18.6.14

Timor-Leste: 15 anos de autodeterminação

Following the vote in favour of self-determination in 1999 chaos engulfed East Timor. Dozens of buildings burned, thousands of people were displaced from their homes and some were injured or killed. World-wide outrage denounced the horror and demanded “something must be done!” Within days a UN mandated Australian-led multi-national force named ‘INTERFET’ (International Force East Timor) arrived on 20 September 1999 with Indonesian agreement and support to restore security and order.
What was the crisis and how did it come about? What events led to it? What factors were influencing events? What did INTERFET achieve or fail to achieve? How did the crisis impact on relationships in the region in the short and longer term?  What can the INTERFET experience teach us for the future?
On the 15th Anniversay of the 1999 crisis in East Timor – this two-day international conference will initiate the process of examining these and other questions. The aim of the conference is to write into the public record different perspectives and responses to the long dormant questions for the benefit and further development of history and scholarship.
In the absence of an Australian official history, and with relations between Indonesia, Australia and Timor Leste in need of greater understanding and enrichment, key participants in the events of that period are gathering together at the prestigious RACV Club in Melbourne on 20 and 21 September 2014 to reflect on the significance of INTERFET then and since.
Military History and Heritage Victoria in partnership with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU have gathered an impressive array of speakers – most of whom were involved first hand at the international, national and operational levels.
His Excellency the Prime Minister of Timor Leste, Xanana Gusmao, GCL, CNZM – former East Timor independence leader – and His Excellency General the Honourable Sir Peter Cosgrove AK, MC, Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia – the Commander of INTERFET – will be the keynote speakers.
The international panel of distinguished speakers includes Lieutenant General Kiki Syahnakri (Retired) who was the Indonesian Martial Law Administrator at the time of the crisis, and author of Timor Timur: The Untold Story and Thailand’s General Songkitti Jaggabatra (Retired) who was the Deputy Commander INTERFET. They will be joined by, Major General Orlando Ambrocio (Retired) who was the Commander of the Philippines Humanitarian Support Mission to East Timor; Colonel Kevin Burnett, ONZM (Retired), former Commanding Officer the 1 RNZIR Battalion Group; and Admiral Dennis Blair (Retired) who was the Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Command.
Speakers from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU include Admiral Chris Barrie (Retired), former Chief of the Australian Defence Force, and Doctor John Blaxland, former Intelligence Officer for West Force, INTERFET.
Doctor Blaxland, whose recently published book The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard included a chapter on INTERFET, will edit the conference proceedings for publication. Doctor John Blaxland said that “the conference is even more important given the absence of an official Australian history for INTERFET.”
Lieutenant General Ash Power, AO, CSC (Retired), former Colonel Operations INTERFET; Professor Damien Kingsbury, author of East Timor: The Price of Liberty; Brigadier Jeff Wilkinson, AM (Retired), former Commander Logistic Support Force; and Associate Professor Bob Breen, author of Mission Accomplished, East Timor: The ADF Participation in INTERFET, will also be speaking at the Conference.
Associate Professor Bob Breen from Deakin University acknowledged that much additional information had come to light over the past 14 years that warranted a review of events, causation and unintended consequences surrounding INTERFET. “It’s important to get the benefit of time and the perspectives of different stakeholders to get a holistic understanding of these historic events” said Professor Breen.
The Conference will be held in the prestigious Pavilion Room at the RACV Club in Melbourne on Saturday 20 and Sunday 21 September 2014.
- See more at: http://mhhv.org.au/?p=4232&utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=interfet-reflections-on-the-1999-east-timor-crisis#sthash.caWWlFsB.dpuf

17.6.14

Bissau: Os antecedentes da operação "Mar Verde"

