31.10.13

Moçambique: O Zimbabwe poderá intervir

A senior official has indicated that the Zim government could intervene in neighbouring Mozambique following reports of a renewed RENAMO insurgency, which has already claimed the lives of at least 58 people. International press last week quoted Foreign Affairs deputy minister Christopher Mutsvangwa as saying that Zimbabwe could intervene in Mozambique. Mutsvangwa is reported as having told the British Broadcasting Corporation that "it will be misguided for RENAMO to bring instability and expect Zimbabwe to watch." Tensions are said to be rising between the Mozambican government troops and the rebels, leading to speculation that this could escalate into a crisis that could suck in neighbouring countries. Following Mutsvangwa's remarks, MDC-T president Morgan Tsvangirai told the NewsDay newspaper that Zimbabwe could not afford to intervene in the Mozambican crisis and suggested that the two parties should talk instead. "We do not have the capacity to launch another military intervention in Mozambique," Tsvangirai reportedly said before adding: "I think the Mozambican issue is an internal matter which should be resolved through dialogue." The former prime minister has already been criticised for his remarks by Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, who felt that the latter did not have the mandate to speak about what the country could or couldn't do. Political commentator Rejoice Ngwenya said he did not think Zimbabwe was seriously considering any military intervention in Mozambique. Ngwenya said firstly, he did not believe that the RENAMO rebels had the capacity to sustain their insurgency. "The only problem I see arising is when ZANU PF then uses this insurgence as an excuse to re-invest in more military hardware on the pretext that they are defending the borders with Mozambique," Ngwenya said. Ngwenya added that if there was any intervention in Mozambique, it can only be done through either the African Union or the Southern African Development Community (SADC). "Any intervention would have to be as part of a resolution by these two bodies, it's not a question of ZANU PF and the Mozambican government phoning each other to arrange an intervention. It doesn't work like that. "Our parliament will have to also debate the costs involved. We need water, electricity and food here in Zimbabwe and we don't need to intervene on matters that really do not require our intervention, Mozambique can manage without us," Ngwenya added. RENAMO was formed in the 1970s and encouraged by the then white-ruled Rhodesia's intelligence service, which recruited Mozambicans opposed to liberation movement FRELIMO. When white rule ended in Zimbabwe in 1980, RENAMO was adopted by South Africa's apartheid military to try to thwart black nationalism on borders from Angola to Mozambique. AllAfrica.com

Bissau: As eleições de pouco servirão

O conflito na Guiné-Bissau não se resolverá com "um desenvolvimento", seja a realização de eleições, seja uma qualquer detenção, exigindo a "reinvenção do modelo econômico e social", defende o economista guineense Carlos Lopes. Em declarações à Lusa, em Lisboa, onde esteve para participar numa conferência, o secretário executivo da Comissão Econômica para África das Nações Unidas afirmou que, "quando se analisa um país com as complexidades da Guiné-Bissau, não se deve pensar que um episódio, por mais significativo que seja, vai resolver" os problemas. Carlos Lopes referia-se à detenção do antigo chefe da Marinha da Guiné-Bissau Bubo Na Tchuto, no início de Abril, pelos Estados Unidos, quando se encontrava em águas internacionais, perto de Cabo Verde. Bubo Na Tchuto era procurado por alegado envolvimento no tráfico internacional de droga, sobretudo cocaína oriunda da América do Sul, e foi detido no quadro de uma operação contra o narcotráfico no Golfo da Guiné. No âmbito do mesmo processo, os Estados Unidos acusaram o actual chefe do Estado Maior das Forças Armadas, António Indjai, por envolvimento no tráfico de droga e de armas. Questionado por alguém na assistência (o jornalista e seu conterrâneo, António Aly Silva) na conferência que proferiu na segunda-feira à noite, na sede da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP), Carlos Lopes destacou que a Guiné-Bissau vive numa "globalização às avessas". O país "já está na globalização, mas pelas razões erradas, pela droga", nomeou. "Muitas vezes se pensa que, por causa de um desenvolvimento, se encontrou a solução. Por exemplo, vamos fazer eleições e pensa-se que as eleições resolvem o problema. Isto é muito mais complexo do que fazer eleições", distinguiu Carlos Lopes. "Expressão de vontades é uma coisa muito comum na Guiné-Bissau. É preciso é expressão de factos, a concretização de algumas destas ideias, que parecem ter consenso, mas que depois acabam por não acontecer", lamentou o especialista. "É preciso uma espécie de reinvenção do modelo econômico e social da Guiné-Bissau", propõe, concretizando: "Enquanto não se resolver o problema dos militares, podem fazer-se todas as eleições do mundo que não servem para nada." 'Criativos' Realçando com alguma ironia que a Guiné-Bissau "tem até conseguido, com uma certa criatividade, que muitos dos seus agentes políticos manipulem a comunidade internacional, e confundam a comunidade internacional", Carlos Lopes constatou: "Em 30 anos, já não sei quem é quem, há muito ziguezague, mudam de opinião constantemente." Realçando que, "na diplomacia internacional, o que conta, mais do que tudo, é a construção da confiança", o especialista recorda que a postura dos políticos guineenses conduziu ao "ponto de haver formas de tensão entre vários organismos intervenientes em mediação de conflitos que normalmente não existem". O economista referia-se, concretamente, às divergências - que entretanto parecem ter diminuído - entre Nações Unidas, União Africana, Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO) e CPLP na condução do processo de transição guineense após o golpe de Estado militar de 12 de Abril de 2012. "A posição comum é recente e exige maturação", alertou, sublinhando que "não há memória de uma descoordenação tão grande" entre organismos internacionais face "a um conflito de dimensão relativamente pequena". Simultaneamente, importa que os políticos guineenses não se esqueçam que "a solução tem que vir de dentro", sustentou o economista. LUSA --- Nas palavras de Carlos Lopes nota-se a lucidez que falta a José Ramos-Horta, muito ingénuo quanto à profundidade da crise guineense.

