows of foreign direct investment. Growth in South Africa has averaged a sluggish 3.4% for the decade 2003-12, against 6.1% north of the border. Even these growth figures flatter by including Africa’s fragile states and slow-growth economies. Among stronger performers, eleven are forecast to grow at between 7% and 14% during 2013-14. South Africa is expected to be the fifth slowest growing economy on the continent this year and next. Economic performance, on a downward trajectory, leaves South Africa at risk of being caught in a slow-growth trap of 2-3% per annum as long standing weaknesses become apparent (AC Vol 54 No 20, Political mould starts to break). Investors say they have taken note of the strikes, the slowing economy and the government’s declining ability to manage social tension. The central bank, the South African Reserve Bank, warned on 29 October that the country’s sovereign credit rating was again at risk: that would curb capital inflows and raise government financing costs. Last month the IMF also warned of a disorderly adjustment to the current account and fiscal deficits due to the escalation of labour and social unrest. Regional economies are also watching South Africa closely. Botswana and Namibia are working to attract industrial investment into the SACU common market. Even high-cost Mozambique has had some success in attracting companies to Maputo’s Beluluane Free Zone, selling to the South African market. Yet it is competing primarily on more favourable tax terms and market proximity. None of the regionals yet have serious cost or productivity advantages relative to South Africa and rank well below it in the World Bank’s annual Doing Business survey of private sector operating conditions. Botswana is the most ambitious – improving its global ranking to 56th of 189 countries in the latest Doing Business report, where South Africa ranks 41st – and launching programmes to improve economic competitiveness. A high-profile Economic Diversification Council oversees policies to improve productivity, lower business costs and streamline regulation. It is also works on growth and innovation in the diamond mining, transport and agricultural sectors. This month, South Africa’s De Beers completes the transfer of its London selling operations to Botswana. That involves operations with annual sales valued at $6 bn. The decision to move was announced in 2011 but the transfer starts when the 80-year-old London diamond auctions close, resuming in Gaborone before the end of November. That shows how an African country can extract additional value from natural resources: it also entails workers moving from London’s international financial centre to Gaborone, where new offices have been built. Some foreign investors are bypassing South Africa in favour of other regional economies. The mature but still lucrative mining sector is losing investment, deterred by policy uncertainty and less favourable mine title and tax terms. The governing African National Congress (ANC) narrowly defeated a grassroots proposal to nationalise mining at its Mangaung party conference last December but did opt to increase state involvement (AC Vol 54 No 8). More favourable tax treatment and more lucrative exploration prospects have sent mining investment to Congo-Kinshasa, Mozambique and Zambia. Lesotho has taken advantage of lighter regulation and lower wage costs to attract labour-intensive manufacturing at the expense of South Africa’s beleaguered textile sector, benefiting from access to the US market through the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Long-term prosperity for Southern Africa and the continent requires competing in the global, not regional, market: it is not on Africa’s interest for South Africa to be a weakened economy. The current period of high growth in Africa, the longest and most sustained in decades, has been supported by a commodity boom and more investment in roads, ports and power generation have followed. Gaining a share of global manufacturing – Africa’s long-standing aim of sustainable and diversified growth – is now realistic, although the sector has actually declined as a share of GDP in the past decade. Research by former World Bank economist Paul Collier at Oxford University’s Centre for the Study of African Economies points to wage costs in Ghana being one quarter of those in China. The loss of China’s cost advantage means that its share of labour-intensive manufacturing is falling and over the next decade, this will shift output to other low-wage areas. The opportunity for African countries is that this might include them, rather than low-wage Asia. Of course, Africa’s increasingly militant trades unions will see things differently: they want more jobs but don’t want to serve as a low-wage alternative to China. Another constraint is that Africa’s non-wage operating costs are still among the highest in the world. Research by the World Bank and McKinsey Global Institute indicates that African countries remain among the most expensive in which to operate a business. Another risk is that the current commodity boom is eroding competitiveness in other sectors, including through currency appreciation, the so-called ‘Dutch disease’. A more serious threat is complacency, as African leaders, benefiting from higher growth, feel less need to pursue bold or politically risky reforms that could modernise their economies. The development of African capitalism is still very much a work in progress as the robber barons and monopoly capitalists cautiously eye new opportunities for productive enterprise. This capitalist class, largely protected by the state and the ruling parties, has little appetite for innovation and vision. It has grown fat on the revenue from state capture and weak governance. In this regard, South Africa’s challenges are very much in line with the rest of the continent. Copyright © Africa Confidential 2013

De como a China ajudou a reeleger Mugabe

