We, The Tuareg Coordination of Libya, wish to express a deep anxiety concerning the present situation of the Tuareg community living in Libya. Since the fall of Tripoli, there has been and continues to be many executions amongst Tuareg Libyan civilians.
The organization of a very serious massacre is being prepared under the eye of the international media. We demand that the press coverage be responsible and ethical concerning the spirit of vengeance that prevails amongst certain rebel groups.
We are calling the TNC, the International Community, NATO, the RED CROSS and all other international organizations to apply the standards of international law, as established in the Geneva International Convention, and to respect and protect innocent civilians and victims in the Libyan conflict.
The collected evidence is unanimous; many civil Tuaregs have been executed and continue to be in Tripoli. Tuaregs in the Libyan refugee camp of Debdeb in Algeria have reported of serious threats of massacre against members of their community in the city of Ghadames situated in the south of Libya.
“The rebels are threatening the Tuareg to make them pay the price by bloodshed of their pretended support to Kaddafi’s regime”
At the present time, several thousand Tuareg families, mostly from the regions of Dereg and Ghadames, have fled to Algeria by fear of reprisals. Most have found refuge in the town of Debdeb in Algeria located twenty kilometers of Ghadames.
The Tuareg community, who at the moment is trapped between two forces, fears a bloodbath. Forced to Submit to Kaddafi’s followers in the south, where the “the Kadhafa’s” have reigned for decades and suspected by the northern communities to be partisans of Kadhafi, the Libyan Tuaregs have become the target of acts of vengeance committed by the Chebab, despite the laws of the Geneva convention.
Since the beginning of the conflict, civil Tuareg Libyans have seen the fighting take a heavy toll within their communities. In the south, many were enrolled to participate in pro Kaddafi demonstrations and found themselves parachuted on the front lines of the conflict.
Since March 2011 and before NATO’s interventions, many military Tuaregs who refused to participate in repression operations were executed by army officials. Over a thousand military Tuareg loyalists have died since the bombing of NATO and during the battle of Misrata.
At the same time, several isolated Tuareg groups have tempted to join the rebellion, despite the communication difficulties. Collaboration succeeded between the rebels and Libyan Tuareg groups during the battles of Zenten, Nalut near the Tunisian border and Nefussa.
Since April 2011, several delegates of the Tuareg Coordination met with the TNC in order to organize coordination with the rebels in southern territories.
This is an urgent appeal addressed to the TNC’s armed forces, to NATO and to the Red Cross to immediately stop all acts of vengeance perpetuated by the rebel’s armed forces. Guaranties and elementary rights must be respected and applied in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the United Nations resolutions. Over 200 000 people are concerned by the threat of massacre in prevision of the fall of Kadhafi’s regime.
The Tuareg Coordination of Libya
28.9.11
A miragem tuaregue
Prior to the start of Libya's revolution in February, the Sahelian regions of Niger and Mali had already suffered eight years of increasing political instability and insecurity. The reasons for this are complex:
First, having partially recovered from the Tuareg rebellions of the 1990s, the rulers of both Niger and Mali became willing, pliant and corrupt partners in the global war on terror (GWOT). This transformation occured following the complicity between the US and Algeria's mukhabarat [security services] and the Departement du Renseignement et de la Securite [DRS - Department of Intelligence and Security] in fabricating terrorism in the region in order to justify the launch of the 2003 second front in the GWOT in the Sahel/Sahara. That alone brought an almost instant decimation of the predominantly Tuareg tourist industry and an annual loss of an estimated $50 million.
Another factor contributing to instability in the region occured in 2005, following the political provocation of the Tuareg by the Niger government. This led to a short-lived rebellion, while in May 2006 the US and Algeria's DRS orchestrated a Tuareg rebellion in NE Mali. This was followed, four to five months later, by two contrived "terrorist" engagements designed to facilitate the name change of Algeria's GSPC into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its "insertion" into the Sahel.
'Unsatisfactory peace process'
This duplicitous series of events led to more serious Tuareg rebellions in both Niger and Mali through 2007-2009, with an unsatisfactory peace process - brokered in large part by Gaddafi - which was accented by an upsurge in AQIM "terrorism", drug trafficking and banditry.
"Tuareg justify [their actions] as an inevitable response to food shortages ... marginalisation and the lack of both economic development and employment opportunities."
Local Tuareg justify their marginal involvement in these activities as an inevitable response to food shortages (and in Niger, famine), their marginalisation and the lack of both economic development and employment opportunities.
The uprising that began in Libya in February against the Gaddafi regime quickly exacerbated the Sahel's wretched economic situation.
By May, it had already cost Niger billions in lost trade and the stemmed flow of remittences causing President Issoufou to be forced to cut the 2011 budget by 6.55 per cent. Since then, the situation in Niger, Mali and Chad has deteriorated drastically - the governments of Mali and Niger each putting the number of returning migrants at more than 200,000 and Chad at more than 80,000.
For the first time in about 30 years, a large proportion of these countries' emigrant Tuareg population that had sought employment or refuge in Libya is coming home. Thousands of them had reportedly recently signed on as mercenaries; many more were long-serving members of Gaddafi's forces. However, not all of them fought for Gaddafi: Many supported Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC).
Either way, they are skilled fighters - armed and angry at what they see as a world that has once again turned against them. The final overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in August has turned this increasingly fragile and chaotic situation into what journalists in Niger are now calling a "powder-keg".
Amongst these returnees are several former rebel leaders: Aghaly ag Alembo (Niger), Ibrahim ag Bahanga (Mali) who was killed (some say assassinated by "the Algerians") on August 26, and assuming he is still alive, Mohamed ag Boula (Niger) - the brother of Rhissa ag Boula.
Rhissa was the leader of one of two main rebel movements in Niger in the 1990s and then the joint leader of the Armed Resistance Organisation (ORA) that signed the 1995 Ouagadougou Peace Accords. Since then, he has served as a government minister, been imprisoned on a trumped-up murder charge, headed another rebel movement (2008-2009) and is now an advisor to Niger's new president, Mohamed Issoufou.
What are the plans of these and other Tuareg leaders? There has been speculative media talk of new Tuareg rebellions and even the possible emergence of some sort of militant, pan-regional Tuareg movement.
On top of all this, arms - including Sam 7s - are now widely reported to be flooding into the region from Libya. Indications are that they are being amassed by certain Tuareg (such as the late Bahanga), AQIM and drugs traffickers.
Whichever way one looks at this part of the Sahel, its immediate future is bleak. Indeed, the fact that the EU placed it at the top of its security agenda last year and is now pumping serious funds into the region is indicative of the seriousness of the situation.
The nightmare scenario
Amid the overwhelmingly pessimistic scenarios for this part of Africa's Sahel region, the spill-over from Libya has given rise to one that the media has so far been reluctant to air. It is what I would call the "nightmare scenario".
