O mortífero Iraque pós-Sadam

The Associated Press, Baghdad Thursday, 2 January 2014 The United Nations said Wednesday that violence claimed the lives of 7,818 civilians in Iraq in 2013, the highest annual death toll in years. Over eight months of escalated violence has sparked fears that the country may be returning to the widespread bloodshed of 2004-2007 that saw tens of thousands killed each year. Death tolls dipped following a U.S. troop surge and an alliance of Sunni militias with U.S. forces against al-Qaida, but soaring sectarian distrust appears to be allowing the extremist network to rebuild. Violence spiked in April after the Shiite-led government staged a deadly crackdown on a Sunni protest camp. Iraq’s al-Qaida branch has fed on Sunni discontent and on the civil war in neighboring Syria, in which mostly Sunni rebels fight a government whose base is a Shiite offshoot sect. It has targeted civilians, particularly in Shiite areas of Baghdad, with waves of coordinated car bombings and other deadly attacks. The U.N. figures gave a total of 759 people killed in December alone, including 661 civilians and 98 members of the security forces. Another 1,345 were wounded, the statement said. The U.N.’s monthly figures for both civilians and security forces over the year totaled 8,868. Mission chief Nickolay Mladenov called on Iraqis to take the necessary steps to stem violence. “This is a sad and terrible record which confirms once again the urgent need for the Iraqi authorities to address the roots of violence to curb this infernal circle,” Mladenov was quoted in the statement as saying. The insurgency appears to have capitalized on a protest movement by Sunnis angered at what they consider second-class treatment, and the government’s crackdown on it. On Wednesday, al-Qaida gunmen fanned out in the streets of towns in the volatile western province of Anbar amid Sunni anger over the arrest of a prominent Sunni lawmaker and the dismantlement of a year-long sit-in the provincial capital Ramadi in recent days. A provincial spokesman told The Associated Press that al-Qaida fighters brandished their weapons in the streets of Ramadi and other towns, taking over police stations and military posts after security forces left. Dhari al-Rishawi said in the former insurgent stronghold of Fallujah, gunmen broke into the main police station, setting free dozens of inmates and taking weapons. Iraq’s Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appealed to Sunni tribes to team up with security forces to fight the militants, expressing his government’s readiness to listen to Anbar residents to address their needs. “I call upon on all generous tribes in Anbar to adopt a courageous stance ... and other tribes in [the provinces of] Diyala, Salaheddin, Ninevah, Baghdad and other parts of Iraq to come together,” al-Maliki said in his weekly televised speech. “I say that all our brothers in Anbar are welcomed for discussion or negotiations,” he said. “We want them to come here [in Baghdad] so that we can put our hands together for the sake of Anbar to protect it from foreign agendas and Takfiri ideology.” Takfirism refers to hard-liners who consider other Muslims to be infidels, and Maliki’s invocation of it appears to be an attempt to remind Sunnis in Anbar, who were among the first to turn on al-Qaida in 2005-2007, that they too had been targeted by extremists. On Tuesday, Maliki said that the Iraqi army would hand over control of cities in Anbar province to the local police, a main demand of discontented Sunni politicians who see the army as a tool in the hand of al-Maliki to target his rivals and consolidate power. But on Wednesday, his spokesman Ali al-Mussawi said that the prime minister ordered the army to return to Anbar, saying it was at the request of the people and local government of the province. Anbar province spokesman Ahmed al-Duleimi said on local television that he had asked the army to return, citing al-Qaida activity in Fallujah. Elsewhere in Iraq, gunmen attacked a police station in Tarmiya, 30 miles (50 kilometers) north of Baghdad, killing three police and wounding five, police said. They spoke anonymously as they were not allowed to talk to media.

