11.10.14

Sudão crê na existência de 20.000 jihadistas

The smuggling out of what appear to be top secret state documents points to a major security breach in the government

The Khartoum government is yet to react to the circulation of what purport to be detailed minutes of a meeting on 31 August of top security and military officers in which they discuss arming Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon's rebels in South Sudan, supporting armed jihadists in Africa and the Middle East, and destroying crops in South Kordofan to starve out rebel supporters. The officers present also show a fairly uniform contempt towards the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Western states and African officials trying to mediate Sudan's internal conflicts.
The first question is whether the minutes are authentic (see Khartoum in fact and fiction). Most of the Sudanese politicians, and serving and former officials that Africa Confidential has spoken to reckon they are and that there have been serious security breaches in Khartoum. The second question is how much they may change events on the ground. They may inform the opposition's negotiating tactics and encourage mediators, regional and otherwise, to take a more realistic view of the regime's position. If Khartoum's support for Riek Machar's forces is further confirmed, that will complicate the tortuous peace negotiations with the Juba government and invite censure from the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, which is mediating in the civil war (AC Vol 55 No 18, A deadline for the deadline).
Entitled 'Management of Military Activities', the document dated 1 September is set out as an account of a meeting at the National Defence College on the previous day. Through a circuitous route, the documents were passed from a dissident within the security structure to oppositionists, we were told. They were posted on the internet after the Arabic originals and loose English translations had been passed to Professor Eric Reeves, a veteran United States-based human rights campaigner on Sudan and South Sudan. The documents refer to a meeting of the military-security chiefs; they are addressed to Lieutenant General Osman Taj el Sir, Managing Director of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Central Security Authority.
The Military Activities meeting was about achieving consensus, not making policy. 'In that kind of dictatorial apparatus, you have to keep the political base of the regime stable and give the impression that each centre of power has had its say', commented one Sudanese academic. 'It gives you a window on the ideological consensus at the heart of the regime's top policy-making apparatus'.
Security inner circle
Of the 14 men listed as attending the security meeting, half are generals and only two are civilian politicians: Investment Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail and Presidential Assistant Ibrahim Ahmed Ghandour. Former dentist and ex-Foreign Minister Mustafa was founding Secretary of the Popular Arab Islamic Congress (PAIC) in the early 1990s (AC Vol 52 No 7, Mr Smile and the militias). 'I never believed he was not a part of the most inner circle', a Western security source told AC.
Prof. Ibrahim was leader of the putatively independent Sudanese Workers' Trades Union Federation, in which guise he has led a campaign against the International Criminal Court's indictment for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity of Field Marshal Omer (AC Vol 51 No 15, Khartoum's most wanted). He is the ruling National Congress Party's Deputy Chairman for Party Affairs and head of negotiations with the opposition Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), due to restart in Ethiopia on 12 October but now postponed until 25 October because the NCP is too busy preparing for its party conference.
Announcing the postponement on 5 October, Ibrahim Ghandour told the official Sudan Radio that the government had 'a clear vision of the solutions in the Two Areas', i.e. Blue Nile and South Kordofan. The Defence College meeting covers the regime's main policy areas, not only directly military ones. It reflects the increased power of the military-security cabal at the expense of the civilians, who used to run the regime through the security, rather than the other way around.