Angola: A França apresenta-se em força

La visite en Angola du ministre des Affaires étrangères, Laurent Fabius, doit être l'occasion pour les industriels français de participer au boom économique de ce pays d'Afrique australe. Mais pour beaucoup, le "miracle" angolais a tout du mirage. Par Sébastian SEIBT La délégation de grands patrons qui accompagnent le ministre français des Affaires étrangères, Laurent Fabius, lors de son déplacement en Angola, jeudi 31 octobre, est impressionnante. Air France, Airbus, Alstom, BNP Paribas, Bolloré, Total, Veolia : ils sont tous là ou presque pour essayer de tirer profit du boom économique que ce pays d’Afrique australe connaît depuis plusieurs années. L’enjeu commercial de ce voyage diplomatique est clair. Il s’affiche jusque sur le site du ministère de l’Économie, où il est précisé sur la fiche descriptive de cet État : “Peu de pays dans le monde ont un potentiel aussi important que l’Angola, où, malgré la concurrence, il existe d’importantes possibilités pour les entreprises françaises”. Sur le papier, le “miracle” angolais est flagrant. Depuis la fin de la sanglante guerre civile qui a ravagé le pays entre 1975 à 2002, cette ancienne colonie portugaise affiche des taux de croissance "à la chinoise". Malgré un sérieux coup de frein pendant les premières années de la crise financière, l’Angola connaît de nouveau depuis 2012 une croissance supérieure à 7 % par an. Et tous les analystes, du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) à la Banque africaine de développement (BAD), prévoient que le pays, aujourd’hui troisième économie d’Afrique, va pouvoir garder ce cap encore quelques temps. Bons baisers de Chine La Chine a d’ailleurs mis tout son poids économique pour devenir le premier partenaire commercial de l’Angola. Pékin a investi plus de 15 milliards de dollars dans 17 projets de coopération économique avec Luanda. “Officiellement, la présence chinoise compte 276 000 ressortissants [dans le pays]”, souligne une note de décembre 2012 de l’équivalent suisse de la chambre de commerce. Le Portugal n’est pas non plus resté indifférent à la bonne santé économique de l’Angola… mais d’une autre manière. Confrontés à la crise dans leur pays, plus de 150 000 Portugais ont obtenu un visa pour aller travailler dans leur ancienne colonie. “Un phénomène de cette ampleur est inédit dans l’histoire contemporaine”, note le site Slate Afrique. Qu’est-ce qui fait tourner l’Angola et aiguise autant d’appétits ? Le pétrole essentiellement. L’Angola est le deuxième producteur d’or noir du continent et le quatrième au niveau mondial. Le pays compte, en outre, encore augmenter sa production - 1,8 million de barils par jour actuellement -, pour atteindre 2 millions de barils par jour en 2015. La France n’est pas en reste dans cette course aux pétrodollars angolais : l’argent investi par Total sur le pays (9,1 milliards d’euros) représente en effet la quasi-totalité des investissements de la France (10 milliards d’euros en 2012). D’autres voient encore plus loin et imaginent que l’Angola pourrait devenir le nouveau Qatar africain. Le pays pourrait bien, en effet, se transformer en puissance gazifière de premier ordre comme le petit émirat. Il abrite la deuxième plus importante réserve de gaz naturel en Afrique et n’a commencé à l’exploiter qu’en 2013. Luanda s’inspire d’ailleurs du modèle qatari et s’est doté en 2012 d’un fonds souverain à hauteur de 5 milliards de dollars pour diversifier son économie. Roi des inégalités Mais le parallèle avec le Qatar peut se révéler trompeur et beaucoup craignent que le miracle ne soit en fait un mirage. D’abord parce que le pays est encore trop dépendant des fluctuations des prix du pétrole. L’or noir représente 90 % de ses exportations et pèse pour plus de 40 % du PIB de l’Angola, d’après la BAD. Le moindre choc peut très vite faire plonger l’économie angolaise. Lors de la crise financière de 2008, et la baisse des prix du pétrole qui s’en est suivie, la croissance du pays est ainsi passée en un an de plus de 10 % à environ 1 %. L’Angola est, en outre, un royaume d'inégalités. Le PIB par habitant (6 120 dollars), l’un des plus élevés du continent, est particulièrement trompeur. La quasi-totalité des richesses sont entre les mains de 5 % de la population, d’après un rapport du Centro de Estudos de Investigaçao Cientifica, un cercle angolais de réflexion économique. “Les inégalités dans les répartitions des revenus est l’un des plus élevés d’Afrique subsaharienne”, s’alarme le site Perspective économique d’Afrique, qui compile les données des principales institutions économiques mondiales et régionales. Quelque 25 % de la population est au chômage et 36 % des Angolais vivent avec moins de 2 dollars par jour. L’un des pays les plus corrompu de la planète Un contexte social encore aggravé par un niveau de corruption important. En 2011, le FMI s’étonnait “d’un écart inexpliqué de 32 milliards de dollars dans les comptes publics de l’Angola pour la période 2007-2010”. Cette somme apparaît bien dans les comptes de Sonangol, la toute puissante entreprise publique pétrolière, mais personne ne sait où l’argent est passé. Pour l’ONG Transparency International, l’Angola, malgré des efforts, demeure l’un des pays les plus corrompus au monde (157e sur 176 États surveillés en 2012). “Près de 40 % des grandes entreprises mondiales perçoivent la corruption comme un obstacle majeur”, souligne le site Perspective économique d’Afrique. Bien qu’endémique, la corruption ne serait toutefois pas le principal frein au développement de l’activité économique. Le manque d’accès à l’eau potable, les infrastructures en piteux état, la lourdeur administrative et l'indigence du secteur financier font de l’Angola, l’un des pires pays pour faire des affaires. Il est classé en 179e place sur 189 de l’indice “Doing Business” 2014 de la Banque mondiale. France 24

Líbia: Um forte decréscimo populacional

Tripoli, 28 October 2013: Libya’s population last year was 5,172,231. The figure was announced by the Bureau of Statistics and Census. The figure is based on applications for the National ID number. According to bureau, there were 959 434 families. The number of males was put at 2,617,275 and females at 2554956. Additionally, the families that registered reported that 831 family members were missing. It has been claimed that over a million Libyans have fled abroad since the revolution, mainly to Egypt and Tunisia. The figure is viewed as suspect and has not been confirmed although there are have been reports in Egypt of over half a million there and 400,000 in Tunisia. http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/10/28/ --- Em 2010 a Líbia tinha 6,3 milhões de habitantes, mas os acontecimentos dos dois últimos anos levaram de facto à partida de muita gente; tanto nacionais como estrangeiros.

