Líbia: Até os islamitas combatem entre si

Des combats ont opposé samedi des jihadistes du groupe Etat islamique (EI) et des miliciens antigouvernementaux à Syrte, dans le centre de la Libye, pays plongé dans le chaos, selon des responsables. "Des combats acharnés se déroulent entre des combattants de Fajr Libya et ceux de la branche libyenne de l'EI", a indiqué à l'AFP le général Mohammed Al-Ajtal, l'un des commandants de cette coalition de milices, en déplorant un mort dans ses rangs. Un responsable local des services de sécurité a ensuite déclaré à l'AFP que les affrontements avaient pris fin à la nuit tombée, sans donner plus de détails ni fournir de bilan. Il s'agit des premiers combats à Syrte entre l'EI et Fajr Libya, coalition de milices notamment islamistes, depuis que la branche libyenne de l'EI a pris en février le contrôle de bâtiments gouvernementaux et de l'université dans cette située à quelque 450 km à l'est de Tripoli. Après l'entrée en février des jihadistes de l'EI à Syrte, Fajr Libya avait envoyé des renforts pour défendre la ville. Depuis la fin de la révolte qui a renversé en 2011 le régime de Mouammar Kadhafi, la Libye est morcelée et sous la coupe de milices rivales formées surtout d'ex-rebelles. Deux autorités s'y disputent le pouvoir: un gouvernement et un Parlement, soutenus par une armée et reconnus internationalement, siégeant dans l'est du pays, et un gouvernement et un Parlement parallèles installés à Tripoli par Fajr Libya, qui s'est emparée en août de la capitale et d'une grande partie de l'ouest libyen. Pour ajouter à la confusion, les deux autorités rivales, outre les combats qui les opposent, tentent de contrer l'influence de l'EI, qui contrôle de vastes territoires en Irak et en Syrie et est désormais présent en Libye et en Egypte voisine. Lors d'une conférence de presse à Tripoli, le Premier ministre du gouvernement parallèle a indiqué samedi qu'il ne laisserait pas "ce cancer (l'EI, ndlr) se propager". Omar el Hassi a aussi accusé le groupe jihadiste de travailler avec d'anciens cadres du régime de Kadhafi. La ville de Noufliyeh, située à 120 km à l'est de Syrte, est considérée comme un fief de l'EI et ce groupe jihadiste est également présent à Derna, une ville située à 850 km à l'est de Syrte et contrôlée par des groupes armés radicaux. Ce groupe extrémiste sunnite, responsable d'atrocités -viols, rapts, décapitations-, a revendiqué ses premières attaques en Libye en janvier avec un assaut spectaculaire contre un hôtel à Tripoli (neuf morts dont un Américain et un Français), puis en février la décapitation de 21 chrétiens, la plupart égyptiens. Les forces pro-gouvernementales menées par le général Khalifa Haftar ont par ailleurs effectué samedi des raids aériens dans la région de Zouara, à 120 km à l'ouest de Tripoli. Nos avions y ont frappé des dépôts d'armes et des positions de miliciens, a indiqué à l'AFP un responsable militaire, disant agir en représailles à un raid de Fajr Libya sur l'aéroport de Zentan, à 160 km au sud-ouest de Tripoli. Les milices de Zentan, anti-islamistes et chassées de la capitale par Fajr Libya à l'été, sont loyales aux forces de Haftar et au gouvernement reconnu. Lire l'article sur Jeuneafrique.com : Libye | Libye : combats entre jihadistes de l'État islamique et miliciens à Syrte | Jeuneafrique.com - le premier site d'information et d'actualité sur l'Afrique Follow us: @jeune_afrique on Twitter | jeuneafrique1 on Facebook

