BANJUL Feb 27 (Reuters) - Gambian President Adama Barrow has replaced the head of the military, a pillar of his predecessor Yahya Jammeh's repressive government, and dismissed a number of senior military officers, officials said on Monday.
The director of the prisons system was also arrested, as were nine men suspected of being members of Jammeh's alleged death squads, known as the Jungulars.
The moves were the latest in a series of arrests and personnel changes under Barrow, who is seeking to assert control following the end of Jammeh's 22-year rule. The former president fled into exile last month after refusing to accept his election defeat.
Jammeh was himself an army officer, seizing power in a coup in 1994, and he leaned heavily on the military to bolster his grip on the country, a popular destination with European tourists.
General Ousman Badjie, the defence chief of staff, was removed along with 10 other senior officers, including the directors of operations and intelligence, army spokesman Lieutenant Kemo Kanuteh said.
Badjie's loyalty appeared to vacillate between Jammeh and Barrow in the wake of the Dec. 1 election.
He finally publicly recognised Barrow as commander-in-chief last month as a regional intervention force closed in on the capital Banjul to remove Jammeh, stating he would welcome the force "with flowers and make them a cup of tea".
27.2.17
Sara Ocidental: Intervenção de Guterres
Retour à la case départ pour le Maroc plus de six mois après le début de l’opération Guerguerat. Le nouveau Secrétaire général de l’ONU, Antonio Guterres, a réussi à faire baisser la tension là ou son prédécesseur, Ban Ki-moon, avait échoué. Les civils et les gendarmes marocains qui, pour la première fois en un quart de siècle, avaient traversé le mur militaire à la pointe sud du Sahara occidental, rebroussent chemin.
Le Secrétaire général de l’ONU blâme le Polisario et s’en prend au Maroc
Guterres s’est alarmé, vendredi, après avoir reçu un appel de Mohamed VI, le roi du Maroc. Il a, le jour même, eu à sa demande un entretien avec Ahmed Boukhari, le représentant du Front Polisario auprès de l’ONU. Vingt-quatre heures après il s’est aussi fendu d’un communiqué dans lequel il se déclare « profondément préoccupé par les tensions accrues » à Guerguerat et « appelle les deux parties à faire preuve de la plus grande retenue (…) ». Le cessez-le-feu qui prévaut depuis 1991 semblait en danger.
Dans son communiqué Guterres blâme d’abord le Polisario, sans le nommer, quand il « souligne que le trafic commercial ne doit pas être obstrué et qu’aucune mesure pouvant éventuellement changer le statut quo dans la zone tampon ne devrait être prise ». Depuis le début de la semaine, ses hommes en armes ne laissaient plus passer vers la Mauritanie les camions frappés du drapeau marocain ou de cartes du Maroc incluant le Sahara. « C’est de la propagande pour l’occupation que nous n’acceptons pas », expliqua au téléphone Mhamed Khadad, coordinateur du Polisario avec la Minurso, le contingent de l’ONU déployé dans cette ancienne colonie espagnole.
Mais le Secrétaire général s’en prend aussi au Maroc quand il exhorte les deux parties « à retirer sans conditions les éléments armés de la zone tampon dès que possible (…) ». Selon lui, les uns et les autres ont ainsi violé les accords de cessez-le-feu contrairement à ce qu’affirmait Rabat. Le Maroc proclamait que ce n’était pas son armée qui avait traversé le mur mais des civils escortés par des gendarmes comme si ces derniers étaient désarmés.
Les gendarmes marocains se retirent
Ceux-ci vont se retirer ce dimanche de leur côté du mur. Sur les « hautes instructions du roi et afin que la demande du Secrétaire général soit respectée et appliquée dans l’immédiat, le Royaume du Maroc procédera, dès aujourd’hui, à un retrait unilatéral de la zone », annonce un communiqué du ministère des Affaires étrangères marocain. Il s’attribue, en partie, le mérite de l’initiative de Guterres car elle s’est produite « suite à l’entretien téléphonique » qu’il a eu avec Mohamed VI.
Au téléphone le souverain avait demandé à Guterres de prendre des « mesures urgentes » pour mettre fin aux « provocations » du Polisario (le renvoi des camions), car elles menacent le cessez-le-feu, selon le communiqué du cabinet royal diffusé tard vendredi dans la nuit.
C’est le 14 août 2016 qu’une poignée d’hommes du génie civil marocain, escortés par des gendarmes, ont traversé à Guerguerat le mur construit par les Forces armées royales (FAR) dans les années quatre-vingt sous prétexte de goudronner en zone tampon la piste de moins de cinq kilomètres qui sépare le rempart marocain de la douane mauritanienne.
Le Polisario s’est alors démené pour que l’ONU empêche ce qui, d’après lui, était une violation du cessez-le-feu, une incursion marocaine dans ce qu’il appelle le « territoire libéré» du Sahara occidental. Mais le Conseil de sécurité n’a pas bougé. Le mouvement indépendantiste a donc pris l’initiative et envoyé ses éléments armés, le 28 août, bloquer l’avancée marocaine. Le Maroc, qui venait d’entreprendre des démarches pour intégrer l’Union Africaine, a alors fait preuve de retenue. Ses hommes se sont arrêtés à 120 mètres de leurs adversaires.