30.10.13

Níger: Dezenas de mortos à sede no deserto

Un grupo de niños, mujeres y algunos hombres que intentaba llegar desde Níger a Argelia murió en el pleno desierto del Sáhara a principios de mes, posiblemente de sed. Los cadáveres de 87 inmigrantes a los que se buscaba hacía días han sido recuperados este miércoles en territorio nigerino a solo diez kilómetros de la frontera con Argelia, según han dicho varias fuentes a la agencia France Presse. La mayoría del grupo, 48, son niños. Además había 32 mujeres y siete hombres. El hallazgo llega solo unas semanas después de que dos naufragios con cientos de muertos en el Mediterráneo colocaran la inmigración por unos días en el centro del debate europeo. El Ejército de Níger localizó hace unos días los cadáveres de cinco inmigrantes que pertenecían al mismo grupo. Según una fuente de seguridad citada por la agencia francesa los sin papeles iniciaron su viaje a finales de septiembre y fallecieron a principios del mes de octubre. El alcalde de Agadez, una ciudad al norte de Níger, reconstruyó el periplo de los fallecidos el lunes en declaraciones a la BBC cuando fueron localizados los cinco primeros cadáveres. Rhissa Feltou contó que dos vehículos partieron de un pueblo más al norte, Arlit, con "al menos" 60 inmigrantes. El convoy se dirigía a la ciudad argelina de Tamanrassett, ubicada en pleno desierto de Sáhara y parte de las rutas de la inmigración clandestina. El alcalde contó que, al averiarse uno de los vehículos, algunos pasajeros se fueron a buscar recambios y otros se dispersaron en pequeños grupos. Días después algunos supervivientes llegaron a Arlit y alertaron al Ejército, que al llegar encontraron aquellos cinco primeros cadáveres. Entonces un trabajador de una ONG alertó en declaraciones a France Presse de lo que encontrarían quienes localizaran al resto del grupo. "Eran familias enteras, incluidos muchos niós y mujeres". El País

EUA interceptaram Tokyo Sexuale

JOHANNESBURG - Former South African government minister and anti-apartheid activist prominent businessman Tokyo Sexwale will approach the US government after he was arrested in New York for being on a list of banned persons to that country. The former Housing minister's lawyer, Lesley Mkhabela says Sexwale was arrested at JF Kennedy Airport while on a business trip to New York. Former struggle activists were banned from visiting America during apartheid. The ban has since been lifted but not all names have been removed from the list, said Mkhabela. "He has instructed us to take the matter up with the authorities of the US so we will address the letter to the US embassy in South Africa," said Sexwale lawyer. He says that they will also send the copy to the state's departments requiring clarification on the status of this issue and also assuring that this shall not happen again in the future.

29.10.13

Tiroteio em Nampula causou um morto

Um tiroteio entre a polícia e ex-combatentes da Renamo, principal força da oposição em Moçambique, provocou nesta quinta-feira um morto e quatro feridos em Nampula, noticiou a AFP. Os contornos do incidente não são claros. Algumas informações indicam que a polícia invadiu um acampamento da Renamo, outras que os ex-guerrilheiros abriram fogo. Foram detidos mais de três dezenas de oposicionistas. O incidente terá resultado do aumento da tensão entre as autoridades e o principal partido da oposição em Moçambique. Vários ex-combatentes da Renamo terão sido chamados a Nampula pelo líder do partido, Afonso Dhlakama, para um encontro cujo objectivo seria preparar manifestações nacionais “para correr com a Frelimo do poder”, adiantou a agência Lusa. No local estariam cerca de 300 apoiantes da Renamo, que durante 16 anos travou uma guerra civil com a Frelimo, até à paz assinada em 1992. Os militantes da Renamo já se encontravam no local desde Dezembro. Nesta quinta-feira a polícia desalojou os militantes do partido após o que o porta-voz da polícia de Nampula, João Inácio Dina, garante ter sido uma operação de rotina. “Era uma patrulha de rotina, mas tivemos de pedir reforços e ripostar quando eles começaram a disparar”, disse Inácio Dina à AFP. Um polícia acabou por morrer depois de ter ficado ferido na cabeça e na barriga, enquanto outro polícia e três membros da Renamo ficaram feridos em resultado dos disparos, adianta a agência francesa. “Foram detidos 34 guardas do corpo dirigente da Renamo e confiscadas cinco espingardas de assalto AK47, uma pistola e 86 balas”, contou João Inácio Dina. Os incidentes terão começado de manhã cedo, pelas 5h30. A Rádio Moçambique noticiou no seu site que membros da Renamo dispararam contra um carro da polícia durante a rendição dos agentes que se encontravam no local, o que levou a polícia a ripostar. No entanto, adianta a estação, era já esperada uma acção policial, depois de terem circulado informações sobre a mobilização de uma força de operações especiais para reforçar a vigilância aos membros da Renamo. A Renamo já tinha acusado o Governo moçambicano de “enviar uma força militar para semear o terror em Nampula”. O partido tem perdido terreno nas urnas desde as primeiras eleições multipartidárias de 1994 e o seu líder ameaçou, no ano passado, mobilizar os antigos combatentes para preparar uma revolta contra o Governo. Público – Lusa