by Khadija Sharife In February, speaking at his birthday, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe described his leadership as a “divine task,” and his certain victory at the then-upcoming presidential poll as God’s choice. His prophecy would be fulfilled on July 31, when the 89-year-old Mugabe, Africa’s longest-serving president, would claim victory with 61 percent of the vote, ahead of Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change. But documents from Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organization obtained by 100Reporters suggest that the success of Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party reflected direct intervention by the Chinese Communist Party, financial support topping $1 billion in diamonds and revenues from three companies and two African presidents, armed intimidation by security forces and vote rigging en masse. The good Lord had less to do with it. The Landscape As the presidential election approached, both candidates signaled their intention to end the power-sharing arrangement of the last five years. Though the MDC itself had not escaped the taint of local corruption, Tsvangirai had campaigned on pledges to clean up the nation’s diamond sector. He openly criticized the secrecy surrounding Zimbabwe’s mining agreements with China and with a handful of companies. Revenue related to the diamond trade, if reported properly, could provide decent jobs for 100,000 Zimbabweans, he said, instead of lining the pockets of a military and political elite and financing what the nonprofit group Global Witness had called a “parallel government.” For his part, Mugabe likened Tsvangirai to a cowardly dog, saying his rival sought to hand over the country’s wealth to white foreigners. One intelligence assessment suggested that a ZANU victory would require massive effort, noting that the party had lost 10 percent of its members since 2008. Votes for Mugabe, the service estimated, would run 670,000, while “hostile votes” could reach one million. “The joke is that we don’t know anyone alive who votes for ZANU,” said a Zimbabwean political activist now based in South Africa, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “This system is a fiction: the enemy is a fiction, the success is a fiction, the idea of voting is a fiction.” The Strategy To rig the elections and secure 50 percent of the vote, ZANU sought the assistance of Nikuv International Projects Ltd. – an Israeli company specializing in large technology projects (such as passports and registries), paying the company $13 million, the documents said. Operating in countries like Angola, Zambia, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe, the company was selected by Daniel Nhepera, internal director of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), and two retired directors (H. Muchena and S. Nyunango), based on the company’s “excellent record from 2002,” one document states. Previous caches of Nikuv’s website, since taken down from the Internet, reveal the company’s past successes in Zimbabwe included population registration, elections (such as presidential, parliamentary, senatorial and local government), identity cards and passports. Voters queue to cast their votes in Zimbabwe elections in Mbare, Harare on election day, July 31, 2013. AP Voters queue to cast their votes in Zimbabwe elections in Mbare, Harare on election day, July 31, 2013. The strategy outlined in Zimbabwean intelligence documents called for the company to “secure votes” by working tightly with Zimbabwe’s feared CIO and armed youth, which used intimidation and forced relocation of voters. The strategy called for delaying and obstructing voter registration in areas likely to favor the opposition. Specific steps included: •Registering less than ten real voters on “any given day with direct command from Nikuv” and the Party; •Populating the voters’ roll before, and during, elections to counter unfavorable voting outcomes; •Parallel registration and mobilization for “statistical maneuvering, depopulation and population of hostile constituencies,” in coordination with the Registrar’s Office and an official of the Chinese Communist Party identified in the documents as Chung Huwao; •Obstructing registration in the 18-35 age brackets, and over-registering voters in the 35-90 age brackets; •Using housing schemes to “re-orient beneficiaries” and log them on the voting roll; •Deliberately congesting the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission registration by “security personnel and trusted lieutenants to delay the process as advised by Nikuv.” Nikuv’s head office acknowledged interview requests but did not respond to allegations that it had played a role in vote rigging. The Chinese Role The Chinese laid out a strategy of tying land rights in the perimeter of urban areas to card-carrying membership in Mugabe’s ruling party, according to an intelligence agency document. “[A]bsolute neutralization of the enemy is recommended when necessary,” the document noted. “Hostile votes will lead to loss of land entitlement.” According to the CIO documents, Mugabe’s benefactors in the Chinese Communist Party also provided and installed short wave jammers to disrupt “enemy radio stations domiciled in hostile areas” and updated old jamming equipment, particularly for use in rural areas. Traditional leaders in rural areas were seen as allies. Insiders, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that deals were cut with traditional leaders to facilitate “assisted” voting. The strategy called for security forces to deploy thousands of armed young men “ward by ward,” one document said. In addition to the army–kept on standby–over 35,000 youth were trained and deployed to areas expected to vote against the president. Youth, one intelligence organization document stated, must be armed with “assault rifles to aid mobilization and stem resistance,” coordinated by provincial leaders. The documents show deployment of youth to specific provinces under military leaders described as provincial coordinators. “Inkomo Barracks is currently serving a total of 3,743 recruits going through mobilization and re-orientation classes, and they will be ready for deployment three days ahead of ELECTIONS” (emphasis in original), reported one intelligence agency document, entitled, “Reconnaissance-Operation Return to ZANU-PF.” The Chinese Communist Party did not respond to requests for comment sent via fax and email. The Chinese embassy in Zimbabwe also did not respond to requests for comment.