Os contactos entre o Governo português e adversários do Presidente da República da Guiné (Conakry), Sékou Touré, decorriam, pelo menos, desde 1967; e tinham como objectivo obter o apoio de Portugal para a invasão daquele país, numa operação que ficaria exclusivamente a cargo de naturais do mesmo e que partiria da Serra Leoa.
Quem assim nos explica os antecedentes políticos da operação "Mar Verde", de Novembro de 1970, é Mário Matos e Lemos, no terceiro número da revista Mátria XXI, do Centro de Investigação Prof. Doutor Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão.
O apoio pedido a Lisboa limitava-se a uma contribuição financeira para o treino de elementos de Frente Nacional de Libertação da Guiné (FNLG), bem como ao fornecimento de material militar.
A contrapartida oferecida pela FNLG, no caso de conseguir derrubar Sékou Touré, seria a proibição das actividades do PAIGC na Guiné-Conakry.
Aparentemente, segundo Matos e Lemos, não se levantava até 1970 a hipótese de a invasão da República da Guiné partir de território sob administração portuguesa.
O Governo de Marcello Caetano não aceitou as propostas iniciais da FNLG, mais baratas e menos comprometedoras, para depois executar a operação "Mar Verde", coordenada pelo Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra Alpoim Calvão.
Segundo o investigador Matos e Lemos, é provável que o governador da Guiné, António de Spínola, pouco confiante na capacidade militar da FNLG para, sozinha, levar a bom termo a invasão, tivesse convencido Caetano a autorizar a participação de forças portuguesas e a partir da então Guiné Portuguesa; e já não da Serra Leoa.
No entanto, o malogro da expedição comandada por Alpoim Calvão levou à consolidação do regime de Sekou Touré e atraiu às águas do Golfo da Guiné dois navios soviéticos, um deles armado com mísseis; tendo-se-lhes juntado mais tarde um navio anfíbio.
De acordo com a tese de Matos e Lemos, inicialmente exposta em 2014 durante um colóquio na Universidade dos Açores, é plausível que o futuro relacionamento difícil do general Spínola com o Governo de Caetano tenha uma das suas raízes no malogro da operação que era para derrubar Sékou Touré e na qual os portugueses nunca se deveriam ter imiscuído; pelo menos tão abertamente.
Na elaboração do plano de invasão de Conakry colaboraram dois dos oficiais que serviam na Guiné sob as ordens de António de Spínola: Firmino Miguel, que viria a ser ministro da Defesa depois do 25 de Abril, e Carlos Azeredo, entretanto governador civil do distrito do Funchal, comandante da Região Militar Norte e chefe da Casa Militar do Presidente Mário Soares.
Eis, pois, um opúsculo muito interessante, este do Centro de Investigação Prof. Doutor Veríssimo Serrão, de Santarém. JH