Bissau: A visão Gucci de José Ramos-Horta

A Guiné-Bissau vai ter umas "eleições Gucci", ironizou hoje o representante especial da ONU José Ramos-Horta, ao revelar que os parceiros internacionais aceitaram um orçamento inflacionado para desbloquear o processo. "É um orçamento de quase 20 milhões de dólares (14,5 milhões de euros), quando se podia fazê-lo por 10-12 milhões (7-9 milhões de euros) ", admitiu hoje, durante uma mesa-redonda no Instituto Real de Relações Internacionais, conhecido por Chatham House, em Londres. O valor, disse o antigo presidente de Timor-Leste e prémio Nobel da Paz, foi acordado para pôr fim a uma discussão sobre "orçamentos altamente inflacionados" que se prolongava desde Junho. Porém, no mês passado, Ramos-Horta sentou-se à mesa com representantes de vários parceiros, nomeadamente a França e a União Europeia e propôs: "Vamos render-nos, senão não saímos daqui". O representante especial do secretário-geral da ONU para a Guiné-Bissau usou o nome de uma marca de roupa e acessórios de luxo para ironizar sobre a questão. "Com 20 milhões de dólares têm de ser umas eleições Gucci. Terão de comprar t-shirts da Gucci, mas genuínas e não chinesas, e relógios Gucci para todos. É por isso que custará 20 milhões de dólares", gracejou. A maioria do dinheiro está mobilizada, sendo Nigéria e Timor-Leste os dois principais, cada um com seis milhões de dólares (4,3 milhões de euros), mas referiu que algumas das promessas de apoio ainda terão de ser materializadas. Se forem reunidos todos os fundos prometido pelos países, salientou, algum do dinheiro em excesso será aplicado em situações de emergência nas áreas da saúde e educação. José Ramos-Horta apontou Fevereiro ou Março de 2014 "o mais tardar" para a realização de eleições, em vez de 24 de Novembro, como chegou a estar definido no acordo que instituiu um primeiro-ministro e o Presidente interinos após o golpe de Estado militar de Abril de 2012. Além do impasse sobre o orçamento, lamentou a demora na escolha do sistema de voto, que o Presidente Serifo Nhamadjo pretendia inicialmente que tivesse tecnologia biométrica. "Aparentemente, ele esteve em consultas que demoraram até agosto e só então nos foi dito que não seria o biométrico, mas aquele que a ONU aconselhou, um sistema manual avançado que é suficientemente bom, seguro e transparente", sublinhou. Ramos-Horta deu conta dos esforços junto dos políticos para acordarem na formação de um Governo inclusivo, com representantes dos principais partidos. Porém, esta solução só poderá resultar se forem eleitos "dois indivíduos extraordinários - um Presidente que deve ser conciliatório e reconciliados e construtor de pontes e é preciso um primeiro-ministro que seja um gestor excepcional de Governo e de pessoas". Lusa

28.10.13

Moçambique: Um dos países mais pobres do mundo

The Commission on Growth and Development chaired by Nobel Prize Laureate Michael Spence designates countries that have achieved a growth rate of 7 percent for at least 25 years “growth miracles.” So far there are only 15 such miracles around the world and only one of those countries, Botswana, is in Africa. However, according to economic forecasts, Mozambique will be part of this select group in 2017. There is no doubt that the 1992 peace accord that ended a brutal civil war in Mozambique (where more than 1 million people died) between the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) and its rival, the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), was the catalyst for this impressive growth record. In terms of its economic performance, Mozambique has not looked back. However, recent sabre rattling between the two former foes is raising the sinister specter of civil strife at a time when Mozambique is close to achieving a “growth miracle.” There are two lessons from the recent events. The first is that the quality of growth matters and the second is that economic growth has to be inclusive. Record growth in Mozambique since 1992 has been driven largely by a number of megaprojects in the energy sector and extractive industries, together with agriculture and strong donor support. However this strong economic growth has not necessarily translated into significant poverty reduction. Worse, the reduction in the country’s poverty rate has weakened in recent years and over half of the population still lives below the poverty line. In fact, Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in Africa and in the world (185 out of 187 in the 2013 Human Development Index). A critical challenge of Mozambique’s growth strategy, which is based on increasing investment in its extractive industries, is the risk of having prosperous economic enclaves that are not linked with the rest of the economy and worse, do not create jobs. And unfortunately, recent large gas and coal discoveries in Mozambique likely mean that growth in the country will continue to be supported by this type of investment. Mozambique’s continued lack of jobs and rampant poverty will have to be addressed, and certainly these issues will have implications for peace and stability in the country. The social unrest that closely preceded the Arab Spring should serve as a warning to the Mozambican authorities. Issues of inequality could be further exacerbated by the expected larger wealth from gas and coal discoveries, which could ultimately strain the country’s political stability. Another challenge associated with Mozambique’s natural resource-driven growth is that it creates a “resource rent” that politicians often cannot resist capturing. After 15 years of war and 21 years in the opposition, Renamo announced this week that it had pulled out of the peace deal. Its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, had previously threatened to “’destroy Mozambique’ if Renamo did not get a bigger slice of the country’s growing wealth.” While there are some signs of other figures in the party leadership talking themselves back from Dhlakama’s words, the party’s main point of contention appears to remain the division of wealth. Renamo leaders reportedly feel marginalized politically and economically and argue that the government lacks the capability and willingness to conduct free and fair elections. The next general elections are scheduled to take place in 2014, in which Frelimo’s Armando Guebuza is not expected to run for a third term as president. Nonetheless, Frelimo is expected to win next year’s elections as Renamo’s popularity has declined in recent years and its role as the main opposition party is increasingly challenged. In short, the literature on the resource curse is vast and policy advice on how to make growth more inclusive and build adequate institutions in resource-rich countries is a well-trodden path. The real problem is in the political economy of implementing these necessary reforms. Mozambique cannot afford another civil war and owes it to its people to become a shared “miracle.” Africa Focus

Pirataria ao largo da Nigéria

ABUJA/WASHINGTON, Oct 24 (Reuters) - Pirates attacked an oil supply vessel off the Nigerian coast and kidnapped the captain and chief engineer, both U.S. citizens, American officials said on Thursday as the Nigerian military ordered its Navy to rescue the men. "We believe this was an act of piracy," U.S. State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said, adding that U.S. officials were closely monitoring the situation and seeking more information. "At this point, we do not have information that would indicate this was an act of terrorism," Harf told reporters in a briefing. "Obviously, our concern at this point is for the safe return of the two U.S. citizens." Pirate attacks off Nigeria's coast have jumped by a third this year as ships passing through West Africa's Gulf of Guinea, a major commodities route, have come under threat from gangs wanting to snatch cargoes and crews. The U.S.-flagged C-Retriever, a 222-foot (67 metre) vessel owned by U.S. marine transport group Edison Chouest Offshore, was attacked early Wednesday, UK-based security firm AKE and two security sources said. The company was not immediately available for comment. A U.S. defense official said the State Department and FBI were leading the American response to the incident. A second defense official said the U.S. Marine Corps has a small training unit in the region but it was not clear if it would get involved. However, representatives for the Nigerian Navy said they were aware of the incident and taking action. "We have directed the central Naval Command to see to their rescue. So our men are on top of the situation," spokesman Kabiru Aliyu told Reuters. U.S. Navy officials have grown increasingly concerned about piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea and are working with local authorities there to strengthen their ability to patrol the region and better share information. The White House said on Thursday it is increasingly concerned about the rise in piracy off the coast of West Africa.

