28.8.14

Senegal: Confirmação de petróleo no offshore



Oil samples have been recovered in the FAN-1 exploration well being drilled offshore Senegal by FAR Ltd (ASX:FAR) and its joint venture partners Cairn Energy PLC (Operator), ConocoPhillips and Petrosen - the Senegalese national oil company.


Elevated gas and fluorescence were encountered in a shallow secondary target and the presence of oil was confirmed by an intermediate logging program. Oil samples from a thin sand were collected by an MDT wireline formation tester for further analysis. This well data confirms the existence of a working petroleum system.

The FAN-1 well has reached a depth of 4402 metres where intermediate casing has now been set. The well will be deepened to planned Total Depth ("TD") of approximately 5000 metres. Conclusive results for this well will not be available until drilling operations are completed and all of the well data is fully assessed. The Operator anticipates that drilling of the FAN-1 well will be completed during the next month after which time the rig will be moved to the SNE-1 well location, the second well of the two well program offshore Senegal.
FAR Managing Director, Cath Norman said, "The presence of oil In the secondary target is important in helping our geological understanding of the margin and is significant because it confirms the existence of a working petroleum generating system. It is very pleasing that the building blocks of a working petroleum system are present and we look forward to drilling ahead to deeper objectives in FAN-1 and completing the SNE-1 well."


As previously announced, the drilling program has been designated as "tight" by the Operator and hence no information related to depth or formation will be provided during the drilling beyond what is required to meet ASX continuous disclosure obligations.

This release in relation to the matter referred to in the Company’s trading halt announcement of 25 August 2014.
Pre-drill estimates


The FAN-1 well is designed to test a stacked fan structure with the potential to contain approximately 900 million barrels of oil (mmbbls) (unrisked prospective resources)* with approximately 135mmbbls net to FAR* which owns a 15% working interest. FAN-1 will be followed immediately by the SNE-1 well to be drilled on the shelf targeting approximately 600mmbbls of oil (unrisked prospective resources)* with approximately 90mmbbls net to FAR* (reference: FAR ASX release of 27 February 2013).




About the drilling offshore Senegal


FAN-1 is the first exploration well in a two well program, offshore Senegal with the wells to be drilled back to back. The first well will be located on the North Fan prospect in 1,500m water depth. This well will be immediately followed by a second exploration well targeting a shelf edge prospect in 1,100m of water (See figures 1, 2 and 3).
These will be the first deep water (>1,000m) wells drilled in Senegalese waters and the first offshore wells to be drilled for over 20 years. The two exploration wells will test combined prospective resources of approximately 1.5 billion barrels of unrisked prospective resources* (225 mmbbls net to FAR*) and FAR retains a 15% working interest in the blocks. (Reference: FAR ASX release of 27/2/2013).


The FAN-1 well is a pure exploration well and, even if successful, will not be completed as a commercial production well. In the event of a success, the Joint Venture may decide to conduct further drilling and evaluation activities.

Moçambique: No bom caminho

Moçambique acaba de ser elogiado pela Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) por ter alcançado "resultados significativos" nas áreas dos direitos humanos, saúde materno-infantil, descentralização, economia, boa governação, emprego, segurança alimentar e nutricional desde 2012.

Elegendo 2013 como o "ano de destaque" no que respeita ao bom desempenho de Moçambique, a ONU aponta o "forte crescimento económico" do país impulsionado em grande parte pela rápida expansão da indústria extractiva no período em análise, possibilitando novos financiamentos e parcerias, como factores que determinaram a avaliação positiva.

Entretanto, apesar desse boom económico, aliado a progressos positivos no acesso a serviços sociais básicos, mais de 50% dos moçambicanos vivem em situação de pobreza crónica, um quadro preocupante que deve ser invertido, indica aquela organização mundial no seu mais recente relatório sobre programas de desenvolvimento em implementação no país desde 2012.

Por outro lado, a ONU destaca reformas legislativas em Moçambique com vista ao cumprimento de normas internacionais sobre a protecção de mulheres e crianças vítimas de violência e abuso sexual, para além de acções de criação de empregos para jovens para o seu maior envolvimento no processo de desenvolvimento socioeconómico do país.