Recurso à força contra o Estado Islâmico

The Vatican says force may be necessary to stop attacks on Christians and other Middle East minorities by Islamic State (IS) if no political solution is found. Archbishop Silvano Tomasi, the Vatican's top diplomat at the UN in Geneva, said jihadists were committing "genocide" and must be stopped. The Vatican traditionally opposes military intervention in the region. However, Pope Francis decried the beheading in February of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians by IS in Libya. The militants have targeted minority religious groups in the parts of Syria and Iraq under their control. Thousands more people have been forced to flee their homes. In an interview with US Catholic website Crux, Archbishop Tomasi said: "What's needed is a co-ordinated and well-thought-out coalition to do everything possible to achieve a political settlement without violence. "But if that's not possible, then the use of force will be necessary." He added: "We have to stop this kind of genocide. Otherwise we'll be crying out in the future about why we didn't so something, why we allowed such a terrible tragedy to happen." Archbishop Silvano Tomasi said the rights of all minorities had to be protected Christians were the main target of IS attacks, the archbishop said, but all minorities were human beings whose rights had to be protected. "Christians, Yazidis, Shias, Sunnis, Alawites, all are human beings whose rights deserve to be protected," he said. Any coalition, he said, must include Muslim states from the Middle East and be guided by the UN. Crux said the archbishop's endorsement of military action was "unusually blunt". In February, human rights organisations warned that IS was trying to eradicate Iraqi minority groups from large areas of the country. In a report, they detailed summary executions, forced conversions, rapes and other abuses suffered by minorities. BBC

A nova aliança Boko Haram-Estado Islâmico

O Estado Islâmico, proclamado em 29 de Junho de 2014 por Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi, aceitou a aliança proposta pelo Boko Haram, que actua no Nordeste da Nigéria, afectando as fronteiras com o Níger, o Chade e os Camarões. Da Europa Ocidental, da África do Norte, da Ásia Central e de outras regiões seguem entretanto jihadistas para a Síria e o Iraque. Na Líbia já existe um ramo do Estado Islâmico; e este também tem aliados na Argélia, no Egipto, no Afeganistão e no Paquistão. O desafio islamita surgiu depois do surgimento e malogro ou repressão das tão controversas primaveras árabes. E agora aí as temos, as muitas faces da jihad mundial, que vai do Mali à Somália e das costas do Mediterrâneo ao Mar Arábico, sem esquecer o Emirato do Cáucaso e o Movimento Islâmico do Uzbequistão. A crise síria e o desenvolvimento de um novo terrorismo islamita, na Nigéria, na Síria e no Iraque, levaram a atentados na França, na Bélgica, no Reino Unido, na Dinamarca e na Austrália. O Islão, o velho Islão, com a sua conquista fulgurante, nos séculos VII e VIII, de Sevilha a Samarcanda, não deixa de nos surpreender, desde que chegou ao Xinjiang, ao Decão, à Malásia e à Indonésia. Se 31,5 por dento da Humanidade é cristã, 23,2 por cento é muçulmana, sendo estas as duas grandes religiões dos últimos 2.000 anos, havendo sucedido ao politeísmo, ao animismo, à redacção dos Veda, texto de referência do hinduísmo, ao primeiro templo judaico de Jerusalém, ao xintoísmo, ao taoismo, a Buda e a Confúcio. O Cristianismo e o Islão constituem o fundo religioso de mais de metade da Humanidade; e é por isso que os cristãos da Europa e das Américas não podem ignorar países muçulmanos tão populosos como a Turquia, o Egipto, o Paquistão, o Bangladesh e a Indonésia. Importa bem verificar como é que esses países se posicionam perante o jihadismo. Kairouan, Cairo, Medina, Meca, Karbala, Bagdad e Qom, entre outros, são santuários da alma muçulmana, a não ignorar por quem tente entender, minimamente que seja, o fenómeno religioso, que ainda ninguém conseguiu erradicar da face da Terra. Temos pois que estar muito atentos ao que se passa em Marrocos, na Argélia, na Tunísia, na Líbia, no Egipto, na Síria, no Iraque e por aí fora, para um dia não acordarmos com fundamentalistas islâmicos em Malta, em Lampedusa, na Sicília, na Sardenha ou na Córsega. O mundo muçulmano, maioritariamente sunita, é uma grande realidade a ter devidamente em conta por quem vive na Europa, pois que de Tripoli a Nápoles ou de Benghazi ao Pireu o caminho é curto, podendo ser feito em escassas horas. Na Turquia, esse cavalo de Tróia que de há muito se tenta introduzir na União Europeia,99,8 por cento da população é muçulmana, havendo também comunidades muito significativas em Chipre, Albânia, Kosovo, Bósnia-Herzegovina e Macedónia. Estejamos pois atentos à nebulosa jihadista, em todos os seus aspectos, chamem-se eles Signatários pelo Sangue, Al-Qaeda no Magreb Islâmico, Soldados do Califado, Boko Haram, Estado Islâmico ou Ansar Bait al-Maqdis. JH 14 de Março de 2015

