Grécia: Corrupção oficial e crime organizado

Greece is a regional financial center for the Balkans, as well as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. Official corruption, the presence of organized crime, and a large informal economy make the country vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing. Greek law enforcement proceedings show that Greece is vulnerable to narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons and illegal immigration, prostitution, smuggling of cigarettes and other contraband, serious fraud or theft, illicit gaming activities, and large scale tax evasion. Evidence suggests financial crimes have increased in recent years and criminal organizations, some with links to terrorist groups, are increasingly trying to use the Greek banking system to launder illicit proceeds. Criminally-derived proceeds historically are most commonly invested in real estate, the lottery, and the stock market. Criminal organizations from southeastern Europe, the Balkans, Georgia, and Russia are responsible for a large percentage of the crime that generates illicit funds. The widespread use of cash facilitates a gray economy as well as tax evasion, although the government is trying to crack down on both trends. Due to the large informal economy, it is difficult to determine the value of goods smuggled into the country, including whether any of the smuggled goods are funded by narcotic or other illicit proceeds. There is increasing evidence that domestic terrorist groups are involved with drug trafficking. Greece has three free trade zones (FTZs), located at the Heraklion, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki port areas. Goods of foreign origin may be brought into the FTZs without payment of customs duties or other taxes and remain free of all duties and taxes if subsequently transshipped or re-exported. Similarly, documents pertaining to the receipt, storage, or transfer of goods within the FTZs are free from stamp taxes. The FTZs also may be used for repacking, sorting, and re-labeling operations. Assembly and manufacture of goods are carried out on a small scale in the Thessaloniki Free Zone. These FTZs may pose vulnerabilities for trade-based and other money laundering operations. Relatório da Secretaria de Estado norte-americana sobre Lavagem de Dinheiro e Crimes Financeiros

Afganistão: Maior produtor mundial de ópio

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is not a regional or offshore financial center. Terrorist and insurgent financing, money laundering, cash smuggling, abuse of informal value transfer systems, and other illicit activities designed to finance organized criminal activity continue to pose serious threats to the security and development of Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains a major narcotics trafficking and producing country, and is the world’s largest opium producer and exporter. The narcotics trade, corruption, and contract fraud are major sources of illicit revenue and laundered funds. Corruption permeates all levels of Afghan government and society. The growth in Afghanistan’s banking sector has slowed considerably in recent years; and traditional payment systems, particularly hawala networks, remain significant in their reach and scale. Less than five percent of the Afghan population uses banks, depending instead on the traditional hawala system, which provides a range of financial and non-financial business services in local, regional, and international markets. Approximately 90 percent of financial transactions run through the hawala system, including foreign exchange transactions, funds transfers, trade and microfinance, as well as some deposit-taking activities. Official corruption and weaknesses in the banking sector incentivize the use of informal mechanisms and exacerbate the difficulty of developing a transparent formal financial sector in Afghanistan. The unlicensed and unregulated hawaladars in major drug areas such as Helmand likely account for a substantial portion of the illicit proceeds being moved in the financial system. Afghan business consortiums that control both hawaladars and banks allow criminal elements within these consortiums to manipulate domestic and international financial networks to send, receive, and launder illicitly-derived monies or funds intended for criminal, insurgent, or terrorism activities. The rapid depreciation of the Iranian rial in October 2012 led to increased demand for U.S. dollars in Iran and a reported increase in cash smuggling from Afghanistan to Iran. Relatório norte-americano sobre Lavagem de Dinheiro e Crimes Financeiros