Bissau: Deputados guineenses tomam hoje posse

O secretário de estado português dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação, Luís Campos Ferreira, que por acaso nem é uma pessoa de grande peso político, afirmou hoje em Bissau que Portugal é um "forte aliado" dos guineenses, verdadeiramente empenhado no seu regresso à ordem constitucional, depois da aventura protagonizada por pessoas como o general António Indjai e o entretanto falecido Kumba Ialá.
Na linguagem pomposa da diplomacia portuguesa, este é "o primeiro governante europeu a visitar o país após o golpe de estado" de Abril de 2012. Mas chamar "governante europeu" a Luís Campos Ferreira soa quase a ridículo, dado que não se trata de pessoa com currículo suficiente para ter grande importância no relacionamento entre a Europa e a África.
Trata-se de um simples alto funcionário que foi assistir à tomada de posse dos deputados eleitos: 57 do PAIGC, 41 do PRS, 2 do PCD, um do PND e um da UM.
"Portugal está muito empenhado neste novo regresso à ordem constitucional", disse o dito Luís Campos Ferreira à agência Lusa. Mas a verdade é que na tomada de posse do Presidente José Mário Vaz, dia 23, Lisboa não se faz representar pelo Presidente da República, nem pela presidente da Assembleia, nem pelo primeiro-ministro, nem pelo vice-primeiro-ministro, mas simplesmente pelo ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Rui Machete.
Por aqui se vê a grande distância que vai das palavras proferidas aos actos verificados. Portugal diz querer muito ouvir as prioridades da Guiné-Bissau, mas não lhe envia, pelo menos para já, nenhuma das figuras de topo da hierarquia do Estado. E aqui se denota uma grande contradição, que talvez ainda esteja a tempo de ser corrigida.
"Queremos dar um sinal de proximidade, de apoio, de afeto, de que a Guiné-Bissau é um país amigo, um país irmão", sublinhou Luís Campos Ferreira. Palavras, palavras, palavras, coisas em que os pequenos "governantes" são férteis.
Uma vez que o Presidente José Mário Vaz tome posse e que indique como primeiro-ministro o líder do PAIGC, Domingos Simões Pereira, então veremos se Portugal conseguirá ou não colocar-se na primeira fila do relacionamento com o povo guineense, coisa que muitos outros querem, e pelos mais variados motivos, nem sempre muito altruístas.
Desde agora e até ao fim de Novembro, a Guiné-Bissau vai continuar a contar com uma representação das Nações Unidas, a UNIOGBIS, e esse vai ser o período para se aquilatar das capacidades da dupla José Mário Vaz-Domingos Simões Pereira para arrancar como deve de ser com um diálogo político de grande fôlego e com a reconciliação nacional tão necessária, depois das tristes aventuras de António Indjai, Kumba Ialá e quejandos.
A ONU, a União Africana, a Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO), a CPLP e outras instâncias terão de ajudar muito a sério a fortalecer as frágeis instituições guineenses, que ao longo dos anos têm sido alvo de muitas conjuras e golpes baixos.
O Presidente que na próxima semana toma posse e o Governo que a seguir se formará terão de fazer com que a justiça realmente funcione, que não haja mais impunidade e que se respeitem tanto os direitos humanos como as liberdades fundamentais.
Se não se avançar de vez para a reforma do sector da segurança, há tantos e tantos anos adiada, e se os tribunais não funcionarem a contento, nada feito. De pouco servirá investir em escolas e hospitais se permanecerem as condições para que, a qualquer altura, um grupo de militares se apossar uma vez mais do poder e deitar tudo a perder.
O combate ao tráfico de drogas e ao crime organizado, a redução drástica dos efectivos das Forças Armadas e o apuramento das responsabilidades de muita coisa errada verificada ao longo dos anos são essenciais para que se chegue a Novembro ou Dezembro de 2014 com muito mais esperanças de retirar a Guiné-Bissau do grande atoleiro em que tem vivido nas suas primeiras quatro décadas de existência.
Uma das tarefas mais difíceis que se deparam ao Presidente Vaz e ao futuro primeiro-ministro Domingos Simões Pereira é escolher, logo que possível, um novo Chefe do Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas, que nada tenha a ver com o general António Indjai e com oficiais da sua laia.
Se este poder civil que está agora a ser constituído não conseguir com eficácia desmantelar os ninhos de víbora que em 2012 se apossaram do controlo do Estado, arrisca-se fortemente a, mais tarde ou mais cedo, vir a ser vítima deles, como o foi o primeiro-ministro Carlos Gomes Júnior (Cadogo Júnior). Jorge Heitor, 17 de Junho de 2014

14.6.14

Salários chineses sobem 10% ao ano

One of the major forces reshaping global business is that of rising wages in China. Nominal wages have been rising at over 10% a year in every year since 1997: Chinese workers are still much cheaper than those in, say, the United States, but the gap is closing rapidly. China has managed to create such a dominant position in global manufacturing supply chains, despite rapidly increasing wages, partly because of its infrastructure, but also because productivity growth has been unusually rapid.

Over the next five years we think that Chinese wages will continue to rise fast. Productivity will rise as well, but this is going to change the type of activity in which Chinese workers are competitive. Countries all around the world, such as Bangladesh, Peru and Nigeria, are hoping to get a slice of labour-intensive manufacturing supply chains as Chinese factories focus on a different stage of production. Which countries are best placed to move into this gap? One country stands out as having a lot of potential: India. It has low wages and business inputs are low, and it has the scale to attract big firms that many countries in, say, Africa lack. India's business environment is very difficult, however, and its infrastructure is poor. But if India can get the building blocks right, then China's rising wages create an opportunity it is uniquely placed to capture.
the Economist

Intercâmbio agricola EUA-Japão

Dear Friends,

 

Today, I had the opportunity to serve as a local guide to Mr. Tatsuya Ito, a Member of the Japanese Diet (House of Representatives). He is visiting the United States to discuss trade and other important bilateral issues between the United States and Japan. During his visit to Tulare, Mr. Ito and I met with local farmers to discuss trade negotiations and their impact on agriculture.

 


 

Pictured above from left to right is Deputy Consul General Nobuhiro Watanabe, Congressman Devin Nunes, Tatsuya Ito, Member of the Japanese House of Representatives, and local farmer Mark Watte.