La situation s’est par la suite davantage détériorée même si la Minurso s’interpose pendant la journée -elle se retire la nuit- entre les deux ennemis. Le Polisario s’était mis à construire en dur démontrant qu’il était venu pour y rester. Ses chefs ont même laissé entendre qu’ils pourraient prendre d’autres mesures pour exercer leur autorité sur un territoire qu’ils considèrent comme le leur : fouiller les véhicules qui vont ou viennent de Mauritanie ou tamponner les passeports avec le sceau de la République arabe sahraouie démocratique (RASD).
Abdallah al-Bellal, chargé de la Défense de la RASD, n’a même pas exclu la fermeture du passage vers la Mauritanie lors d’une interview avec le site mauritanien « Masara ». Ce verrouillage empêcherait le Maroc d’exporter ses produits agricoles chez ses voisins du Sud.
Craintes d’une reprise des affrontements
Pour la première fois depuis le cessez-le-feu, il y a plus d’un quart de siècle, les capitales européennes qui suivent de près le conflit du Sahara occidental se sont mises alors à craindre que les armes se remettent à crépiter. La presse marocaine semblait aussi de cet avis. Elle spéculait sur l’escorte que la Gendarmerie pourrait fournir aux camions marocains jusqu’à la frontière mauritanienne. Le journal marocain online « Le Desk » croyait même savoir que Rabat soupesait la possibilité juridique d’invoquer la poursuite à chaud pour s’en prendre au Polisario sous prétexte qu’il entrave le trafic frontalier.
Guterres a démontré son efficacité. Si le Conseil de sécurité s’était lui aussi penché sérieusement, depuis la mi-août, sur la situation à Guerguerat, le Polisario et l’armée marocaine n’auraient pas été sur le pied de guerre. Mais il a été incapable de faire baisser la tension. L’organe suprême des Nations unies est totalement inefficace sur ce sujet. Il n’a même pas pu obtenir le retour au Sahara de 17 agents de la branche civile de la Minurso expulsés en mars dernier par les autorités marocaines.
Que va faire le Front Polisario ?
Le Polisario ne semble pas prêt à rebrousser chemin. Dans un communiqué publié tard dimanche, il dit certes partager les « préoccupations » Guterres, mais il décrit aussi le retrait marocain comme de « la poudre aux yeux qui cache mal le mépris de Rabat pour la légalité internationale ».
Le Front Polisario rappelle également « qu’avant l’établissement du cessez-le-feu il n’y avait ni route, ni trafic commercial entre le mur d’occupation marocain et la frontière mauritanienne ». Leur existence est « une violation du statut du Territoire (…) ». La direction saharauie pense sans doute avoir marqué un point et elle ne veut pas y renoncer même si Paris et Madrid le lui ont demandé dans leurs communiqués.
Même s’il avait été délogé de Guerguerat par la force, le mouvement sahraoui aurait pu tirer profit d’un bref affrontement armé. Plus encore que son prédécesseur, son nouveau chef, Brahim Ghali, cherche à sortir le conflit de l’oubli dans lequel il plongea peu après le cessez-le-feu de 1991. Il souhaite que la communauté internationale s’y intéresse à nouveau et force le Maroc à négocier, ce qu’il se refuse de faire depuis 2011 à Manhasset, dans la banlieue de New York. Pour Ghali, déterrer la hache de guerre, ne serait-ce que brièvement, c’est aussi démontrer à cette jeunesse sahraouie, avide de reprendre les armes, qu’il tient compte de ses aspirations.
Le Maroc ne veut plus, en effet, négocier le sort de « son » Sahara. Il n’évoque même plus très souvent cette offre timide d’autonomie pour le Sahara qu’il avait formulée en 2007 et qui avait été applaudie à Paris et Madrid car ces capitales avaient aidé discrètement à son élaboration. Il table désormais, pour asseoir son contrôle sur ce grand morceau de désert, sur l’effondrement de l’Algérie frappée par une grave crise économique à cause de la chute du prix des hydrocarbures et qui n’arrive toujours pas à trouver un successeur à son président malade.
La santé fragile d’Abdelaziz Bouteflika nuit déjà à la politique étrangère de l’Algérie face à un roi marocain qui ne cesse depuis l’automne de parcourir l’Afrique. Sans une Algérie débout, il n’y aura plus de Polisario, pense-t-on plus que jamais à Rabat. C’est la deuxième fois qu’on y fait ce calcul. La première fut dans les années quatre-vingt-dix quand l’Algérie subissait les coups des groupes terroristes, mais alors, il ne s’est pas vérifié.
25.2.17
Bissau: O diálogo que nunca mais há
A aprovação do Acordo de Conacri, assinado em outubro de 2016, na sequência de conversações entre os líderes políticos, a sociedade civil e os líderes religiosos - o Conselho considerou que este é o quadro principal para uma resolução pacífica da crise política, uma vez que oferece oportunidade histórica às autoridades nacionais, aos líderes políticos, bem como à sociedade civil, para assegurar em conjunto a estabilidade política e construir uma paz sustentável.
Os 15 membros do Conselho congratularam-se e apoiam uma missão de alto nível que deverá chegar ao país sob a orientação do bloco regional, a Comunidade Económica dos Estados de África Ocidental (CEDEAO), como parte de um acompanhamento para a implementação do Acordo.
No âmbito do seu novo mandato, que terá início no dia 1 de março de 2017 e irá até 28 de fevereiro de 2018, o Conselho de Segurança manifestou o seu firme apoio ao papel fundamental desempenhado pelo Representante Especial do Secretário-Geral da ONU para a Guiné-Bissau. Também endossou plenamente as recomendações da missão de revisão estratégica de dezembro de 2016, conforme delineadas no relatório do Secretário-Geral, sobre a necessidade de UNIOGBIS reorientar seus esforços atuais em direção às capacidades políticas de apoio aos bons ofícios do RESG e ao papel de facilitação política.