O legado de Bin Laden

ny way you measure it, 2013 was a good year for al Qaeda. It wasn’t supposed to be. Shortly after the United States killed the group’s charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden, a couple of years ago, Obama administration officials openly proclaimed that his death, coupled with targeted strikes that eliminated other senior jihadist leaders, had just about put al Qaeda out of business. Leon Panetta, then the defense secretary, stated in July 2011 that the United States was “within reach” of “strategically defeating” al Qaeda if it killed or captured 10 to 20 of its remaining leaders. But as this year ends, the jihadist group’s regional affiliates have dramatically reasserted themselves in multiple countries, carrying out spectacular attacks and inflicting increasing levels of carnage. Though it’s hard to come by reliable estimates of the deaths they caused, the number is certainly in the thousands, and more than half a dozen countries now view these affiliates, or foreigners who have joined their ranks, as their top national security concern. The affiliates’ regeneration became so apparent over the course of this year that President Barack Obama was forced to clarify that his administration’s various claims of al Qaeda’s decimation were limited to the core leadership in Pakistan alone. The year began with France spearheading a military intervention to push back jihadist groups that had seized territory in northern Mali, an impoverished country in the bone-dry Sahel region of Africa. France’s operation achieved some success, but a brigade led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar—who has pledged his loyalty directly to al Qaeda’s senior leaders—seized more than 800 hostages in a retaliatory operation at Algeria’s In Amenas gas complex. At least 39 foreign hostages were killed during the operation. France’s war in Mali also showed how deteriorating conditions in Libya, where the new government has never been able to assert its authority, help the jihadist cause. Some of the In Amenas attackers reportedly trained in southern Libya (where camps prepare militants for suicide missions, among other things), and used the country as a staging ground for the hostage-taking operation. And as France advanced on the battlefield, many jihadist fighters fled to southwest Libya, where they evaded pursuit by “blending with local militant groups,” according to the Wall Street Journal. The In Amenas siege began on Jan. 16. The following day, Iraq experienced its first double-digit casualty terrorist attack of the year, as a series of bombs targeting buses and their passengers struck in predominantly Shia areas. The bombings killed 19 and injured more than 100 people. Iraq’s death toll mounted throughout the year, driven by al Qaeda’s blossoming capabilities. By the end of 2013, more than 6,000 Iraqis had died in violence, the highest level of fatalities since 2007, the peak year of Iraq’s bloody civil war. As U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq two years ago, American and Iraqi officials expressed concern that al Qaeda was “poised for a deadly resurgence.” Rather than proving alarmist, these warnings likely understated the speed and magnitude of the organization’s rebound in Iraq. Another al Qaeda franchise surged this year. The Somali militant group al-Shabaab, which once controlled more territory in southern Somalia than did the country’s U.N.-recognized government, had lost its last major urban stronghold of Kismayo to advancing African Union forces in October 2012. But Shabaab remained lethal. On Sept. 21, terrorists associated with the group launched a spectacular assault on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall. The attack dragged on for four days, killing 67 and injuring at least 175. But even before that, there were signs that a complex operation like Westgate was possible, as Shabaab carried out increasingly sophisticated attacks throughout the year. These included an attack on a Mogadishu courthouse that killed 29, and a twin suicide bombing at Mogadishu’s U.N. compound that claimed 22 lives. In Syria, jihadists built on the gains they had made in 2012. Extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have proven to be some of the country’s most effective rebel factions. As 2013 ends, jihadists have been able to gain full control over such cities and towns as Raqqa and Shadadi in the north. ISIS has become adept at the targeted use of violence against Raqqa’s citizens, for the purposes of dominating and intimidating them as it implements a harsh version of Islamic law. Further compounding concerns stemming from the Syria conflict, a recent study published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation found that up to 11,000 foreign fighters have flocked to the battlefield to fight Bashar Assad’s government, of whom around 2,000 are from Western Europe. This has sparked fears in their countries of origin that the fighters could pose a security threat if they return both radicalized and battle-hardened. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program. He is the author or volume editor of 12 books and monographs, including Bin Laden’s Legacy. Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/12/al-qaeda-2013-101477.html#ixzz2pEZZHqDz

Bissau: Os atrasos do processo eleitoral

O ministro da Administração Territorial e Poder Local, Baptista Té, assumiu os atrasos e as anomalias que se têm vindo a verificar desde o primeiro dia de recenseamento eleitoral na Guiné-Bissau, a 1 de Dezembro. Num comunicado enviado à PNN, Baptista Té disse que é justo reafirmar que o atraso da chegada dos kits teve influências negativas na selecção e formação de agentes de recenseamento, assim como na distribuição desses materiais. O documento surge na sequência da notícia que dava conta que o Governo de Timor-Leste esteva envolvido no atraso deste processo. «O único responsável por este facto é o Governo da Guiné-Bissau, concretamente o Ministério da Administração Territorial e Poder Local, e não o Governo de Timor-Leste», refere o comunicado. --- Ou seja, o dito por não dito. E uma verdade: há atrasos e anomalias, de modo que só muito dificilmente os guineenses irão às urnas antes de 20 de Março.