The agenda lists: 'The Paris Declaration [between El Sadig el Mahdi and the SRF] and the impact of the SRF statement [presumably the memorandum of understanding signed with Ghazi Salah el Din el Atabani and Ahmed Saad Omer (AC Vol 55 No 18, Opposition beams, Khartoum glowers)]; Radical and moderate trends in regards to Shiite belief activities in Sudan; President Mbeki's role and Sudanese issues; Elections, National Dialogue and peace negotiations – The Priority; New Sudan project and its impact on the national security and economic activity'.
The participants do not proceed in an orderly fashion down the agenda. 'In this meeting it is not necessary that we agree on every point we discuss', says First Vice-President Bakri Hassan Salih, though they mostly do. 'Every one is to express his point of view and I will inform the President with all the details and the majority and minority opinion regarding each topic'. This is where the decisions will actually be made, 'in the Palace'. Key areas discussed are as follows:
South Sudan
Assistance to Riek's rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition will increase and include tanks, artillery, intelligence and logistical training, as requested, said the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Hashim Abdullah Mohamed, by Riek, Taban Deng Gai and Dhieu Mathok Diing on a visit to Khartoum. The NCP's explicit aim is a federal state of Greater Upper Nile – a bid to regain the oilfields and to block the SPLM-North's route southwards.
Evidence of NCP support for Riek is skimpy, though Western sources believe light weaponry is involved and question the utility of tanks. An investigation by the Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research after this year's fighting in Bentiu found cartridge cases made this year in Khartoum.
Sudanese opposition
'All the plans for dividing the SRF and the SPLM are in place with the aim to get rid of the New Sudan Project' says NISS boss Mohamed Atta el Moula Abass. The Director of People's Security, Gen. El Rasheed el Fagiri, describes sending people abroad to claim asylum. 'After that we contact them to get regular reports about the SPLM-N chapters' activities in the Diaspora. We managed to send many such collaborators to most countries'. This fits with what Sudanese in exile know but Britain's Home Office steadfastly denies: the community is infiltrated by regime spies and security officers. The non-governmental organisation Waging Peace detailed such methods in a September report, The Long Arm of the Sudanese Regime: How the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service monitors and threatens Sudanese nationals who leave Sudan. People's Security is the organ directing the 'People's Committees', local groups that spy on the neighbourhood.
Gen. El Rasheed reports that he has infiltrated all political parties and as for the rebels, 'We are following all their movements, chats, private affairs with women, the type of alcohol preferred or taken by each one, the imaginary talks when they get drunk. We have ladies who are always in contact with them. The ladies managed to send to us their emails, telephone numbers, Skypes, WhatsApps and all their means of communications...  In our activities abroad, we are now concentrating on the SPLM-N. Because we believe that, if we managed to destroy the SPLM-N, the threat to our rule will vanish,' says El Rasheed.
The securocrats are furious with El Sadig el Mahdi. In August, he signed the Paris Declaration with the SRF, the first serious attempt to bring the vacillating Umma Party leader into a broad-based opposition. 'On top we must put pressure on El Sadig's family through his children to see him return to Sudan and we pardon him, provided that, he disowns the Paris Declaration and severs any relation with the SRF', declares El Rasheed. Since El Sadig's daughter Mariam el Sadig el Mahdi was held in solitary confinement to force her father home, this is bad news for the family. El Sadig is so 'insulted' that this looked unlikely, said one Mahdi family source.
The military-security meeting reiterated the regime's refusal to postpone next year's general and presidential polls. 'Holding the elections constitutes a psychological war against the armed movements and may frustrate them and lead to the end of the New Sudan Project' announced Lt. Gen. Salah el Din el Tayeb, an NISS Deputy Director and head of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, a post he took over from Sulaf el Din Salih Mohamed Tahir, who previously led the organisation Muessessa Muwafag el Kheiriya ('Blessed Relief').