Líbia: O terrorismo propaga-se à Tunísia

Selon le secrétaire d'État tunisien chargé des affaires sécuritaires, les deux auteurs de l'attentat du musée du Bardo à Tunis, qui a coûté la vie à 21 personnes dont vingt touristes, se sont formés au maniement des armes en Libye. Les terroristes du carnage au musée du Bardo ont été formés en Libye. Selon Rafik Chelly, qui s'est exprimé jeudi soir sur la chaîne privée AlHiwar Ettounsi, il s'agit de deux éléments extrémistes salafistes takfiris qui ont quitté clandestinement le pays en décembre dernier pour la Libye où ils ont pu se former aux armes. "Nous n'avons pas les détails mais il y a des camps d'entraînement pour les Tunisiens (en Libye) à Sabratha, à Benghazi et à Derna, donc (ils ont pu se former) dans l'un de ces camps", a-t-il ajouté. >> Lire aussi : Attaque du musée du Bardo : comment un guide tunisien a sauvé trente touristes Les deux assaillants avaient été identifiés par les autorités : il s'agit de Yassine Abidi et de Hatem Khachnaoui. Le secrétaire d'État tunisien a précisé que le premier avait été arrêté avant son départ en Libye, sans autres précisions. "Les deux hommes étaient des éléments suspects faisant partie de ce qu'on appelle les cellules dormantes, formées d'éléments présents dans les villes, connus, dont nous savons qu'ils sont takfiris, dont nous savons qu'ils peuvent mener des opérations mais il faut rassembler les indices pour pouvoir mener une arrestation", a fait valoir le responsable. (Avec AFP) Lire l'article sur Jeuneafrique.com : Terrorisme | Tunisie : les terroristes du musée du Bardo ont été entraînés en Libye | Jeuneafrique.com - le premier site d'information et d'actualité sur l'Afrique Follow us: @jeune_afrique on Twitter | jeuneafrique1 on Facebook

Bissau: Corrupção e impunidade

Guinea-Bissau continues to experience political disruptions due to the transit of narcotics and the flow of money related to the drug trade. The cohesion and effectiveness of the state itself is very poor; corruption and impunity are major problems and the judiciary has demonstrated its lack of integrity on a number of occasions. On April 8, 2010, the United States Department of the Treasury designated two Guinea-Bissau-based individuals – former Bissau-Guinean Navy Chief of Staff Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto and Air Force Chief of Staff Ibraima Papa Camara – as drug kingpins. On April 2, 2013, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration arrested Na Tchuto. On May 18, 2012, the UNSC adopted resolution 2048 imposing a travel ban on five Bissau-Guinean military officers in response to their seizure of power from the civilian government on April 12, 2012. On May 31, 2012, the EU followed with a travel ban and freezes on the assets of the military junta members. One of the poorest countries in the world, the value of the illicit narcotics trade in Guinea-Bissau is very large compared to the size of the Bissau-Guinean economy. Drug proceeds, often in U.S. dollars, circulate in Guinea-Bissau, albeit outside the formal financial system. Traffickers from Latin America and collaborators from the region continue to take advantage of the extreme poverty, unemployment, political instability, lack of effective customs and law enforcement, corruption, and general insecurity to make the country a major transit point for cocaine destined for consumer markets, mainly in Europe. A multitude of small offshore islands, upon or near which drug shipments may be dropped, and complicit officials and military officers able to sidestep weak and under-resourced enforcement efforts with impunity contribute to the problem. Transition President Nhamadjo has declared the problem a top priority for his administration, although no resources have been devoted to this effort, nor is there the capacity to take steps toward enforcement. The formal financial sector in Guinea-Bissau is undeveloped, poorly supervised, and dwarfed by the size of the underground economy. For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism, which can be found at: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/ Relatório do Departamento de Estado norte-americano sobre lavagem de dinheiro e crimes financeiros. Se bem que só tenha saído agora, é óbvio que o relatório foi essencialmente elaborado há quatro ou cinco meses, antes de o actual Governo ter tomado posse. Só nos resta esperar que no fim deste ano o panorama já possa ser um bocado diferente.

