Timor: Será que Xanana mandou matar

April 07, 2015 EXCLUSIVE By Ted McDonnell IT started in the jungles of Timor Leste in 1985, a senior commander of Falintil allegedly ordered the murder of a number of his fellow commanders. The exact number of Timorese commanders who lost their lives during that period -- remains sketchy. Some say as many as 11 were murdered, others say 8 were murdered during the mid 1980s; and a number of other commanders allegedly had their names given to the Indonesian Army during the 1990s. The deaths and betrayal of at least 11 Timorese commanders, is as significant to Timor Leste as the Balibo 5 murders to Australia. None of the men who lost their lives; or their families have ever had justice. The fear of reprisals has stopped many former commanders revealing the truth, however, now in their latter years several respected former Falintil commanders believe the truth must be revealed. These "unspoken" murders and betrayals committed in the jungles of Timor Leste during the fight against the Indonesians were 'all about power and the ongoing internal fight between Falintil Commanders' over political ethos that ended in a series of deaths of Timorese Commanders which started from 1985. The Timorese have for almost 30 years been too scared to talk about these horrific crimes against their own for fear of reprisals. The men who were ordered to be killed in the jungles of Timor Leste by a fellow commander or who later had their names handed to the Indonesian Army were: Aquilis, Fonsiano, Fernando Sousa, Rodak, Sabalae, Conis Santana, Derek Maulelak, Bendito Mauselon, Oka, Kilik, David Alex Daitula. (These names have been transcribed from Tetum and we apologise for the poor translations) Each of these men committed themselves and their families to fight against murderous Indonesian regime who invaded their country in 1975, but each of the commanders were allegedly either murdered or betrayed by their own Timorese brothers. According to one of the former Falintil commanders these men were killed in various locations in Timor Leste. The locations of the deaths were Ossu and Viqueque districts; the Bacau district and Lospalos. Only the commanders of Falintil during this period know the fully story and who gave the orders for the cold blooded killings of these men. Some have decided to come forth due to their age and fear that these murders and betrayals would go unpunished. Each of these former commanders were interviewed separately, at a different time and different location. All the interviews were recorded. Each of the former Falintil commanders name the same person who ordered the killings. The perpetrator and his henchmen have gone free for almost 30 years. Some have reached high positions in Timor Leste society; some have literally disappeared believed dead. The three former Faltinil commanders interviewed each alleged the same thing that the orders to kill or betray the commanders allegedly came from former Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao. The former commanders said that during the early 80s and leading up to the events of 1985 there was a power struggle within Timor Leste’s Falintil. According to each former commander interviewed a 'much younger Xanana Gusmao wanted absolute control of Falintil and disagreed with the political leanings of many of his fellow commanders'. The commanders allege Gusmao “gave the order” to kill the his fellow commanders in 1985. Each of the former commanders reaffirmed the allegation that Gusmao was behind the murders and betrayls. Each of their stories match. The allegations of murder and betrayal of the Timorese commanders comes at a time when the spotlight is firmly on the antics of the now former Prime Minister and his power games. There have long been allegations that Gusmao was also behind the attempted assassination of former President Jose Ramos Horta and the murder of Alfredo Reinado. Attempts to interview key players involved in the 2008 assassination plot were declined. Two as we know are dead. Reinado was killed supposedly by a member of the Timor Leste Defence Force when found with other 'rebels' within the former President's compound. However, a coroner’s report reveal that Reinado was shot at close range in the back of the head. An autopsy report indicated that Reinado died after being shot through the eye at near point-blank range. According to a forensic expert consulted by The Australian newspaper, the autopsy’s finding of “burning/blackening of the surrounding skin” to each of Reinado’s four wounds (to the eye, chest, neck, and hand) means that he must have been shot from a range of less than 30 centimetres. The report on Reinado’s colleague Leopoldino Exposto found that he was killed by a single gunshot to the back of the head, also by a “high-velocity rifle fired at close range”. It is also allege that Reinado was invited by Xanana Gusmao for a peace meeting in Dili and that Reinado and an accomplice were setup and murdered by "persons unknown". Copies of the letter signed by Gusmao are now in several safe hands and would be brought forward at a judicial inquiry. Very few people in Timor Leste like talking about these three events. They are scared for their families’ safety and their own lives. However, surely the time has come for the President Taur Matan Ruak, who knows the true facts surrounding the murders of the Timor 11, and what went on in the jungles during the struggle against the Indonesians; who knows the truth behind the attempted assassination of Ramos Horta, as well as the cold blooded killing of Reinado and Exposto, should call for a judicial inquiry into each of these murderous events. It is also necessary for the new Prime Minister Dr Rui Maria de Araújo to call for the same inquiry. Murder is murder is murder. The Balibo 5 never received the true justice they deserved, but it is about time justice came for the Timor 11 now that Timor Leste is free and peaceful. **Note: The above story was taken from interviews with three legendary Timorese commanders. They state their facts are correct. Each one recounted the same stories. The timeline of their accounts starts in 1985 and continues into the mid 1990s. Two of the three interviews were translated from Tetum. They all accused the same person of murder or betrayal at a later time. Some of the names of the former commanders are hard to decipher due to translation problems.