Como recomendação, a ONU indica que "Moçambique deve continuar a construir um caminho transparente", através da formação e inclusão social, tidos como pilares essenciais de governação para uma economia bem sucedida.

Refira-se que Moçambique é um dos oito países-pilotos no mundo que beneficiam de programas das Nações Unidas para reformas nas áreas sociais, economia e boa governação, cuja agenda é "Um líder, um programa, um orçamento, uma só voz e um escritório".

Em Moçambique aquela iniciativa está a ser monitorada por 22 agências da Organização das Nações Unidas, com um orçamento de cerca de USD 723,5 milhões.

(E. Arante) Correio da Manhã, Maputo

27.8.14

Gaza: Cessar-fogo, depois de 2.200 mortos

A long-term ceasefire has been agreed between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip.

The truce, ending seven weeks of fighting that has left more than 2,200 people - mostly Palestinians - dead, was brokered by Egypt and began at 19:00 (16:00 GMT) on Tuesday.

Hamas said the deal represented a "victory for the resistance".

Israel is to ease its blockade of Gaza to allow in aid and building materials, Israeli officials said.


Indirect talks on more contentious issues, including Israel's call for militant groups in Gaza to disarm, will begin in Cairo within a month.

The US gave the full backing to the deal, with State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki saying: "We strongly support the ceasefire announcement."

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon also welcomed the truce. But in a statement via his spokesman, Mr Ban warned that "any peace effort that does not tackle the root causes of the crisis will do little more than set the stage for the next cycle of violence".

The breakthrough came as both Israel and the Palestinians continued to trade fire.

A last-minute volley of mortar shells from Gaza killed two Israeli civilians in Eshkol Regional Council, medics told the BBC.

Earlier on Tuesday, at least six Palestinians were killed in a series of Israeli air strikes in Gaza, Palestinian officials said.
BBC

26.8.14

Líbia: Os Emiratos passaram ao ataque

The US was "caught off guard" by air strikes against Islamist militia in Libya, a senior official has told the BBC.

The attacks on militia positions around Tripoli airport were reportedly carried out by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from bases in Egypt.

Egypt has denied any involvement and the UAE has not commented.

A militia alliance recently captured the capital's international airport after a battle lasting nearly a month.

The official told the BBC that the US had not been consulted about the air strikes and that it was concerned that US weapons may have been used, violating agreements under which they were sold.

The unidentified war planes attacked twice in the past week during a battle for Tripoli's airport between Islamist and nationalist militias.

A report in The New York Times on Monday said the UAE had provided the military aircraft, aerial refuelling planes and crews while Egypt gave access to its air bases.

Damaged plane at Tripoli airport. 25 Aug 2014 Planes and buildings have been badly damaged by fighting at the airport

On Monday, the US, France, Germany, Italy and the UK issued a joint statement denouncing "outside interference" in Libya which it said "exacerbates current divisions and undermines Libya's democratic transition".
Weak police and army
The BBC's Barbara Plett Usher in Washington says the air strikes have exposed another battleground in a regional struggle for power between Arab autocrats and Islamist movements.

Qatar has provided weapons and money to Islamist forces in Libya and elsewhere, she says, while Egypt and the UAE along with Saudi Arabia are trying to roll back Islamist advances.

Violence in Libya has surged recently between the rival groups who overthrew Muammar Gaddafi in the 2011 uprising.

Libya's police and army remain weak in comparison with the militias.

Over the weekend, Islamist-affiliated forces from Misrata and other cities took over Tripoli airport from the Zintan militia, which has held it for three years.

The airport, Libya's largest, has been closed for more than a month because of the fighting.

Hundreds of people have died since clashes broke out in Tripoli in July.

Islamist fighter at Tripoli airport. 25 Aug 2014 Islamist fighters are now in control of the international airport in Tripoli
Rival parliaments
In another development on Monday, Libya's previous Islamist-dominated parliament reconvened and voted to disband the country's interim government.

Correspondents say it leaves Libya with two rival parliaments, each backed by armed factions.