The postponement of the resumption of National Dialogue talks in Addis Ababa looks like a bid to ensure the NCP Conference that precedes it endorses Omer as candidate, notwithstanding the constitutional block on a third term. 'The elections will give us another five years of legitimacy', urges Mustafa Osman.
Foreign policy
Apart from expressing contempt for Western governments and African mediators, the officers seem to believe they can continue to get cash from Arab governments while expanding relations with Iran and with the International Muslim Brotherhood's multifarious offspring. 'In the open let us maintain good relations with the Gulf States but strategically with Iran and to be managed secretly by the Military Intelligence and security organs,' advises former Foreign Minister Mustafa.
The State (junior) Defence Minister, Gen. Yahya Mohamed Kheir, is blunter: 'The Gulf states have only very weak information about the terrorist groups that are based in Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, North African Arab Countries and Afghanistan, because they have bad relations with these radical groups. They want us to cooperate with them in the war against terrorism because the radical groups constitute a direct threat to them. Their relation with Da'ish [Islamic State in Iraq and Shams, ISIS], Nusra Front, Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Islamic Movement is even weaker. We will not sacrifice our relations with the Islamists and Iran for a relation with the Saudis and the Gulf states'.
Saudi Arabia and the dissidents
The National Service General Coordinator, Abdel Gadir Mohamed Zein asks: 'Are you sure Saudi Arabia can change its mind after it has classified the Muslim Brothers as terrorists?' Distrust of Saudi Arabia runs deep. Lt. Gen. Sideeg Amir Ali Hassan, Director of Military Intelligence and Security, says: 'We should confront them [Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates] and tell them openly that we got evidence (audio tapes, names etc) that you Saudis and Emiratis are the ones who financed the September 2013 uprising and demonstrations in Khartoum... 'They contacted two of our officers with the ranks of brigadier general and sat with them in Khartoum... after five meetings with the Saudis, the two officers disclosed to us that [the Saudis] want a coup to be carried out by Islamist officers who are pro-Saudi Arabia.'
In an attempt to stem Sudanese support for IS, Riyadh threatened to block Sudan's lucrative export of millions of sheep to be slaughtered for the Eid al Adha festival on 4 October, an opposition source tells us. This followed reports of Saudi officials being killed when IS fighters went into Saudi Arabia but is part of a broader policy to deal with Iraqi-Syrian 'blow-back' (AC Vol 55 No 8, Saudi Arabia targets Khartoum). The officers believe they have the capital well covered: 'All the embassies and chanceries in Khartoum are infiltrated and our elements report to us who visited the embassy and who went out from the embassy staff and to where,' boasts El Rasheed.
On Egypt, Chief of Joint Operations, Gen. Emad el Din Mustafa Adawi, suggests pressuring Cairo to block El Sadig in return for Sudan preventing the political activities of Muslim Brothers who arrived after the fall of Mohamed Mursi. Then he changes tone: 'The northern border is totally secured, especially after the victory of our [Islamist] allies in Tripoli. We managed to get to them the weapons and military equipment donated by Qatar and Turkey and we formed a joint operations room under a colonel for coordination purposes with them on how to administer military operations. Turkey and Qatar provided us with information in favour of the revolutionaries on top of the information collected by our own agents that will help them to win the war and control the whole country'.
'Intelligence cooperation' with the United States may amount to less than Western officials often make out. 'America has fallen into the trap of the ISIS and the other jihadist movements that are newly formed and can move freely outside the traditional surveillance networks', comments Defence Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein. 'Currently, there are 20,000 jihadists and 15 newly formed jihadist movements which are scattered all over, from Morocco to Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, all Gulf States, a wide presence in Africa and Europe and nobody else owns a data-base on that as the one we have. We release only limited information to the Americans according to the request and the price is the armed movements file'.