This starts with Gaddafi loyalists being not wholly dislodged from Libya. After the assumed eventual collapse of resistance in Sirte and Bani Walid, fort systems still remain - possibly around Sebha, the Traghan oases, the Wadi al-Ajal, Oubari, Ghat and perhaps elsewhere. Such areas of resistance then become supported - or, if lost - will be recaptured by an insurgency launched out of the Sahel. This resurgence will most likely come out of Niger, but with support from Mali, and perhaps from elsewhere where Gaddafi has spread his largesse.
Such an insurgency would depend on four key factors: The willingness of the Tuareg to take up the Gaddafi cause; the inability or unwillingness, for various reasons, of the governments of the region to prevent such developments; and sufficient financial resources and the inability or unwillingness of the West to intervene to stop it. A fifth factor, the "elephant in the room", is Algeria.
One can only speculate on how the Tuareg might react to a further call to arms on Gaddafi's behalf. Media interviews with Tuareg fighters who have just returned from Libya suggest that a significant number could still be mustered - especially if cash was on the table. Certainly, many Tuareg in Niger and Mali still feel they owe him a debt of gratitude, and therefore support.
Scattered leadership
However, behind the current, slightly gung-ho air of bravado, the political reality of the situation is still very unclear.
Aside from the fact that the Tuareg populations scattered across at least five countries of the Sahara-Sahel have never been politically unified, there are many schisms between them. And the same applies to many of their leaders, whose personal agendas are at present quite unclear, perhaps even to themselves.
National politics in all five countries (Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria and Libya) are also very different, although Tuareg in all of them share a sense of political and economic marginalisation. In addition, there is much common anger and disillusionment - especially against the US, France, the EU, and the West as a whole for failing to help them in their recent predicaments.
"There is much common anger and disallusionment among [the Tuareg] ... that, in itself, may be sufficient to maintain some sense of loyalty and gratitute to Gaddafi, the only person who has come to their aid."
That, in itself, may be sufficient to maintain some sense of loyalty and gratitude to Gaddafi, the only person who has come to their aid - albeit for reasons of self-interest - since the launch of Washington's GWOT sent the region into a spiral of increasing insecurity and instability.
Another factor in the "Tuareg equation", which should not be discounted, is Gaddafi's proposition to make a Tuareg political entity of "state" that would somehow be carved out of the Sahara and Sahel. This proposition was first mooted in a speech at Oubari in 2005 and written off as "crazy" by all except Algeria.
Parallels have been drawn to France's attempt in 1957 to carve its own "Saharan state", the Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS), out of its colonial territories in defiance of Algeria's fight for Independence.
The likelihood of the Tuareg taking up arms again Gaddafi's behalf, or as part of a "post-Gaddafi" movement, is unlikely. Nevertheless, if Niger and Mali, with the financial assistance of international development aid, are unable to provide an alternative and more attractive future, it cannot be ruled out.
Whether Niger or any other Sahelian country, would accept such a "rear base" in its territory is also most unlikely. The mere presence of Gaddafi, his family or key loyalists in any of these countries will be a disruptive and potentially destabilising force.
However, the popular support for Gaddafi in these Sahelian countries, and not only from the Tuareg, will make it very difficult for any of their governments to fulfil their international obligations. Although a Niger government spokesman has made it clear that Gaddafi's supporters would not be sent back to Libya, he did say that, if any of these people were wanted by an international court with universal competence over the crimes for which they were being pursued, Niger would do its duty in terms of its commitments to international justice.
Jeremy Keenan, professor de Antropologia Social (em artigo de opinião divulgado pela AlJazeera)
First, having partially recovered from the Tuareg rebellions of the 1990s, the rulers of both Niger and Mali became willing, pliant and corrupt partners in the global war on terror (GWOT). This transformation occured following the complicity between the US and Algeria's mukhabarat [security services] and the Departement du Renseignement et de la Securite [DRS - Department of Intelligence and Security] in fabricating terrorism in the region in order to justify the launch of the 2003 second front in the GWOT in the Sahel/Sahara. That alone brought an almost instant decimation of the predominantly Tuareg tourist industry and an annual loss of an estimated $50 million.
Another factor contributing to instability in the region occured in 2005, following the political provocation of the Tuareg by the Niger government. This led to a short-lived rebellion, while in May 2006 the US and Algeria's DRS orchestrated a Tuareg rebellion in NE Mali. This was followed, four to five months later, by two contrived "terrorist" engagements designed to facilitate the name change of Algeria's GSPC into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its "insertion" into the Sahel.
'Unsatisfactory peace process'
This duplicitous series of events led to more serious Tuareg rebellions in both Niger and Mali through 2007-2009, with an unsatisfactory peace process - brokered in large part by Gaddafi - which was accented by an upsurge in AQIM "terrorism", drug trafficking and banditry.
"Tuareg justify [their actions] as an inevitable response to food shortages ... marginalisation and the lack of both economic development and employment opportunities."
Local Tuareg justify their marginal involvement in these activities as an inevitable response to food shortages (and in Niger, famine), their marginalisation and the lack of both economic development and employment opportunities.
The uprising that began in Libya in February against the Gaddafi regime quickly exacerbated the Sahel's wretched economic situation.
By May, it had already cost Niger billions in lost trade and the stemmed flow of remittences causing President Issoufou to be forced to cut the 2011 budget by 6.55 per cent. Since then, the situation in Niger, Mali and Chad has deteriorated drastically - the governments of Mali and Niger each putting the number of returning migrants at more than 200,000 and Chad at more than 80,000.
For the first time in about 30 years, a large proportion of these countries' emigrant Tuareg population that had sought employment or refuge in Libya is coming home. Thousands of them had reportedly recently signed on as mercenaries; many more were long-serving members of Gaddafi's forces. However, not all of them fought for Gaddafi: Many supported Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC).
Either way, they are skilled fighters - armed and angry at what they see as a world that has once again turned against them. The final overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in August has turned this increasingly fragile and chaotic situation into what journalists in Niger are now calling a "powder-keg".
Amongst these returnees are several former rebel leaders: Aghaly ag Alembo (Niger), Ibrahim ag Bahanga (Mali) who was killed (some say assassinated by "the Algerians") on August 26, and assuming he is still alive, Mohamed ag Boula (Niger) - the brother of Rhissa ag Boula.
Rhissa was the leader of one of two main rebel movements in Niger in the 1990s and then the joint leader of the Armed Resistance Organisation (ORA) that signed the 1995 Ouagadougou Peace Accords. Since then, he has served as a government minister, been imprisoned on a trumped-up murder charge, headed another rebel movement (2008-2009) and is now an advisor to Niger's new president, Mohamed Issoufou.
What are the plans of these and other Tuareg leaders? There has been speculative media talk of new Tuareg rebellions and even the possible emergence of some sort of militant, pan-regional Tuareg movement.