O Conselho de Segurança solicitou ainda ao UNIOGBIS para que, principalmente, através da utilização de seus bons ofícios e do apoio político do Representante Especial, a focar-se, nomeadamente, nas seguintes prioridades:
- Apoiar um diálogo político inclusivo e um processo de reconciliação nacional para reforçar a governação democrática e trabalhar em prol de um consenso sobre questões políticas fundamentais, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à implementação das reformas urgentes necessárias;
- Apoiar, nomeadamente através da assistência técnica, as autoridades nacionais a agilizar e finalizar a revisão da Constituição da Guiné-Bissau;
- Dar aconselhamento e apoio estratégico e técnico às autoridades nacionais e às partes interessadas em coordenação com a CEDEAO/ECOMIB e outros parceiros internacionais, na implementação de estratégias de reforma do setor da segurança nacional e do Estado de direito, bem como no desenvolvimento de sistemas de justiça civis e militares, que sejam compatíveis com as normas internacionais;
O UNIOGBIS também se concentrará em apoiar o Governo da Guiné-Bissau na "mobilização, harmonização e coordenação da assistência internacional", com os parceiros tais que a União Africana (UA), a Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLC), a Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO) e a União Europeia (UE).
Congratulando-se com o papel crucial desempenhado pelo ECOMIB na segurança das instituições do Estado e no apoio à Reforma do Setor de Segurança, o Conselho de Segurança expressou a sua apreciação pela sua contribuição para a estabilidade na Guiné-Bissau e incentivou a CEDEAO a considerar uma nova prorrogação do seu mandato.
O Conselho de Segurança também declarou que o UNIOGBIS e o Representante Especial continuarão a liderar os esforços internacionais em áreas prioritárias, incluindo o reforço das instituições democráticas e o reforço da capacidade de funcionamento dos órgãos estatais, tais como: a justiça; os direitos humanos; o tráfico de drogas e o crime organizado transnacional, em estreita cooperação com o UNODC.
O Conselho de Segurança congratulou-se com os esforços conjuntos de parceiros internacionais, nomeadamente as Nações Unidas, a União Africana, a CEDEAO, a UE e a CPLP, para reforçar a cooperação em apoio ao Governo da Guiné-Bissau e encorajou-os a continuarem a trabalhar em conjunto para a estabilização do país em conformidade com as reformas estruturais prioritárias estabelecidas pelo Governo e, neste contexto, reconheceu o papel da Comissão de Consolidação da Paz no reforço destes esforços com vista a apoiar as prioridades de consolidação da paz a longo prazo na Guiné-Bissau.
Os 15 membros do Conselho congratularam-se e apoiam uma missão de alto nível que deverá chegar ao país sob a orientação do bloco regional, a Comunidade Económica dos Estados de África Ocidental (CEDEAO), como parte de um acompanhamento para a implementação do Acordo.
No âmbito do seu novo mandato, que terá início no dia 1 de março de 2017 e irá até 28 de fevereiro de 2018, o Conselho de Segurança manifestou o seu firme apoio ao papel fundamental desempenhado pelo Representante Especial do Secretário-Geral da ONU para a Guiné-Bissau. Também endossou plenamente as recomendações da missão de revisão estratégica de dezembro de 2016, conforme delineadas no relatório do Secretário-Geral, sobre a necessidade de UNIOGBIS reorientar seus esforços atuais em direção às capacidades políticas de apoio aos bons ofícios do RESG e ao papel de facilitação política.
O Conselho de Segurança solicitou ainda ao UNIOGBIS para que, principalmente, através da utilização de seus bons ofícios e do apoio político do Representante Especial, a focar-se, nomeadamente, nas seguintes prioridades:
- Apoiar um diálogo político inclusivo e um processo de reconciliação nacional para reforçar a governação democrática e trabalhar em prol de um consenso sobre questões políticas fundamentais, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à implementação das reformas urgentes necessárias;
- Apoiar, nomeadamente através da assistência técnica, as autoridades nacionais a agilizar e finalizar a revisão da Constituição da Guiné-Bissau;
- Dar aconselhamento e apoio estratégico e técnico às autoridades nacionais e às partes interessadas em coordenação com a CEDEAO/ECOMIB e outros parceiros internacionais, na implementação de estratégias de reforma do setor da segurança nacional e do Estado de direito, bem como no desenvolvimento de sistemas de justiça civis e militares, que sejam compatíveis com as normas internacionais;
O UNIOGBIS também se concentrará em apoiar o Governo da Guiné-Bissau na "mobilização, harmonização e coordenação da assistência internacional", com os parceiros tais que a União Africana (UA), a Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLC), a Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO) e a União Europeia (UE).
Congratulando-se com o papel crucial desempenhado pelo ECOMIB na segurança das instituições do Estado e no apoio à Reforma do Setor de Segurança, o Conselho de Segurança expressou a sua apreciação pela sua contribuição para a estabilidade na Guiné-Bissau e incentivou a CEDEAO a considerar uma nova prorrogação do seu mandato.
O Conselho de Segurança também declarou que o UNIOGBIS e o Representante Especial continuarão a liderar os esforços internacionais em áreas prioritárias, incluindo o reforço das instituições democráticas e o reforço da capacidade de funcionamento dos órgãos estatais, tais como: a justiça; os direitos humanos; o tráfico de drogas e o crime organizado transnacional, em estreita cooperação com o UNODC.