Os diamantes aguentam Robert Mugabe

By Khadija Sharife Exclusive to 100Reporters From time to time, a VIP-configured Airbus jetted into Lanseria International Airport, a small and privately-owned base facility near Johannesburg, South Africa. The plane, an Airbus 319CJ, also stopped at Zimbabwe’s Harare airport. It carried important people and was widely believed to ferry some precious—and illicit–cargo: Zimbabwe’s conflict diamonds. The diamonds came from one of the largest diamond troves in history: Marange. Spanning 173,000 acres and priced at $800 billion in rough diamonds, Marange’s concentration of treasure is eight times higher than average, at more than 1,000 carats per hundred tons. The plane, first identified in report by the British nonprofit organization Global Witness, has been used to move diamonds out of Zimbabwe. Money from their export has gone to cement the hold of President Robert Mugabe, and finance Zimbabwe’s notorious secret police—responsible for killing, raping and maiming hundreds of artisanal miners in an operation to clear out Marange in 2008. An examination of purchasing documents, corporate records and interviews with relevant officials by 100Reporters has, for the first time, parted the curtain on the plane’s ownership to reveal links between the mysterious jet, Zimbabwe government officials, law firms and investors with holdings across the globe, from the UK to China, Angola to Bermuda to Wall Street. Flight logs for the plane, registered as VP-BEX, disclose frequent trips to Singapore, Hong Kong, Tanzania and Angola, among others. The Airbus appears to enjoy a remarkable lack of scrutiny, seemingly flying in a perpetual no-oversight zone. In the South African airport that was the plane’s home base, unless cargo and goods were self-declared, the plane and its passengers were not normally subject to inspection by customs, police or civil aviation authorities. Farai Maguwu, an award-winning human rights activist and Zimbabwe’s leading researcher of the diamond trade, said, “We don’t know where the plane goes, what the routes are, or even who is involved. But we know that VP-BEX A319 was identified as playing an important role in facilitating this secretive system that is causing Zimbabweans to lose diamond revenue.”