On top of all this, arms - including Sam 7s - are now widely reported to be flooding into the region from Libya. Indications are that they are being amassed by certain Tuareg (such as the late Bahanga), AQIM and drugs traffickers.
Whichever way one looks at this part of the Sahel, its immediate future is bleak. Indeed, the fact that the EU placed it at the top of its security agenda last year and is now pumping serious funds into the region is indicative of the seriousness of the situation.
The nightmare scenario
Amid the overwhelmingly pessimistic scenarios for this part of Africa's Sahel region, the spill-over from Libya has given rise to one that the media has so far been reluctant to air. It is what I would call the "nightmare scenario".
This starts with Gaddafi loyalists being not wholly dislodged from Libya. After the assumed eventual collapse of resistance in Sirte and Bani Walid, fort systems still remain - possibly around Sebha, the Traghan oases, the Wadi al-Ajal, Oubari, Ghat and perhaps elsewhere. Such areas of resistance then become supported - or, if lost - will be recaptured by an insurgency launched out of the Sahel. This resurgence will most likely come out of Niger, but with support from Mali, and perhaps from elsewhere where Gaddafi has spread his largesse.
Such an insurgency would depend on four key factors: The willingness of the Tuareg to take up the Gaddafi cause; the inability or unwillingness, for various reasons, of the governments of the region to prevent such developments; and sufficient financial resources and the inability or unwillingness of the West to intervene to stop it. A fifth factor, the "elephant in the room", is Algeria.
One can only speculate on how the Tuareg might react to a further call to arms on Gaddafi's behalf. Media interviews with Tuareg fighters who have just returned from Libya suggest that a significant number could still be mustered - especially if cash was on the table. Certainly, many Tuareg in Niger and Mali still feel they owe him a debt of gratitude, and therefore support.
Scattered leadership
However, behind the current, slightly gung-ho air of bravado, the political reality of the situation is still very unclear.
Aside from the fact that the Tuareg populations scattered across at least five countries of the Sahara-Sahel have never been politically unified, there are many schisms between them. And the same applies to many of their leaders, whose personal agendas are at present quite unclear, perhaps even to themselves.
National politics in all five countries (Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria and Libya) are also very different, although Tuareg in all of them share a sense of political and economic marginalisation. In addition, there is much common anger and disillusionment - especially against the US, France, the EU, and the West as a whole for failing to help them in their recent predicaments.
"There is much common anger and disallusionment among [the Tuareg] ... that, in itself, may be sufficient to maintain some sense of loyalty and gratitute to Gaddafi, the only person who has come to their aid."
That, in itself, may be sufficient to maintain some sense of loyalty and gratitude to Gaddafi, the only person who has come to their aid - albeit for reasons of self-interest - since the launch of Washington's GWOT sent the region into a spiral of increasing insecurity and instability.
Another factor in the "Tuareg equation", which should not be discounted, is Gaddafi's proposition to make a Tuareg political entity of "state" that would somehow be carved out of the Sahara and Sahel. This proposition was first mooted in a speech at Oubari in 2005 and written off as "crazy" by all except Algeria.
Parallels have been drawn to France's attempt in 1957 to carve its own "Saharan state", the Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS), out of its colonial territories in defiance of Algeria's fight for Independence.
The likelihood of the Tuareg taking up arms again Gaddafi's behalf, or as part of a "post-Gaddafi" movement, is unlikely. Nevertheless, if Niger and Mali, with the financial assistance of international development aid, are unable to provide an alternative and more attractive future, it cannot be ruled out.
Whether Niger or any other Sahelian country, would accept such a "rear base" in its territory is also most unlikely. The mere presence of Gaddafi, his family or key loyalists in any of these countries will be a disruptive and potentially destabilising force.
However, the popular support for Gaddafi in these Sahelian countries, and not only from the Tuareg, will make it very difficult for any of their governments to fulfil their international obligations. Although a Niger government spokesman has made it clear that Gaddafi's supporters would not be sent back to Libya, he did say that, if any of these people were wanted by an international court with universal competence over the crimes for which they were being pursued, Niger would do its duty in terms of its commitments to international justice.
Jeremy Keenan, professor de Antropologia Social (em artigo de opinião divulgado pela AlJazeera)
27.9.11
Teodoro Obiang ataca de novo
We write to alert you to the fact that the UNESCO-Obiang Nguema Mbasogo International Prize for Research in the Life Sciences is once again coming up for consideration at UNESCO. As you know, UNESCO’s governing executive board decided last October to indefinitely suspend the prize in the wake of a vigorous global campaign by individuals and organizations. Your support was key in achieving that suspension, which was an important victory.
We recently learned that a proposal to reinstate the prize has been placed on the agenda for UNESCO’s upcoming executive board meeting. The meeting’s plenary session begins on Monday, September 26, and the prize could be considered as early as Wednesday, September 28.
Although an effort by the government of Equatorial Guinea to reinstate the prize failed in May, its current effort presents a far more serious threat because the government is not acting alone. In June, President Obiang used his position as Chair of the African Union to get an African Union resolution that calls on UNESCO to reinstate the prize. He has been able to use the AU resolution to get the issue back on the agenda less than a year after it was shelved indefinitely.
We would welcome your continued support for the campaign against the UNESCO-Obiang prize. We hope you will help us persuade UNESCO to block this latest effort to reinstate it and to instead cancel the prize definitively. You can take action by contacting directly African foreign ministries, writing to individual country delegates on the board (see below for more information), or alerting any media contacts you may have about this latest maneuver by President Obiang to try to revive this ill-conceived prize.
Thank you in advance for your support, and please don’t hesitate to contact us with any questions or concerns.
Sincerely yours,
Tutu Alicante
EG Justice
We recently learned that a proposal to reinstate the prize has been placed on the agenda for UNESCO’s upcoming executive board meeting. The meeting’s plenary session begins on Monday, September 26, and the prize could be considered as early as Wednesday, September 28.
Although an effort by the government of Equatorial Guinea to reinstate the prize failed in May, its current effort presents a far more serious threat because the government is not acting alone. In June, President Obiang used his position as Chair of the African Union to get an African Union resolution that calls on UNESCO to reinstate the prize. He has been able to use the AU resolution to get the issue back on the agenda less than a year after it was shelved indefinitely.
We would welcome your continued support for the campaign against the UNESCO-Obiang prize. We hope you will help us persuade UNESCO to block this latest effort to reinstate it and to instead cancel the prize definitively. You can take action by contacting directly African foreign ministries, writing to individual country delegates on the board (see below for more information), or alerting any media contacts you may have about this latest maneuver by President Obiang to try to revive this ill-conceived prize.
Thank you in advance for your support, and please don’t hesitate to contact us with any questions or concerns.
Sincerely yours,
Tutu Alicante
EG Justice
26.9.11
Obiang defende democracia...na Líbia
By Peter Onwubuariri
United Nations, Sept. 20, 2011 (NAN) The African Union on Tuesday recognised Libya's National Transitional Council as the official representative of the Libyan people.