6.10.14

Política brasileira não tem lugar para negros

“Não posso falar com autoridade no Brasil, mas às vezes não é preciso ser especialista para perceber que alguma coisa está errada em um país cuja maioria é negra e a representação é majoritariamente branca”, diz Angela Davis.

angela davis brasil negros
A filósofa e ativista norte-americana Angela Davis (reprodução)
Marcos Sacramento, DCM
A ausência de negros em cargos políticos e de destaque no Brasil chamou a atenção da filósofa e ativista norte-americana Angela Davis. Nascida no Alabama, Davis foi professora da Universidade da Califórnia e teve ligações com o grupo Panteras Negras, sendo presa por causa disso no início dos anos 70. Uma das principais lideranças femininas na luta pelo direito dos negros nos Estados Unidos, foi homenageada em músicas de John & Yoko (“Angela”) e dos Rolling Stones (“Sweet Black Angel”).
Ela foi um dos destaques do Festival Latinidades 2014: Griôs da Diáspora Negra, em Brasília. Na sua conferência, disse que ficou impressionada com a pouca presença de negros e pardos na política nacional. “Quantos senadores negros há no Brasil? Se olharmos para o Senado não saberíamos que os negros constituem mais de 50% da população brasileira”, questionou.
LEIA TAMBÉM: Angela Davis: Racismo de hoje é muito mais perigoso
“Não posso falar com autoridade no Brasil, mas às vezes não é preciso ser especialista para perceber que alguma coisa está errada em um país cuja maioria é negra e a representação é majoritariamente branca”, disse.
Ela criticou, inclusive, a participação irrisória dos negros nos meios de comunicação. “Sempre assisto TV no Brasil para ver como o país se representa e a TV brasileira nunca permitiu que se pensasse que a população é majoritariamente negra”.
O comentário da intelectual e a matéria do The Guardian que destacou a ausência de negros nos estádios durante os jogos da última Copa ilustram o racismo estruturado na sociedade brasileira.
Em um país onde 50,7% da população é negra ou parda, de acordo com o último censo do Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), menos de 10% dos parlamentares federais são desses grupos, como mostra um estudo da Transparência Brasil.
Número que contribui para as estatísticas cruéis contra os negros e explicita a necessidade de implantação de cotas para reduzir as discrepâncias raciais. A probabilidade de um negro ou pardo ser vítima de homicídio, por exemplo, é quase oito pontos percentuais a mais do que a da população branca.
Angela Davis, contudo, não acha suficiente que os negros ocupem o poder. É preciso que tomem atitudes para realmente pôr fim ao preconceito. “Não significa somente trazer pessoas negras para a esfera do poder, mas garantir que essas pessoas vão romper com os espaços de poder e não simplesmente se encaixar nesses espaços”.
A crítica faz referência a Barack Obama, mas pode ser aplicada ao presidente do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), Joaquim Barbosa. Questionado por jornalistas sobre a possibilidade de implantação de cotas no Judiciário, ele disse: “Não sei e estou de saída. Es ist mir ganz egal (em alemão,’para mim tanto faz’). Não estou nem aí”.
Segundo o Censo do Poder Judiciário divulgado mês passado pelo Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ), 1,4% dos magistrados brasileiros se autodeclaram pretos. Percentual hediondo, pequeno demais para “não estar nem aí”.

Um Brasil maioritariamente preto e pardo

Brasília – A população negra brasileira – que já era a maior fora da África – ultrapassou a casa dos 100 milhões de pessoas, de acordo com o estudo "Projeção da População do Brasil por Sexo e Idade para o período 200/2060 e Projeção da População das Unidades da Federação Por Sexo e Idade para o período 2000/2030", do Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).
A população preta e parda, que corresponde a 50,7% da população brasileira, de acordo com o Censo do IBGE de 2010, agora já chega a 101.923.585 habitantes. A publicação informa que esta semana o Brasil passou dos 200 milhões de habitantes: somos agora 201.032.714 habitantes.
O estudo também faz uma projeção de quantos seremos até 2042, quando a população deverá chegar a 228,4 milhões – 115,7 milhões de negros, pretos e pardos autodeclarados, de acordo com o critério de classificação de raça e cor do IBGE.
Com uma população de 170 milhões, a Nigéria é o país mais populoso da África e o oitavo mais populoso do mundo. No Censo do IBGE 2010, pela primeira vez, desde o primeiro censo realizado no Brasil, em 1.872, a população preta e parda autodeclarada ultrapassou os brancos. Dos 190.755.799 habitantes, 91.051.646, declararam-se brancos, 14.517.961 declararam-se pretos, 82.277.333, pardos – (96.795.294 negros no total); 817.963 indígenas e 2084.288 amarelos. Dos pesquisados, 6.608 nada declararam.
O crescimento da população em geral, e da negra, em particular coloca por terra a visão que pretende impor ao Brasil os valores eurocêntricos como, por exemplo, o padrão de beleza, que justifica a predominância do tipo loiro de olhos azuis como estética dominante.
História
Durante o I Congresso Internacional das Raças, realizado em Londres, em julho de 1.911, o delegado brasileiro João Batista Lacerda, diretor do Museu Nacional, apresentou a tese "Os mestiços do Brasil", em que garantia que em 100 anos, precisamente em 2.012, os negros desapareceriam da população brasileira e os mestiços estariam reduzidos a 3%. A elite racista, entre os quais intelectuais e cientistas, da época atribuíam o atraso do país ao fato de ter uma maioria de população negra. A tese de Lacerda chegou a provocar revolta nessa elite, que considerava um século um tempo muito longo para o Brasil tornar-se branco.