Timor: Ainda se morre em combate

Lusa 08 Ago, 2015 O corpo de Mauk Moruk, líder do Conselho da Revolução Maubere (CRM), morto hoje em confrontos com forças de segurança timorenses, foi helitransportado para Díli, sob medidas de vigilância, com reforço policial. Mauk Moruk foi morto numa troca de tiros entre elementos do CRM e efetivos policiais e das forças armadas timorenses, tendo fonte policial dito à Lusa que há informações "não totalmente confirmadas" sobre uma terceira vítima mortal. "Os confrontos ocorreram cerca das 17:00 [09:00 de Lisboa] a sul de Baucau. Posso confirmar que Mauk Moruk e o seu braço direito (Sunardy) foram abatidos", disse à agência Lusa fonte sénior da Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste. "Os corpos foram helitransportados para Díli", disse à Lusa confirmou a chegada do helicóptero a Díli cerca das 19:35 locais (11:35 em Lisboa). Segundo explicou a mesma fonte, as forças policiais decidiram aumentar preventivamente as patrulhas em Díli e em alguns distritos, nomeadamente em Baucau, "apesar de não haver qualquer ameaça concreta" ou "risco adicional". A troca de tiros de hoje ocorreu próximo a uma zona onde na quarta-feira já tinha havido confrontos entre apoiantes de Mauk Moruk, um dos quais morreu, e efetivos das forças armadas e da polícia, dos quais dois ficaram feridos. Fonte do executivo disse à Lusa que a vítima mortal de 4ª feira é irmão de Sunardy, uma das vítimas de hoje e que o próprio Mauk Moruk terá ficado ferido na perna. "Não conseguiu escapar, subiu a montanha e ficou cercado. As forças tiveram sempre ordem de não o matar porque o objetivo da operação não era esse. Mas ele tinha mais armas do que se pensava", afirmou a fonte. Desconhece-se o detalhe exato das circunstâncias em que as mortes ocorreram. Mauk Moruk estava a ser perseguido pela polícia e pelas forças armadas de Timor-Leste desde março e, nas últimas semanas, a polémica em torno da operação, de nome código Hanita, tinha aumentado, tanto pelo seu custo, como pela falta de êxito até ao momento. Agio Pereira, ministro de Estado e porta-voz do Governo, disse à Lusa que "a operação conjunta concluiu uma das suas principais fases", lamentando que "o objeto da operação tenha sido abatido por força de circunstâncias operacionais no terreno, absolutamente fora do seu controlo". Questionado sobre receios de potenciais incidentes na sequência da morte de Mauk Moruk, o porta-voz do executivo timorense disse que o Governo "continua a cumprir a sua responsabilidade principal de garantir toda a segurança e harmonia na comunidade". Está "absolutamente certo de que isto será alcançado, sem dificuldades de grande escala".

Bissau: Presidente ameaçado com impugnação

PARTIDO AFRICANO DA INDEPENDÊNCIA DA GUINÉ E CABO VERDE III REUNIÃO EXTRAORDINÁRIA DO BUREAU POLITICO RESOLUÇÃO Nos dias, 7 e 8 de Agosto, sob a presidência do Camarada Domingos Simões Pereira, Presidente do Partido, e em observância da alínea b) do Artº 33 dos Estatutos, reuniu-se extraordinariamente o Bureau Político (BP) do PAIGC, com a seguinte ordem dos trabalhos: 1. – Informações a) Acidente ocorrido em Canchungo b) Acórdão do Conselho Nacional de Jurisdição 2. Análise da Situação Político Nacional a) Circunstâncias e implicações do regresso ao país do contra almirante José Zamora Induta b) Remodelação Governamental A ordem dos trabalhos foi aprovada por unanimidade. SOBRE O ACIDENTE OCORRIDO EM CANCHUNGO O Bureau Politico foi informado das deligências realizadas pelo governo nomeadamente através da criação de um gabinete de crise para conceder apoio e consolo aos familiares das vitimas. Foi instituída uma comissão técnica no Ministério das Obras Públicas para averiguar e inspeccionar as causas do desabamento do prédio em Canchungo, e apurar as responsabilidades técnicas e administrativas dessa ocorrência. Foi igualmente recomendada ao Ministério da Saúde, a criação de uma Comissão de apoio e acompanhamento dos sobreviventes e feridos desse terrível acidente. O Bureau Político lamentou profundamente esta ocorrência, apelou às autoridades competentes à tomada de medidas de antecipação e prevenção de tais situações assim como o devido apuramento e responsabilização dos infratores. SOBRE O ACÓRDÃO DO CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JURISDIÇÃO O Presidente do Conselho Nacional de Jurisdição informou ao Bureau Politico da decisão do seu órgão em aplicar uma sanção ao III Vice Presidente do partido, Camarada Baciro Dja, nos termos da alínea e) do nº1 do Artº 102 dos Estatutos. Esta decisão (ver em anexo), de acordo com as explicações do Presidente do CNJ, corresponde à aplicação de uma das resoluções da II Sessão ordinária do Comité Central que ordenou o apuramento dos factos então alegados por este dirigente do partido, relativamente a eventuais fundos doados para a campanha eleitoral de 2014. Apesar de várias tentativas, o visado recusou-se a receber a notificação e a colaborar com o CNJ, o que obrigou a aplicação da Jurisprudência e aplicação da sanção. SOBRE O REGRESSO DO CONTRA ALMIRANTE JOSE ZAMORA INDUTA O Bureau político recebeu uma informação detalhada, dos elementos apurados sobre as circunstâncias que rodearam o regresso ao país do Contra Almirante e, pôde verificar pelas provas documentais exibidas e testemunhas factuais, que: • não houve nenhum envolvimento do governo e do Primeiro-ministro na autorização e preparação do regresso ao país dessa alta figura da nomenclatura militar; • a Presidência da República e o Estado Maior General das Forças Armadas, foram as duas entidades informadas e que geriram o processo; • o governo, ao ter informação da chegada ao país de tão relevante figura militar, limitou-se a mandar providenciar a sua segurança pessoal por forma a garantir a sua integridade física, colocando-o à disposição das entidades competentes para a verificação da existência de quaisquer restrições ou acusações contra ele. Nessa conformidade, à primeira ocasião, o Primeiro Ministro convocou e presidiu o Conselho Nacional de Segurança que se debruçou sobre este assunto tendo emitido de seguida um comunicado. Refira-se para memória colectiva que o Conselho Nacional de Segurança integra, para além dos membros do governo para