Brasil oferece aviões à Força Aérea de Moçambique

A presidente brasileira, Dilma Rousseff, pediu ao Congresso do seu pais autorização para doar três aviões Tucano T-27 para a Força Aérea de Moçambique. Esta é, segundo registos do Ministério da Defesa do Brasil, a primeira vez que Moçambique pode receber equipamentos militares brasileiros. Usada para treino pelo Brasil, a série de aviões Tucano T-27, da Embraer, foi adquirida pela Força Aérea Brasileira há 30 anos. Além de destacar que os aviões não são de combate, a Defesa afirma que a decisão de doar as aeronaves foi tomada muito antes do actual momento de tensão politica em Moçambique. Moçambique é um dos maiores aliado do Brasil em África. O país abriga investimentos de empresas como a Vale e acções de agências como Embrapa e Fiocruz. A cooperação na defesa entre Brasil e Moçambique foi firmada em março de 2009. Em maio deste ano, a Defesa mandou ao Governo a exposição sobre os motivos para doar os aviões, argumentando que "tem se empenhado em celebrar acordos bilaterais com nações amigas, visando estreitar laços de amizade e permitir a participação mais efectiva do Brasil em questões internacionais".

27.10.13

Bissau: Arroz, milho e feijão

A partir de julho a chuva caiu como só na Guiné-Bissau o sabe fazer. Apesar de se sentir a sua força crescente a alimentar a terra e as culturas nela acomodadas, é nos meses de setembro e de outubro que tradicionalmente as populações da Guiné-Bissau mais dificuldades sentem. Implementam-se então, formas de contornar esses défices estimulando-se a produção das culturas de "tempo da chuva" como o milho-bacil, milho-cavalo, feijão, mandioca, batata-doce e mancarra. Para salvaguardar sementes destas plantas para 2014 concebeu-se e implementou-se um campo de demonstração de técnicas e banco de sementes na Tabanca de Dinga Bantanguel, Região de Gabu. Com a situação periclitante do preço da castanha de caju e na dependência do rendimento auferido pela sua venda por grande parte dos agricultores guineenses, urge pensar em culturas de rendimento concorrentes ou paralelas. A cultura do sésamo, do algodão ou o investimento na fruticultura são opções. O arroz, cereal, alimento, base da dieta dos guineenses, medida da perceção da fome na Guiné-Bissau, é o centro de todas as atenções. Após os receios prematuros de uma época chuvosa fraca veio o desenvolvimento seguro. Venham e juntem-se a nós. O PAIPA-DC é um projeto do Camões, Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua que visa reforçar a capacidade de produção criando condições de resistência em aldeias na Guiné Bissau, Sucotô, Djana, Ondame e Dinga, combatendo a insegurança alimentar, valorizando as infra-estruturas produtivas de base e fornecendo pequenos fatores de produção, apoio, conselho e enquadramento. Pode seguir o PAIPA-DC no terreno através do nosso Facebook ou pedir mais informações por mail. -- PAIPA-DC Projecto de Apoio à Intensificação da Produção Alimentar - Desenvolvimento Comunitário Bairro da Cooperação Portuguesa Bissau - Guiné-Bissau Tel.: +2456545360 . +2455918514 . +2456925803 . +351938351337 E-mail: paipa.dc@gmail.com . Facebook: PAIPA-DC . Youtube: PAIPAIPAD

