Bissau: China pronta para construir Barragem do Saltinho

Bissau, 09 Jan.14 (ANG) – O Primeiro-Ministro anunciou ter rubricado um acordo com um grupo empresarial chinês, para a construção da Barragem Hidroeléctrica em Saltinho, capaz de produzir 82 megawatts. Rui Duarte Barros, que falava na quarta-feira, no acto de apresentação pelo governo do cumprimento do novo ano ao Presidente da República de Transição, disse ainda que, no quadro dos objectivos estratégicos de assegurar uma oferta energética global e de custo acessível às populações, destaca-se ao projecto da OMVG (Valorização da Bacia do Rio Gâmbia), cujo processo está em fase avançada. “Ainda no quadro da cooperação com a China, está prevista a instalação no decurso de 2014, de 36 quilómetros de iluminação pública solar e negociação para construção de 500 habitações sociais”, informou Rui Barros. Relativamente ao isolamento a que a Guiné-Bissau é alvo por parte da Comunidade Internacional desde o golpe de Estado de 12 de Abril de 2012, o Primeiro-Ministro de Transição apelou a compreensão dos parceiros externos do país no sentido de criar um bom ambiente pré-eleitoral. “O Governo Inclusivo de Transição, elegeu como uma das suas prioridades, a normalização das relações com a Comunidade Internacional e a restauração dos quadros do diálogos políticos e técnicos com os parceiros de desenvolvimento, aliás, um dos objectivos que estiveram na génese do seu executivo é a progressivo regresso á ordem constitucional, exigida pela Comunidade Internacional”, salientou. O Primeiro-Ministro disse que infelizmente o Governo continua a sentir os efeitos do bloqueio internacional que constituem entraves para os propósitos do cumprimento da Agenda de Transição.

Egipto: Conseguirá El-Sissi ser Presidente?

The Associated Press, CAIRO Thursday, 9 January 2014 Egypt's military chief is looking for a strong turnout in next week's constitutional referendum as a mandate to run for president. But the popular general who ousted President Mohammmd Mursi and ordered a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood could be disappointed: His Islamist foes have promised a boycott and mass demonstrations aimed at keeping voters at home.