Bissau: Nhamadjo defende regresso à normalidade constitucional

O presidente de transição da Guiné-Bissau, Serifo Nhamadjo, confirmou, no seu discurso à Nação de fim do ano, que o «incidente com a TAP» deteriorou a imagem externa do país. Além de prejudicar a imagem do país, Serifo Nhamadjo afirmou que a passagem dos cidadãos sírios pela Guiné-Bissau, de onde partiram para Portugal e onde acabariam por pedir asilo político complicou também as relações com Portugal. «É verdade que o incidente da passagem por Bissau, a caminho de Lisboa, de 74 cidadãos sírios veio acrescer mais uma acha nas já deficitárias relações entre o nosso país e Portugal», disse Nhamadjo. No passado dia 10 deste mês 74 sírios, entre adultos e crianças, embarcaram à força no aeroporto de Bissau, depois de pressões à tripulação da TAP, por parte do ministro guineense do Interior, para Portugal sob alegação de constituírem perigo para a segurança interna da Guiné-Bissau. Para o presidente de transição, o incidente complicou as relações com Portugal, afetou a imagem externa da Guiné-Bissau e ainda «lesa a dignidade dos guineenses». Nhamadjo diz, contudo, que aguarda pelo posicionamento da Justiça e do primeiro-ministro, Rui de Barros, para depois tomar uma decisão. «Como é do conhecimento público tanto o ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, que tutela as embaixadas, como o ministro do Interior, que tutela as migrações, colocaram os seus lugares à disposição do chefe do Governo», lembrou Nhamadjo. Perante este e outros factos invocados no discurso de fim do ano, o presidente guineense questionou os seus concidadãos sobre os caminhos a tomar para o novo ano. Para Nhamadjo só resta aos guineenses trabalharem para que o país possa retomar a normalidade constitucionalmente interrompida com o golpe de Estado militar de abril de 2012. Nhamadjo instou os guineenses a continuarem «com a mesma determinação», empenho e «capacidade de sofrimento», mas mantendo sempre a coesão na diversidade. «Devemos levar a cabo aquilo que a Nação e toda a comunidade internacional espera de nós, a realização de eleições gerais (...) bem como a criação de condições para um efetivo retorno à normalidade constitucional», observou o presidente guineense. As eleições gerais (legislativas e presidenciais) estão marcadas para 16 de março. Lusa

Bissau: Kumba afasta-se da política activa

Bissau, 01 jan. - O ex-presidente guineense, Kumba Ialá, renunciou hoje à política ativa, disse o próprio em conferência de imprensa,