Equatorial Guinea President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who holds the AU's rotating chair, said the bloc supports the Libyan people as they build a ``united, democratic, and prosperous and peaceful Libya''.
Nguema, who spoke at a high-level UN conference on Libya in New York, said the 54-member bloc was ready to support the NTC as it works to form an inclusive government.
The UN Correspondent of the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reports that the AU had been reluctant to recognise the provisional authority, which now controls most of Libya.
Nguema declared that now ``the AU is prepared to work with other international partners’’ for a united Libya living in peace.
In his remarks at the high level meeting on Libya, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal called on the deposed leader of Libya, Col. Muammar Gaddafi to urgently step down and publicly renounce violence in the North African country.
`` I am here to speak to Gaddafi; (...) we had an hour and half long conversation at the end of which I asked him to step aside but he did not listen to me.
``In June, I went to Benghazi to speak to him directly and to say to him now everything I told you has played out spare Africa and Libya further pains; spare the world further pains but he did not listen to me.
``Today, I do not know where he is but I am here to speak to him and to say to him, that everything that has happened in the world since I spoke to him till now, will bring anyone to the conclusion that you must step down.
``You must state publicly that you renounce violence and make an appeal to your partisans who are still fighting on your behalf,’’ he said.
--- Trata-se de um despacho da Agência Noticiosa Nigeriana. Por ele se vê como é que os presidentes da Guiné Equatorial e do Senegal sabem aconselhar outros a afastar-se de cena.
United Nations, Sept. 20, 2011 (NAN) The African Union on Tuesday recognised Libya's National Transitional Council as the official representative of the Libyan people.
Equatorial Guinea President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who holds the AU's rotating chair, said the bloc supports the Libyan people as they build a ``united, democratic, and prosperous and peaceful Libya''.
Nguema, who spoke at a high-level UN conference on Libya in New York, said the 54-member bloc was ready to support the NTC as it works to form an inclusive government.
The UN Correspondent of the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reports that the AU had been reluctant to recognise the provisional authority, which now controls most of Libya.
Nguema declared that now ``the AU is prepared to work with other international partners’’ for a united Libya living in peace.
In his remarks at the high level meeting on Libya, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal called on the deposed leader of Libya, Col. Muammar Gaddafi to urgently step down and publicly renounce violence in the North African country.
`` I am here to speak to Gaddafi; (...) we had an hour and half long conversation at the end of which I asked him to step aside but he did not listen to me.
``In June, I went to Benghazi to speak to him directly and to say to him now everything I told you has played out spare Africa and Libya further pains; spare the world further pains but he did not listen to me.
``Today, I do not know where he is but I am here to speak to him and to say to him, that everything that has happened in the world since I spoke to him till now, will bring anyone to the conclusion that you must step down.
``You must state publicly that you renounce violence and make an appeal to your partisans who are still fighting on your behalf,’’ he said.
--- Trata-se de um despacho da Agência Noticiosa Nigeriana. Por ele se vê como é que os presidentes da Guiné Equatorial e do Senegal sabem aconselhar outros a afastar-se de cena.
24.9.11
0 retrocesso do nível de vida líbio
"There is no tomorrow" under a NATO sponsored Al Qaeda rebellion.
While a "pro-democracy" rebel government has been instated, the country has been destroyed.
Against the backdrop of war propaganda, Libya's economic and social achievements over the last thirty years, have been brutally reversed:
The [Libyan Arab Jamahiriya] has had a high standard of living and a robust per capita daily caloric intake of 3144. The country has made strides in public health and, since 1980, child mortality rates have dropped from 70 per thousand live births to 19 in 2009. Life expectancy has risen from 61 to 74 years of age during the same span of years. (FAO, Rome, Libya, Country Profile,)
According to sectors of the "Progressive Left" which have endorsed NATO's R2P mandate: "The mood across Libya, particularly in Tripoli, is absolutely —like there’s just a feeling of euphoria everywhere. People are incredibly excited about starting afresh. There’s a real sense of rebirth, a feeling that their lives are starting anew. (DemocracyNow.org, September 14, 2011 emphasis added)
The rebels are casually presented as "liberators". The central role of Al Qaeda affilated terrorists within rebel ranks is not mentioned.
"Starting afresh" in the wake of destruction? Fear and Social Despair, Countless Deaths and Atrocities, amply documented by the independent media.
No euphoria.... A historical reversal in the country's economic and social development has occurred. The achievements have been erased.
The NATO invasion and occupation marks the ruinous "rebirth" of Libya's standard of living That is the forbidden and unspoken truth: an entire Nation has been destabilized and destroyed, its people driven into abysmal poverty.
The objective of the NATO bombings from the outset was to destroy the country's standard of living, its health infrastructure, its schools and hospitals, its water distribution system.
And then "rebuild" with the help of donors and creditors under the helm of the IMF and the World Bank.
The diktats of the "free market" are a precondition for the instatement of a Western style "democratic dictatorship ".
About nine thousand strike sorties, tens of thousands of strikes on civilian targets including residential areas, government buildings, water supply and electricity generation facilities.
Prof. Michel Chossudovsky
While a "pro-democracy" rebel government has been instated, the country has been destroyed.
Against the backdrop of war propaganda, Libya's economic and social achievements over the last thirty years, have been brutally reversed:
The [Libyan Arab Jamahiriya] has had a high standard of living and a robust per capita daily caloric intake of 3144. The country has made strides in public health and, since 1980, child mortality rates have dropped from 70 per thousand live births to 19 in 2009. Life expectancy has risen from 61 to 74 years of age during the same span of years. (FAO, Rome, Libya, Country Profile,)
According to sectors of the "Progressive Left" which have endorsed NATO's R2P mandate: "The mood across Libya, particularly in Tripoli, is absolutely —like there’s just a feeling of euphoria everywhere. People are incredibly excited about starting afresh. There’s a real sense of rebirth, a feeling that their lives are starting anew. (DemocracyNow.org, September 14, 2011 emphasis added)
The rebels are casually presented as "liberators". The central role of Al Qaeda affilated terrorists within rebel ranks is not mentioned.
"Starting afresh" in the wake of destruction? Fear and Social Despair, Countless Deaths and Atrocities, amply documented by the independent media.
No euphoria.... A historical reversal in the country's economic and social development has occurred. The achievements have been erased.
The NATO invasion and occupation marks the ruinous "rebirth" of Libya's standard of living That is the forbidden and unspoken truth: an entire Nation has been destabilized and destroyed, its people driven into abysmal poverty.
The objective of the NATO bombings from the outset was to destroy the country's standard of living, its health infrastructure, its schools and hospitals, its water distribution system.
And then "rebuild" with the help of donors and creditors under the helm of the IMF and the World Bank.
The diktats of the "free market" are a precondition for the instatement of a Western style "democratic dictatorship ".