O Conselho de Segurança congratulou-se com os esforços conjuntos de parceiros internacionais, nomeadamente as Nações Unidas, a União Africana, a CEDEAO, a UE e a CPLP, para reforçar a cooperação em apoio ao Governo da Guiné-Bissau e encorajou-os a continuarem a trabalhar em conjunto para a estabilização do país em conformidade com as reformas estruturais prioritárias estabelecidas pelo Governo e, neste contexto, reconheceu o papel da Comissão de Consolidação da Paz no reforço destes esforços com vista a apoiar as prioridades de consolidação da paz a longo prazo na Guiné-Bissau.
Timor-Leste: Um Governo de Unidade Nacional
Timor-Leste goes to the polls in 2017 with little in the way of a genuine policy debate. The political scene is dominated by former revolutionary leaders and the jostling between them. It seems likely that the two largest parties—the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (known by its Portuguese initials, CNRT) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin)—will back the candidacy of Francisco "Lu Olo" Guterres in the upcoming presidential election. These two parties will probably also win a majority in the parliamentary poll due in July, allowing a broad government of national unity to remain in place. Opposition groups that highlight issues of corruption are unlikely to make much headway, producing a new parliament with a fragile opposition.
The decision of Xanana Gusmão, a former leader of the resistance against Timor-Leste's occupation by Indonesia, to step down as prime minister in February 2015 led to the formation of a government of national unity, backed both by Mr Gusmão's CNRT and Fretilin, the party of the current prime minister, Rui Maria de Araújo. The support of smaller parties afforded the coalition government the backing of all 65 members of parliament for some time, leaving Timor-Leste bereft of a parliamentary opposition.
However, this cosy set-up has led to government clashes with the president, José Maria Vasconcelos, who is popularly known by his nom de guerre, Taur Matan Ruak. In February 2016 Taur Matan Ruak made a withering criticism of Mr Gusmão and what he sees as political corruption. This is significant, as Taur Matan Rauk has decided to stand down as president in 2017, running for parliament instead with the support of a new party, the People's Liberation Party (PLP), in a way that reopens the sphere of democratic competition. The perceived closeness of a small party, the Partido Democrático (PD), to the president led in May 2016 to the PD's own expulsion from the ruling unity government. (PD ministers in the government opted to stay as independents, forestalling a reshuffle.)
This will be followed in July by the legislative election. As CNRT and Fretilin appear to be continuing to co-operate, it is likely that these parties will win a majority in parliament. A poll conducted in November 2016 by the International Republican Institute (IRI), a pro-democracy think-tank, shows that Fretilin has the support of 44% of Timorese, while CNRT comes in at second place with the support of 19%. Only 3% of those surveyed supported the PD, and 2% the PLP, with other small amounts of backing other minor parties. Under a proportional representation system with a 3% threshold to secure a seat, Taur Matan Ruak may struggle. The opposition groups are likely to win only a handful of seats in total.
This reflects broad satisfaction with the governing coalition. In the IRI poll, 74% stated that the government was doing a good job, and reported improvements in healthcare, education and electricity supply. There is strong public support for state investment in the Oecusse special economic zone and the Tasi Mane petrochemical complex. At present, there appears to be little public opposition to the way that the government is spending petroleum wealth. Over the longer term, however, as petroleum wealth runs out, a stronger political debate may emerge in Timor-Leste. In policy terms, there seems little reason to expect the 2017 elections to produce a sharp change. The Economist
The decision of Xanana Gusmão, a former leader of the resistance against Timor-Leste's occupation by Indonesia, to step down as prime minister in February 2015 led to the formation of a government of national unity, backed both by Mr Gusmão's CNRT and Fretilin, the party of the current prime minister, Rui Maria de Araújo. The support of smaller parties afforded the coalition government the backing of all 65 members of parliament for some time, leaving Timor-Leste bereft of a parliamentary opposition.
However, this cosy set-up has led to government clashes with the president, José Maria Vasconcelos, who is popularly known by his nom de guerre, Taur Matan Ruak. In February 2016 Taur Matan Ruak made a withering criticism of Mr Gusmão and what he sees as political corruption. This is significant, as Taur Matan Rauk has decided to stand down as president in 2017, running for parliament instead with the support of a new party, the People's Liberation Party (PLP), in a way that reopens the sphere of democratic competition. The perceived closeness of a small party, the Partido Democrático (PD), to the president led in May 2016 to the PD's own expulsion from the ruling unity government. (PD ministers in the government opted to stay as independents, forestalling a reshuffle.)
Fretilin set for an easy presidential win
This pits the supporters of the unity government against those who focus on corruption and claim that the government is wasting the country's petroleum wealth on trophy projects. The first election due in 2017 is for the presidency, which is likely to be held in March, with a run-off in April. A new president will take office on May 20th. So far, there are three candidates. Fretilin is backing its party leader, Mr Guterres, who lost out to Taur Matan Ruak in the 2012 presidential poll. Mr Guterres has emphasised his closeness to Mr Gusmão in a way that suggests he is seeking CNRT backing. The only other declared candidates are António Maher Lopes, known by his nom de guerre Fatuk Mutin, who was put forward by a minor party, the Socialist Party of Timor, as well as José António de Jesus das Neves, who goes by the nom de guerre Samala Rua. He is a former deputy commissioner of the Anti-Corruption Commission and is running as an independent. Presuming that CNRT does not run a separate candidate, this leaves the field wide open for an easy win by Mr Guterres. Speculation that a former president and Fretilin founder, José Manuel Ramos-Horta, currently the UN Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau, might run has so far proven unfounded.This will be followed in July by the legislative election. As CNRT and Fretilin appear to be continuing to co-operate, it is likely that these parties will win a majority in parliament. A poll conducted in November 2016 by the International Republican Institute (IRI), a pro-democracy think-tank, shows that Fretilin has the support of 44% of Timorese, while CNRT comes in at second place with the support of 19%. Only 3% of those surveyed supported the PD, and 2% the PLP, with other small amounts of backing other minor parties. Under a proportional representation system with a 3% threshold to secure a seat, Taur Matan Ruak may struggle. The opposition groups are likely to win only a handful of seats in total.