 

Japan tightly restricts its agriculture imports, but we're looking to change that. New access to the Japanese market would allow made-in-America products to compete in one of the world’s richest economies. This would result in significant economic growth and, more importantly, jobs for rural America.

 

As trade negotiations with the Japanese and other Trans-Pacific Partnership nations continue, I am fighting to make sure agriculture will not be left behind (see my statement at a recent hearing here). In fact, as Chairman of the Trade Committee, I have made it clear that there will be no deal if our farmers don’t get a fair deal (see more about California agriculture exports).

 

Thanks for your interest in this important issue. And please check out the Nunes Digest which has been updated for your weekend reading.

 

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Devin Nunes

Nigéria: Uma crescente crise regional

After two months in the global spotlight, the insurgency in northern Nigeria is fast turning into a national political crisis

The deepening security crisis in northern Nigeria and along the borders with Cameroon and Niger has galvanised more attention internationally than in Abuja. This week, it was Britain's turn to hold a security conference on northern Nigeria. It invited an impressive group of diplomats and security experts. Many also attended the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, hosted by Foreign Secretary William Hague and Angelina Jolie, a Special Envoy of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
A month ago it was France that hosted the regional summit at which President Goodluck Jonathan declared 'total war' on the Jama'atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad, widely known as Boko Haram, dubbing it the Al Qaida of West Africa. His fellow leaders, especially Cameroon's Paul Biya, looked markedly less enthusiastic about the prospect of total war in the region.
Then in August, United States President Barack Obama will host a grand Africa summit in Washington and security will top the agenda, along with economic renewal. Jonathan has been invited to that too, despite some coded critical messages passing between Abuja and Washington.
Many Nigerians have been puzzled by this intensity of international attention, triggered by Boko Haram's abduction of over 230 schoolgirls from Chibok, Borno State in April (AC Vol 55 No 10, Everyone loses & Vol 55 No 11, Poison politicsAmnesty anomalies). Far from being a new peak in violence by the jihadist group, it was the latest in a series of bloody attacks in the north-east. Earlier attacks had included the murder of dozens of teenage school children of both genders and serial abductions. Since the kidnapping of the Chibok girls, Boko Haram has launched a succession of attacks on villages in the area, and organised two bombs blasts in Abuja.
Last week, it killed hundreds more people in the Gwoza local government area in Borno, after murdering the Emir of Gwoza, Shehu Mustapha Idrisa Timta, who had publicly condemned Boko Haram. This prompted speculation that the Islamists may be seeking to take over swathes of territory. Locals say the group's black flag is flying in many villages in the Gwoza area.
Nine parts military
Taking territory would mark a huge tactical switch for a group that security experts say is about 4,000-5,000 strong and split into hundreds of quasi-autonomous fighting units, with several established bases in the Sambisa Forest, reckoned to cover an area the size of Britain, and the Mandara mountains on the Cameroon border.
Boko Haram's fighting and logistical capability has increased under Abubakar Shekau's leadership. 'The group is now nine parts military, one part theological, at least for this moment in the struggle,' says a Nigerian official who has had extensive contacts with its former members.
Not only has the group launched a near-constant barrage of attacks on villages, and especially schools, this year; it also has the logistics to move hundreds of captive children and adults around the region in trucks, keeping them well concealed from, or at least beyond the reach of, Nigeria's military and Special Forces from Britain and the USA.
Until now, Boko Haram's great military strength has been its mobility, able to hit and run at will, targeting military and police installations, and even organising gaol breaks. When the government announced emergency laws in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in the north-east alongside a new army onslaught a year ago, Boko Haram retreated from cities such as Maiduguri to the forest.
Although it reduced operations for a few weeks, the militia quickly established a new tempo of armed raids on villages and even the military's Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri. In the short term, there would seem to be little advantage in trying to hold territory, unless it was able to take vast numbers of civilians hostage in the process. Nigerian security officials said the armed forces would see that as a red line and any Boko Haram-held territory would be attacked by air and land.