Líbia: A hora do general Khalifa Haftar

The impact of jihadists claiming allegiance to IS has increased and General Haftar seems set on a military solution. The escalation of violence by 'Islamic State' in Libya over the past month has contributed fresh horror to an already bloody conflict. However, the prospect of IS succeeding in establishing a new branch of its 'caliphate' in North Africa is far from certain. The Geneva talks process led by the United Nations in Morocco is in tatters, against a background of trademark spectacular murders of captives by IS. Yet further talks could take place. More moderate voices are still looking for compromise and at least one new proposal, whose details are yet unknown, may come before the warring parties in the next fortnight. Influential political figures in Tripoli, Misurata and Cyrenaica who all fear the destructive influence of their more belligerent Islamist allies, might welcome it, we hear. The alternative is for Khalifa Belqasim Haftar and his Egyptian backers to go for a pure military victory over their enemies in the Islamist-Misurata alliance of Fajr Libya (Libya Dawn) and IS (aka Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant: ISIS/ISIL). On 2 March, Parliament in Tobruk confirmed Haftar, who supported the late Colonel Moammar el Gadaffi until 1987, as Army Commander and he was promoted Lieutenant General (AC Vol 55 No 11, Enter the General). Meanwhile, the fighting is seriously affecting foreign currency reserves, currently the fractured state's only means of supporting the population. They could soon run out and precipitate a humanitarian crisis. The UN Special Representative for Libya, Spanish diplomat Bernardino León, had hoped to convene a fourth round of negotiations in Morocco during the last week of February between representatives from the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, which backs Haftar, and its Islamist-dominated rival, the Tripoli-based rump General National Congress. But following a spate of IS suicide bombings against HoR-related targets in the eastern town of El Qubbah, HoR members voted not to attend the talks. The IS attacks were a response to Egyptian air force strikes – the country's first foreign military action since the 1973 war with Israel – which were themselves retaliation for IS's beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic captives in mid-February. Splits of convenience 'The talks are quite stuck at the moment,' European Council on Foreign Relations analyst Mattia Toaldo told Africa Confidential, noting that, 'The HoR have no incentive to strike any deal because they have all they need.' The HoR's current advantages include international legitimacy and military superiority. Even the emergence of IS, with all its dangers, can be interpreted as a potential strategic advantage for the Tobruk government of Abdullah el Thani and Haftar's Libyan National Army because it reflects a split within the ranks of Fajr Libya. Sooner or later the militias from Misurata, which are now targeting HoR's control of oil export terminals in the oil crescent of the Sirte Basin, will have to turn and fight IS. Businessmen in Misurata presently backing the militia are desperate to find a way out of a conflict which they look like losing and which is ruining them commercially. Banking independence Whether the social and economic fabric of the country can hold together while the various elements of the conflict are militarily resolved is unclear. March could be the month when the Central Bank of Libya (CBL)'s access to ready cash will run out. Libya will, of course, be far from bankrupt. Its sovereign wealth funds may hold at least US$60 billion and it may yet have the same amount again in illiquid foreign reserves. Yet the shortage of cash has been worsening since the beginning of the year and all parts of the country are experiencing increasingly severe shortages of electricity, fuel and staple foods, all of which are imported and paid for in hard currency. In a vain attempt to impose independent control over the nation's dwindling assets, the CBL is insisting on its institutional and operational independence. While that may have prevented the rival governments from using the control of financial assets as a weapon, it funds both of them. The bank has institutionalised the payment of vast sums to militia leaders, which funds wages for their fighters and an equally lucrative business in the cross-border smuggling of subsidised commodities. According to a recent local television interview with the Tripoli-based Oil Minister, Mashallah Zwei, the smuggling of fuel out of the country costs his government about 400 million Libyan dinars ($300 mn.) per month (AC Vol 55 No 24, A tale of two cities). Many young people are loyal to the militias because they pay them wages and there are no viable economic alternatives. In this respect, Libya's political problems are a product of its economic dysfunction. Oil workers flee The other 'independently' functioning state institution, the National Oil Corporation, has also found it increasingly hard to operate. Production has fallen to a little above the level necessary to supply those domestic refineries that are still working. In mid-February, following a number of attacks on its facilities, NOC warned that 'the recurrence of such incidents is causing the migration of technical manpower away from oil fields'; staff are leaving over fears for their safety. 