A presidential run by Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi will also depend on whether oil-rich Gulf Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pledge financial assistance substantial enough to keep Egypt's battered economy afloat and bankroll major development projects, senior officials told The Associated Press. That would create a large number of jobs, allowing the general to retain popular support while he searches for long-term remedies for the country's economic ills. No date has been set for a presidential election or whether it should be held before or after parliamentary elections, also slated for this year. There are growing signs that the presidential vote will be held first, as early as April. The significance and timing of the referendum are all too significant. A comfortable "yes" majority - of, say, 70 percent or more - along with a respectable turnout, would enshrine the legitimacy of the regime installed by el-Sissi when he ousted Mursi, Egypt's first freely elected leader, in a July 3 coup. El-Sissi, a 59-year-old career infantry officer, has enjoyed soaring popularity in the nearly six months since Mursi's removal, with many Egyptians looking to him to be their savior after three years of turmoil and a heavy legacy of corruption and economic and social injustice left behind by ousted autocrat Hosni Mubarak's 29-year rule. Egypt's mostly pro-military media has been treating el-Sissi's candidacy as an all but foregone conclusion, but the general has remained publicly silent on the issue since he told a newspaper interviewer late last year that he could not rule out a bid for the presidency. The last time el-Sissi asked for a popular mandate was in July, when he called on Egyptians to take to the streets in support of what he called a fight against "possible terrorism." Millions responded and security forces have since stepped up their crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, rounding up most of the group's leaders, together with thousands of Mursi supporters. Hundreds were killed when security forces cleared two pro-Mursi sit-in camps in August. Senior officials, including two Cabinet ministers, army generals, security chiefs, top clerics linked to the post-Mursi administration and officials at the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of police, painted a mixed and complex picture of the dilemma facing el-Sissi as he ponders a presidential run. Interviewed over the past week by the AP, they said he was most concerned by the possibility of a poor turnout or a slender "yes" majority in the Jan. 14-15 vote on the constitution. The charter is a heavily amended version of an Islamist-tilted one drafted by Mursi's allies and adopted in a referendum in December 2012. That constitution was adopted by some 64 percent of the vote, but with a modest turnout of under 35 percent. If the "yes" vote and the turnout are below expectations, the officials said, el-Sissi would remain as the source of behind-the-scene power, retain his Cabinet position as first deputy prime minister and defense minister, and throw his weight behind a candidate of his choice. Already, a clause introduced in the draft constitution gives the military veto power over the choice of defense minister for the next eight years - language that secures el-Sissi's current job if he chooses not to run for president, while weakening the authority of the president until 2022. The officials' assertion that el-Sissi wants an emphatic popular endorsement and firm pledge of financial aid from the wealthy Gulf nations before announcing a presidential run is understandable given Egypt's multitude of socio-economic problems, from high unemployment and inflation, to poor services and a weak education system. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have pumped a whopping $12 billion into Egypt's coffers since Mursi's ouster. That money has mostly been spent on the nation's essential food and energy imports, however, making an economic reform program essential. Since Mubarak's removal, Egypt has seen its vital tourism industry slump, investors flee and hundreds of factories close. Near daily street protests, strikes and sit-ins have disrupted life across much of the country and curtailed productivity. "So far, I don't see that el-Sissi has a coherent economic program that can address the real economic and social problems in Egypt," said Khalil el-Anani, a senior fellow at Washington's Middle East Institute. "He cannot continue to bank on the anti-Muslim Brotherhood sentiment for support. He needs to deliver solutions to economic and social issues." Mursi's supporters have taken to the streets to demand the popularly elected leader's reinstatement - demonstrations the Muslim Brotherhood insists are peaceful, though most end violently, with protesters pelting the police with rocks and firebombs, and police responding with tear gas and bird shot. Lately, a growing number of pro-Mursi protesters have been seen with firearms. That has raised fears that the Brotherhood and its Islamist backers will attempt to disrupt the vote and raise questions over its fairness, said one senior official. He, like the other top officials interviewed by the AP, spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the topic. And, while the Muslim Brotherhood has publicly said it will boycott the constitutional referendum, the officials said they suspect the group will instead put to work its mobilization abilities to rally a "no" vote that, coupled with a possible poor turnout, could significantly eat into a "yes" majority. Another concern is that the return to the political scene of Mubarak-era officials has driven away many of the liberal youth groups and other prominent secular figures who played a pivotal role in the 18-day uprising that toppled Mubarak, campaigned against the generals who succeeded him and vigorously worked for the removal of Mursi. Many now criticize what they see as harsh military rule. They have been further alienated by the detention, trial and swift conviction of some of their iconic figures for violating a recently introduced law that places stringent conditions on street protests. The move has led many to warn of a return to the authoritarian ways and police brutality of the Mubarak era, and of an attempt to cast the January 2011 revolution as a foreign-backed plot. The officials interviewed by the AP tried to distance themselves from the crackdown on liberal and secular youth groups. While acknowledging that the mass demonstrations preceding the July coup attracted many Mubarak supporters, they said a media campaign to stain the reputation of revolutionary youth leaders did not enjoy the approval of the military and any Mubarak-era officials suspected of corruption would not be allowed to assume office. Having a military man at the helm of power is not new in Egypt which, with the exception of Mursi, has been continuously ruled by men of military background since the overthrow of the monarchy some 60 years ago. An el-Sissi presidency would be in keeping with this familiar formula, noted Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution in Washington. But she warned the popular mood of today's Egypt may not tolerate that. "That's the model that they know. It's part of the recipe for Egyptian stability. But one of the lessons of the January 2011 revolution is that the old recipe doesn't work anymore, and it seems to me that the military hasn't learned that yet," she said. "Egypt has demonstrated repeatedly over last two years that it's no longer willing to tolerate living in a repressive society."