Elections in June saw the old General National Congress (GNC), where Islamists had a strong voice, replaced by the House of Representatives, dominated by liberals and federalists.

The GNC, which reconvened in Tripoli on Monday, has refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of its successor assembly, which is based in Tobruk.

The House of Representatives says the groups now in control of Tripoli airport are "terrorist organisations".

But the Misrata-led brigade, now in control of Tripoli airport, has called on the GNC to resume work.

Libya's government has repeatedly called for the militia groups to disband and join the national army. But so far, few have shown a willingness to disarm.  BBC

---   Eis a triste Líbia que resultou do derrube de Kadhafi por uma tropa fandanga apoiada pelas NATO!

23.8.14

Afganistão: Mais de 90 % da heroína mundial

Afghanistan now supplies over 90 percent of the world’s heroin, generating nearly $200 billion in revenue. Since the U.S. invasion on Oct. 7, 2001, opium output has increased 33-fold (to over 8,250 metric tons a year).
The U.S. has been in Afghanistan for over seven years, has spent $177 billion in that country alone, and has the most powerful and technologically advanced military on Earth. GPS tracking devices can locate any spot imaginable by simply pushing a few buttons.
Still, bumper crops keep flourishing year after year, even though heroin production is a laborious, intricate process. The poppies must be planted, grown and harvested; then after the morphine is extracted it has to be cooked, refined, packaged into bricks and transported from rural locales across national borders. To make heroin from morphine requires another 12-14 hours of laborious chemical reactions. Thousands of people are involved, yet—despite the massive resources at our disposal—heroin keeps flowing at record levels.
Common sense suggests that such prolific trade over an extended period of time is no accident, especially when the history of what has transpired in that region is considered. While the CIA ran its operations during the Vietnam War, the Golden Triangle supplied the world with most of its heroin. After that war ended in 1975, an intriguing event took place in 1979 when Zbigniew Brzezinski covertly manipulated the Soviet Union into invading Afghanistan.Behind the scenes, the CIA, along with Pakistan’s ISI, were secretly funding Afghanistan’s mujahideen to fight their Russian foes. Prior to this war, opium production in Afghanistan was minimal. But according to historian Alfred McCoy, an expert on the subject, a shift in focus took place. “Within two years of the onslaught of the CIA operation in Afghanistan, the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became the world’s top heroin producer.”
When the history of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is written, Washington's sordid involvement in the heroin trade and its alliance with drug lords and war criminals of the Afghan Communist Party will be one of the most shameful chapters.
The Huffington Post, October 15, 2008
Soon, as Professor Michel Chossudovsky notes, “CIA assets again controlled the heroin trade. As the mujahideen guerrillas seized territory inside Afghanistan, they ordered peasants to plant poppies as a revolutionary tax. Across the border in Pakistan, Afghan leaders and local syndicates under the protection of Pakistan intelligence operated hundreds of heroin laboratories.”
Eventually, the Soviet Union was defeated (their version of Vietnam), and ultimately lost the Cold War. The aftermath, however, proved to be an entirely new can of worms. During his research, McCoy discovered that “the CIA supported various Afghan drug lords, for instance Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The CIA did not handle heroin, but it did provide its drug lord allies with transport, arms, and political protection.”
By 1994, a new force emerged in the region—the Taliban—that took over the drug trade. Chossudovsky again discovered that “the Americans had secretly, and through the Pakistanis [specifically the ISI], supported the Taliban’s assumption of power.”
These strange bedfellows endured a rocky relationship until July 2000 when Taliban leaders banned the planting of poppies. This alarming development, along with other disagreements over proposed oil pipelines through Eurasia, posed a serious problem for power centers in the West. Without heroin money at their disposal, billions of dollars could not be funneled into various CIA black budget projects. Already sensing trouble in this volatile region, 18 influential neo-cons signed a letter in 1998 which became a blueprint for war—the infamous Project for a New American Century (PNAC).