5.10.14

Moçambique: Malditos narcóticos!

A US-sanctioned narcotics kingpin's finance for the governing party complicates commercial and diplomatic relations

The appearance of Mohamed Bashir Suleiman – designated a 'drugs kingpin' by the United States – at the banquet of a local business association on 18 September has infuriated friends of Filipe Nyussi, presidential candidate of the governing Frente de Libertação de Moçambique . This is because the Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique (CTA), the organisers of the banquet, invited Bashir to the event and placed him at the top table, just a couple of seats away from Nyussi. As the CTA banquet at the Indy Village complex in Maputo turned out to be a fundraiser for Frelimo's election campaign, Bashir's attendance sent a clear message: that he remains an important financier of the party, despite US reports that his fortune derives from drug smuggling, and that he has strong endorsement from a powerful faction within Frelimo.

África Confidential

4.10.14

Suécia vai reconhecer a Palestina

Sweden is to "recognise the state of Palestine", Prime Minister Stefan Lofven has said, the first long-term EU member country to do so.

"The conflict between Israel and Palestine can only be solved with a two-state solution," he said during his inaugural address in parliament.

It should be "negotiated in accordance with international law", he said.

Sweden last month voted out the centre-right Alliance coalition of Fredrik Reinfeldt after eight years.

That allowed the Social Democrats led by Mr Lofven to form a government with other parties on the left including the Greens.

"A two-state solution requires mutual recognition and a will to peaceful co-existence. Sweden will therefore recognise the state of Palestine," Mr Lofven said on Friday, without giving a timeline for the recognition.

Sweden will join more than 130 other countries that recognise a Palestinian state.

Most of the EU's 28 member states have refrained from recognising Palestinian statehood and those that do - such as Hungary, Poland and Slovakia - did so before joining the bloc.
Long campaign
The Palestinians have long sought to establish an independent, sovereign state in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem as its capital, and the Gaza Strip - occupied by Israel during the 1967 Six Day War.

Correspondents say Sweden's move is likely to be strongly criticised by Israel and the US, who argue that an independent Palestinian state should only emerge through negotiations.

Palestinian protesters wave the national flag, in front of the Israeli settlement of Beitar Illit. 26 Sept 2014 Palestinians say the peace process is hampered by Israeli settlements like this one in the West Bank

In 1988, the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat unilaterally declared a Palestinian state within the pre-June 1967 lines.

This won recognition from about 100 countries, mainly Arab, Communist and non-aligned states - several of them in Latin America.

The 1993 Oslo Accord between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Israel led to mutual recognition. However, two decades of on-off peace talks have since failed to produce a permanent settlement.

In 2012, the UN General Assembly voted to upgrade the status of the Palestinians to that of a "non-member observer state".

It followed a failed bid to join the international body as a full member state in 2011 because of a lack of support in the UN Security Council.  BBC