Líbia: Um grande erro britânico

Arriving in Benghazi by C-130 military transport plane in May 2011 as the UK special envoy’s stabilisation adviser, I could never have imagined the dark future that lay ahead. We were led to believe by political emigres in the UK that rebuilding Libya would be a relatively simple operation: Muammar Gaddafi was finished, Libya’s army was useless and its tribes were broken. A new state was to be built on fresh and firm foundations. How mistaken we were. Just four years later, Libya is witnessing an explosion in violence, led by al-Qaida and Islamic State (Isis): the gruesome murder of Egyptian Christians, devastating suicide bombings, the kidnapping of western oil workers and the discovery of countless headless soldiers and civil-society activists in Benghazi. Back in 2011, while everyone trumpeted democracy, human rights and transparent institutions, competing Libyan political alliances differed over the means. The popular, politically liberal – though still socially conservative – majority, represented by the National Forces Alliance, promoted reform. The much less popular, but better organised, Islamists and their allies preferred continuous revolution. Unhappy with just a share in the state, the Islamists wanted to own it entirely – and now, following three consecutive losses at the ballot box, they are the ones responsible for leading Libya towards annihilation. In retrospect, little thought was spared in London for our common values or interests when we “exited stage left” following Gaddafi’s demise in 2011. Without a long-term strategy for Libya and clear support for those who shared our values and interests (both security and commercial), we all inherited the worst of both worlds. An alarming terror threat is now metastasising beneath the “soft underbelly” of Europe. Libya’s economy – critical for the provision of jobs for the young and a barrier of prosperity against illegal migration to Europe – is at increasing risk of total collapse. Amid the fighting on the ground, the cloud of social media “designed to influence”, and the rebadging into Isis of long-established black-flag wavers who took part in the original ousting of Gaddafi, the political challenge is clear. Poignantly, western advisers with experience of other conflict zones noted in private in 2011 that, were these extremists only a few degrees further to the east on the map – in Afghanistan for example – we would have targeted them, as opposed to coordinating with them. Despite the remark by Philip Hammond, the British foreign secretary, that “there is no authority in Libya to engage with”, the Libyan parliament remains resolute in tribally secure Tobruk. The army and police, with whom we share security and commercial interests, are (albeit only just) containing the extremists in Benghazi. And the administration, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, occupying Tripoli – with whom we have nothing in common – has been called out on its covert relationships with extremists. The bottom line is: we can’t do business with the militias occupying Tripoli Libya is not that complicated. The relationships between, and agendas of, the various and competing tribes and Islamist groupings are now well-mapped. However, what is not clear is the bureaucracy surrounding the western policy-making process. Having now returned to the commercial sector following service in Libya, I know what the bottom line is: we can’t do business with the militias occupying Tripoli. And, following the assassination of so many old friends and acquaintances from those early days and now, with the recent killing in militia-held Tripoli of Intisar al-Hasiri, another leading female civil-society activist, it is clear that only Libyans can solve their problems. However, the UK government’s fence-sitting is not only undermining the democratically elected parliament’s efforts to deal with the situation, but also endangers the UK’s long-term interests across the rest of the region. The Libyans deserve more, and are the only ones capable of dealing with Isis – or would be if only they were empowered to do so. Without immediate and concerted intervention in support of the democratic authorities – excluding “boots on the ground”, but including the deployment of diplomatic missions to sit alongside parliament, the provision of advisers and intelligence to support the police and army’s efforts to combat Isis, and the unambiguous recognition of parliament’s supreme authority over Libya’s central bank and sovereign wealth fund – Libya risks a permanent “failed state” status. Britain’s prime minister has a duty to urgently review the UK’s equivocal position on Libya and avoid the damaging assertion, to which civil servants cling tight, that “there is no military solution to Libya, only political”. For anyone who has read Clausewitz, military means are, of course, political. And the Islamists, including Isis, are giving us a masterclass in them. Joseph Walker-Cousins