Fifteen days after 9-11, CIA Director George Tenet sent his top-secret Special Operations Group (SOG) into Afghanistan. One of the biggest revelations in Tenet’s book, At the Center of the Storm, was that CIA forces directed the Afghanistan invasion, not the Pentagon.
In the Jan. 26, 2003, issue of Time magazine, Douglas Waller describes Donald Rumsfeld’s reaction to this development. “When aides told Rumsfeld that his Army Green Beret A-Teams couldn’t go into Afghanistan until the CIA contingent had lain the groundwork with local warlords, he erupted, ‘I have all these guys under arms, and we’ve got to wait like little birds in a nest for the CIA to let us go in?’”
ARMITAGE A MAJOR PLAYER
But the real operator in Afghanistan was Richard Armitage, a man whose legend includes being the biggest heroin trafficker in Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War; director of the State Department’s Foreign Narcotics Control Office (a front for CIA drug dealing); head of the Far East Company (used to funnel drug money out of the Golden Triangle); a close liaison with Oliver North during the Iran-Contra cocaine-for-guns scandal; a primary Pentagon official in the terror and covert ops field under George Bush the Elder; one of the original signatories of the infamous PNAC document; and the man who helped CIA Director William Casey run weapons to the mujahideen during their war against the Soviet Union. Armitage was also stationed in Iran during the mid-1970s right before Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew the shah. Armitage may well be the greatest covert operator in U.S. history.
On Sept. 10, 2001, Armitage met with the UK’s national security advisor, Sir David Manning. Was Armitage “passing on specific intelligence information about the impending terrorist attacks”? The scenario is plausible because one day later—on 9-11—Dick Cheney directly called for Armitage’s presence down in his bunker. Immediately after WTC 2 was struck, Armitage told BBC Radio, “I was told to go to the operations center [where] I spent the rest of the day in the ops center with the vice president.”
These two share a long history together. Not only was Armitage employed by Cheney’s former company Halliburton (via Brown & Root), he was also a deputy when Cheney was secretary of defense under Bush the Elder. More importantly, Cheney and Armitage had joint business and consulting interests in the Central Asian pipeline which had been contracted by Unocal. The only problem standing between them and the Caspian Sea’s vast energy reserves was the Taliban.
Since the 1980s, Armitage amassed a huge roster of allies in Pakistan’s ISI. He was also one of the “Vulcans”—along with Condi Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Rabbi Dov Zakheim—who coordinated Bush’s geo-strategic foreign policy initiatives. Then, after 9-11, he negotiated with the Pakistanis prior to our invasion of Afghanistan, while also becoming Bush’s deputy secretary of state stationed in Afghanistan.
Our “enemy,” or course, was the Taliban “terrorists.” But George Tenet, Colin Powell, Porter Goss, and Armitage had developed a close relationship with Pakistan’s military head of the ISI—General Mahmoud Ahmad— who was cited in a Sept. 2001 FBI report as “supporting and financing the alleged 9-11 terrorists, as well as having links to al Qaeda and the Taliban.”
The line between friend and foe gets even murkier. Afghan President Hamid Karzai not only collaborated with the Taliban, but he was also on Unocal’s payroll in the mid-1990s. He is also described by Saudi Arabia’s Al-Watan newspaper as being “a Central Intelligence Agency covert operator since the 1980s that collaborated with the CIA in funding U.S. aid to the Taliban.”
Capturing a new, abundant source for heroin was an integral part of the U.S. “war on terror.” Hamid Karzai is a puppet ruler of the CIA; Afghanistan is a full-fledged narco-state; and the poppies that flourish there have yet to be eradicated, as was proven in 2003 when the Bush administration refused to destroy the crops, despite having the chance to do so. Major drug dealers are rarely arrested, smugglers enjoy carte blanche immunity, and Nushin Arbabzadah, writing for The Guardian, theorized that “U.S. Army planes leave Afghanistan carrying coffins empty of bodies, but filled with drugs.” Is that why the military protested so vehemently when reporters tried to photograph returning caskets?