About nine thousand strike sorties, tens of thousands of strikes on civilian targets including residential areas, government buildings, water supply and electricity generation facilities.
Prof. Michel Chossudovsky
23.9.11
Sata é o novo Presidente da Zâmbia
Michael Sata has been sworn in as Zambia's president after an upset election victory that has ushered in a handover of power in Africa's biggest copper producer.
Sata, the 74-year-old Zambian opposition leader, swept to victory on Friday on the back of voters hoping profits from the country's vast mineral deposits would finally make their way to the people.
Foreign mining firms were reassured by Sata that their investments would be safe, but he warned them to improve conditions for their Zambian workforce.
"Foreign investment is important to Zambia and we will continue to work with foreign investors who are welcome in the country ... but they need to adhere to the labour laws," Sata said after being sworn in following his defeat of former leader Rupiah Banda.
Zambians celebrated from the pre-dawn hours of Friday after Sata was declared the winner and painted the capital in the green and white int the colours of his Patriotic Front Party.
Al Jazeera's Gladys Njoroge, reporting from Lusaka, said people poured into the streets to applaud the victory win although the process was marred by violence due to delayed results and allegations of vote rigging.
Sata told the gathered crowd: "We should not allow violence to separate us. The gap between the rich and the poor is growing wider and we need to address that. I stand by the promise to change Zambia within 90 days."
Gracious defeat
In a continent where leaders are often reluctant to give up power, Banda tearfully conceded defeat, saying the people had spoken. His Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) party has run Zambia since one-party rule ended in 1991.
"Now is not the time for violence and retribution. Now is the time to unite and build tomorrow's Zambia together," he told a news conference.
In his concession speech, Banda may have been delivering a message to Zimbabwe, Malawi, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where entrenched leaders have suppressed democracy or used deadly force to crush protests.
"My generation, the generation of the independence struggle, must now give way to new ideas; ideas for the 21st century," Banda said.
"Did we become gray and lacking in ideas? Did we lose momentum? Our duty now is to go away and reflect on any mistakes we may have made and learn from them. If we do not, we do not deserve to contest power again," the 74-year-old Banda said.
Election monitors from the European Union and regional groups declared the vote free and fair although protests broke out over the slow release of results.
Sata, nicknamed "King Cobra" because of outspokenness, toned down his rhetoric against foreign mining firms, especially those from China, in the closing stages of the six-week campaign but his victory could still make investors nervous.
Mining overhaul
Analysts said Sata would review contracts with foreign companies struck by Banda's administration, and could overhaul the country's mining, trade and banking regulations.
"Sata's upset victory will likely usher in a new era for a resource-nationalist mining sector policy," said Sebastian Spio-Garbrah, an analyst at Africa consultancy DaMina Advisors.
Ernest Sakala, Zambia's chief justice, declared Sata the winner after he received 1,150,045 votes compared with Banda's 961,796 with 95.3 per cent of constituencies counted. Sata received 43 per cent of the vote, which was also contested by many minor parties.
Sata has enjoyed a long and varied career that included stints in motor vehicle assembly plants in Britain and as a porter with British Rail before becoming a political activist under first president, Kenneth Kaunda.
"At long last, the will of the people has been respected. The people wanted change," said street vendor Peter Musonda.
Sata secured support among the youth on promises to create jobs and his criticism that Banda's government failed to let ordinary Zambians share in the proceeds from the country's copper mines.
China welcomed the outcome of the vote and said it would continue fostering cooperation.
Its companies have become major players in Zambia's $13 billion economy, with total investments by the end of 2010 topping $2 billion, according to data from the Chinese embassy.
But Sata has accused Chinese mining firms of creating slave labour conditions with scant regard for safety or the local culture.
Zambia's currency, the kwacha, fell 2.9 per cent to a 14-month-low of 5,150 against the dollar after Sata's victory and traders said it would remain vulnerable until he gave clearer indications on his future policies.
Regional praise
South Africa congratulated Sata on his election victory, saying the peaceful change of power bodes well for democracy on the continent.
"This bodes well for the consolidation of democratic culture on the continent and in Zambia particularly," South Africa's foreign ministry said in a statement.
"The South African government and its citizens reiterate its commitment to continue working with the government and the people of Zambia for the mutual benefit of the two countries," it said.
Zambia is South Africa's fourth-largest trading partner in Africa, with a total trading volume of $2.1 billion, according to the Zambia Chamber of Commerce.
Source: Agencies/AlJazeera
Sata, the 74-year-old Zambian opposition leader, swept to victory on Friday on the back of voters hoping profits from the country's vast mineral deposits would finally make their way to the people.
Foreign mining firms were reassured by Sata that their investments would be safe, but he warned them to improve conditions for their Zambian workforce.
"Foreign investment is important to Zambia and we will continue to work with foreign investors who are welcome in the country ... but they need to adhere to the labour laws," Sata said after being sworn in following his defeat of former leader Rupiah Banda.
Zambians celebrated from the pre-dawn hours of Friday after Sata was declared the winner and painted the capital in the green and white int the colours of his Patriotic Front Party.
Al Jazeera's Gladys Njoroge, reporting from Lusaka, said people poured into the streets to applaud the victory win although the process was marred by violence due to delayed results and allegations of vote rigging.
Sata told the gathered crowd: "We should not allow violence to separate us. The gap between the rich and the poor is growing wider and we need to address that. I stand by the promise to change Zambia within 90 days."
Gracious defeat
In a continent where leaders are often reluctant to give up power, Banda tearfully conceded defeat, saying the people had spoken. His Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) party has run Zambia since one-party rule ended in 1991.
"Now is not the time for violence and retribution. Now is the time to unite and build tomorrow's Zambia together," he told a news conference.
In his concession speech, Banda may have been delivering a message to Zimbabwe, Malawi, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where entrenched leaders have suppressed democracy or used deadly force to crush protests.
"My generation, the generation of the independence struggle, must now give way to new ideas; ideas for the 21st century," Banda said.
"Did we become gray and lacking in ideas? Did we lose momentum? Our duty now is to go away and reflect on any mistakes we may have made and learn from them. If we do not, we do not deserve to contest power again," the 74-year-old Banda said.
Election monitors from the European Union and regional groups declared the vote free and fair although protests broke out over the slow release of results.
Sata, nicknamed "King Cobra" because of outspokenness, toned down his rhetoric against foreign mining firms, especially those from China, in the closing stages of the six-week campaign but his victory could still make investors nervous.
Mining overhaul
Analysts said Sata would review contracts with foreign companies struck by Banda's administration, and could overhaul the country's mining, trade and banking regulations.
"Sata's upset victory will likely usher in a new era for a resource-nationalist mining sector policy," said Sebastian Spio-Garbrah, an analyst at Africa consultancy DaMina Advisors.