A "grande vitória no Afeganistão", por Eça de Queirós

Em 1847, os Ingleses – «por uma razão de estado, uma necessidade de fronteiras científicas, a segurança do império, uma barreira ao domínio russo da Ásia…» e outras coisas vagas que os políticos da Índia rosnam sombriamente retorcendo os bigodes – invadem o Afeganistão, e aí vão aniquilando tribos seculares, desmantelando vilas, assolando searas e vinhas: apossam-se, por fim, da santa cidade de Cabul; sacodem do serralho um velho emir apavorado; colocam lá outro de raça mais submissa, que já trazem preparado nas bagagens, com escravas e tapetes; e logo que os correspondentes dos jornais têm telegrafado a vitória, o exército, acampado à beira dos arroios e nos vergéis de Cabul, desaperta o correame e fuma o cachimbo da paz… Assim é exactamente em 1880... Os Ingleses estão experimentando, no seu atribulado império da Índia, a verdade desse humorístico lugar-comum do século XVIII: «A história é uma velhota que se repete sem cessar.» O fado ou a Providência, ou a entidade qualquer que lá de cima dirige os episódios da campanha do Afeganistão, em 1847, está fazendo simplesmente uma cópia servil, revelando assim uma imaginação exausta. Em 1847, os Ingleses – «por uma razão de estado, uma necessidade de fronteiras científicas, a segurança do império, uma barreira ao domínio russo da Ásia…» e outras coisas vagas que os políticos da Índia rosnam sombriamente retorcendo os bigodes – invadem o Afeganistão, e aí vão aniquilando tribos seculares, desmantelando vilas, assolando searas e vinhas: apossam-se, por fim, da santa cidade de Cabul; sacodem do serralho um velho emir apavorado; colocam lá outro de raça mais submissa, que já trazem preparado nas bagagens, com escravas e tapetes; e logo que os correspondentes dos jornais têm telegrafado a vitória, o exército, acampado à beira dos arroios e nos vergéis de Cabul, desaperta o correame e fuma o cachimbo da paz… Assim é exactamente em 1880. No nosso tempo, precisamente em 1847, chefes enérgicos, messias indígenas, vão percorrendo o território, e com grandes nomes de pátria, de religião, pregam a guerra santa: as tribos reúnem-se, as famílias feudais correm com os seus troços de cavalaria, príncipes rivais juntam-se no ódio hereditário contra o estrangeiro, o homem vermelho, e em pouco tempo é todo um rebrilhar de fogos de acampamento nos altos das serranias, dominando os desfiladeiros que são o caminho, a entrada da Índia… E quando por ali aparecer, enfim, o grosso do exército inglês, à volta de Cabul, atravancado de artilharia, escoando-se espessamente por entre as gargantas das serras, no leito seco das torrentes, com as suas longas caravanas de camelos, aquela massa bárbara rola-lhe em cima e aniquila-o. Foi assim em 1847, é assim em 1880. Então os restos debandados do exército refugiam-se em alguma das cidades da fronteira, que ora é Gasnat ora Candaar: os Afegãs, correm, põem o cerco, cerco lento, cerco de vagares orientais: o general sitiado, que nessas guerras asiáticas pode sempre comunicar, telegrafa para o vice-rei da Índia, reclamando com furor «reforços e chá e açúcar!» (Isto é textual; foi o general Roberts que soltou há dias este grito de gulodice britânica; o Inglês, sem chá, bate-se frouxamente.) Então o governo da Índia, gastando milhões de libras como quem gasta água, manda a toda a pressa fardos disformes de chá reparador, brancas colinas de açúcar e dez ou quinze mil homens. De Inglaterra partem esses negros e monstruosos transportes de guerra, arcas de Noé a vapor, levando acampamentos, rebanhos de cavalos, parques de artilharia, toda uma invasão temerosa… Foi assim em 47, assim é em 1880. Esta hoste desembarca no Indostão, junta-se a outras colunas de tropa hindu e é dirigida dia e noite sobre a fronteira em expressos a quarenta milhas por hora; daí começa uma marcha assoladora, com cinquenta mil camelos de bagagens, telégrafos, máquinas hidráulicas e uma cavalgada eloquente de correspondentes de jornais. Uma manhã avista-se Candaar ou Gasnat – e num momento é aniquilado, disperso no pó da planície, o pobre exército afegã com as suas cimitarras de melodrama e as suas veneráveis colubrinas de modelo das que outrora fizeram fogo em Diu. Gasnat está livre! Candaar está livre! Hurra! Faz-se imediatamente disto uma canção patriótica; e a façanha é por toda a Inglaterra popularizada numa estampa, em que se vê o general libertador e o general sitiado apertando-se a mão com veemência, no primeiro plano, entre cavalos empinados e granadeiros belos como Apoios, que expiram em atitude nobre! Foi assim em 1847; há-de ser assim em 1880… No entanto, em desfiladeiro e monte, milhares de homens, que ou defendiam a pátria ou morriam pela fronteira científica, lá ficam, pasto de corvos o que não é, no Afeganistão, uma respeitável imagem de retórica: aí, são os corvos que nas cidades fazem a limpeza das ruas, comendo as imundícies, e em campos de batalha purificam o ar, devorando os restos das derrotas. E de tanto sangue, tanta agonia, tanto luto, que resta por fim? Uma canção patriótica, uma estampa idiota, nas salas de jantar, mais tarde uma linha de prosa numa página de crónica… Consoladora filosofia das guerras! No entanto a Inglaterra goza por algum tempo a «grande vitória do Afeganistão» com a certeza de ter de recomeçar daqui a dez anos ou quinze anos; porque nem pode conquistar e anexar um vasto reino, que é grande como a França, nem pode consentir, colados à sua ilharga, uns poucos de milhões de homens fanáticos, batalhadores e hostis. A «política», portanto, é debilitá-los periodicamente, com uma invasão arruinadora. São as fortes necessidades de um grande império. Antes possuir apenas um quintalejo, com uma vaca para o leite e dois pés de alface para as merendas de Verão… --- Em Cartas de Inglaterra.