Read more: http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/11/24/cia-heroin-still-rule-day-in-afghanistan.html#ixzz3BEqrJHaW

Nigéria: A importante escolha do Emir de Kano

Ancien patron de la Banque centrale du Nigéria, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi vient d’être couronné

Émir de Kano, dimanche dernier. Il s’agit néanmoins du banquier le plus célèbre d’Afrique, récemment

limogé au forceps par le régime actuel.


Le banquier Sanusi Lamido a été coopté dimanche 8 juin 2014 par un collège de dignitaires de l’Emirat de Kano pour succéder à

son oncle Ado Bayero, décédé à la suite d’une maladie, vendredi dernier. Face à l’ancien gouverneur, qui entretient depuis son

limogeage à la tête de la Banque centrale du Nigéria des rapports exécrables avec l’entourage du président nigérian, Jonathan

Goodluck, il y a eu 3 candidatures (Abbass Sanusi, oncle de Lamido, le gouverneur luimême, Ado Bayero, fils du défunt Émir)

pour prétendre à la couronne laissée vacante. Le profil du nouvel Émir de Kano devait sortir des clans Bayero et les Sanusi,

auxquels appartient l’ancien gouverneur.

Quatre membres du Conseil des sages traditionnels de l’Émirat se sont concertés plusieurs heures pour départager les candidats

à la succession d'Ado Bayero. Le banquier Sanusi Lamido avait le meilleur profil pour se faire introniser. Le verdict des sages n’a

pas été du goût des fidèles des candidats déchus. Des affrontements violents ont éclaté aussitôt après l’annonce du choix

d’introniser le banquier Sanusi Lamido à la tête de l'Émirat religieux de Kano (État situé au nord du Nigéria).

Le tout nouvel Émir Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, petit-fils du 11ème Émir de Kano, Sir Muhammadou Sanusi, auquel beaucoup de

spécialistes politiques nigérians prêtent de fortes ambitions présidentielles en 2015, a été suspendu de ses fonctions par le

président Goodluck Jonathan le 20 février 2014, après avoir évoqué une fraude de 20 milliards de dollars commise par les

associés du président de la Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC).
ISMAEL AIDARA

22.8.14

Timor-Leste: Por onde é que anda a Liberdade?