Ernest Sakala, Zambia's chief justice, declared Sata the winner after he received 1,150,045 votes compared with Banda's 961,796 with 95.3 per cent of constituencies counted. Sata received 43 per cent of the vote, which was also contested by many minor parties.
Sata has enjoyed a long and varied career that included stints in motor vehicle assembly plants in Britain and as a porter with British Rail before becoming a political activist under first president, Kenneth Kaunda.
"At long last, the will of the people has been respected. The people wanted change," said street vendor Peter Musonda.
Sata secured support among the youth on promises to create jobs and his criticism that Banda's government failed to let ordinary Zambians share in the proceeds from the country's copper mines.
China welcomed the outcome of the vote and said it would continue fostering cooperation.
Its companies have become major players in Zambia's $13 billion economy, with total investments by the end of 2010 topping $2 billion, according to data from the Chinese embassy.
But Sata has accused Chinese mining firms of creating slave labour conditions with scant regard for safety or the local culture.
Zambia's currency, the kwacha, fell 2.9 per cent to a 14-month-low of 5,150 against the dollar after Sata's victory and traders said it would remain vulnerable until he gave clearer indications on his future policies.
Regional praise
South Africa congratulated Sata on his election victory, saying the peaceful change of power bodes well for democracy on the continent.
"This bodes well for the consolidation of democratic culture on the continent and in Zambia particularly," South Africa's foreign ministry said in a statement.
"The South African government and its citizens reiterate its commitment to continue working with the government and the people of Zambia for the mutual benefit of the two countries," it said.
Zambia is South Africa's fourth-largest trading partner in Africa, with a total trading volume of $2.1 billion, according to the Zambia Chamber of Commerce.
Source: Agencies/AlJazeera
10.9.11
Libye : les problèmes ne font que commencer
La Jamahiriyah a vécu. La Libye est débarrassée de la dictature imposée, depuis 1969, par Muammar Kadhafi à ses
habitants. Nous nous en réjouissons car rien n'est plus légitime que l'aspiration des peuples à plus de liberté et de
démocratie.
Cependant, l'euphorie de la victoire ne doit pas masquer la réalité de la situation : la guerre civile qui dure depuis six mois
a profondément marqué le pays, accentuant les clivages internes ; et la perte de contrôle de Tripoli sur son territoire, aussi
bien que le pillage des ses arsenaux, ont favorisé le développement de menaces (séparatisme, terrorisme, criminalité) qui
vont accroître durablement la déstabilisation du pays, mais aussi de la région.
Surtout, il convient de rappeler quelques réalités qu'occultent politiques et médias des pays ayant soutenu les insurgés :
le basculement du rapport de forces s'est produit d'extrême justesse pendant l'été ; ce n'est pas une victoire du peuple
libyen mais celle des puissances belligérantes dirigées par l'OTAN ; et le Conseil national de transition (CNT) est une
structure hétérogène et fragile, qui semble incapable de gérer, seul, l'avenir du pays.
Alors que pendant cinq mois, la lutte contre le régime libyen avait piétiné, basculement de la situation s'est produit au
cours de l'été, accélérant l'évolution des événements.
En premier lieu, l'offensive diplomatique en faveur du CNT a franchi un pas avec la reconnaissance par la Turquie des
insurgés libyens (4 juillet), suivie quelques jours plus tard par celle d'une trentaine de pays à l'occasion de la réunion du
Groupe de contact à Istanbul. Parallèlement, un changement de position de la Russie est également intervenu.
Mais c'est surtout le meurtre du général Abdel Fatah Younès (28 juillet), qui a été l'événement déterminant. L'ancien
ministre de l'intérieur de Kadhafi a été très vraisemblablement assassiné par les éléments les plus radicaux de la branche
armée du CNT, qui lui reprochaient son manque d'efficacité. Le Conseil national de transition a été alors à deux doigts
d'imploser, la tribu des Obeidi - à laquelle appartenait le général - demandant réparation. Seule une pression
extrêmement forte des sponsors étrangers du CNT a permis de sauver la situation. Les Etats occidentaux et les pays du
Golfe ont exigé le limogeage du "gouvernement" provisoire (8 août) et ont pris en main la direction des opérations, ce qui
a accéléré l'issue du conflit. Ainsi, le renversement du régime est la victoire de l'OTAN, et non celle des insurgés.
Depuis le début de l'insurrection contre le colonel Kadhafi, malgré l'importante aide occidentale dont ils ont bénéficié, les
insurgés libyens ont fait preuve d'une totale inefficacité militaire, alors même que l'armée libyenne n'a jamais été réputée
pour ses qualités.
Leurs forces, en grande partie constituées de milices civiles mal entraînées, de volontaires inexpérimentés et d'anciens
militaires libyens, n'ont montré ni sens tactique ni cohésion. Les éléments les plus combatifs ont été les membres du
Groupe islamiste combattant libyen (GICL) – la branche locale d'Al-Qaïda - passés par les camps d'Afghanistan, ayant
déjà combattu les forces de Kadhafi et les Américains en Irak. Mais, sans le soutien occidental, il y a longtemps que les
insurgés auraient été anéantis.
Aussi, il est illusoire de croire qu'ils aient pu, seuls, parvenir à renverser le régime de Tripoli en moins de trois semaines,
après l'assassinat de leur commandant en chef. Ce succès n'a pu être obtenu que grâce à une intensification des
opérations de renseignement, de ciblage et de bombardement de l'OTAN et grâce à l'appui logistique, l'encadrement et
aux actions directes des unités spéciales occidentales et des pays du Golfe.
Dès le début des opérations aériennes, des équipes de la CIA ont été déployées en Libye, sur ordre du président Obama,
pour appuyer les insurgés et contribuer à leur effort de guerre. Puis, à la demande de Washington, le Royaume-Uni a
rapidement dépêché ses forces spéciales auprès des insurgés, afin d'épauler sur le terrain l'action de la CIA.
La France a également envoyé quelques officiers de liaison auprès du CNT, ainsi que des membres du service Action de
la DGSE pour instruire et assister les insurgés. Afin de ne pas demeurer en reste, l'Italie, l'Egypte, le Qatar et les Emirats
arabes unis ont aussi envoyé plusieurs conseillers militaires auprès de la rébellion.
Ces hommes, qui relèvent, selon les pays des forces spéciales, des services secrets ou de sociétés militaires privées, ont
L
également formé et encadré des Libyens résidant à l'étranger, avant de les infiltrer sur le théâtre des opérations, via
l'Egypte, la Tunisie ou en les débarquant sur les côtes de Tripolitaine. Depuis début août, ils les ont dirigés et
accompagnés au combat. Sans cet engagement important des forces de la coalition anti-Kadhafi, jamais le CNT n'aurait
pu remporter la victoire.