This reflects broad satisfaction with the governing coalition. In the IRI poll, 74% stated that the government was doing a good job, and reported improvements in healthcare, education and electricity supply. There is strong public support for state investment in the Oecusse special economic zone and the Tasi Mane petrochemical complex. At present, there appears to be little public opposition to the way that the government is spending petroleum wealth. Over the longer term, however, as petroleum wealth runs out, a stronger political debate may emerge in Timor-Leste. In policy terms, there seems little reason to expect the 2017 elections to produce a sharp change. The Economist
Timor-Leste: Sem uma oposição efectiva
Politicians must sometime feel as though they can never win. For most of the last 15 years since Timor-Leste gained its independence, it has been marred by political division and partisanship, which exploded violently in 2006 when a dispute between regional officers in the military escalated into nationwide unrest. Today, the problem is the opposite: there is not enough division.
In 2015 the two largest political parties – FRETILIN and the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) – reached what is widely considered to be a power-sharing agreement. CNRT leader Xanana Gusmão stepped down as prime minister in February that year and nominated as his successor the former health minister and FRETILIN lawmaker, Rui Maria de Araújo. Along with the backing of some smaller parties, this “unity government” now has a majority in the National Parliament, meaning Timor-Leste is without an effective opposition.
This consensus irked President Taur Matan Ruak, who decided last year to take it upon himself to be the one to hold the government to account (not strictly the purpose of his role). In February 2016, he stood before the country’s parliamentarians and announced: “The state of Timor-Leste is far too centralized. It centralizes skill, power, and privileges. It excessively wastes resources, allowing thousands of Timorese to become second-class citizens.”
Without an effective opposition, he said, the country’s leaders were becoming more nepotistic and wasteful. Rauk is expected to step down as president before this year’s general election, predicted to take place in July, and run for prime minister with the backing of a newly created political party, the People’s Liberation Party (PLP).
Before the parliamentary elections, East Timorese vote to choose the next president. Both FRETILIN and the CNRT are looking likely to back the same candidate, Francisco “Lu Olo” Guterres, the president of FRETILIN, although the CNRT has yet to formally back him. There are few indications, however, that it will come up with its own candidate with only a month to go.
There were rumors late last year that the Nobel Peace Prize-winning former president José Ramos-Horta would run again for the post this year. This now appears not to be the case. Ramos-Horta announced last month that he would not stand as a candidate, according to a Portuguese-language newspaper. Other presidential candidates include António “Fatuk Mutin” Maher Lopes, who is reportedly running with the backing of the small Socialist Party of Timor, and José António de Jesus das Neves, a former deputy commissioner of the Anti-Corruption Commission, who is running as an independent.
So what does this mean? Well, should Lu Olo win the presidential race, and FRETILIN and the CNRT win a majority of the seats at the general election (which is likely to be the case, though they will be campaigning separately) then the FRETILIN-CNRT alliance will have complete control over the executive if the unity government continues post-election. Ruak and the PLP may well win some seats in parliament, they will have an uphill struggle to secure enough MPs to form a viable opposition.
Some contend that unity between FRETILIN and the CNRT is justifiable, since it means the scenes that unfolded in 2006 are unlikely to reoccur. And the country, which desperately needs to develop economically and socially, will no longer be plagued by infighting in the National Parliament over legislation.
There are also suggestions the public is happy with the arrangement. A poll conducted in November by the International Republican Institute (IRI), a U.S.-based nonprofit, found 74 percent of East Timorese thought the government was doing a good job, and 72 percent thought Timor-Leste will be “better off” in years to come. In terms of infrastructure, a high number of respondents thought things had improved over the course of the year: 79 percent for healthcare, 78 percent for education, and 71 percent for electricity. Though only 29 percent saw improvements in the country’s enfeebled road network, compared to 32 percent who thought it was getting worse.
“The optimistic outlook and enthusiasm for democracy displayed in this poll are highly encouraging,” IRI Regional Director for Asia, Derek Luyten, said in a statement. “Ahead of the upcoming presidential election, it is crucial that Timorese political leaders seize upon this popular goodwill to address the issues of greatest concern to citizens, and take steps to ensure citizens are well-informed of how and when to vote.”
Still, this is only half of the picture. A report published last month by the Asia Foundation , a nonprofit international development organization, found that the majority of residents in the capital, Dili, fear they could be evicted from their homes should a draft law currently being debated in parliament go through. If the law is passed, said the Asia Foundation’s deputy country director in Timor-Leste, Todd Wassel, “we estimate a quarter of Dili would not be protected under the new law, so they wouldn’t have any legal tenure security on the land where they’re currently living.” The report described land dispossession and conflict as the “dormant giants” affecting the country’s stability.