sublinhando que "tudo na vida tem o seu tempo". Kumba Ialá já não será candidato às próximas eleições presidenciais de 16 de março. "Agora que me despeço não da política, mas de disputas e mandatos de cargos eleitorais, realço que não é necessário, que não é preciso, ter cargos para exercer a cidadania ativa", observou. O ex.presidente guineense disse ter tomado a decisão após consultar a família e os amigos. Na conferência de imprensa, as palavras de Ialá foram recebidas com palmas de vários apoiantes que se fizeram presentes. Ao abandonar a vida política ativa, Kumba Ialá diz que encerra uma etapa iniciada há mais de 20 anos, tendo fundado o Partido da Renovação Social (PRS) e alcançado a presidência da Guiné-Bissau, entre 2000 a 2003, de onde saiu através de um golpe de Estado militar. Explicando as razões do abandono da vida política ativa, Kumba Ialá recorreu aos textos bíblicos. "O rei Salomão dizia no velho testamento que há tempo para tudo na vida terrena de um homem. Há tempo para nascer e há tempo para morrer. Há tempo para odiar, tempo para amar, tempo para parar a Guerra", observou Ialá. Sobre as próximas eleições gerais, Kumba Ialá afirmou que a sua decisão de não se apresentar à corrida "é irrevogável", por compreender que "os tempos são outros" e por ser também dar espaço à novas figuras. O ex-presidente guineense diz que parte "com a consciência tranquila" mas continua a querer ver a Guiné-Bissau melhorada. Kumba Ialá diz que se vai posicionar como próximo membro do futuro senado a ser criado no país. "Os que exerceram cargos públicos de relevo deviam afastar-se das lutas partidárias. Parto porque reformas importantes estão para ser feitas nos setores da Defesa e Segurança", observou Kumba Ialá. Saudando as "grandes figuras" que ajudaram e inspiraram a Guiné-Bissau para a sua emancipação, Kumba Ialá referiu o nome do ex-presidente e falecido João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira e vários nomes de líderes africanos defuntos. Ialá não se esqueceu também de "ilustres homens de Estado" de Portugal, nomeadamente Mário Soares, Álvaro Cunhal e Francisco Sá Carneiro, ao saudar a contribuição dada por Portugal na sua formação enquanto estudante e democrata. Novas da Guiné-Bissau