as áreas da Defesa, Segurança, Justiça, Negócios Estrangeiros e Finanças,Transportes e Comunicações, o Representante do Presidente da Assembleia Nacional Popular, o Procurador geral da República, o Chefe de Estado Maior General das Forças Armadas, o Comissário Geral da Ordem Pública, o Comandante Geral da Guarda Nacional, os Directores Gerais dos Serviços de Informação do Estado, da Interpol e da Polícia Judiciária. SOBRE A SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA VIGENTE NO PAÍS O actual quadro de funcionamento das instituições do estado, resultantes das últimas eleições gerais realizadas em Abril-Maio de 2014, mereceu uma aturada e profunda análise pelo Bureau Político; O Bureau Político reconheceu que o desentendimento entre os titulares dos órgãos de soberania está sendo provocado por uma ausência evidente do diálogo institucional sincero e responsável a que se remeteu nos últimos tempos o Senhor Presidente da República; Considerando então que os principais titulares dos órgãos de soberania do País, designadamente, o Presidente da República, o Presidente da Assembleia Nacional Popular e o Primeiro Ministro, resultam do apoio eleitoral do PAIGC, este tem de assumir a co-responsabilidade político-institucional pelo funcionamento normal das instituições da República; Assim, O Bureau Politico delibera: 1. Apelar ao restabelecimento imediato do diálogo institucional entre os titulares dos órgãos de soberania, particularmente, por parte do Senhor Presidente da República; 2. Condenar veementemente as repetidas atitudes do Presidente da República, de desrespeito pelos símbolos nacionais e da República, as datas históricas, alertando para o risco de retirada definitiva da confiança política, o que configuraria a assunção de uma luta directa, política e judicial pela sua destituição; 3. Exortar os titulares dos órgãos de soberania a observarem escrupulosamente os preceitos constitucionais no exercício das suas funções, pressuposto fundamental para a garantia da paz e estabilidade política e social do País; 4. Responsabilizar o Presidente da República pelas consequências que possam advir do eventual bloqueio institucional decorrente da falta de diálogo, podendo conduzir à exigência de convocação antecipada de novas eleições gerais (Presidenciais e Legislativas), como forma de restituir o poder ao Povo e de legitimar os órgãos do Estado; 5. Felicitar à Assembleia Nacional Popular, ao seu Presidente, à mesa, aos Deputados da Nação e particularmente à Bancada Parlamentar do PAIGC pela sua coragem, lucidez e firmeza na defesa da verdade, da transparência e das conquistas eleitorais ditadas pelo voto popular e aprovar a correspondente moção de felicitações. 6. Congratular-se com o espírito de tolerância e disponibilidade sempre patenteados pelo Presidente do Partido e reiterar a confiança política no Governo de inclusão que chefia, assegurando o apoio firme e inequívoco do Partido Libertador; 7. Agradecer e felicitar a mobilização dos orgãos socio politica do partido, nomeadamente a JAAC, a UDEMU, trabalhadores sindicalizados, 8. e associação dos antigos combatentes pela forma atenta e determinada como seguem a situação politica evitando e denunciando quaisquer tentativas de branqueamento da realidade e aproveitamento politico. 9. Agradecer a mobilização e apoio de todos os partidos politicos organizações da Sociedade Civil e dos cidadãos na diáspora e apelar aos simpatizantes, militantes e dirigentes do partido, assim como a população em geral a se manterem firmes e irredutíveis na defesa das conquistas revolucionárias deste povo, assegurando a preservação dos valores da liberdade e da democracia; 10. Agradecer a Comunidade Internacional e aos parceiros da Cooperação e Desenvolvimento pela redobrada atenção com que tem acompanhado a situação política e social do país. Bissau 8 de Agosto de 2015 O Bureau Politico Publicada por António Aly Silva no blog Ditadura do Consenso

Grécia; 4600 anos de vida

Desde o surgimento da civilização minoica, na ilha de Creta, até ao anúncio, há semanas, de novas negociações entre a comunidade internacional e a Grécia, decorreram sensivelmente 4600 anos. De tudo isso nos fala, com grande interesse, Pedro Caldeira Rodrigues, no seu livro "O sobressalto grego", lançado esta semana em Lisboa. A Antiguidade, a Época Bizantina, a recuperação da independência e a expansão territorial, a contraofensiva dos turcos em 1922, a colocação da Grécia na esfera de influência britânica, em 1944, e tudo o mais que daí em diante se passou são descritos com grande sabedoria por este jornalista, Mestre em História e Cultura Europeias Contemporâneas pela Faculdade de Letras da Universidade Clássica de Lisboa. Não se pode de forma alguma chegar à actualidade sem se conhecer tanta coisa que ao longo dos séculos foi acontecendo em Creta, em Chipre, nas Ilhas Jónicas e em outros pedaços do grande espaço helénico. É esse o grande trunfo de Pedro Caldeira Rodrigues, que nos relata tanto o que aprendeu com a sua própria experiência como o que foi beber a Sophia, a Frederico Lourenço, a Hélia Correia e a outros que não conseguiram passar incólumes ao lado do fascínio que a Grécia sempre despertou em tanta gente. Para ele, a História grega e o sobressalto dos gregos não começaram de forma alguma com Tsipras, Varoufakis e Tsakalotos. Vêm indubitavelmente de muito mais longe, não esquecendo o terror pelo declínio que marcou sucessivas gerações de intelectuais, desde há bem mais de um século. É "um lamento infindável, um sofrimento interior e solitário", detectável na música, na poesia e em outras formas da cultura helénica, como a canção que diz: "Estou a arder, estou a arder/deitem mais óleo no fogo/Estou a afogar-me, estou a afogar-me/lancem-me para as profundezas do mar". Com uma extrema sensibilidade, Pedro Caldeira Rodrigues fala-nos da ditadura dos coronéis, da revolta estudantil, da ascensão e queda do PASOK, da entrada da Grécia na moeda única europeia e de tudo o mais que convém saber para se entender como deve de ser este emblemático ano de 2015. Seria praticamente impossível fazer melhor, pois que o autor sintetizou em 176 páginas a vida e o drama de um povo a quem todos tanto devemos. Obrigado. Ehfkhareesto.