Mapa cor-de-rosa: Portugal ao serviço da Alemanha

A Alemanha esteve por trás do Mapa Cor-de-Rosa Em 1873, Portugal apresentava-se em Angola e Moçambique, como chave da diplomacia alemã, de uma Alemanha potência emergente, que se unificara há pouco e que queria grandes negócios para os seus banqueiros, comerciantes e armadores. Quem assim fala da colocação do Governo português ao serviço da expensão ultramarina germânica é Álvaro Henriques do Vale, num livro agora publicado pela Chiado Editora: "Do Mapa Cor-de-Rosa à Europa do Estado Novo". D. Fernando II de Saxe-Coburgo-Gotha, o construtor do Palácio da Pena, só falava em alemão com os filhos; e a diplomacia de Berlim resolveu aproveitar o facto de a corte portuguesa de então ser dominado por um espírito e cultura alemães. O país de Bismarck queria subtrair a Península Ibérica à alçada britânica e transformá-la num mercado para os produtos alemães, bem como numa ponte para Marrocos e terras mais a sul. Guilherme II, que subiu ao poder em 1888, sonhou colocar gente sua nas Canárias, em Cabo Verde e em Fernando Pó, na actual Guiné Equatorial, de modo a contrabalançar o domínio britânico sobre os mares. "O Mapa Cor-de-Rosa é talvez o principal pormenor de toda uma política de Berlim, agendada e prevista para o século que se avizinhava", diz-nos Álvaro Henriques do Vale, formado em Ciências da Informação e da Comunicação, na Universidade Católica Portuguesa. Portugal e a Espanha foram vistos pelos homens do Kaiser e de Bismarck como pontes para a Alemanha se expandir para um sonhado Ultramar, constituindo uma alternativa ao Reino Unido. A pátria que se unificara em redor da velha Prússia queria mais, muito mais, não se conformando em ser apenas uma potência europeia; e por isso entrou em abordagens com Portugal para que este traísse o antiquíssimo tratado luso-britânico. Políticos como Vicente Barbosa du Bocage e Barros Gomes apostaram na Alemanha, colocaram-se sob a sua protecção, afastando-se da Grã-Bretanha, a mais velha aliada de Lisboa. "África era o continente à mão, virgem, cheio de matérias-primas para abastecer o Vale do Ruhr, o coração industrial da nova Prússia", continua a escrever o autor deste livro, que dia 25 de Março é apresentado na livraria Desassosego, em Lisboa, pelo Prof. Ernesto José Rodrigues e pelo escritor Fernando Dacosta. E foi nesse contexto que Barros Gomes, ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, apresentou ao Parlamento o plano do Mapa Cor-de-Rosa, para unir territorialmente Angola e Moçambique. Alguns governantes portugueses pensaram que os novos amigos alemães poderiam cobrir a dívida pública desta velha nação anquilosada, que outrora fora alguém, no contexto internacional. Mas enganaram-se; e surgiu o ultimato inglês de 11 de Janeiro de 1890, que tanto nos envergonhou. O convénio luso-alemão de 1886 foi parar ao caixote do lixo da História, mas a verdade é que Berlim teve planos para se instalar na Catembe, frente a Lourenço Marques (hoje Maputo), e na Baía dos Tigres, no sul de Angola. A Alemanha não chegou a concretizar a sua ambição de ficar com as terras entre a Baía dos Tigres e a foz do rio Cunene, mas entretanto a França conseguiu arrebatar a Portugal a zona de Casamansa, no Sul do Senegal, entre a Gâmbia e a actual Guiné-Bissau. Eram tempos em que diferentes países europeus se digladiavam para ficar com pequenos pedaços da África, como se ela não tivesse dono, não pertencesse aos africanos. É por tudo isso e por muito mais que merece a pena encetar a leitura das 511 páginas deste interessante livro sobre o período decorrido de 1871 a 1939, 68 anos de geopolítica, pela pena de um esforçado jornalista e investigador. Jorge Heitor 18 de Março de 2015