R. B. Pires escreve sobre Moçambique

O recente ataque da FRELIMO à base RENAMO em Satungira, Distrito da Gorongosa, na Província de Sofala, é o culminar de cerca de 3 ou 4 meses de tensão entre ambos os partidos, por via de reiterados ataques armados a postos de controlo e viaturas que circulam na principal estrada que atravessa a Província e que liga o Maputo ao Rovuma. A RENAMO culpa a FRELIMO pelos mesmos, enquanto que a FRELIMO culpa a RENAMO. Um clássico, com mortos envergando a farda de quem se quer acusar. De forma resumida, pode-se dizer que o Presidente Armando Guebuza se fartou das constantes ameaças do rival Afonso Dhlakama, as quais surgem constantemente em anos eleitorais, o que aliás se trata duma estratégia pessoal do líder da RENAMO, para continuar à frente dos destinos do partido. Caso queiramos ser mais profundos na análise, é pegar precisamente nesta eternização de Dhlakama à frente da RENAMO. O momento ideal para este passar a pasta, teria sido durante as Autárquicas de 2008, para o jovem Daviz Simango que aderira ao partido em 2003, ganha o Município da Beira no mesmo ano e, em 2006, é galardoado como o Melhor Presidente de Município no Moçambique, pela Professional Management Review-Africa! O ego de Dhlakama não aguentou tal competência, nem a possibilidade da RENAMO se renovar e ver a "Geração da Paz" fazer melhor que a "Geração de Guerra", à qual pertence e, impede a recandidatura deste jovem promissor nas Autárquicas de 2008, o que cria uma enorme ruptura no "Partido da Perdiz". Quanto a Simango, movido por uma vaga de fundo que obedece a uma série de cisões e expulsões no seio da RENAMO, candidata-se como Independente, ganhando a Cidade da Beira por expressivos 61,6%, com a agravante de a RENAMO ter perdido nestas eleições de 2008, os restantes municípios que detinha, para a FRELIMO. Ou seja, 5 anos depois e com eleições Autárquicas marcadas para o próximo dia 20 de Novembro, o líder da RENAMO vê-se confrontado com a cruel realidade de uma mais que certa nova razia eleitoral. Por isso mesmo, o partido propositadamente não entregou as listas de candidatos às próximas autárquicas até à data limite, o passado dia 06 de Agosto, querendo agora negociar com a FRELIMO novas regras de jogo (entretanto já disseram que não participarão, na sequência deste ataque). Pior, a dinâmica que Dhlakama desencadeou de forma involuntária ao eliminar Simango das suas opções políticas, reforçando assim a vitória deste, teve como resultado a criação do Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM) em 2009, o qual é sobretudo constituido por dissidentes da RENAMO e por jovens "independentes", que nunca se reviram na habitual bipolaridade política moçambicana. O MDM, liderado por Daviz Simango, orfão de Celina e do Reverendo Urias Simango (dissidentes da FRELIMO executados extra-judicialmente pelo partido, nas purgas que se seguiram à independência), ao apresentar-se como uma Terceira Via no Moçambique do Século XXI, meteu medo a toda a gente durante as Legislativas e Presidenciais de 2009, sobretudo ao "Partido-Estado", o qual apenas lhe permitiu concorrer a 4 de um total de 13 círculos eleitorais. Apenas conseguiram eleger 8 deputados, contra 51 da RENAMO e 191 da FRELIMO. Ou seja, tendo a possibilidade de concorrer à totalidade dos 13 círculos eleitorais nas legislativas programadas para Outubro de 2014, o MDM poderá passar a ser o novo maior partido da oposição, reduzindo a RENAMO a um grupo armado sem financiamento e militarmente obsoleto. Perante este cenário, compreendem-se as fugas para a frente sempre efectuadas por Afonso Dhlakama, as quais aliás têm agradado à FRELIMO, já que uma RENAMO afonsina tem sido sinónimo dum Moçambique frelimista. Os "Empresários de Sucesso" agradecem! FRELIMO O "Partido-Estado" está tranquilo e por cima, nesta contenda. O Presidente Guebuza encontra-se aliás em campanha eleitoral precisamente por Sofala, podendo aqui facturar o crédito de aparecer perante as populações como garante de tranquilidade e segurança. Nem mesmo o facto de a RENAMO ter denunciado o Acordo Geral de Paz de 1992, para o qual Guebuza foi um dos pricipais negociadores, o preocupa. Sem financiamento nem potenciais financiadores, muito provavelmente com o mesmo material bélico e de comunicações dos tempos da Guerra Cívil, mais o cenário político acima descrito, a opção do Estado-Maior moçambicano em atacar a base da RENAMO, entra naquilo que poderemos considerar de lógico e racional em termos militares e políticos. Mais, do ponto de vista internacional, ninguém tem interesse em apoiar a própria FRELIMO numa escalada militar, o que iria ser profundamente disruptivo para a "Nova Angola", conforme referiu Rui Newmann, jornalista da Portuguese News Network (PNN), atento e experimentado observador das realidades lusófonas, em contacto telefónico efectuado. Sobretudo agora com gás e petróleo à vista. Por último e, o que deverá ser o verdadeiro sumo a retirar no futuro deste cenário de escaramuças e posterior negociação, poderá ser o de uma alteração constitucional, que permita ao PR Armando Guebuza a possibilidade de um 3º mandato. O assunto não é novo, tem-se aventado a gosto para o debate público durante os últimos 2/3 anos, no sentido de se sentir a temperatura popular. Porquê? Porque os males da FRELIMO são exactamente os mesmos da RENAMO. Ou seja, a inevitavel crise geracional. A sucessão na FRELIMO assume-se como o actual grande desafio do partido, dividido entre a velha guarda legitimada pelos cabelos grisalhos da luta pela independência e a chamada "Geração da Paz". Seus filhos e netos, portanto. Uns mais competentes e outros mais mimados, mas todos com o sentimento de que a sua hora continua a ser adiada. Movimento Democrático de Moçambique O MDM continua assim a marcar a diferença, ao apresentar-se como um partido jovem e homogénio do ponto de vista geracional, formado por civis e não por ex-militares, cujos quadros anteriormente viram a criatividade ser constrangida pelo ideológico, quer pertencessem a partido político, ou não. Por outro lado, Simango vale votos como candidato presidencial (8,6% em 2009) e mais valerá caso Dhlakama, ou outro qualquer candidato RENAMO, decidir não aparecer a jogo. Um cenário de ausência da RENAMO nas Presidenciais de 2014, até poderá ser propositado, como forma de dificultar a vida ao rival FRELIMO e ajudar Daviz Simango a vingar a execução dos pais. Quanto à guerra, parece-me não haver condições, nem interesse maior na existência duma escalada, sobretudo por uma rejeição total da população face a tal cenário. Quanto a escaramuças, irão certamente continuar, o que provocando um clima de tensão e de alguma insegurança, beneficiará a FRELIMO, ajudando a confirmar a necessidade de um Guebuza III até 2019. Raúl Braga Pires http://expresso.sapo.pt/mocambique-guebuza-versus-dhlakama=f837095#ixzz2iukLDOHJ

Bissau: As ficções de José Ramos Horta

Referindo-se às denúncias de alegadas torturas às populações levadas a cabo por forças militares na sequência dos incidentes contra a embaixada da Nigéria, em Bissau, e do linchamento de um cidadão nigeriano, Ramos Horta aconselha a sociedade castrense a parar com torturas física ou moral à quem quer que seja. “Não é competência de militares interrogar ou garantir segurança interna as populações. Essa função é dos polícias”, disse. O ex-presidente de Timor-Leste, em missão das Nações Unidas na Guiné-Bissau, sublinhou que as forças armadas deste país são profissionais que granjearam respeito internacional, pelo que devem comportar-se como profissionais. José Ramos-Horta concorda que o ex-Primeiro-ministro, Carlos Gomes Júnior, Raimundo Pereira e outros possam regressar ao pais e, se quiserem, participar livremente nas próximas eleições. “Que eu saiba, eles não cometeram nenhum crime que lesa ao estado. Hoje em dia até parece que muita gente se arrepende de ter havido um golpe de estado. Na minha opinião chega de hostilidade, chega de intimidações”, disse. Ramos-Horta acredita também que, com a boa governação, dentro de cinco a dez anos, a Guiné-Bissau pode ser um dos mais ricos per capita na África Ocidental “com a exportação dos seus camarões, ostras e exploração do petróleo, bauxite e fosfato”. ANG --- 1 - Ramos Horta ACONSELHA os militares guineenses a pararem com as torturas físicas e morais em que são exímios. 2 - Ramos Horta diz que os militares guineenses são militares "que granjearam respeito internacional". Com os golpes cometidos? Com a interferência constante na política? 3 - Ramos Horta acredita numa "boa governação", que dentro de cinco a 10 anos transforme a Guiné-Bissau num dos países mais ricos da África Ocidental! É um dos mais curiosos ficcionistas que tenho lido nos últimos anos, pois só ele consegue ver os guineenses a viver a médio prazo num Estado bem governado e rico, onde os militares se comportem como meros profissionais.