Il convient également de noter que les Libyens de l'ouest n'ont pas participé aux combats. Les tribus du Fezzan et de
Tripolitaine n'ont rien fait pour défendre Kadhafi - comme l'illustre le départ de l'ex n°2 du régime, Abdessallam Jalloud,
retiré de la politique depuis les années la fin des années 1980, et chef d'une importante tribu - mais elles ne se sont pas
pour autant engagées aux côtés des insurgés, en très grande majorité originaires de l'est du pays ou de l'étranger. La
rébellion, comme le CNT lui-même, sont donc peu représentatifs du peuple libyen.
Le CNT n'est qu'une coalition d'éléments disparates aux intérêts divergents, dont l'unique point commun est leur
opposition déterminée au régime de Tripoli. Les véritables démocrates n'y sont qu'une minorité, et doivent cohabiter avec
d'anciens proches du colonel Kadhafi, des partisans d'un retour de la monarchie sénoussie et des djihadistes liés à Al-
Qaïda (GICL).
De plus, le CNT n'est pas représentatif du peuple libyen – les tribus de l'ouest et du centre en sont quasiment absentes -
et reste dominé par les hommes de Cyrénaïque. Par ailleurs, il est opaque puisque seuls les noms de 13 de ses 31
membres ont été rendus publics.
Plus inquiétant, l'Article 1 de sa Charte nationale transitoire - tenant lieu de projet de constitution - stipule : "La Libye est
un Etat indépendant, souverain et unifié, non divisé. C'est un Etat démocratique, décentralisé, le peuple est la source du
pouvoir. Sa religion est l'islam et les principes de la shariah islamique sont la source de ses lois".
Ainsi, le CNT est peu homogène, peu représentatif, une partie de ses représentants dissimulent leur identité et son
orientation islamiste est à peine voilée. Il n'offre aucune garantie pour l'avenir, malgré les efforts des démocrates, car les
autres factions entendent bien orienter le conseil dans le sens de leurs objectifs.
Le CNT n'a pas les moyens de tenir le pays, déstructuré par six mois de guerre, la libre circulation des armes et
l'exacerbation des haines internes. Tout laisse craindre que les règlements de comptes (personnels, tribaux, régionaux,
etc.) vont se multiplier et entrainer des rétorsions, car la Libye fonctionne largement sur le principe clanique. Les
divergences entre les faction du CNT vont s'accroître tant pour des raisons conjoncturelles (ils ne sont plus unis contre
l'ennemi commun) que pour l'orientation et le contrôle du pouvoir. Cette situation explosive n'est pas sans rappeler le
contexte somalien des années 1990.
Les deux principaux risques qui guettent le pays sont : la partition entre l'est et l'ouest ; et l'installation durable d'un foyer
terroriste djihadiste, en Cyrénaïque, sous l'impulsion d'un GICL qui ressort renforcé des événements récents et dont les
liens avec Al-Qaïda ne se sont jamais distendus. Ce que les islamistes n'ont pu faire en Algérie, ils pourraient le réussir en
Libye. Les conséquences en seraient alors catastrophiques pour la région sahélo-saharienne.
D'ores et déjà, grâce au pillage des arsenaux libyens, Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) s'est doté de missiles
antiaériens et va accroître la menace qu'il représente pour les États de la région.
Eric Denécé/Le Monde por gentileza do Prof. Dr. Eduardo Costa Dias, que me chama a atenção para estas coisas.
habitants. Nous nous en réjouissons car rien n'est plus légitime que l'aspiration des peuples à plus de liberté et de
démocratie.
Cependant, l'euphorie de la victoire ne doit pas masquer la réalité de la situation : la guerre civile qui dure depuis six mois
a profondément marqué le pays, accentuant les clivages internes ; et la perte de contrôle de Tripoli sur son territoire, aussi
bien que le pillage des ses arsenaux, ont favorisé le développement de menaces (séparatisme, terrorisme, criminalité) qui
vont accroître durablement la déstabilisation du pays, mais aussi de la région.
Surtout, il convient de rappeler quelques réalités qu'occultent politiques et médias des pays ayant soutenu les insurgés :
le basculement du rapport de forces s'est produit d'extrême justesse pendant l'été ; ce n'est pas une victoire du peuple
libyen mais celle des puissances belligérantes dirigées par l'OTAN ; et le Conseil national de transition (CNT) est une
structure hétérogène et fragile, qui semble incapable de gérer, seul, l'avenir du pays.
Alors que pendant cinq mois, la lutte contre le régime libyen avait piétiné, basculement de la situation s'est produit au
cours de l'été, accélérant l'évolution des événements.
En premier lieu, l'offensive diplomatique en faveur du CNT a franchi un pas avec la reconnaissance par la Turquie des
insurgés libyens (4 juillet), suivie quelques jours plus tard par celle d'une trentaine de pays à l'occasion de la réunion du
Groupe de contact à Istanbul. Parallèlement, un changement de position de la Russie est également intervenu.
Mais c'est surtout le meurtre du général Abdel Fatah Younès (28 juillet), qui a été l'événement déterminant. L'ancien
ministre de l'intérieur de Kadhafi a été très vraisemblablement assassiné par les éléments les plus radicaux de la branche
armée du CNT, qui lui reprochaient son manque d'efficacité. Le Conseil national de transition a été alors à deux doigts
d'imploser, la tribu des Obeidi - à laquelle appartenait le général - demandant réparation. Seule une pression
extrêmement forte des sponsors étrangers du CNT a permis de sauver la situation. Les Etats occidentaux et les pays du
Golfe ont exigé le limogeage du "gouvernement" provisoire (8 août) et ont pris en main la direction des opérations, ce qui
a accéléré l'issue du conflit. Ainsi, le renversement du régime est la victoire de l'OTAN, et non celle des insurgés.
Depuis le début de l'insurrection contre le colonel Kadhafi, malgré l'importante aide occidentale dont ils ont bénéficié, les
insurgés libyens ont fait preuve d'une totale inefficacité militaire, alors même que l'armée libyenne n'a jamais été réputée
pour ses qualités.
Leurs forces, en grande partie constituées de milices civiles mal entraînées, de volontaires inexpérimentés et d'anciens
militaires libyens, n'ont montré ni sens tactique ni cohésion. Les éléments les plus combatifs ont été les membres du
Groupe islamiste combattant libyen (GICL) – la branche locale d'Al-Qaïda - passés par les camps d'Afghanistan, ayant
déjà combattu les forces de Kadhafi et les Américains en Irak. Mais, sans le soutien occidental, il y a longtemps que les
insurgés auraient été anéantis.
Aussi, il est illusoire de croire qu'ils aient pu, seuls, parvenir à renverser le régime de Tripoli en moins de trois semaines,
après l'assassinat de leur commandant en chef. Ce succès n'a pu être obtenu que grâce à une intensification des
opérations de renseignement, de ciblage et de bombardement de l'OTAN et grâce à l'appui logistique, l'encadrement et
aux actions directes des unités spéciales occidentales et des pays du Golfe.