Sudão do Sul: A falência de um Estado acabado de nascer

The new year opens with the very real possibility that the world’s youngest country, South Sudan, may fail at statehood without ever having acquired more than its pro forma trappings: a flag, an anthem, and a seat at the United Nations. The government and rebel forces continued to fight over the weekend and failed to begin substantive talks being mediated in neighboring Ethiopia. Only thirty months after the international community helped South Sudan to secede from Sudan and thus end decades of civil war, a collapse of the South Sudanese state would be a geopolitical catastrophe with reverberations well beyond East Africa. Avoiding that calamity will require a radical break with the conventional analysis that has undergirded the approach to the crisis so far. The conflict has spread with surprising speed since South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit rather foolishly tried to use a relatively minor December 15 mutiny as a pretext to eliminate political rivals. Nonetheless, a first key point is that it was foreseeable. The country’s political and social tensions were left unresolved at its independence, and have worsened under the dysfunction, rampant corruption, wholesale incompetence, and increasingly dictatorial tendencies of the Salva Kiir government. Second, while the South Sudanese are ultimately responsible for their own fate, people outside the country share responsibility for either condoning or excusing the bad choices and failures of leadership that led to the current situation. (Daniel Howden, who reports from Nairobi for the Guardian newspaper, noted last week the roles of Hollywood actors, including George Clooney and Matt Dillon, in promoting an overly simplistic public understanding of South Sudan’s problems in recent years. The celebrities’ script painted South Sudan as simply a victim of Sudan, and helped conceal the new country’s internal problems.) A great deal of moral culpability for the political failure, and the humanitarian disaster it has wrought, belongs to advocates and celebrity dilettantes who cavalierly treated a delicate and complex political and social ecology as little more than an exotic stage on which they could preen themselves. Third, international organizations and Western governments have exacerbated the crisis by persisting in their misread of the situation and by systematically depriving the United Nations force for South Sudan of a robust mandate and the resources to carry it out. (See Sudarsan Raghavan’s succinct analysis in the Washington Post this past weekend.) The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was originally authorized more than two years ago to have 7,000 military personnel and 900 police, in addition to a proportionate civilian component—this to cover an area roughly the size of Texas. This force probably was inadequate even under the best circumstances. After the current conflict broke out last month, the UN Security Council hurriedly authorized UNMISS to have up to 12,500 military personnel and 1,323 police, although the additional forces have yet to be recruited and deployed. The UN force’s mandate has been framed almost entirely in terms of development, rather than anything more robust, and the mission is run by a Norwegian politician who comes to UNMISS from a desk job at UNICEF—as if the problems of South Sudan were due merely due to a lack of material aid, as opposed to conflicts rooted in deeper pathologies. Fourth is the exaggeration of the conflict’s ethnic dimension. It certainly exists, with armed groups committing atrocities against civilians of the two largest tribal groups, the Dinka and Nuer. Still, much of the media coverage has erred in casting the bloodletting in purely ethnic terms. Examples abound of politics that ignore tribal lines. Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior, the widow of South Sudan’s revered founding father, John Garang de Mabior, is an ethnic Dinka like President Salva Kiir, but she also is one of his fiercest critics, and Salva Kiir clapped her under house arrest last month. Also arrested was the former secretary-general of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Pagan Amum Okiech, a member of the Shilluk, the country’s third-largest ethnic group. On the other hand, South Sudan’s foreign minister, Barnaba Marial Benjamin, who has remained loyal to his president, is a Nuer, like former Vice President Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, who at least nominally heads the forces in rebellion. A fifth issue is intervention by neighboring countries. With the United States and its European partner reducing embassy staff or evacuating citizens, those countries most likely to intervene will be pursuing their own interests, and possibly aggravating the situation. As The Economist noted, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has thrown “his diplomatic and military weight wholesale” behind Salva Kiir. Ugandan forces have been reported to have joined Salva Kiir’s men in battling rebels for control of Bor, the capital of Jonglei, South Sudan’s largest and most populous state. Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta has so far abstained from the conflict, instead joining Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in trying to mediate the crisis. Still, Kenyan companies are among the largest investors in South Sudan and Kenyan-owned businesses reportedly have been looted in Bor as well as in the state capitals of Bentiu and Malakal. Sixth, the international hopes for the peace talks, which formally opened over the weekend in Addis Ababa, may not be justified. The East African regional grouping of nations that is mediating the discussions may not even have convened the relevant parties. Riek Machar may be the opposition leader who previously held the highest governmental title, but it is not readily apparent that he actually commands the forces fighting the government. It is certainly not at all clear that the rebel “White Army”—so called because of the ash the mainly Nuer fighters smear on their bodies to ward off insect bites—even has a chain of command. The more regular units among the rebels are led by Major General Peter Gadet Yak, a former commander of South Sudan’s 8th Division and one of the country’s more effective battle leaders. He is not even a party to the talks. And at least a dozen prominent opponents of Salva Kiir, some representing not insignificant South Sudanese constituencies, also are absent, having been detained in the aftermath of the supposed putsch. To its credit, the US State Department released a strong statement late Saturday evening urging the Salva Kiir government to “to uphold its commitments and release political detainees immediately,” noting correctly that “to be meaningful and productive, discussions of political issues requires the presence of the senior SPLM members currently detained in Juba, among others.” Not surprising, but nonetheless disappointing, is the absence at the talks of South Sudan’s religious leaders. These include figures who largely have retained their credibility through the decades of struggle against the Sudanese government and the thirty months of independence. Thus, they command broad public support irrespective of ethnic divides. Just days before the violence broke out, Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul of the Episcopal Church of Sudan, and Paride Taban, retired Roman Catholic Bishop of Torit, had unveiled a detailed plan of action for dialogue, healing, and reconciliation at local and national levels. The two men lead a National Reconciliation Committee, and their initiative, supported by the Norwegian and Swiss governments, has drawn explicitly from the experience of faith-based groups in South Africa’s post-apartheid truth and reconciliation process. Since the fighting started, Archbishop Deng Bul repeatedly has emphasized that the conflict is not ethnic, writing in one pre-Christmas missive: “We condemn and correct the media statements and reports that refer to the violence as conflict between the Dinka and Nuer tribes…These are political differences among the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Party.” And yet he has no place at the negotiating table. Seventh: For any peace to have any chance of being sustainable, the negotiations must encompass a discussion of the immediate and long-term political future of South Sudan. This includes consideration of a short-term power-sharing arrangement that reflects realities on the ground. (The mismatch between notional “authority” and actual power contributed immensely to the present difficulties.) A viable peace process also must include a decentralization of resource management. (Absent a sense of national identity, is it any wonder that people resent that the wealth under their feet flows to some far-off capital?) And negotiations must move the country toward long-delayed elections. None have been held since independence and a number of observers have pointed out that the pre-independence poll was compromised by fraud in a number of important races. Also in need of a frank airing is whether Salva Kiir – having precipitated a civil war by intention, incompetence, or miscalculation – is even the right person to lead South Sudan forward. Ultimately, if the South Sudanese are to have a country of their own, it will be up to them to define a positive sense of national identity and purpose, and to construct a state that can provide all their communities with not only some semblance of order, but other vital common goods and perhaps some basic services. In this process, outsiders can and should be supportive, especially if they are realistic about what is actually happening and what they can and will do about it. J. Peter Pham, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Sudão do Sul: Uma independência precipitada?