Bissau: Grave crise política

"A Presidência da República tomou conhecimento, com surpresa e estupefacção, da comunicação do senhor primeiro-ministro à nação, difundida ontem pelos órgãos da comunicação social, numa altura em que sua Excelência o Senhor Presidente da República procede a uma auscultação normal aos atores sociopolíticos sobre a atual situação política do país. O teor da referida comunicação, descortes, calunioso e ofensivo para com o Chefe de Estado, mais do que demonstrar a existência de uma grave crise política, vem agravar ainda mais o já por si frágil clima de relacionamento entre os dois órgãos de soberania. A Presidência da República lamenta profundamente que, numa altura em que o momento exige maior serenidade e ponderação na busca de soluções que melhor acautelem a imperiosa necessidade de preservação do clima de paz social, tenham surgindo vozes e posicionamentos no sentido de criar ruído e perturbar ainda mais este processo de extrema delicadeza. A Presidência da República abstém-se, por ora, de comentar as declarações do Presidente da Assembleia Nacional Popular, na medida em que, nos termos dos estatutos dos deputados, ele é responsável pelas suas palavras no exercício das suas funções. Sua Excelência o Senhor Presidente da República garante a todos os guineenses e a comunidade internacional de que, enquanto primeiro Magistrado da Nação, continua empenhado na procura de soluções, dentro de quadro e no limite das suas competências constitucionais, que melhor se adaptem à situação atual, no intuito de salvaguardar os superiores interesses das instituições da República. Sua Excelência o Senhor Presidente da República convocou para hoje o Conselho de Estado, seu órgão constitucional de consulta, finda a qual anunciará ao país a sua decisão sobre a forma de ultrapassar a mencionada crise política. A Presidência da República apela a todos os cidadãos a manterem a calma e a serenidade até estarem na posse de todas as informações para melhor poderem ajuizar. Bissau, 07.08.2015 Fernando Mendonça conselheiro porta-voz"

Bissau: Uma vez mais em polvorosa

"Perante a crise institucional que se vive na Guiné-Bissau, o Primeiro-ministro Domingos Simões Pereira covocou hoje, dia 6 de agosto, os líderes dos Partidos Políticos com assento parlamentar e a Comunidade Internacional para os informar sobre a actualidade política vigente no país. No fim dos encontros proferiu uma comunicação à Nação: COMUNICAÇÃO DO PRIMEIRO-MINISTRO À NAÇÃO Caros compatriotas, Sei que as dificuldades de relacionamento institucional entre o Primeiro-Ministro e o Presidente da República, já há muito são do domínio público, e constituem sérios motivos de preocupação e inquietação dos cidadãos, partidos políticos, deputados à Assembleia Nacional Popular, bem como da comunidade internacional. Na qualidade de Primeiro-Ministro e Presidente do PAIGC, Partido que ganhou as últimas eleições legislativas, considero legítimas essas preocupações, na justa medida em que o cenário prevalecente pode remeter, mais uma vez, a Guiné-Bissau para uma situação de instabilidade governativa, o que representaria uma revolta e frustração absolutas para todos quanto consideram a nova visão de governação a solução para a paz, estabilidade e desenvolvimento da “nossa terra”. Tentativas várias foram feitas, pelo PAIGC, por cidadãos e personalidades guineenses, bem como pelos representantes e personalidades da comunidade internacional, junto dos dois titulares dos órgãos de soberania, Primeiro-Ministro e Sua Excelência o Senhor Presidente da República, visando ultrapassar essas dificuldades. Caros compatriotas, Apesar da afirmação pública, perante os deputados, membros do Governo e diplomatas e representantes do corpo diplomático, numa das sessões solenes da Assembleia Nacional Popular, de que “nunca lhe passou pela cabeça demitir o Governo” e a informação veiculada “não passava de um mero boato”, Sua Excelência o Senhor Presidente da República manteve e mantém o propósito de demitir o Governo. Considerando que essa ameaça permanente de demissão do Governo pelo Presidente da República prejudica séria e profundamente o nosso País; Considerando que ontem, o Gabinete de Sua Excelência o Senhor Presidente da República informou da decisão unilateral deste em cancelar, sem qualquer explicação, a reunião semanal de trabalho que mantém com o Primeiro-ministro e Chefe do Governo; Tendo ainda em atenção que foi anunciado o início de consultas aos partidos políticos e se presume que visem a destituição do Governo; Considerando finalmente que a Assembleia Nacional Popular denunciou a existência de um “Plano Estratégico” para o derrube do Governo e criação de um Governo de Unidade Nacional de base alargada. Em nome e representação do Governo a que tenho o privilégio e a responsabilidade de dirigir, entendi como chegado o momento de levar ao conhecimento da opinião Pública Nacional e dos Parceiros Internacionais de Cooperação, estes e outros factos e a nossa leitura sobre as implicações da atual situação. Primeiro, temos a informar que a proposta de remodelação governamental está preparada há mais de um mês, tendo sido entregue ao Senhor Presidente da República, há exatamente 16 dias. Antes da submissão dessa proposta de remodelação governamental (da competência e responsabilidade do Chefe do Governo) ficaram acordadas as seguintes disposições: Que o PM deveria apresentar uma proposta para depois juntos analisarem os nomes e as opções aí inclusas; Como não se chegou a realizar o debate de urgência pedido à ANP sobre a situação da justiça, que visava esclarecer o quadro de aplicação da lei 14/97 sobre os titulares de cargos políticos, foi recolhida informação sobre os processos judiciais em curso, o que permitiu a exclusão da lista proposta, dos passiveis de acusação; O PM solicitou e recebeu a anuência do PR para incluir na sua proposta eventuais elementos tidos como próximos ou trabalhando no atual gabinete do PR. Nunca se tratou de ceder lugares para o preenchimento pelo próprio PR; Observados estes pressupostos, são tidos como pontos prevalecentes de discórdia entre o PR e o PM : Mesa Redonda. O PR diz continuar a não conhecer os resultados reais da MR e não aceita a explicação do governo em como os únicos documentos são o comunicado final da Conferência e a lista dos “Pledges”, já há muito e por várias vezes transmitidos. O PR assume a existência de um fundo que o Governo não quer divulgar e que pretende gerir à margem do seu conhecimento e fiscalização; Mesa Redonda. O Senhor PR quer participar ativamente na gestão dos recursos angariados. Para esse feito, exige a nomeação de um membro do governo (da sua confiança) funcionando sob a direta dependência do PM (e não do Ministro da Economia e