Dès le début des opérations aériennes, des équipes de la CIA ont été déployées en Libye, sur ordre du président Obama,
pour appuyer les insurgés et contribuer à leur effort de guerre. Puis, à la demande de Washington, le Royaume-Uni a
rapidement dépêché ses forces spéciales auprès des insurgés, afin d'épauler sur le terrain l'action de la CIA.
La France a également envoyé quelques officiers de liaison auprès du CNT, ainsi que des membres du service Action de
la DGSE pour instruire et assister les insurgés. Afin de ne pas demeurer en reste, l'Italie, l'Egypte, le Qatar et les Emirats
arabes unis ont aussi envoyé plusieurs conseillers militaires auprès de la rébellion.
Ces hommes, qui relèvent, selon les pays des forces spéciales, des services secrets ou de sociétés militaires privées, ont
L
également formé et encadré des Libyens résidant à l'étranger, avant de les infiltrer sur le théâtre des opérations, via
l'Egypte, la Tunisie ou en les débarquant sur les côtes de Tripolitaine. Depuis début août, ils les ont dirigés et
accompagnés au combat. Sans cet engagement important des forces de la coalition anti-Kadhafi, jamais le CNT n'aurait
pu remporter la victoire.
Il convient également de noter que les Libyens de l'ouest n'ont pas participé aux combats. Les tribus du Fezzan et de
Tripolitaine n'ont rien fait pour défendre Kadhafi - comme l'illustre le départ de l'ex n°2 du régime, Abdessallam Jalloud,
retiré de la politique depuis les années la fin des années 1980, et chef d'une importante tribu - mais elles ne se sont pas
pour autant engagées aux côtés des insurgés, en très grande majorité originaires de l'est du pays ou de l'étranger. La
rébellion, comme le CNT lui-même, sont donc peu représentatifs du peuple libyen.
Le CNT n'est qu'une coalition d'éléments disparates aux intérêts divergents, dont l'unique point commun est leur
opposition déterminée au régime de Tripoli. Les véritables démocrates n'y sont qu'une minorité, et doivent cohabiter avec
d'anciens proches du colonel Kadhafi, des partisans d'un retour de la monarchie sénoussie et des djihadistes liés à Al-
Qaïda (GICL).
De plus, le CNT n'est pas représentatif du peuple libyen – les tribus de l'ouest et du centre en sont quasiment absentes -
et reste dominé par les hommes de Cyrénaïque. Par ailleurs, il est opaque puisque seuls les noms de 13 de ses 31
membres ont été rendus publics.
Plus inquiétant, l'Article 1 de sa Charte nationale transitoire - tenant lieu de projet de constitution - stipule : "La Libye est
un Etat indépendant, souverain et unifié, non divisé. C'est un Etat démocratique, décentralisé, le peuple est la source du
pouvoir. Sa religion est l'islam et les principes de la shariah islamique sont la source de ses lois".
Ainsi, le CNT est peu homogène, peu représentatif, une partie de ses représentants dissimulent leur identité et son
orientation islamiste est à peine voilée. Il n'offre aucune garantie pour l'avenir, malgré les efforts des démocrates, car les
autres factions entendent bien orienter le conseil dans le sens de leurs objectifs.
Le CNT n'a pas les moyens de tenir le pays, déstructuré par six mois de guerre, la libre circulation des armes et
l'exacerbation des haines internes. Tout laisse craindre que les règlements de comptes (personnels, tribaux, régionaux,
etc.) vont se multiplier et entrainer des rétorsions, car la Libye fonctionne largement sur le principe clanique. Les
divergences entre les faction du CNT vont s'accroître tant pour des raisons conjoncturelles (ils ne sont plus unis contre
l'ennemi commun) que pour l'orientation et le contrôle du pouvoir. Cette situation explosive n'est pas sans rappeler le
contexte somalien des années 1990.
Les deux principaux risques qui guettent le pays sont : la partition entre l'est et l'ouest ; et l'installation durable d'un foyer
terroriste djihadiste, en Cyrénaïque, sous l'impulsion d'un GICL qui ressort renforcé des événements récents et dont les
liens avec Al-Qaïda ne se sont jamais distendus. Ce que les islamistes n'ont pu faire en Algérie, ils pourraient le réussir en
Libye. Les conséquences en seraient alors catastrophiques pour la région sahélo-saharienne.
D'ores et déjà, grâce au pillage des arsenaux libyens, Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) s'est doté de missiles
antiaériens et va accroître la menace qu'il représente pour les États de la région.
Eric Denécé/Le Monde por gentileza do Prof. Dr. Eduardo Costa Dias, que me chama a atenção para estas coisas.
6.9.11
Há ainda tanta Líbia por descobrir
Sukhna, Al Jufrah, Birak, Sabah, Burayk, Jammah e Murzuq são algumas terras da Líbia a sul do paralelo 30, o que passa pelas Ilhas Selvagens e pelo Grande Erg Ocidental da Argélia. Não consta que o Conselho Nacional de Transição domine essas povoações. Tal como aparentemente não domina Dulaym, Tarbu, Al-Qatrun e Madrusah.
Em qualquer uma dessas tantas povoações poderão estar o coronel Muammar Khadafi e seu filho Saif al Islam, que há 11 ou 12 dias os dirigentes do Conselho Nacional de Transição diziam estar em vias de neutralizar.
Do paralelo 30 ao Trópico de Câncer, que passa pelo Hoggar argelino, há uma Líbia imensa que os homens do Conselho Nacional de Transição e os seus amigos franceses, britânicos e norte-americanos não parecem conhecer.
Por isso mesmo, devido a esse grande desconhecimento, é que a mulher e alguns dos filhos de Khadafi já se encontram na Argélia e que outros sequazes seus conseguiram fazer todo o trajecto de Al Jufrah à cidade de Agadez, bem no interior do Níger, já ultrapassado o Maciço de Aïr.
Os homens da Cirenaica que conquistaram parcialmente a Tripolitânia não estão a ter na devida conta a terceira das componentes do enorme país: Fezzan, onde ficam Emgayet, Adiri, Tmisan, Burayk, Tasawah, Tajarhi e tantos outros pontos perdidos na imensidão do deserto, por cujos insondáveis caminhos se podem alcançar terras da Argélia, do Níger e até mesmo da Faixa de Aozou, no Chade.
Devido a um desastroso conhecimento de Geografia e dos mares de areia do Sara é que tantas televisões andam há duas semanas a transmitir aos incautos que a Líbia foi conquistada a 95 por cento pelo Conselho Nacional de Transição, só restando a Kadhafi uns 100 ou 200 homens, entrincheirados em Bani Walid, Sirte e Sabbah, esta última a capital histórica do velho império de Fezzan.
Reflictam sobre tudo isto e aguardem para ver bem que nem tudo vai ser tão fácil como aí por volta de 23 de Agosto nos queriam fazer crer.
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