Da Lili da Parede à guerra na Guiné-Bissau

"Recordo-me da menina mais espampanante, na altura areia de mais para qualquer camioneta, a Lili da Parede, uma louraça bem bronzeada, que andava um ou dois anos mais adiantada (creio que frequentava 0 6º, quando nós andávamos no 4º ou 5º)e que hoje dá pelo nome de Lili Caneças". Quem assim escreve é o embaixador Francisco Manuel Guimarães Henriques da Silva (foto), no livro "Guerra na Bolanha", hoje lançado pela editora Âncora, no seu programa sobre o fim do império colonial português. O diplomata nasceu em 17 de Dezembro de 1944, em Lisboa. E Maria Alice Custódio de Carvalho Monteiro, a Lili da Parede, em 4 de Abril desse mesmo ano, na Guarda. "Recordo-me das lições do falecido professor Marcello Caetano. O mestre subia à tribuna, ladeado por dois assistentes, Diogo Freitas do Amaral e Miguel Galvão Teles. Os 300 e tal alunos levantavam-se". Estas são mais algumas linhas das memórias do embaixador Francisco Henriques da Silva, que nos fala dos anos da sua formação, da ida para a Guiné como alferes miliciano e do ingresso na carreira diplomática, que o levaria aos Estados Unidos, à França, ao Canadá, a Bissau, à Costa do Marfim, à Índia, ao México e à Hungria. Manuel Barão da Cunha, coordenador do Programa Fim do Império, escreveu uma nota prévia ao livro de 302 páginas hoje lançado e Mário Beja Santos redigiu o prefácio, no qual chama a atenção para as dificuldades que se poderiam sentir no regresso a casa, depois de dois anos de comissão de serviço no Ultramar. Numa linguagem excepcionalmente fluente, ao alcance de qualquer um, Francisco Henriques da Silva conta-nos o seu nascimento na Avenida Rovisco Paes, junto ao Instituto Superior Técnico, a breve passagem pelo Bairro Azul, a ida para o Restelo, as sessões de cinema no São Jorge e outras salas, o nível da Companhia Rey Colaço-Robles Monteiro, do Teatro Experimental de Cascais e do Teatro Estúdio de Lisboa, de Luzia Maria Martins e Helena Félix; e fala-nos de tantas, tantas outras coisas, particularmente queridas a quem hoje anda na casa dos 67/70 anos. Vitorino Nemésio, António Lopes Ribeiro, João Villaret e Pedro Homem de Mello não poderiam deixar de ser evocados, quando se está a contar o como era Portugal na década de 1960, quando ele passou por Mafra, Castelo Branco, Tancos e Amadora, antes de ter viajado para Bissau no navio "Uíge". No Depósito de Adidos, em Brá, Francisco Henriques da Silva teve a oportunidade de ouvir logo a seguir à chegada o então governador e comandante-chefe das tropas destacadas na Guiné, António de Spínola, "de monóculo, pingalim e luvas, acompanhado pelo seu habitual séquito". Naquela altura, conta o autor do livro, António Sebastião Ribeiro de Spínola "encarnava, ou julgava encarnar, tudo: os Lusíadas, a bandeira verde-rubra, Afonso e Mouzinho de Albuquerque combinados, Aljubarrota e os conjurados de 1640...". Era, realmente, um grande sonhador, esse oficial general que durante meia dúzia de anos tudo fez para chegar à chefia do Estado, lugar no qual só se aguentaria por alguns meses. Pobre Napoleão tresloucado, que em 11 de Março de 1975 ainda tentou reconquistar Belém. De todas estas coisas e de muitas, muitas mais, nos fala o embaixador Francisco Henriques da Silva, que inclusive relata conversas com o sogro, António Rosa Casaco, inspector da PIDE/DGS, que foi correio diplomático entre Salazar e Franco, durante a Guerra Civil de Espanha e a Segunda Guerra Mundial. "Não me posso, nem me devo queixar da vida, à parte os pequenos percalços do quotidiano, que, obviamente, também os houve", conclui o autor de "Guerra na Bolanha", pessoa que em Setembro de 2012 já nos dera as "Crónicas dos (Desfeitos) da Guiné", nas Edições Almedina. JH 17 de Março de 2015