Moçambique: Contra os excessos de optimismo

Lisboa, 13 Nov (AIM)- O antigo ministro moçambicano do Comércio e actualmente administrador do Banco Terra, Manuel Aranda da Silva, apelou esta quarta-feira à serenidade sublinhando que a cidade de Maputo é mais segura do que 90 por cento das capitais de África e da América Latina, não obstante os recentes casos de sequestros. Manuel Aranda da Silva foi o convidado da mesa-redonda intitulada 'Moçambique: Paz Ameaçada?', promovida pelo Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF), a Fundação AIP, o EuroDefense-Portugal e a AFCEA-Portugal, que decorreu na capital portuguesa, Lisboa. 'Os problemas de insegurança assustam as pessoas e criaram uma certa instabilidade, mas Maputo é uma cidade mais segura do que 90% das cidades capitais de África e da América Latina, disse Manuel Aranda da Silva, em declarações aos jornalistas após intervir na mesa redonda. Para o antigo ministro do Comércio, no México, por exemplo, houve 100 mil raptos no ano passado (2012) e na Venezuela foram sequestrados 20 portugueses nos últimos meses, sublinhando que a criminalidade surge associada ao desenvolvimento de Moçambique: 'Quando há dinheiro, há mais ganância'. 'O que é importante é que haja um sistema de justiça e um sistema policial que enfrente e reduza' o problema, sublinhou. Os sequestros, principalmente na cidade de Maputo e arredores, fizeram manchetes nos jornais e ocuparam espaços de televisões em Portugal e um pouco noutras capitais europeias, bem como noutros cantos do mundo. Alguns jornais avançaram com a tese de que Moçambique 'é inseguro' e alguns cidadãos portugueses abandonaram o país. Questionado sobre o desenvolvimento do país perante a instabilidade provocada pelos sequestros e os ataques de homens armados da Renamo, principal partido da oposição, contra civis e forças de defesa e segurança, Aranda da Silva mostrou-se convicto de que Moçambique continuará a crescer. 'Estabilizando politicamente depois das eleições autárquicas (a 20 de Novembro corrente) e depois das presidenciais do próximo ano, tenho razões para crer que o desenvolvimento de Moçambique vai continuar, os investimentos não vão parar porque houve uma certa instabilidade', afirmou. O administrador do Banco Terra, na capital moçambicana, afirmou ainda que a tensão entre o partido no poder, a Frelimo, e o principal partido da oposição, a Renamo, 'tem de ser resolvida'. 'A Renamo é um dos partidos mais importantes em Moçambique. Tem de haver diálogo e penso que o governo está a procurar essas soluções neste momento', disse. O diálogo com a Renamo 'tem de ser conduzido de forma a evitar que haja instabilidade nas estradas moçambicanas porque isso cria problemas à população em geral e impede o desenvolvimento', acrescentou Aranda da Silva. Os ataques intensificaram-se depois que, a 21 de outubro, uma operação do exército moçambicano desalojou Afonso Dhlakama e seus homens armados da base de Satungira, na Gorongosa, centro de Moçambique, onde o líder da Renamo residia há cerca de um ano. Manuel Aranda da Silva, membro do Conselho de Administração do Banco Terra, em Maputo, voltou a apelar para a necessidade dos moçambicanos conterem a 'euforia e entusiasmo' sobre os recursos naturais, atribuindo parte da responsabilidade pelo excesso de expectativas aos jornalistas que, permanentemente, falam em biliões de dólares e não explicam que o gás natural descoberto na bacia do Rovuma, no norte do país, ainda não começou a ser explorado. Ainda são projectos cuja concretização poderá ocorrer nos próximos seis a dez anos, mas já há pessoas que reivindicam os ganhos, numa altura em que o gás natural em exploração é apenas o de Pande e Temane, na província de Inhambane, no sula de Moçambique, pela petroquímica sul-africana SASOL. Esta quarta-feira, em Maputo, o Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP), organização não governamental que monitoriza a transparência no Estado moçambicano, anunciou que o preço que a multinacional sul-africana SASOL paga pelo gás que extrai em Moçambique é 'abusivo' e vai levar 'uma eternidade' para que o Estado consiga arrecadar o imposto sobre lucros. O CIP considerou 'delapidador' do país o contrato que o governo assinou com a SASOL para a exploração de gás das reservas de Pande e Temane, durante o lançamento do 'Relatório sobre as Receitas do Projecto de Exploração de Gás de Pande-Temane pela SASOL'. Durante a apresentação do estudo, o director do CIP, Adriano Nuvunga, afirmou que o preço que a firma sul-africana paga ao Estado pelo gás que explora em Moçambique é 'bastante prejudicial para o país e levará uma eternidade para o Estado começar a arrecadar os impostos provenientes do lucro do projecto'. 'Uma das falhas do contrato é o preço abusivo que a SASOL paga ao Estado moçambicano. Em 2009, por exemplo, a SASOL comprou o gás natural em Moçambique por 1,44 dólares (1,07 euros) por giga-joule e vende-o aos clientes na África do Sul por mais de sete dólares (5,2 euros) por giga-joule', enfatizou o diretor do CIP. Segundo a organização, o governo arrecada apenas nove milhões de dólares anuais (6,7 milhões de euros) em receitas de produção do gás contra várias projecções que variavam entre 40 milhões de dólares (29,8 milhões de euros) e 47 milhões de dólares (35 milhões de euros). (AIM)