Consensus, according to Ruak, only works in the interest of the ruling elite. According to the outgoing president, the government does “not use unanimity to solve [Timor-Leste’s] issues; they use it for power and privilege. Brother Xanana takes care of Timor while Brother [Alkatiri] takes care of Oecussi.” Oecussi is a small enclave in Indonesian West Timor, where a costly Special Social Market Economy Zone is currently in development. In 2013, Mari Alkatiri, the Secretary-General of FRETILIN, was chosen by Gusmão to preside over this economic zone.
Timor-Leste’s problems, however, tend to fall into the categories of “what-ifs.” What if violence breaks out again (unlikely) and what if its oil and gas reserves run out (incredibly likely), as I have considered previously?
Should the unity government survive after this year’s elections, there is little to suggest it would turn away from the economic policy it has followed for a number of years: growing state budgets, a lethargic diversification of the economy, dependence on its sovereign wealth fund, and large infrastructure projects that (not always unfairly) have been dubbed vanity projects.
The division that has arisen in East Timorese politics, going into an election year, was summed up in a brief report by the Economist’s Intelligence Unit, published January 16, which stated that the elections will pit “the supporters of the unity government against those who focus on corruption and claim that the government is wasting the country’s petroleum wealth on trophy projects.”
The question, therefore, is whether political peace and stability justify the costs that come with consensus. Indeed, whether they justify the possible weakening of the country’s proud democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2015 Democracy Index ranked Timor-Leste 44th out of 167 places, the highest of all Southeast Asian countries. The 2016 edition of the same index bumped Timor-Leste up one place, still the highest in the region.
This is quite a feat for a nation that only gained its independence 15 years ago. But it is a feat that could be so easily undone should the government be bereft of an effective opposition for the next five years. Arguably, the government needs to be held accountable during the next few years more than any other time since 2002; the decisions it makes will be among the most important in the nation’s short history. The Diplomat
In 2015 the two largest political parties – FRETILIN and the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) – reached what is widely considered to be a power-sharing agreement. CNRT leader Xanana Gusmão stepped down as prime minister in February that year and nominated as his successor the former health minister and FRETILIN lawmaker, Rui Maria de Araújo. Along with the backing of some smaller parties, this “unity government” now has a majority in the National Parliament, meaning Timor-Leste is without an effective opposition.
This consensus irked President Taur Matan Ruak, who decided last year to take it upon himself to be the one to hold the government to account (not strictly the purpose of his role). In February 2016, he stood before the country’s parliamentarians and announced: “The state of Timor-Leste is far too centralized. It centralizes skill, power, and privileges. It excessively wastes resources, allowing thousands of Timorese to become second-class citizens.”
Without an effective opposition, he said, the country’s leaders were becoming more nepotistic and wasteful. Rauk is expected to step down as president before this year’s general election, predicted to take place in July, and run for prime minister with the backing of a newly created political party, the People’s Liberation Party (PLP).
Before the parliamentary elections, East Timorese vote to choose the next president. Both FRETILIN and the CNRT are looking likely to back the same candidate, Francisco “Lu Olo” Guterres, the president of FRETILIN, although the CNRT has yet to formally back him. There are few indications, however, that it will come up with its own candidate with only a month to go.
There were rumors late last year that the Nobel Peace Prize-winning former president José Ramos-Horta would run again for the post this year. This now appears not to be the case. Ramos-Horta announced last month that he would not stand as a candidate, according to a Portuguese-language newspaper. Other presidential candidates include António “Fatuk Mutin” Maher Lopes, who is reportedly running with the backing of the small Socialist Party of Timor, and José António de Jesus das Neves, a former deputy commissioner of the Anti-Corruption Commission, who is running as an independent.
So what does this mean? Well, should Lu Olo win the presidential race, and FRETILIN and the CNRT win a majority of the seats at the general election (which is likely to be the case, though they will be campaigning separately) then the FRETILIN-CNRT alliance will have complete control over the executive if the unity government continues post-election. Ruak and the PLP may well win some seats in parliament, they will have an uphill struggle to secure enough MPs to form a viable opposition.
Some contend that unity between FRETILIN and the CNRT is justifiable, since it means the scenes that unfolded in 2006 are unlikely to reoccur. And the country, which desperately needs to develop economically and socially, will no longer be plagued by infighting in the National Parliament over legislation.
There are also suggestions the public is happy with the arrangement. A poll conducted in November by the International Republican Institute (IRI), a U.S.-based nonprofit, found 74 percent of East Timorese thought the government was doing a good job, and 72 percent thought Timor-Leste will be “better off” in years to come. In terms of infrastructure, a high number of respondents thought things had improved over the course of the year: 79 percent for healthcare, 78 percent for education, and 71 percent for electricity. Though only 29 percent saw improvements in the country’s enfeebled road network, compared to 32 percent who thought it was getting worse.
“The optimistic outlook and enthusiasm for democracy displayed in this poll are highly encouraging,” IRI Regional Director for Asia, Derek Luyten, said in a statement. “Ahead of the upcoming presidential election, it is crucial that Timorese political leaders seize upon this popular goodwill to address the issues of greatest concern to citizens, and take steps to ensure citizens are well-informed of how and when to vote.”
Still, this is only half of the picture. A report published last month by the Asia Foundation , a nonprofit international development organization, found that the majority of residents in the capital, Dili, fear they could be evicted from their homes should a draft law currently being debated in parliament go through. If the law is passed, said the Asia Foundation’s deputy country director in Timor-Leste, Todd Wassel, “we estimate a quarter of Dili would not be protected under the new law, so they wouldn’t have any legal tenure security on the land where they’re currently living.” The report described land dispossession and conflict as the “dormant giants” affecting the country’s stability.