1.10.14

Angola envia tropas para a RCA

30/09/2014 à 16:03
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Les troupes angolaises participeront à la Minusca. Les troupes angolaises participeront à la Minusca. © AFP
Un officiel de la diplomatie angolaise a annoncé lundi que Luanda enverra ses troupes en Centrafrique pour prendre part à la Minusca. Ce sera la première participation de l'Angola dans une opération de maintien de la paix des Nations unies.
"Ce sera une participation avec l'envoi d'une force significative sur le terrain en réponse à une demande du gouvernement de transition de la République centrafricaine et des Nation unies, notamment des États-Unis". Le 29 septembre, Joaquim do Espirito Santo, le directeur Afrique du ministère angolais des Relations extérieures, a ainsi annoncé la participation des troupes angolaises dans la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation de la Centrafrique (Minusca).
"Nous devons donner l'exemple et renforcer la présence de la mission afin d'assurer la paix dans le pays", a ajouté Joaquim do Espirito Santo, précisant que les troupes pourraient être sur place en décembre. Mais aucune précision sur l'effectif du contingent angolais n'a été communiquée.
Vendredi déjà, Manuel Vicente, vice-président angolais, qui représente son pays à la 69e Assemblée générale des Nations unies organisée jusqu'au 3 octobre à New-York, avait fait des déclarations dans ce sens. Et le 29 septembre, dans son discours devant l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies, il a même promis une "contribution effective à la paix et à la sécurité dans le monde" si son pays était élu membre non-permanent au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, une position convoitée depuis longtemps par l'Angola.
Changement de cap
Il s'agit là d'un changement de cap dans la politique extérieure pratiquée par l'Angola ces dernières années. Jusqu'à présent, le pays, deuxième producteur de pétrole du continent derrière le Nigeria, limitait son action à une aide humanitaire, financière, voire de la formation militaire, refusant catégoriquement l'envoi de troupes.
La participation à la Minusca constituera donc une première dans l'histoire de l'Angola qui n'avait pas, jusqu'ici, pris part à aucune opération de maintien de la paix de l'ONU dans le monde.
Même si dans le passé, l'armée angolaise était déjà intervenue hors de ses frontières, notamment au Zaïre devenu la RDC. En 1997, le président angolais avait en effet envoyé des troupes pour aider la rébellion qui marchait sur Kinshasa afin de renverser le maréchal Mobutu et ainsi favoriser l'accession au pouvoir de Laurent-Désiré Kabila. L'année suivante, il renvoyait un contingent pour soutenir Kabila menacé par les forces rwandaises qui, pourtant, l'avait aidé l'année précédente à renverser Mobutu au sein d'une coalition régionale qui, outre l'Angola, comptait notamment l'Ouganda et le Zimbabwe.
En 1997, l'Angola avait également envoyé au Congo-Brazaville des forces en soutien aux miliciens de Denis Sassou Nguesso, entrainant le renversement de Pascal Lissouba, président élu en 1992 après l'instauration du multipartisme.
(Avec AFP)