Finanças) que se ocuparia da gestão desses recursos financeiros; O PR entende que ainda estão no governo elementos que não colhem a sua aprovação, por penderem suspeitas de crime ou por outras situações. Contudo, nunca indicou de quem se tratavam e nunca se disponibilizou a receber quaisquer explicações; Finalmente a inclusão no governo de elementos próximos ao PR. Essa proposta mereceu uma reação negativa e forte do Senhor PR indicando ao PM que nunca havia falado com ninguém sobre isso. Contudo agora se queixa de não ter sido “nem tido nem achado”; Mais recentemente foi incluído mais um ponto de discórdia: o regresso ao país do Contra-almirante José Zamora Induta, que o PR ser da responsabilidade do governo e tendo como propósito desestabilizar o país e o seu mandato. Dados objectivos agora na posse do governo indicam que o Senhor Presidente da república e o Senhor Chefe de Estado-maior general, foram as duas entidades contactadas e portanto com conhecimento da chegada do Contra-almirante, sendo da sua exclusiva responsabilidade o seu acolhimento. Já estando no país, o governo limitou-se a garantir a sua segurança preservação da integridade física. Com base em todos estes elementos factuais e objectivamente demonstráveis, o governo conclui da existência de: Uma intenção deliberada e evidente de provocar uma crise para justificar a decisão de destituição do governo resultante das últimas eleições legislativas; Uma falta grosseira de ponderação sobre as implicações e o alcance de tal medida, para a ordem interna e a estabilidade que estamos conquistando, no país e no mundo, para além de um rude e traiçoeiro golpe á esperança que a todos tem animado; A determinação do PAIGC e dos partidos e organizações políticas e sociais que o apoiam em defender e assegurar as suas conquistas eleitorais; A responsabilização política e judicial do autor de atos que ponham em causa a ordem interna e a estabilidade do país; Nesta conformidade Quero através desta comunicação, exortar aos partidos políticos que apoiam a atual governação, à sociedade civil e a toda a população guineense a se manter calma e tranquila, mas atenta ao evoluir da situação; Assegurar que todos os mecanismos e dispositivos legais e democráticos serão mobilizados para preservar a ordem e evitar a interrupção desta caminhada do país rumo à paz e ao desenvolvimento; Agradecer a confiança de todas e de todos e renovar a minha determinação mobilizar toda a minha energia e competência e trabalhar a favor do meu país e do meu povo. Viva a Guiné-Bissau Viva a Unidade Nacional Viva a Democracia Viva o desenvolvimento Bissau, 6 de Agosto de 2015 Domingos Simões Pereira Primeiro-Ministro" Publicada por António Aly Silva no Blog Ditadura do Consenso

Uma tragédia grega

Down the road from my studio, in Melbourne’s northern suburbs, there is a small cafe next door to a tobacconist. Both are owned by Australians of Greek heritage. The week before the people of Greece voted on whether they wished to accept the new round of austerity measures demanded by the Troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) in order to release bailout funds, the shop owners plastered a series of black-and-white A4 sheets across their windows. Each sheet contained one bold word, OXI – Greek for “no”. On the morning of 6 July I awoke before dawn, fired up the internet and switched on the television, both anxious for and dreading the news: the outcome would have consequences not only for Greece’s membership in the eurozone but also for the very definition of a united Europe. The referendum result was an overwhelming OXI. An hour later, still trying to identify why I felt this combination of fear and trembling and ecstasy as I watched images of the jubilant crowds in Athens, I realised that I was experiencing sensations that I had almost forgotten could exist: political hope and political optimism. The Greek nation had refuted an almost universal economic logic, one that exonerated the financial system responsible for the greatest economic catastrophe since the Great Depression. It was a logic that demanded that ordinary people pay for the miscalculations of the global markets, a logic that cleared the debts of the banks but allowed no such leniency regarding the crippling effects of debt on individual nations. Within a week my hope and optimism had dissipated as Greece’s six-month-old coalition government, led by the left-wing Syriza party’s Aleksis Tsipras, seemed on the verge of accepting bailout terms that had been rejected by its own people. Yanis Varoufakis is on the phone. Greece’s charismatic finance minister had resigned his position immediately following the referendum result. Varoufakis, an economist with an extensive academic career, has dual Greek and Australian citizenship after a decade-long stint working at the University of Sydney. His outsider status in the European Union political club, his refusal to use technocratic language or conform to bureaucratic style, was a constant sore spot in the negotiations with the Troika. But in many ways, the strong referendum result can be seen as a validation of his tactics and directness. The first thing I ask him is how he felt on the night of the vote, and how he feels now, a week later. “Let me just describe the moment after the announcement of the result,” he begins. “I made a statement in the Ministry of Finance and then I proceeded to the prime minister’s offices, the Maximos [also the official residency of the Greek prime minister], to meet with Aleksis Tsipras and the rest of the ministry. I was elated. That resounding no, unexpected, it was like a ray of light that pierced a very deep, thick darkness. I was walking to the offices, buoyed and lighthearted, carrying with me that incredible energy of the people outside. They had overcome fear, and with their overcoming of fear it was like I was floating on air. But the moment I entered the Maximos this whole sensation simply vanished. It was also an electric atmosphere in there, but a negatively charged one. It was like the leadership had been left behind by the people. And the sensation I got was one of terror: What do we do now?” And Tsipras’ reaction? Varoufakis’ words are measured. He insists his affection and respect for the beleaguered Greek prime minister are undiminished. But sadness and disappointment are evident in his reply. “I could tell he was dispirited. It was a major victory, one that I believe he actually savoured, deep down, but one he couldn’t handle. He knew that the cabinet couldn’t handle it. It was clear that there were elements in the government putting pressure on him. Already, within hours, he had been pressured by major figures in the government, effectively to turn the no into