Consensus, according to Ruak, only works in the interest of the ruling elite. According to the outgoing president, the government does “not use unanimity to solve [Timor-Leste’s] issues; they use it for power and privilege. Brother Xanana takes care of Timor while Brother [Alkatiri] takes care of Oecussi.” Oecussi is a small enclave in Indonesian West Timor, where a costly Special Social Market Economy Zone is currently in development. In 2013, Mari Alkatiri, the Secretary-General of FRETILIN, was chosen by Gusmão to preside over this economic zone.
Timor-Leste’s problems, however, tend to fall into the categories of “what-ifs.” What if violence breaks out again (unlikely) and what if its oil and gas reserves run out (incredibly likely), as I have considered previously?
Should the unity government survive after this year’s elections, there is little to suggest it would turn away from the economic policy it has followed for a number of years: growing state budgets, a lethargic diversification of the economy, dependence on its sovereign wealth fund, and large infrastructure projects that (not always unfairly) have been dubbed vanity projects.
The division that has arisen in East Timorese politics, going into an election year, was summed up in a brief report by the Economist’s Intelligence Unit, published January 16, which stated that the elections will pit “the supporters of the unity government against those who focus on corruption and claim that the government is wasting the country’s petroleum wealth on trophy projects.”
The question, therefore, is whether political peace and stability justify the costs that come with consensus. Indeed, whether they justify the possible weakening of the country’s proud democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2015 Democracy Index ranked Timor-Leste 44th out of 167 places, the highest of all Southeast Asian countries. The 2016 edition of the same index bumped Timor-Leste up one place, still the highest in the region.
This is quite a feat for a nation that only gained its independence 15 years ago. But it is a feat that could be so easily undone should the government be bereft of an effective opposition for the next five years. Arguably, the government needs to be held accountable during the next few years more than any other time since 2002; the decisions it makes will be among the most important in the nation’s short history. The Diplomat
Timor-Leste: As presidenciais de 20 de Março
By Rui Graça Feijó, Lecturer at CES/UCoimbra and IHC/UNLisboa
The field of candidates is composed of 8 individuals who submitted at least 5,000 endorsements with a regional distribution of at least 100 in each of the country’s 213 districts. This is the same number as in 2007, and 5 less than in 2012. Underneath the “normality” of this picture, a major change is occurring: there is a very strong candidate alongside seven others with little or no chance of actually fighting for anything more than a modest result, at best an honourable second. The presidential elections will thus fulfil two purposes: one is the official task of choosing a president; the other is to help contenders ascertain their hold on popular vote and their chances in the legislative elections scheduled for June, allowing for tactical decisions. On top of that, internal party struggles, a show of personal vanity, and access to the generous public support to candidates (at least US$ 10,000 per candidate regardless of their electoral score) will play a minor part in the circus.
FRETILIN proposed Lu Olo, its chairman (not its leader, the secretary-general Mari Alkatiri), as it had done in 2007 and 2012. Both times Lu Olo came first on the initial round only to see all other candidates rally against him in the decisive one. He has now received the formal backing of the largest parliamentary party, CNRT, and most of all, of the charismatic leader of the young nation, Xanana Gusmão. He is “Snow White” surrounded by seven dwarfs.
The main rival seems to be António Conceição. He is a member of Partido Democrático, a party that suffered a heavy blow with the death of its historical leader Fernando Lasama de Araújo (2015), followed by internal strife. The party as such ceased to be part of the governmental coalition, although his ministers were allowed to remain in functions as “independent”. António Conceição is one of those, and his bid at the presidency is partly a test for a presumed bid for the party leadership. He may have the backing of a new party, Partido da Libertação do Povo, inspired by the outgoing president Taur Matan Ruak, who declined to seek re-election and is widely believed to be preparing a bid for the premiership (if the presidential elections allow for such presumption).
Former minister José Luis Guterres, whose party Frenti-Mudança is the smaller one in the governmental coalition, has also declared his intention to run.
Two non-parliamentary parties have also fielded candidates. Partido Trabalhista supports its leader, Angela Freitas, and Partido Socialista Timorense backs António Maher Lopes. Although PST has no MP, its leader, Avelino Coelho, holds an important position in government.
A former deputy commissioner in the Anti-Corruption Commission, José Neves, is among those who seek the popular vote without party support – a circumstance that in the past has been critical in winning the second ballot, as candidates in these circumstances were able to build coalitions of all the defeated runners against the “danger” of a partisan candidate. Two others fall in this category: Amorim Vieira, of whom very little is known apart from the fact that he lived in Scotland where he joined SNP; and Luis Tilman, a virtually unknown individual who also presents himself as “independent”.
A few things emerge from this picture. Against what is expectable in two-round elections in fragmented party systems (Timor has 4 parliamentary parties, about 30 legal ones, and the 2012 elections had 21 parties or coalitions running), which induce the presentation of candidates on an identity affirmation basis in view of a negotiation for the second ballot (as was the case in Timor in 2007 and 2012), this time the two largest parties negotiated a common candidate before the first round, significantly increasing the likelihood that he will be elected on March 20.