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Angola subsidia a RCA

01/10/2014 à 08:57
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Catherine Samba-Panza et Eduardo dos Santos, à Luanda, le 4 mars. Catherine Samba-Panza et Eduardo dos Santos, à Luanda, le 4 mars. © DR
En mars, le président angolais José Eduardo dos Santos avait octroyé un don de 10 millions de dollars à son homologue centrafricaine Catherine Samba-Panza afin de renflouer son pays en faillite. Un quart de cette somme n'est pas entré dans les caisses de l'État. Simple oubli ?
Quand on préside - ne serait-ce que par intérim - aux destinées d'un pays pauvre, sinistré, instable et entièrement dépendant de l'aide financière et militaire étrangère, on se doit d'être irréprochable côté gouvernance. Cette leçon, Catherine Samba-Panza devrait la méditer alors que la Centrafrique vient de passer sous quasi-tutelle onusienne et que le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) et la Banque mondiale s'apprêtent à examiner son cas, début octobre, à Washington.
Au coeur des préoccupations des grands argentiers de la planète, qui devront décider s'ils accordent ou non un ballon d'oxygène aux finances exsangues du gouvernement centrafricain : la gestion, pour le moins opaque, d'une importante somme d'argent remise en main propre à la présidente Samba-Panza par son homologue angolais.
L'affaire date d'il y a sept mois. Le 4 mars 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza (CSP) se rend en urgence à Luanda. À Bangui, les caisses du Trésor sont vides et la chef de l'État, étranglée, doit absolument assurer le salaire des fonctionnaires, conformément à ses engagements. Son hôte, le président José Eduardo dos Santos, est riche, et il ne lui déplaît pas de prendre la relève du Congolais Denis Sassou Nguesso, qui, jusqu'ici, comblait seul, tel Sisyphe, les déficits sans fond de la Centrafrique.
Il se montre donc compréhensif et, après avoir longuement reçu CSP, s'engage sur un don de 10 millions de dollars (7,8 millions d'euros), dont la moitié lui est remise sur-le-champ, en liquide, dans des valisettes. Pourquoi en liquide ? Parce que l'Angola n'est pas membre de la zone franc, qu'un virement via Paris prendrait trop de temps et que Mme Samba-Panza est très pressée.
5 millions en cash
De retour à Bangui le lendemain, la présidente remet elle-même les 5 millions cash à trois personnes de confiance, avec pour consigne - aucune banque commerciale de Bangui ne disposant des liquidités nécessaires - d'aller les changer contre des francs CFA à Douala, au Cameroun.
Le ministre centrafricain des Finances, Rémi Yakoro, est curieusement tenu à l'écart de toute la transaction.
Le 6 mars, Mahamat Kamoun, conseiller spécial à la présidence (et actuel Premier ministre), Christelle Sappot, fille et chef de cabinet de CSP, et Robert Bokoyo, directeur adjoint du Trésor, se rendent dans la capitale économique du Cameroun et procèdent à l'opération de change auprès d'Ecobank. Le 8 mars, un peu plus de 2 milliards de F CFA (Ecobank empochant au passage une belle commission de 6 %) sont transférés sur le compte du Trésor centrafricain auprès de la Banque des États de l'Afrique centrale (Beac). Jusqu'ici, tout va bien - si ce n'est que le ministre centrafricain des Finances, Rémi Yakoro, est curieusement tenu à l'écart de toute la transaction. Une bonne partie des fonctionnaires recevront, ce mois-là, leur salaire.
Quelques semaines plus tard - fin mars, début avril -, la deuxième tranche du don angolais, soit 5 millions de dollars cash, parvient à la présidence de Bangui via un émissaire. Et c'est là que le bât blesse. Le 28 avril, à la demande de Mahamat Kamoun, le directeur général du Trésor, Gabriel Madenga, se fait remettre par Christelle Sappot, la fille de CSP, la somme de 2,5 millions de dollars qu'il transfère aussitôt sur le compte centrafricain à la Beac, via Ecobank, dont l'agence banguissoise dispose, cette fois, des liquidités nécessaires en francs CFA.
"Disparition" de 1,132 milliards de F CFA
À nouveau, le ministre des Finances, pourtant unique ordonnateur des finances de l'État, est mis de côté. Il ne sera informé qu'a posteriori, deux jours plus tard, par un courrier du DG du Trésor. Une anomalie et une question évidente : quid de la seconde moitié de la seconde tranche, soit l'équivalent de 1,132 milliard de F CFA, un pactole à l'échelon centrafricain ? Pressée de questions par le FMI, qui a eu vent du don, et par la présidence angolaise, qui apprécie peu cette "disparition" d'une partie du magot, Catherine Samba-Panza charge son directeur de cabinet, Joseph Mabingui, de réagir.
En guise de réponse, ce dernier confectionne un tableau  daté du 14 juillet 2014, dans lequel il est "expliqué" que l'argent manquant a été utilisé sous forme de "fonds politiques" et réparti entre le Premier ministre de l'époque, André Nzapayeké, la présidente et des chapitres aux intitulés aussi vagues ("composantes de la société civile", "assistance sociale et humanitaire", "actions gouvernementales"...) qu'incontrôlables.
Samba-Panza plaide la bonne foi
Il va de soi que la procédure normale en la matière, qui veut que ces fonds de souveraineté doivent d'abord être inclus et comptabilisés au sein du compte courant du Trésor à la Beac avant d'en ressortir, n'a absolument pas été respectée. Face aux bailleurs de fonds internationaux, mais aussi à José Eduardo dos Santos, qui l'a convoquée le 20 août à Luanda pour une brève séance d'explications, et Denis Sassou Nguesso, qui ne cache plus l'agacement qu'elle lui inspire, la présidente par intérim a plaidé la bonne foi et (encore) l'urgence de la situation, sans lever pour autant les soupçons qui pèsent quant à l'utilisation des 2,5 millions de dollars.
En visite à New York mi-­septembre en marge de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, Catherine Samba-Panza a décrit avec des mots justes et émouvants la situation catastrophique dans laquelle se trouve son pays. Elle ne parlait pas, on l'aura compris, de sa propre gestion.



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