'If these incidents continue, NOC will have to stop all operations in all oil fields', it said in a separate statement. This is almost unthinkable and unprecedented. Indeed, it has since brought two terminals back into production, indicating that the trends are not entirely negative. Other vital parts of the infrastructure are also under severe pressure. As Africa Confidential went to press reports were coming in that the Bahi and Mabruk oilfields, about 300 miles east of Tripoli, had fallen under the control of forces loyal to Fajr Libya. Islamist groups attacked these same fields in mid-February. In terms of output, they are less important than fields in the eastern part of the Sirte basin. So, although these are among the largest of Libya's oilfields, no strategic change in the balance of power is evident. The two fields have not been operating since their export terminal at Sidra was put out of action last December. Libya Fajr, however, seems to be pursuing a campaign of occupying as many oilfields as they can, especially those, like Bahi and Mabruk, which are close to the front line with Haftar's forces. In mid-February, the state electricity utility, the General Electric Company of Libya, said that failures in the national power grid had caused it to collapse into four isolated networks. Combined with shortages of both diesel oil and natural gas, GECOL estimated that it had lost two-fifths of installed generating capacity. Tripoli residents complain of power cuts lasting more than six hours a day. Interruptions to the water supply are also common: 80% of the population depends on the Great Man-Made River, a pipeline network which brings water from prehistoric aquifers under the Sahara to the coast. Once at the surface, water in the eastern branch from Sarir and Kufra runs by gravity to Ajdabiya on the coast. However, the western branch, which has already suffered some vandalism, requires pumping to cross the Jebel Nafousa to Tripoli and is therefore dependent on electric power. There is international division over how to deal with a conflict which threatens the security of neighbouring states, the Sahel, southern Europe and beyond. An alliance of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates with backing from Saudi Arabia, has long supported Haftar's Operation Karama (Dignity). This has generally been interpreted as part of a wider campaign based on the desire of Egyptian President Abdel Fatah el Sisi and Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahayan, to destroy the Muslim Brotherhood as a political force (AC Vol 54 No 17, High stakes in the Sinai fight). Egypt may support Haftar but it will not hesitate to drop him if it feels that he is not adequately protecting its western border against jihadist infiltration or military action. So far, there is no other plan for Egypt to stabilise that border, so it will persist with Haftar, though the UN Security Council opposes Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry's proposal to lift the arms embargo against the Tobruk government and to impose a naval blockade on ports controlled by Fajr Libya. The murder of its citizens by IS and the belief that an IS caliphate in Libya would directly threaten Egypt, which is already fighting an Islamist insurgency in Sinai, means Cairo 'feels no restraint any more because it has been declared a matter of national security', says Toaldo (AC Vol 55 No 17). Russia also supports lifting the arms embargo. Prime Minister El Thani went to Moscow to discuss counter-terrorism on 27 February, stopping in Cairo en route to offer his condolences for the murder of the Copts. Within Europe, France also supports the Egypt-UAE axis, although its Sahel deployments mean it is overstretched, while Italy, the nearest mainland European country to Libya and its former colonial power, has also said it would support a military response. The United States and Britain remain determined not to take sides in the conflict and they back the UN. This policy may be partly dictated by their domestic political cycles. In neither country is there much appetite for involvement in more Middle East conflicts in the lead-up to elections in November and May respectively. This view also appears motivated by a deep reluctance to line up behind Haftar and Egypt, whose rhetoric on counter-terrorism reflects a broader anti-Islamist political agenda. At a joint press conference on 19 February in Algiers with his counterpart, Ramtane Lamamra, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, argued, 'We don't believe that military action can solve the problem in Libya,' adding 'the Algerian position and the British position are identical... we believe in an inclusive political solution in Libya'. A recent paper by the International Crisis Group argued that 'Libya needs a negotiated political bargain and an international effort that channels efforts toward that goal'. Its recommendations included the notion that the UN should attempt to 'de-emphasise' the legitimacy of the Tobruk government, 'be more forthright in confronting regional actors who contribute to the conflict by providing arms or other military or political support', should keep the arms embargo in place and 'protect the neutrality and independence' of the CBL and NOC. In every case, though, the trends are running strongly in the opposite direction. Copyright © Africa Confidential 2015