It thus highly probable that Timor-Leste will have for the first time a president who is a member of a political party. The experience of three non-partisan presidents comes to an end not because the rules of the game have been changed, but rather because the political scenario has moved considerably. Back in 2015, a government of “national inclusion” replaced the one led by Xanana with the backing of all parties in the House, even if FRETILIN, who offered one of its members for the premiership, still claims to be “in the opposition”. The move has been called by a senior minister “a transformation of belligerent democracy into consensus democracy”. Although the outgoing president is supposed to have facilitated this development, he soon turned sides and became a bitter and very outspoken critic of Rui Maria de Araújo’s executive and the political entente that sustains it.
Now the two major partners of the entente agreed to go together to the presidential elections, signalling that they wish to continue the current government formula after this year’s cycle of elections (even if the place of smaller parties in the coalition is not secure, and a question mark hangs above the score that the new opposition PLP may obtain). More than this, they assume that the role of the president has somehow changed from being the guarantor of impartiality discharging a “neutral” function as “president of all Timorese” to be a player in the partisan game, throwing his political and institutional support behind the government coalition.
A question emerges when one considers that CNRT is the largest party in the House, and that it has relinquished the right to appoint the prime minister (who is a member of FRETILIN acting in an “individual capacity”) and now forfeits the chance of securing the presidency, offering it to its rival/partner. Will it maintain this low-key attitude after the parliamentary elections if it remains the largest party?
The CNRT/FRETILIN entente suggests that Timorese politics lives in a double stage: the official one with state officers discharging their functions, and the one behind the curtains where de facto Xanana (who is simply a minister) and Mari Alkatiri (who holds a leading position in a regional development entity) tend retain the reins of actual power. In this light, public efforts to promote the “gerasaun foun” (younger generation) in lieu of the “gerasaun tuan” (the old guard that was already present back in 1975) by offering the premiership and other jobs to those who are relatively younger needs to be carefully hold in check.
In Dili, I was told that Timorese presidents tend to suffer the “syndrome of the wrong palace”. This expression is meant to convey the idea that they become frustrated with the (allegedly limited) powers bestowed upon them by the constitution, and consider that the legitimacy conferred on them by a two round election that guarantees an absolute majority is sort of “kidnapped”. They are prisoners in their palace. They believe they have the right to determine strategic orientations and cannot find the actual means to implement them. So they look at the premiership in the palace next door. Xanana stepped down from the presidency and launched a party and a successful bid to head government; Taur Matan Ruak is trying to follow suit – but his chances are not deemed so high. If Lu Olo manages to get elected, the sort of relations he is likely to establish with the prime-minister are totally different, as he is compromised with “one majority, one government, one president” – only the president is not likely to be the one who leads. Will this resolve the syndrome issue? Interesting times lay ahead.
23.2.17
Bissau: Jomav must go!
Hundreds of protesters have marched through the capital of Guinea-Bissau, demanding the departure of embattled President Jose Mario Vaz.
On Thursday, the crowd of angry demonstrators on the main avenues of the capital Bissau held anti-government placards and repeatedly chanted slogans such as "Jomav get out", using the president's local nickname.
They also called for fresh elections to end the political crisis gripping the African country.
The demonstration came a day after parliament rejected a program submitted by Prime Minister Umaro Mokhtar Sissoco Embalo.
Vaz appointed Sissoco in November after months of regional talks seeking an end to an 18-month political turmoil in the country.
The prime minister has already missed a 60-day deadline to present a government program and budget that have to be accepted by parliament.
"The party ... voted against the program of the PM because his government is illegitimate," said Seidy Ba Sane, a spokesman for the country's ruling PAIGC party.
Sissoco has stressed that he would continue ruling without the confidence of parliament.
People in the West African country say the failure to pass a budget has begun to affect their daily lives and caused delays in payment of salaries for civil servants.
In addition, the ongoing crisis has stoked fears that drug traffickers might profit from the power vacuum in the country.
Earlier this month, the United Nations expressed concern "over challenges posed by transnational organized crime and emerging threats, including drug trafficking, in the country."
The economy of Guinea Bissau, one of the world's poorest countries, is heavily reliant on cashew nut production.
Violence has rocked Guinea-Bissau since 1974 when it gained independence from Portugal.
Since its independence, the country has suffered from political turmoil, including a series of military coups largely due to the unprecedented expansion of the army.
On Thursday, the crowd of angry demonstrators on the main avenues of the capital Bissau held anti-government placards and repeatedly chanted slogans such as "Jomav get out", using the president's local nickname.
They also called for fresh elections to end the political crisis gripping the African country.
The demonstration came a day after parliament rejected a program submitted by Prime Minister Umaro Mokhtar Sissoco Embalo.
Vaz appointed Sissoco in November after months of regional talks seeking an end to an 18-month political turmoil in the country.
The prime minister has already missed a 60-day deadline to present a government program and budget that have to be accepted by parliament.
"The party ... voted against the program of the PM because his government is illegitimate," said Seidy Ba Sane, a spokesman for the country's ruling PAIGC party.
Sissoco has stressed that he would continue ruling without the confidence of parliament.
People in the West African country say the failure to pass a budget has begun to affect their daily lives and caused delays in payment of salaries for civil servants.
In addition, the ongoing crisis has stoked fears that drug traffickers might profit from the power vacuum in the country.
Earlier this month, the United Nations expressed concern "over challenges posed by transnational organized crime and emerging threats, including drug trafficking, in the country."
The economy of Guinea Bissau, one of the world's poorest countries, is heavily reliant on cashew nut production.
Violence has rocked Guinea-Bissau since 1974 when it gained independence from Portugal.
Since its independence, the country has suffered from political turmoil, including a series of military coups largely due to the unprecedented expansion of the army.
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