a yes, to capitulate.” Out of loyalty to Tsipras, and to honour a promise he made, Varoufakis won’t name names. But he does tell me that there were powerbrokers within the fragile coalition government “who were counting on the referendum as an exit strategy, not as a fighting strategy”. “When I realised that, I put to him that he had a very clear choice: to use the 61.5% no vote as an energising force, or [to] capitulate. And I said to him, before he had a chance to answer, ‘If you do the latter, I will clear out. I will resign if you choose the strategy of giving in. I will not undermine you, but I will steal into the night.’” Though Varoufakis is circumspect, he makes clear that exiting the eurozone was something that he, Tsipras and their like-minded colleagues in the coalition would not countenance. “We always thought that the European project, despite all its flaws … would be an opportunity for Europeans to get together, that maybe there would be an opportunity to subvert the original intentions and turn it into a kind of united states of Europe. And within that, to agitate for left-wing progressive politics. This was our mindset, how we were nurtured from a very young age.” This mindset goes a long way to making sense of the compromised decision Syriza has made since the referendum. It was not being disingenuous in its commitment to Europe, for all the scaremongering in the mainstream European media. But for Varoufakis, honouring that pledge could not be conditional on accepting the suffocating terms of the proposed debt relief, the continuing social devastation being legitimised in the name of austerity. “Tsipras looked at me and said, ‘You realise that they will never give an agreement to you and me. They want to be rid of us.’ “And then he told me the truth, that there were other members of the government pushing him into the direction of capitulation. He was clearly depressed. “I answered him, ‘You do the best with the choice that you’ve made, one that I disagree with wholeheartedly, but I am not here to undermine you.’ “So then I went home. It was 4.30 in the morning. I was distraught – not personally, I don’t give a damn about moving out of the ministry; it was actually a great relief. I had to sit down between 4.30 and 9 in the morning and script the precise wording of my resignation because I wanted on one hand that it was supportive of Aleksis and not undermining him but on the other hand [to] make clear why I was leaving, that I was not abandoning ship. The ship itself had abandoned the course.” I ask Varoufakis if there were members within the Eurogroup, the 19 finance ministers of the eurozone, who were agitating for a Greek exit. His answer is swift and blunt. “Not the Eurogroup. The German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble.” I want him to be clear on this, for the dominant media portrayal of the unfolding crisis is as a battle between the intransigent Greeks and a desperate Europe trying to keep the eurozone together. The reality is much more complex. I have wondered if the unworkable austerity conditions the Troika was demanding from this new left-wing Greek government suggested that, behind the scenes, members of the Eurogroup were preparing for a Greek exit. If this is the case, does it imply bad faith on the part of Schäuble? Again, Varoufakis’ response is immediate. “It wasn’t bad faith, it was a very definite plan. I called it the Schäuble plan. He has been planning a Greek exit as part of his plan for reconstructing the eurozone. This is no theory. The reason why I am saying it is because he told me so.” Five years of austerity have seen the Greek economy contract by 25% and one in four Greeks unemployed, and debt conditions that economists from both the right and left argue can only mean increasing economic and social devastation. It strikes me that there is a desire to punish the Greek nation for the well-documented sins of its political structures, its clientelism and its corrupt public services. But for Varoufakis the ruthlessness of the austerity measures is part of a political game the European Commission is playing in order to frighten other member states. “This is Schäuble’s way of exacting concessions from France and Italy, that was what the game always was. The game was between Germany, France and Italy, and Greece was – not so much a scapegoat – we have an expression in Greece …” We have been conducting the interview in English but on his hesitation I prompt him to speak in Greek. He answers, and though Varoufakis’ tone is that of an educated Athenian and he speaks English with the cosmopolitan accent of someone who has studied in the UK, and worked in Australia and the US, for a moment I hear my father’s voice; for a moment the rural and the urban conflate, the past and the present are one: The jockey strikes the whip for the mule to hear. Then the urbane voice returns. “It is a clear strategy for influencing from Paris and from Rome,particularly from Paris, the kind of concessions towards creating a disciplinarian, Teutonic model of the eurozone.” Possibly because of that moment of dissonance, the switch between English and Greek, I am reminded that I am not a disinterested participant in this interview. Since 2010, I have been returning to my parents’ country to try to make sense of the experiences of family and friends, to comprehend the economic paralysis, and to be witness to its human costs. No Australian of my heritage is unaware of the deleterious effects of long-term state corporatism, of nepotism and corruption, in Greece. Many of us were lamenting the lack of serious reform in Greek politics long before the nation entered the eurozone in 2001. Whatever the ideological differences, whatever the compromises and limitations of realpolitik, did Varoufakis’ fellow ministers in the Eurogroup, did the people he was negotiating with in the Troika, understand the extent of the humanitarian crisis in his country? “It was a combination of indifference and self-interest. You have to understand, for some of them, the Greek [austerity] program was their life’s work, it was their baby. It was like Dr Frankenstein: a monster but nevertheless it’s your monster. It was something their careers depended on. For example, Poul Thomsen, who ran the Greek program on behalf of the IMF from 2010 to 2014, was promoted on the basis of that work to being now the IMF’s European chief. When these people look at the effects of what they have done – the people on the streets eating out of rubbish bins, the phenomenal unemployment – what kicks in is that normal process of self-rationalisation: either saying that it had to be done as there is no other way or blaming the Greek government for not carrying out the reforms sufficiently.” Did they really believe austerity was the only way to keep Greece within the eurozone? “It is a very cynical, utilitarian view that in order to forge the future you have to sacrifice unproductive people who are good for nothing. Now, the smarter ones – and there are very few smart ones – can see that this is all rubbish. They could see that the program they were implementing was catastrophic. But they were cynical. They thought, I know which side my bread is buttered. “Interestingly enough, the finance minister of Germany is a man who understands this better than anyone. In a break during a meeting, I asked him, ‘Would you sign this, this agreement?’ and he said, ‘No, I wouldn’t. This is no good for your people.’ This is the most frustrating part of it, that at the personal level you can have this human conversation, but in meetings it is impossible to bring it up, it is impossible to have humanity inform policy-making. The policy debate is structured in such a way that humanity has to be left outside the room.” Varoufakis has made clear that self-interest and careerism are at play within these negotiations. But if statespeople are making decisions based on policies they don’t believe in, isn’t there also cowardice at play? “Let me try to answer as accurately as I can by saying this. Of my colleagues in the Eurogroup …” – he corrects himself – “former colleagues in the Eurogroup – I am no longer in the Eurogroup, thank God – it was often said it was 18 against one, that I was alone. It’s not true, it is not true. A very small minority, led by the German finance minister, pretended to believe – pretended to believe – that the austerity that was being forced on the Greeks was the only way out, was the best thing for the Greeks, and if we were only to reform ourselves along the lines of that austerian logic then we would be fine, that we are not getting out of the woods because we are lazy, we live off other people’s kindness, etc. etc. But they were a minority. There were two other groups that were more significant. “One group consisted of the finance ministers who don’t believe in these policies but who had been forced in the past to impose them on their own people with great detrimental consequences. Now, this group was terrified of the prospect that we would succeed because they would have to answer to their own people … Why were they such cowards?” “And there was a third group, France and Italy. These are important countries, frontline states of Europe, and the way I would characterise it is that their finance ministers neither believed in austerity nor had they practised it seriously. But what they feared was that if they sided with us, if they are seen to be sympathetic to the Greeks, they would encounter the wrath of the Teutonic group and maybe austerity would be imposed on them. They didn’t want to be seen supporting us in case they would be forced to suffer the same indignities.” Varoufakis offers a precise and compelling account of the missteps of the eurozone, the lunacy of “creating a single common currency that was to be run by a central bank that had no state to back it, [and] states with no central bank to back them”. “It was as if we were removing the shock absorbers from the euro area, the shock absorbers being the exchange-rate flexibility. The moment that banks stopped lending to places like Ireland and Greece, the bubble burst … In the old days the drachma would be devalued and the situation would be corrected. But we didn’t have the drachma, and so we had to replace the loans from the banks with loans from taxpayers.” There was hubris in the structuring of the euro, a short-sighted euphoria prompted by the end of the Cold War and the victory of neoliberal ideology. Those mistakes have been compounded by a betrayal of any trans-European communal aspirations, the very notion of Europe that Varoufakis has tried to defend. This betrayal has reignited old nationalist stereotypes of a disciplined north and a slothful south, setting European taxpayer against taxpayer and shifting attention away from the financial elites that created this disaster. But for all of Europe’s mistakes, there remain the noxious deficiencies of the Greek state itself. Many of us who supported Syriza hoped that the new government would begin dismantling the corrupt systems of patronage, whole-scale tax evasion and public-sector venality. In his writing, Varoufakis has referred to it as a “kleptocracy”, a state of thievery. What were the obstacles in confronting the kleptocracy? “Huge! We had to confront an unholy alliance of vested interest and oligarchic practices, what I call the triangle of sin within Greece. Firstly, the banks, the bankrupt banks that are kept alive by the Greek taxpayers but without the Greek taxpayers having any say in the running of [them]. Secondly, the mass media, particularly the electronic media and the press, which were fully bankrupt. But they were controlled by the banks, which used bailout money to bolster the newspaper and electronic media to make sure the media is doing their dirty work in the form of propaganda. And thirdly, procurement, public-sector procurement. To give you an example, a motorway in Greece costs …” He stops, again a correction. “… cost, in the past, three times as much per kilometre compared to a motorway in Germany or France. It was not that people worked less hard or that the private companies were less efficient; they were plenty efficient. If you want to know why it cost so much, you just have to look at northern Athens and examine the villas in which the owners of these companies live.” I remember being taken for a walk through Kifisia, one of Athens’ wealthiest neighbourhoods, in the late 1980s. The ostentatious houses were a shock. “What do these people do?” I asked my cousin. She said, resignedly, patting her back pocket, “We pay for them.” Varoufakis continues. “On top of that, we had the Troika, which was in cahoots with this triangle.” Is Varoufakis argiung that the Troika was hypocritical in its dealings with the Greek government over the past five years? That the new Tsipras government was held to a different standard than that applied to the coalitions led by Pasok or New Democracy? “The Troika did challenge the previous governments of Pasok and New Democracy. They did that plenty of times. But not once did they threaten to switch off liquidity to them because the governments had failed to sufficiently tax the oligarchs, or because [they] had failed to tax the television channels, or failed to catch the big fat tax cheats with bank accounts in Switzerland. The Troika would only threaten to withdraw its liquidity if the lowest of the low of pensions were not