John Garang, the father of South Sudan’s liberation, always argued against its existence. He didn’t want to secede from Khartoum, but to overthrow the government and create a unified Sudan for all its citizens. His successors, grasping for immediate power and bowing to international influence, chose a different path. On the brink of civil war, is South Sudan now paying the price for this lack of vision? By SIMON ALLISON. The father of South Sudanese resistance, the late Dr John Garang, never ruled out the possibility of seceding from the north to create a new, independent state. But nor did he advocate it. For him, secession was a last resort, an option to be taken only if everything else had failed. “If we cannot rise to the challenge and move to the New Sudan, it is better that the Sudan breaks up before it breaks down,” he said in speeches delivered across the continent and the world. But his vision, his dream, was always to meet that challenge; to make a New Sudan which could accommodate its wonderfully diverse peoples, and give them all a say in the running of the state. In January 2005, at the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nairobi – the deal which ended the decades-long civil war between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A rebels of which Garang was chief – he reiterated this to the 20,000 Sudanese and the 15 African heads of state who were assembled for the occasion: “This peace agreement signals the beginning of one Sudan regardless of race, religion or tribe.” Six months later, his helicopter crashed in circumstances which continue to fuel conspiracy theories. Garang was dead, and with him any hope of a unified Sudan. Garang’s vision was never particularly popular amongst his people, and understandably so. Secession seemed like (and ultimately was) an achievable goal, whereas overthrowing Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and his henchmen was an exponentially more difficult challenge; and after enduring centuries of oppression from northern rulers, southerners were entitled to feel aggrieved enough to want to cut ties completely. Even within his own party, Garang had to push hard for unity. Without the force of his personality – and under the guidance of his deputy, Salva Kiir, a committed secessionist – impetus swung swiftly and irreversibly the other way. The international community, led by activists from the United States, pushed hard in the same direction. Sure enough, by the time the referendum came around in 2011, South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly to create a new, independent state. South Sudan was born. Just three and a half short years later, the world’s newest state is on the brink of collapse. Kiir’s army, the only functional institution, is divided between his supporters and those of Vice-President Riek Machar. Fighting in the capital Juba and other areas has taken on dangerous ethnic overtones. Thousands are dead, tens of thousands have fled the country and hundreds thousands more are displaced within South Sudan’s borders. “Even before the recent fighting broke out in December, 80 percent of healthcare and basic services in South Sudan were provided by non-governmental organisations,” observed Doctors Without Borders (MSF), in their latest, urgent missive. Now many of those NGOs are gone (MSF being a notable exception), and the situation is rapidly deteriorating. “What was already a difficult situation has become even worse.” Oil, the country’s only asset of note, has stopped flowing completely; so completely that even the Chinese, notoriously reluctant to intervene in the internal affairs of African nations, have issued a stern rebuke, mindful of their significant energy interests in the country. In short, the South Sudanese state – barely there to begin with – has already failed. It’s worth pondering, at this juncture of South Sudan’s history, if perhaps John Garang was right – and southern Sudanese, not to mention northerners who have continued living under oppression, would have been better served by trying to reform Sudan in its entirety. South Sudan, on its own, doesn’t have much going for it. “The new state was born with all the makings of a crisis,” argues William Wallis in the Financial Times. “Its development had been stunted by five decades of intermittent war. Unlike other African liberation movements, the now fractured Sudan People’s Liberation Movement had few if any social programmes in areas it controlled. There were few functioning institutions beyond the army and less infrastructure than most African nations had when colonial powers began to withdraw.” This underdevelopment is further entrenched by a few geographical and infrastructural realities. It’s a landlocked country, which means it can’t ship any of its abundant oil to buyers. For that, the oil must travel via pipeline through Sudan proper, to the tankers waiting at Port Sudan. Or it must go by truck on dodgy roads to neighbours Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, because a pipeline heading south hasn’t been built yet (and won’t for some time to come). Many places in the country aren’t connected by road, and are completely cut off during the rainy season (some refugee camps, for example, are only accessible via helicopter). Besides oil, the country has almost no industry to speak of. While there’s potential for agriculture – South Sudanese officials keep talking about turning the country into the ‘breadbasket of East Africa’ – it’s a long way from happening, and the biggest factory in Juba is the local brewery (run by SABMiller). Post-secession Sudan, meanwhile, is also in trouble. Its economy has been devastated by the sudden cut-off in oil funds, which for so long were used to keep the population complacent and compensate for the economic impact of the sanctions (these were levied against Khartoum for its role in Darfur). A united Sudan, meanwhile, without sanctions, with a reliable oil income that is properly invested in national infrastructure, healthcare and education programs, has the potential to be more than the current sum of its parts – the strengths of the north complementing those of the south, and vice versa. This may be little more than a mirage, but it’s an alluring prospect nonetheless, and one for which John Garang was prepared to fight, and even sacrifice the prospect of immediate power. His successors, possessed of shorter-term vision, settled for the easy money compromise – a lack of foresight for which South Sudan might just be paying the price. DM Daily Maverick