Sudão do Sul: Tudo preparado para o pior

South Sudan's crisis began just two weeks ago, on Dec. 15, and it already has observers warning that it could lead to civil war. Fighting has killed an estimated 1,000 people and sent 121,600 fleeing from their homes. International peacekeepers are preparing for the worst; some have been killed and a number of them, including four U.S. troops, have been injured. What's happening in South Sudan is complicated and can be difficult to follow; understanding how it got to be this way can be even tougher. Here, then, are the most basic answers to your most basic questions. First, a disclaimer: This is not an exhaustive or definitive account of South Sudan and its history -- just some background, written so that anyone can understand it. 1. What is South Sudan? South Sudan is the world's newest country. It's located in Central Africa, is about the size of Texas and has about as many people as Ohio (11 million). South Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world, has a 27 percent literacy rate and is so underdeveloped that it has only about 35 miles of paved road. Its economy is driven by oil exports. South Sudan declared independence from the rest of Sudan on July 9, 2011. At the time, it was considered a huge success for the world. But its 2½ years as a sovereign state have been disastrous. This latest crisis is just another part of the country's struggle to stand on its own. 2. Why are people in South Sudan killing each other? The violence started on Dec. 15, when troops in the presidential guard started fighting against one another, in what is a depressingly accurate metaphor for South Sudan's problems. That fighting quickly spread and is now engulfing entire swaths of the country. If that seems like a strange way for a potential civil war to start, it will make more sense once you hear the backstory. In July, the president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, fired his vice president, Riek Machar. The two were more rivals than partners; Kiir thought that Machar was gunning for his job. Here's the really important thing: Kiir and Machar are from different ethnic groups, and in South Sudan ethnic groups are really important. Kiir is ethnic Dinka, the largest of South Sudan's many ethnic groups. Machar is Nuer, the country's second-largest group. Tension between the Dinka and the Nuer goes way back in South Sudan, and the political rivalry between the groups' two most powerful members, Kiir and Machar, always had the potential to become an ethnic conflict. It did on Dec. 15, when members of the presidential guard who are Dinka tried to disarm members of the guard who are Nuer, maybe because they feared the Nuer would try to stage a coup. (Kiir later said the fighting had started because Machar had tried to stage a coup, although evidence for this is thin.) The fighting between Dinka and Nuer presidential guards very quickly spread across the country. The main antagonists are rebels, often ethnic Nuer, including a group called the White Army. (Some reports say the group got its name because fighters smeared themselves with white ash to protect themselves from insects.) The rebels have seized territory, including some oil-producing land, and may or may not be marching on the city of Bor. 3. How could that one little incident spark such a big conflict? When fighting spread from a few presidential guards to entire areas of South Sudan, we saw something that has happened before in sub-Saharan Africa. Political leaders and grass-roots militants alike defaulted from their national identity to their ethnic identity. Political rivalries became ethnic conflicts. Competing against the other group became more attractive than cooperating. Since they won independence, it's been hard for South Sudan's ethnic groups to get along. Southerners don't have that common enemy uniting them anymore. Worse, they don't have a strong sense of belonging to a shared nation. People have been identifying by ethnicity for so long that they often still do. Another big problem is that South Sudan is extremely poor but has lots of oil; that makes it very tempting for ethnic groups to compete for the scarce resources they so badly need. If this were, say, Iceland, then a contentious rivalry between the nation's two leading politicians would probably be seen as just political infighting, or at most perhaps a clashing of political parties or ideologies. But Kiir and Machar are the two most powerful people from their ethnic groups in a country where ethnic grouping is very important. So a fight between those two men was bound to exacerbate tension between their respective ethnic groups, which also have lots of other people in positions of power. And they have militias. 4. I thought giving South Sudan independence was supposed to stop ethnic fighting. Why didn't it? The tragedy of South Sudan is that the same forces that helped it win independence also set it up for this conflict. People in southern Sudan spent decades fighting for autonomy from the north. This led them to organize themselves by their tribe or ethnicity, since they had no national identity to align with. It also led them to form militias. Those militias, sometimes organized by tribe or ethnicity, came together as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM has since become South Sudan's national army. When the south's ethnic groups were fighting on the same side, against the north, they mostly got along okay. But, in 1991, the SPLM split along ethnic lines. Some fighters who were ethnic Nuer formed their own semi-official breakaway group, the White Army, which attacked Dinka civilians in the city of Bor, killing 2,000. That fighting stopped, but the White Army has stuck around, in part because some Nuer fear they will not be treated fairly by the Dinka, who are more numerous and who hold the country's presidency. Today, rebels took up arms in the apparent belief that Kiir's government was turning against the Nuer, and perhaps also because they saw Kiir going after Machar, who does not lead the White Army but has long been associated with it. Remember that many Nuer split off from the SPLM in 1991; while they've since reconciled, the SPLM is officially commanded by Kiir, who is Dinka. And Kiir has called Machar, the country's most important Nuer, a traitor. It was almost inevitable that when Kiir turned against Machar many Nuer would think that he was seeking to marginalize their entire tribe. That's how the political fight could turning into an ethnic conflict. 5. This is all very intense. Let's take a music break? Good idea. Since we're focusing so much on South Sudan's problems since independence, let's listen to this song by South Sudanese pop singer Queen Zee from late 2010, "Referendum," encouraging people to vote in the January 2011 election for independence. The song helps capture the degree to which the vote brought the South Sudanese together, even if that unity has been hard to maintain, and the excitement the election brought. 6. How did South Sudan become independent, anyway? This question, and to some extent the conflict itself, goes back to European colonialism and the artificial borders it imposed on Africans. As the British expanded across the continent, in the 1890s they began incorporating Sudan into the empire. In part to prevent neighboring Egypt from claiming northern Sudan as its own, the British lumped the Sudan's north and south together. The two parts of the country are very different, though: The north is mostly Arab and Muslim, while the south is made up of ethnic sub-Saharan Africans who are Christian or Animist. When colonialism ended and Sudan declared independence in 1956, it kept its unwieldy colonial borders, with the capital Khartoum in the Arab-Muslim north. You can guess what happened next: The northern-dominated government treated the black-skinned southerners badly; southerners formed militias; and then came the civil wars. Yes, wars, plural: The first began in 1955, before Sudan even declared independence, and ended in 1972 with greater autonomy for the south. The second civil war started in 1983, when the government in Khartoum revoked much of the south's autonomy and southerners formed rebel groups to fight the north. The second civil war finally ended in 2005 – the longest-running conflict in Africa – with a peace accord that promised the south it could hold a referendum for independence. In early 2011, 98.8 percent of southern voters said they wanted to secede from the north, and a few months later they got it. There were two important outside factors that made independence happen. First, the United States played a key role supporting the south's demand for independence (more on this later). Second, the Sudanese government was loathed by much of the world for its human rights abuses and its affiliation with terrorist groups; this made it easier to build international pressure against Khartoum. 7. I remember South Sudan's independence being treated as a huge success. Was that not true? Yes, it was a big success, promising southern Sudanese a reprieve from decades of war and the autonomy they'd long desired. It went peacefully enough, which was great, and it seemed like a promising sign for the world's ability to resolve terrible conflicts. But things have really gone south since then. South Sudan endured violent ethnic conflicts (sometimes with the South Sudanese government part of the problem), fought a brief war with Khartoum in which South Sudan was far from blameless and even briefly shut off oil production to punish the north. In May 2012, less than a year after it had helped establish South Sudan as an independent country, the United Nations threatened it with economic sanctions for its bad behavior. South Sudan's government, meanwhile, has been plagued by infighting and widespread allegations of official corruption. Poverty and poor governance are big problems for South Sudan. But the biggest of all may be the fact that the country has never really resolved its ethnic rivalries. Until this most-basic problem can be solved, there will always be the possibility for another conflict. 8. What does this all have to do with Darfur? Anything? On the surface, not really. Darfur is a part of the Republic of Sudan, not South Sudan, and so is not involved in South Sudan's conflict. But the Darfur conflict that killed so many civilians in the mid-2000s, and which the United States labeled a genocide, is not totally separate from what's happening in South Sudan. The SPLM also fought in Darfur, on behalf of people there who wanted autonomy from the Khartoum government. More significantly, both South Sudan and Darfur were huge political and popular causes in Western countries, and especially in the United States. The two causes fed into one another; U.S. political and religious groups had been advocating on behalf of South Sudan since the late 1980s, long before Americans started thinking about Darfur. But the "Save Darfur" campaign was much, much bigger. Outrage over Darfur made it easier to pressure Khartoum to allow South Sudan's independence referendum; it also focused popular and political support within the United States, which proved crucial. Not everyone thinks this is a good thing. Some South Sudan-watchers say that the years of activism have convinced Americans that Khartoum is the "bad guy," which is not necessarily false, so much as it sets up South Sudan as the "good guy" or underdog. And that can make it harder, they warn, to hold South Sudan's government accountable for its many missteps, ultimately worsening the country's crisis. 9. I skipped to the bottom. What happens next? It's not clear how long this conflict will go; as it becomes more decentralized, it gets more dangerous and tougher to end. The South Sudanese government has agreed to meet for peace talks. But the really important thing isn't this latest conflict but South Sudan's deeper issues. As African Union official Abdul Mohammed and Tufts University’s Alex de Waal wrote Monday in a guest op-ed in The Washington Post, we "should not be content with patching together a ruling coalition" between rival ethnic groups. "A power-sharing formula could become just another division of the spoils, and elections could become another exercise in ethnic division," they warned. The Washington Post