cut, if the minimum wage was not cut. It only threatened those previous governments if they dared give a little bit of money to the poorest of Greeks.” The rage that shoots through me is clear in my interjection, an obscenity. In part, the rage comes from a fury at a country that has failed to restructure itself. I detest the bloated public sector that made employment contingent on who you voted for. I don’t want to excuse the rampant tax evasion practised across the Greek population. I am as appalled as anyone at a pension system that too was structured on patronage. Reform in these areas is necessary, essential. The rage also arises because a lack of compassion, born from 50 years of systematic corruption, is now visited on those in Greece who can least afford it. I feel it here in Australia, with friends who curl their mouth in pious disdain at stories of tax evaders and 50-year-old pensioners. In the past five years Greece has undergone a radical experiment that has caused the economy to cease. There is no social-security safety net, and unemployment and working without payment have become the norm. Fine, the pensions were too generous. Let’s cut them. But if there’s no dole, no work, what do you want the 50-year-old to do? Starve? Let me assure you it is happening. Varoufakis senses my fury. He says quietly, “The class consciousness of the Troika was mind-boggling.” “Our state apparatus had been contaminated by the Troika, very, very badly. Let me give you an example. There is something called the Hellenic Financial Stability Facility, which is an offshoot of the European Financial Stability Facility [EFSF]. This is a fund that contained initially €50 billion – by the time I took over it was €11 billion – for the purpose of recapitalising the Greek banks. This is money that the taxpayers of Greece have borrowed for the purpose of bolstering the banks. I didn’t get to choose its CEO and I didn’t get to have any impact on the way it ran its affairs vis-à-vis the Greek banks. The Greek people who had elected me had no control on how the money they had borrowed was going to be used. “I discovered at some point that the law that constituted the EFSF allowed me one power, and that was to determine the salary of these people. I realised that the salaries of these functionaries were monstrous by Greek standards. In a country with so much hunger and where the minimum wage has fallen to €520 a month, these people were making something like €18,000 a month. “So I decided, since I had the power, I would exercise that power. I used a really simple rule. Pensions and salaries have fallen by an average of 40% since the beginning of the crisis. I issued a ministerial decree by which I reduced the salaries of these functionaries by 40%. Still a huge salary, still a huge salary. You know what happened? I got a letter from the Troika, saying that my decision has been overruled as it was insufficiently explained. So in a country in which the Troika is insisting that people on a €300-a-month pension now live on €100, they were refusing my cost-cutting exercise, my ability as a minister of finance to curtail the salaries of these people.” Varoufakis, 54, left Greece after high school to study economics in the UK. In 1988, he left a position at Cambridge to take up an academic job at the University of Sydney. He tells me, laughing, that the people who recruited him thought he was a right-winger as he used game theory and mathematics in his published articles. “The left at Sydney Uni were actually dreading my coming.” Knowing that Varoufakis has lived for periods among the Greek diaspora in the UK, the US and Australia, and spent time with that generation of immigrants who arrived in the 1950s and ’60s, I ask him if he thinks that during the decades of prosperity and the integration into the EU the Greeks had forgotten the trauma of emigration. “Of course they had. During that period that I came to Australia and up to the beginning of the crisis, any Greek Australian that visited Greece felt a deep sense of betrayal. [Because] the Greeks were almost embarrassed by the Greek Australians. They reminded them of a past when Greece was poor, when Greece was the Albania of the 1950s.” I mention that I recall being in Greece in the late 1990s and telling my cousins, “I am the Albanian.” I was appalled at the casual racism they were directing towards the eastern European migrants. I recall, too, the implication that my parents and other migrants of their generation were still peasants: salt of the earth, of course, but nothing to do with the new, cosmopolitan Europe. It was then that I realised I had a different history to those of the Greeks. Mine belonged to a history of immigration, not to Europe. Varoufakis agrees. “But now that the Greeks have had that smack by history, we have realised that it was all a façade, that we are still a nation of migrants, that we never really made it into first-class European citizenship.” The new wave of Greek emigration has certainly begun. On the high street near my home, there has been a resurgence in spoken Greek. It is 20-somethings, 30-somethings, 40-somethings: those fortunate enough to have been born here, those whose parents retained Australian citizenship. I ask Varoufakis to reflect on the similarities and differences between the two waves of immigration. “In the 1950s and ’60s Greece lost a great deal of human capital, but it was unskilled labour. The great investment that has happened in Greece from the 1950s onwards has been in education. We have managed to become a supremely well-educated nation. In terms of our public sector, our private sector, we’ve done very little – even the environment we’ve managed to make a mess of, to deplete. But when it comes to human capital, we have created a great deal of it, and the tragedy of the current crisis is that we are exporting it. Young, well-qualified people whose education was paid for by the state primarily – and their families, but primarily by the state – are now offering their services all over the world, including in Australia. And this is a kind of loss that simply can’t be retrieved. Buildings you can rebuild, highways you can fix, but this depletion is irreversible.” On the morning after my interview with Varoufakis, I receive a frantic call from a friend in Athens. She has not been paid for months and her husband is unemployed. They are terrified for their children’s futures. They both have university degrees; he has studied in the UK. Her voice is hushed, shamed. She apologises again and again. She asks me, “Please, please, is there any work possible in Australia? I am scared of what’s happening here, my friend. I am terrified of what’s coming.” CHRISTOS TSIOLKAS