A nova exploração colonial em Moçambique

"Cerca de 70% da riqueza de Moçambique estão praticamente a ser controlados por investidores estrangeiros dos corredores de desenvolvimento de Maputo, Limpopo, Beira, Nacala, Pemba e do Vale do Zambeze, segundo a Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais (ADECRU). A agremiação diz que a situação agrava a degradação ambiental, pobreza, problemas de usurpação de terras de camponeses e conflitos sócio-ambientais. “O padrão de governação e desenvolvimento em Moçambique é explorador, colonial e imperialista por acomodar grandes projectos de exploração que provocam consequências perversas à sociedade”, realça o grupo apelando uma “visão séria e mudança de atitude” por parte dos governantes de modo a se evitar eventuais conflitos sociais no país. Nos últimos 10 anos, Moçambique tem sido vítima da “obsessão dos doadores” e de instituições financeiras internacionais devido a descobertas de recursos minerais e petrolíferos. (...)". Correio da Manhã, Maputo

Rajaonarimampianina eleito Presidente de Madagáscar

Madagascar's former finance minister, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, has won the presidential election, officials in the Indian Ocean nation have announced. Mr Rajaonarimampianina, allied to incumbent President Andry Rajoelina, won 53.5% of the vote in December's run-off, the electoral commission said. His rival, Richard Jean-Louis Robinson, has said the second round was rigged and is demanding a recount. The election is intended to end years of political unrest. Foreign election observers have urged both parties to respect the electoral process. An electoral agent holds up a ballot as votes are counted at a polling station in Antananarivo on 20 December 2013 The second round was endorsed by international election observers The vote has yet to be confirmed by the electoral court which will make the announcement within 15 days. Economic paralysis The elections were the first to be held since a 2009 military-backed takeover, when Mr Rajoelina, who backed Mr Rajaonarimampianina, overthrew the democratically elected government of Marc Ravalomanana. Electoral officials said Mr Robinson, a former health minister in Mr Ravalomanana's government, took 46.5% of the run-off vote, held on 20 December. Following the coup, the international community imposed sanctions and the country has since suffered economic paralysis. The election is an attempt to restore normality to the country and to induce foreign investment and boost anaemic growth. A relative new comer to politics, Mr Rajaonarimampianina, 55, holds a degree in economics and accounting from the University of Quebec in Canada. Amongst other election pledges, he promised to help the unemployed, build infrastructure to improve agriculture and reform the education system. More than 92% of the country's 21 million people live on less than $2 (£1.2) a day, according to the World Bank. (

África Center for Strategic Studies)