RDC: "No coração das trevas"

Democratic Republic of Congo, a vast country in the heart of Africa, is trying to find its feet on the path to peace after a five-year conflict dubbed "Africa's world war" that involved seven countries and enveloped the region. The country's first post-war elections were held in 2006, but the vote highlighted a deep east-west divide along ethnic and linguistic lines. Elections in 2011 were marred by allegations of fraud. Although the war officially ended in 2003, violence continues to displace tens of thousands in the remote east. The largest U.N. peacekeeping force in the world is stationed in Congo, with 20,000 troops, and the International Criminal Court in The Hague is investigating allegations of war crimes. It's a Herculean task keeping control of a country the size of western Europe which lacks the most basic infrastructure. Jungle paths and rivers are often the only transit routes in the country formerly known as Zaire. Dozens of heavily armed groups – some of them with links to Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda – stoke ethnic rivalries and vie for control of valuable natural resources. Extensive criminal networks within Congo's security forces deliberately foster insecurity to profit from illegal mining, smuggling and poaching, the U.N. Group of Experts said in its June 2012 report. Rwanda and Uganda officially withdrew their troops from Congo in 2002 and 2003, and although they were often accused of keeping a foothold in Congo through proxy militias, much of the violence in the northeastern border regions originated in the power vacuum left behind when their armies pulled out. Reuters