Crise no Sahel: 2011-2015

Grave concerns persist for some 20 million people in the Sahel. Recurrent conflict, erratic weather patterns, epidemics and other shocks continue to weaken the resilience of households across a region still suffering chronic levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. An estimated 20.4 million people remain food insecure at the start of 2015. At least 2.6 million people have already crossed the crisis threshold, 70 percent of whom are in Niger, Nigeria, Mali and Chad where insecurity and poverty compound food insecurity. Epidemics continue to demand urgent attention in 2015. Besides cholera, meningitis, Lassa and yellow fever, more recently, Ebola has been posing a serious threat to the Sahel region and has already impacted Mali, Nigeria, and Mali directly. Beyond the chronic threats of food insecurity, malnutrition and epidemics, violent conflict in and around the Sahel region has led to a surge in population displacement. The region begins 2015 with some 2.8 million people displaced; over a million more than in early 2014. With escalating conflict in northeast Nigeria, an estimated one million people have been internally displaced. Some 150,000 Nigerian refugees have fled to neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The volatile security situation in northern Mali continues to have a devastating impact on civilians, hampering the return of refugees, affecting markets and preventing the full restoration of basic services. Some 133,000 Malian refugees remain in Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso and more than 80,000 Malians remain internally displaced. As in Nigeria, high levels of insecurity in northern Mali also greatly impact the ability of humanitarians to access those in need. (Sahel: A call for humanitarian aid, 12 Feb 2015) --- É assim o pós-Kadhafi no Sara-Sahel. Para quem há três anos ainda não tinha compreendido os efeitos desastrosos do desmoronar do sistema líbio.

Isabel dos Santos quer fusão BPI-BCP

Isabel dos Santos formalizou ontem à noite, em carta enviada ao presidente executivo do CaixaBank e a Fernando Ulrich e Nuno Amado uma proposta de fusão entre o BPI e o BCP, apurou o Económico. Na carta, a empresária angolana defende a criação do maior banco com sede em Portugal, e com posições em Angola, Moçambique e Polónia, e uma gestão portuguesa e independente dos accionistas. O novo banco passaria a ser controlado por Angola, através da Sonangol, accionista de referência do BCP6.24%, e da própria Isabel dos Santos. Além do CaixaBank, claro. A Oferta Pública de Aquisição (OPA) do CaixaBank sobre o BPI7.43% a 1,329 euros por acção ainda não tinha merecido qualquer resposta de Isabel dos Santos, a segunda maior accionista com 19% do capital. Mas o silêncio era ensurdecedor, leia-se, a empresária angolana não está disponível para aceitar a OPA nas condições presentes. Outra das condições para o sucesso da oferta é o fim da limitação dos direitos de voto no BPI7.43%, hoje nos 20%, quando o CaixaBank tem 44,1% do capital. O Económico