Bissau: Eleições nunca antes do fim de Fevereiro

A um mês das eleições gerais na Guiné-Bissau, o país e a comunidade internacional aguardam pela marcação de uma nova data, algures no início de 2014, de acordo com o representante das Nações Unidas no país, Ramos-Horta. O atraso das autoridades guineenses na definição do modelo de recenseamento eleitoral levaram a que só em setembro se chegasse a um orçamento final e se iniciasse a angariação de fundos, explicou aquele responsável. A União Europeia foi, na terça-feira, a primeira entidade a entregar dinheiro, num montante de dois milhões de euros, através de um acordo assinado em Bissau. "Estamos a criar condições para que logo que o dinheiro chegue aos cofres do Estado, se inicie o recenseamento", referiu na última semana Fernando Vaz, ministro de Estado do Governo de transição. Segundo as contas de Ramos-Horta, o orçamento de 14,6 milhões de euros deverá ser financiado com 9,5 milhões (65 por cento) da Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO), 2,2 milhões da União Europeia (15 por cento) e 1,4 milhões de outros fundos, alguns do sistema das Nações Unidas. Haverá ainda milhão e meio de euros por cobrir, mas, segundo o representante da ONU, também há ainda anúncios de doações por fazer, por exemplo, por parte do Reino Unido. Entretanto, partidos políticos e sociedade civil guineenses admitiram chegar a um acordo para encurtamento dos prazos previstos nas leis eleitorais para acelerar o registo dos votantes e o escrutínio. É neste cenário que o Presidente de transição da Guiné-Bissau, Serifo Nhamadjo, se encontra hoje e na sexta-feira com os chefes de Estado da CEDEAO para com eles chegar a acordo sobre a nova data. O tema está na agenda da cimeira extraordinária que se realiza na sexta-feira em Dacar, capital do Senegal. A Guiné-Bissau está a ser dirigida por um Presidente e um Governo de transição na sequência do golpe militar de 12 de abril de 2012. A CEDEAO determinou que o período de transição tinha que terminar antes do final deste ano com a organização de eleições gerais. Com o prazo já comprometido, Ramos-Horta defende que a ida às urnas não deve acontecer para lá das primeiras semanas de 2014. Xanana Gusmão, primeiro-ministro de Timor-Leste, anunciou que as autoridades guineenses pretendem ter o recenseamento concluído "até final do presente ano, de modo a permitir a realização de eleições em finais de fevereiro de 2014". A informação foi revelada num discurso a que a agência Lusa teve acesso e que foi proferido em Nova Iorque, depois de o governante timorense ter visitado a Guiné-Bissau, no início deste mês. LFO // MLL Lusa/fim -------- Há muitas semanas que ando aqui a insistir na tecla de que seria completamente irrealista falar de eleições presidenciais e legislativas na Guiné-Bissau antes do fim de Fevereiro, pois que gastar dinheiro num acto mal organizado será deitá-lo à rua, com o risco de se chegar a Abril ou Maio com tudo na mesma. Com todas as animosidades bem patentes nestes últimos anos. Alguns líricos é que ainda andavam há 15 dias a falar na hipótese de eleições antes do fim de 2013.

26.10.13

Procurado general angolano Bento dos Santos Kangamba

Andreza Matais / BRASÍLIA e Fausto Macedo - O Estado de S.Paulo A Polícia Federal acusa um parente do presidente de Angola de chefiar esquema internacional de tráfico de mulheres do Brasil para África do Sul, Portugal, Angola e Áustria. O Estado apurou que, na Operação Garina, deflagrada nessa quinta-feira, 24, a PF pediu e a Justiça concedeu a prisão do general Bento dos Santos Kangamba, caso ele desembarque no Brasil, e incluiu seu nome e o de um comparsa na lista de procurados da Interpol. Chamado de "tio Bento" ou "tio Chico" pelos integrantes da quadrilha, o general é casado com uma sobrinha do presidente de Angola, José Eduardo Santos, no cargo desde 1979. O general é dirigente do Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), mesmo partido do presidente, e tem influência no governo por meio de sua mulher, uma filha de Avelino dos Santos, irmão do presidente. Presidente do grupo Kabuscorp, um complexo industrial com sede em Angola, o general também é influente no mundo dos negócios. Kangamba é o maior patrocinador do Vitória Sport Clube, da primeira divisão de Portugal, e tem, ainda, um time de futebol no país africano. Duas atividades usadas na lavagem de dinheiro do crime organizado. O Estado apurou que o braço do esquema do general no Brasil é Wellington Eduardo Santos de Sousa, que a PF identificou nos relatórios de inteligência como Latino, um ex-pagodeiro da banda Desejos. Em um ano de investigação, a PF descobriu que a quadrilha aliciava mulheres em casas noturnas paulistanas no bairro de Indianópolis, zona sul de São Paulo, mediante promessa de pagamento de US$ 10 mil para se prostituírem pelo período de uma semana para clientes de elevado poder econômico. Modelos de capas de revistas masculinas e que participavam de programas de TV receberam até US$ 100 mil para se relacionar sexualmente com o general. Há fortes indícios de que parte das vítimas foi privada temporariamente de sua liberdade no exterior e obrigada a manter relações sexuais sem preservativos com clientes estrangeiros. Para essas vítimas, os criminosos ofereciam um falso coquetel de drogas antiaids. Foram cumpridos ontem 16 mandados judiciais: 5 de prisão e 11 de busca e apreensão nas cidades de São Paulo, São Bernardo, Cotia e Guarulhos. A PF apreendeu 11 carros de luxo, 23 passaportes, 9 cópias de passaportes, 14 pedidos de visto para Angola, moeda estrangeira e drogas. Luxo. Segundo a PF, a organização movimentou US$ 45 milhões com o tráfico internacional de mulheres desde 2007. O enriquecimento da família do presidente de Angola tem sido noticiado em todo o mundo. A filha do presidente, Isabel dos Santos, foi apontada pela revista americana Forbes como a mulher mais rica e poderosa da África. A revista noticiou que a fortuna tem origem em corrupção: ela fica com uma parte de empresas que querem estabelecer-se em Angola e recebe comissão em troca da assinatura do pai numa lei ou decreto. Em julho, a imprensa de Portugal noticiou que Kangamba comprou uma casa de 12 milhões nos arredores de Madri, no mesmo condomínio em que mora o jogador Cristiano Ronaldo. O nome da operação, Garina, significa menina na gíria de Angola. A Embaixada de Angola no Brasil foi procurada, mas não respondeu à ligação. / COLABORARAM FÁBIO FABRINI E BERNARDO CARAM

25.10.13

O amigo britânico de Mugabe

Air Zimbabwe is under new management and looks set for privatisation. The new board wants to borrow from the notorious entrepreneur and ZANU-PF donor Nicholas van Hoogstraten The state-owned national airline, Air Zimbabwe, has approached controversial British tycoon Nicholas van Hoogstraten for cash to help revive its operations. The programme may result in its privatisation. Van Hoogstraten, long an admirer of President Robert Mugabe and major donor to the governing Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), is reportedly Zimbabwe’s biggest landowner.
Aviation sources in Harare said Air Zimbabwe wants Van Hoogstraten to extend at least US$15 million to the company, which could enable it to resume the Harare-London route. Van Hoogstraten will be given a 180-day commercial paper for the funds which, according to an investors’ guide seen by Africa Confidential, is ‘for the immediate resuscitation of Air Zimbabwe operations’. The airline currently operates one long-range Boeing 767-200ER with one more in storage, among a small number of other aircraft which are mostly grounded.