Timor-Leste tends to largely stay out of the international spotlight these days, much to the relief of those who have seen it in the headlines for the wrong reasons in the past.
Yet Timor’s proposed media law [pdf] has turned into news itself, raising international ire among NGOs, activists and media organisations.
The law would require all journalists to be certified, including bloggers. Foreign journalists would require government permission to report in the country. It would also require the media to “promote the national culture, values and identity” and would create a five-member Press Council that could exercise disciplinary authority, among other tasks.
Human Rights Watch has labelled the law “repressive”, while Time wrote of the threat in Timor that “if a government was able to influence broadcast content and put pressure on journalists, it would stand a good chance of disseminating its messages unchallenged”.
Drafts and redrafts have left campaigners unsatisfied, yet Parliament approved the law in May. President Taur Matan Ruak sent the law to the country’s top court to assess whether it was constitutional, and this week, the court found that it was not. The law now goes back to Parliament, giving activists another chance to push for changes.
In Timor, prominent journalist Jose Belo is leading the charge against the new law, along with think tank La’o Hamutuk (which is helpfully compiling developments and translations here).
Belo wrote on Crikey that the new media law is a “story of insiders versus outsiders, of the rich versus the poor” and that he would refuse to register as a journalist, no matter the consequences.
Belo is no stranger to controversy and has long been an outspoken activist. His Tempo Semanal newspaper has broken a number of large corruption stories and has had a major role in the state building process in Timor-Leste by pushing for transparency and accountability.
For a presentation to an international anti-corruption conference held in Dili in July last year, Belo wrote about the newspaper’s history and the challenges it has faced in its work, lambasting those who were more interested in protecting their own interests instead of supporting independent journalism.
… This is no joke. We at Tempo Semanal are considering closing the newspaper because we receive little or no support from those that claim to stand against corruption… The government chokes us like a chicken’s neck, the national and international business community here are too scared to advertise with us because they get all their contracts from the government, and the donor community is too scared to support us because they are afraid by doing so they will undermine their cosy relationship with Government.
But the problems with Timor’s press run even deeper, despite the tenacity of individual reporters.
For starters, the media in Timor is not yet in a position to be profitable, hamstringing its independence. The tiny nation, with a population of around 1.17 million, represents an even tinier media market—radio has the highest audience penetration, but even its weekly reach is only around 55 percent (UNMIT, 2011 [pdf]). Low literacy levels combined with linguistic diversity, and high production costs leading to high cover prices for papers, mean that newspaper audiences represent just a sliver of the total population and are mostly limited to Dili. It’s little wonder that there is limited advertising revenue for newsprint, especially for papers that may be annoying those in power.
So how do the papers and other media organisations survive? Well, one answer is that they simply run on the smell of an oily rag. Another answer is that UN agencies and NGOs operating in the country have set a precedent of paying to place press releases in newspapers and for the papers, television and radio stations to come out to cover their events, announcements, ceremonies and handshakes. While this may have subsided in line with the reduced presence of the international community in Dili in the last two years, actions by donors in the past have led to the business model of a number of media outlets becoming dependent on a steady stream of, what are essentially (often unidentified), advertorials. You can still get coverage without paying, but some agencies don’t want to take the risk of missing out.
On the one hand, this practice can be seen as a financial stop-gap while other elements needed to support a free and properly functioning media continue to develop. On the other hand, it is pervasive. It allows donors to influence the news agenda and raises them above questioning, when there are a lot of questions that could be asked. The journalists covering these stories are under no inducement to ask interesting questions, making the content dull. It encourages a culture within the media of polite deference instead of inquiry and investigation. And it aids and abets a government that is sensitive to any critical coverage—when content is supplied by agencies and NGOs that are keen to maintain their relations with the government, it is hardly going to be critical, as Belo argues.
Consequently, it seems that there is even less scrutiny of the machinery of aid in much of Timor-Leste’s media than there is of the government. But is heavy-handed regulation the only solution left after the media has failed to be capacity-built into professionalism through workshops?
Belo himself has criticised some of the media development initiatives run by donors, as have other organisations. For example, Freedom House writes that there is evidence to suggest that internationally funded media assistance “has contributed to what some Timorese journalists call a “project mentality,” in which news organisations become dependent on grants from non-state actors and find it difficult to be independently sustainable”.
Besides advertising from business and the international community, the government itself is the major financial backer of the Timor-Leste media, through advertising, through direct state support and through subsidies [in Tetum]. While our ABC shows that it is possible to have independent state-funded media, this is a more precarious proposition in Timor, given the sensitivity of the government to criticism. There are also problems in the relationships between government officials and journalists—there are reports of poorly-paid journalists receiving kick-backs from government officials for positive coverage, while other journalists and bloggers cannot access the information they need to accurately report.
On top of all this, the mobile revolution has been slow to take off due to a long-running telco monopoly (only broken by the entry of Telkomsel at the beginning of 2013). So unlike other countries in the region, where strong public momentum on social media and blogs has subsequently challenged the mainstream media to better perform, this counter voice is still subdued. The future development of online citizen journalism could also be threatened by the proposed law.
In a context of increasing concern around corruption and public spending, the arguments of the government about the law being necessary for quality ring hollow, as does the reasoning that the law will enshrine journalism as a profession with protections.
This law will not solve the quality challenge facing the Timor press. New voices, increased competition and stronger demands from audiences are probably the best hopes, and they cannot be legislated into existence.
Instead, there is a real threat of increasing self-censorship by publications and individual journalists to mitigate their financial and legal risk in the face of the new sanctions that can be imposed under the law, and a real threat to the freedom and diversity of the Timor-Leste media. As media ethicist Mark Pearson advised in a speech in Dili last year, “once media laws have been introduced it is hard to claw back eroded freedoms”.
As the resources boom offers up a once in a lifetime opportunity for Timorese to climb out of extreme poverty, the country needs independent watch dogs and checks and balances on government spending and actions. In light of all the progress that has been made since the dark days before independence, a new law threatening press freedom would be a troubling backward step.
Ashlee Betteridge , Research Officer at the Development Policy Centre.