A persistência da memória africana

Desde o Bornu até ao Borno Uma curiosa viagem histórica de muitos séculos pode ajudar-nos a compreender o que liga o antigo império de Bornu ao actual estado nigeriano de Borno, sede do grupo fundamentalista islâmico Boko Haram. Jorge Heitor A História, quando nos é contada por mestres fascinantes, como o burkinabe Joseph Ki-Zerbo, mostra-nos bem que muitas das coisas que estão a acontecer hoje em dia têm algo a ver com outras que se verificaram há 500 ou mais anos. E a África, ao contrário do que poderiam imaginar alguns, ainda no século XIX, teve ao longo dos tempos muitos reinos e impérios, não tendo sentido a necessidade de esperar os primeiros contactos com os europeus para se "civilizar". Por volta de 1600, por exemplo, a potência dominante nas imediações do Lago Chade era o Bornu, governado nessa altura por Idriss Alaoma, que se informou sobre as técnicas militares do Egipto e comandou tropas que recorriam ao uso tanto de cavalos como de camelos. Sabia-se então, sabia quem por lá vivia, que havia um reino de Bornu e um reino de Karem, se bem que quem estivesse na Europa julgasse muitas vezes que a sul do Sara as populações eram como que bandos de selvagens. Suposições obscurantistas que só com muita dificuldade viriam a ser abandonadas. Puritano islamista, Idriss Alaoma é um dos antepassados espirituais dos homens que actualmente vivem no estado nigeriano de Borno; e mandou construir em Meca, na Arábia Saudita, um albergue ou estalagem para os peregrinos. Naqueles tempos, no início do século XVII, a população de etnia e língua kanuri dominava a bacia do lago Chade, tal como hoje em dia os Kanuris constituem a parte principal dos quadros do movimento fundamentalista Boko Haram, que tanto actua em territórios nigerianos como nigerinos, chadianos e camaroneses. No século XVIII o Bornu ainda exercia uma grande influência cultural e religiosa no interior da África Negra, a sul do Trópico de Câncer, tendo guias espirituais que eram muito versados no Alcorão, o livro que diz que "não há outra divindade senão Deus e Maomé é o seu profeta". Sultões e cidadelas foram-se sucedendo nos territórios que hoje constituem o Níger, a Nigéria, o Chade e os Camarões, até que a colonização francesa e a britânica tentou em vão apagar da face da Terra a recordação desses tempos, como se isso alguma vez fosse possível. Não era! O Kanem, o Bornu e a Fezânia (sul da actual Líbia) são realidade bem palpáveis, que existiram há 600, 700, 800 anos; e que nenhum político do século XX seria capaz de apagar da memória dos povos. A África pode ter sido adormecida, anestesiada, durante o período colonial e os primeiros anos das independências que se seguiram à descolonização, mas ela não morreu, na sua verdade intrínseca, naquilo que verdadeiramente é. E ela está lá, na consciência dos povos, quer se queira quer não, quer se goste ou não goste. Haussas, Fulas, Kanuris, Saras e outros são povos africanos, de que evidentemente a maioria dos ocidentais nunca ouviu falar, mas que têm tanto direito de existir e tanto orgulho de o serem como os Bascos, os Catalães, os Corsos, os Sérvios ou os Croatas. É bom não esquecê-lo, para que não haja equívocos. O fundo cultural negro-africano persistirá sempre nos novos países da África Central, Oriental e Austral, por mais influências externas que estes tenham sofrido, nos últimos 125 anos. Querer ignorá-lo não será bom para ninguém.