These developments, regardless of international reaction, are changing political dynamics in the country. The local campaign #bringbackourgirls is led by luminaries such as Obi Ezekwesili, former Education Minister and Vice-President of the World Bank, and Hadiza Bala Usman, an activist from a radical northern family and former Special Assistant to Nasir El-Rufai. Their campaign prompted global attention as their messages and interviews flashed across social media and satellite television stations amid multiple demonstrations in cities across Nigeria.
Both Boko Haram and the government are drawing some harsh lessons from this latest development. Earlier this year, several Boko Haram fighters intensified their kidnapping and ransom operations, say government security officials. Abductions stick in the public mind far longer than even the bloodiest massacre. Many local newspapers carry a daily tally of the number of days the Chibok girls have been held hostage; one opposition newspaper simply carries 'Where are our girls?' each day.
The fighters see the operations, officials say, as a means to boost their profile internationally and to raise funds through ransom payments. Cameroon is known to have paid ransoms on behalf of French hostages last year; the official line from Abuja, reinforced by Western diplomats, is that no ransom will be paid.
Some fear that northern Nigeria could replace the Sahel as the hostage market of choice for jihadist fighters, who have earned tens of millions of dollars from kidnapping there over the past decade. However, the main concern for Jonathan's government is the group's political impact. For months, the orthodoxy in Jonathan's circle was that the group was sustained primarily by opposition politicians and their business allies, who saw it as a way to undermine the government.
Tacticians in the governing People's Democratic Party (PDP) suggested that the insurgency could be turned to the government's advantage in elections due next year. The state of emergency likely to continue in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe – all opposition strongholds – makes polling difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, voters will be able to contrast the conditions in the opposition-controlled north-east with the rising wealth of the south-south and south-east states.
That calculation no longer works. Boko Haram's bases may be confined to the north-east and neighbouring countries but its political effects are sweeping the nation. Whatever he may say at international conferences about the global struggle against terrorism, President Jonathan has not convinced his own people that the government has a strategy to rescue the Chibok girls or contain, let alone defeat, Boko Haram.
Instead, political confidence in his government is declining and there have been ominous rumblings in the military. Some politicians in Abuja think that Jonathan won't win the PDP presidential nomination for next year's elections, while others say he won't even manage to hold on to power until the vote.
The announcement this week that Diezani Allison-Madueke, the seemingly immoveable Petroleum Minister and close presidential ally, is to seek election as Secretary General of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries was seen by oil company executives as a sign that Jonathan is planning to throw in the towel. Even if he wanted to, it's difficult to believe that his Ijaw people, led by fiery nationalists such as Edwin Clark, would allow him to stand down. Political insiders say simply that Jonathan won't get the votes, state by state, to win the party's presidential primaries but they don't yet have a clear idea of who could.
That leaves other messier options. There is much interest in the plans of Senate President David Mark, a veteran ally of General Ibrahim Babangida, whose coup-making days go back to the 1970s and 1980s. Mark has taken a noticeably harder line on Boko Haram than his counterparts at the top of government.
He is also, we hear, outraged by the current state of the armed forces, whose soldiers say they lack basic supplies and weaponry. Should Jonathan stumble, jump or be pushed, a groundswell is building for some form of transitional government to tackle both the security crisis and the flagging morale of the military. Among the leaders mooted for such a transition is none other than Brigadier Gen. (Retired) David Mark.

13.6.14

Bissau: Procurador-Geral continua a ser o mesmo

Bissau – O Chefe de Estado guineense eleito nas últimas Presidenciais na Guiné-Bissau, José Mário Vaz (JOMAV), informou que vai reconduzir o actual Procurador-geral da República, Abudu Mane, ao seu cargo, em função da promessa feita aos eleitores guineenses durante a campanha eleitoral.
A informação foi avançada à PNN por uma fonte ligada ao Presidente da República eleito, depois de este ter sido informado sobre o pedido de demissão apresentado no início desta semana por Abudu Mané.

Deparado com vários processos inconclusivos, de entre os quais o próprio processo contra JOMAV, o processo dos assassinatos de Nino Vieira, Tagme Nawaie e outros, com a sua intenção de abandonar o cargo o homem forte do Ministério Público pode deixar as investigações feitas aos processos em causa cair por terra.

Além destas situações, desde a sua nomeação, Abudu Mané tem-se envolvido em várias polémicas ao nível da justiça guineense, tendo chegado mesmo a tentar impugnar a candidatura do actual Presidente da República, acto que na altura não foi aceite pelos colectivos de juízes do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça.
(c) PNN Portuguese News Network