Está a ser desenhado um novo mapa de África

There is a new scramble for Africa. Roads, railways and pipelines are being built or envisioned into the interior of central Africa from multiple directions. Africa’s geographic tragedy through the ages has been its isolation, which has been among the main causes of its poverty. Despite possessing a long coastline, Africa has relatively few natural deep-water harbors. Its great rivers are generally not navigable from the interior to the various seaboards. The Sahara Desert has acted as a barrier to human contact with the great Eurasian civilizations. Of course, electronic communications in recent decades have worked to dilute such isolation. But these new pathways may promise a further, pivotal leap in terms of connecting Africa to the outer world. Looking at a map of Africa with these new and projected pathways highlighted, one sees two major networks into the interior — from southern Africa and from East Africa — and two minor ones from West Africa and from the Horn of Africa. Three proposed routes into the interior originate in Angola alone, leading mainly toward the southern edges of the immense forest and jungle of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Angolans, flush with offshore oil wealth and feeling secure enough in their domestic control following a 25-year civil war, are a rare example on the continent of intent and capability to extend their economic reach. They are initiating these plans themselves, and Luanda will pay the Asians for their technical expertise rather than barter for it, as most other African governments would do. The goal is to extract diamonds, copper and other precious commodities, which along the southern edges of the Congo have not been properly mined or explored to their full potential. South Africa plans a complex network of routes from the Indian Ocean northwest and north into Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia, culminating, again, at southern outposts in the Congo. The South Africans are after gold, diamonds, copper and coal. In this sense, the black-dominated African National Congress has the same geopolitical imperative as the former white Afrikaner regime. Mining, which began in the late 1800s in South Africa, created the modern South African state. Indeed, the discovery of gold and diamonds and the blessing of a temperate climate with several natural deep-water harbors set South Africa on a unique geopolitical trajectory, empowering it to become the continent’s economic hegemon. The present goal is to reach stranded mineral resources and create a zone of South African economic and political influence throughout southern Africa, with the potential to expand farther north into the continent later. The envisioned transport and pipeline network along the Indian Ocean in East Africa goes from both the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts westward to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, and a spur line could run north from the Ugandan capital of Kampala to the South Sudanese capital of Juba. Ethiopia is reinforcing its rail connectivity to the Indian Ocean at Djibouti, and may eventually extend other links to South Sudan and Kenya. In the East African cases, unlike with the Angolans and South Africans, the financing, the impetus and the know-how must come from the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Japanese. These Asian countries have a hunger for African copper and cobalt, rare earths and other minerals from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and hydrocarbons from South Sudan. These are not entirely new networks, given that the Chinese in the 1970s built a railway into the Copperbelt of Zambia and the southern edge of the Congo (and the Germans, British and Portuguese during colonialism built limited rail networks in their respective colonies of Tanganyika, Kenya and Angola). Now the Chinese want to build a deep-water port in Bagamoyo and the Japanese want to do likewise in Dar es Salaam: Both ports are in Tanzania, with new pathways westward into the interior of Central Africa in each case. The Kenyans have been trying to interest the Chinese in building a port and transport links from Lamu on the Kenyan coast northwestward all the way into the oil fields of South Sudan, but so far at least the Chinese have held back from making a serious commitment. Beijing is sensitive to the consequences of empowering South Sudan with a pipeline independent of Sudan, and prefers instead to ensure that Juba and Khartoum remain co-dependent and thus peaceful in their economic conduct, avoiding any additional costs for crude extraction. If you look at all of these newly planned routes into the interior from southern Africa and from East Africa, one geographical phenomenon stands out: Every route ends at or near the edge of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but without really penetrating it. The Congo, even if all of this infrastructure is built, will remain a vast, impassable blank spot on the map despite its abundance of copper, cobalt, rare earths, diamonds and oil, to say nothing of its agricultural potential (which is already its largest economic sector by gross domestic product). Here, too, geography is destiny. The Congo is both enormous in size — among the largest countries in Africa — with a tropical rainforest difficult to clear, leading to poor communication between its major cities and to a government in the capital of Kinshasa that barely functions in terms of projecting authority. Rather than leading to Kinshasa, transportation linkages serving the mineral-rich regions of Congo are engineered and connected to neighboring regions. Congo is a universe unto itself of civil wars and local fiefdoms divorced from any meaningful central control. The government knows full well its constraints, and thus limits its ambitions to playing the role of kingmaker reliant on powerful barons ruling distant fiefs. So unconnected to the outside world is the Congo that Kinshasa has not even one international hotel chain, whereas just across the river from Kinshasa in the Republic of the Congo, hotel chains are numerous and the French essentially run a vibrant, modernizing country. With the gaping heart of the African interior as represented by the Congo still destined to remain remote, and pathways reaching around its edges from multiple points along the Indian Ocean and from the adjacent southeastern Atlantic Ocean, we start to see the emergence of the African piece of the Greater Indian Ocean trade and conflict system — a system that stretches from Angola far in the west on the Atlantic to the Philippines far to the east in the South China Sea. In other words, the vast southern rimland of Afro-Eurasia is forming into one organic region, with even sub-Saharan Africa now a part. Finally, there are the new routes envisioned in the Horn of Africa and West Africa. The Ethiopians want to upgrade their road and rail links from their capital of Addis Ababa to Djibouti near the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, again, on the Indian Ocean. The Ethiopians, having lost their outlet to the sea because of the separation of Eritrea, require a fully reliable export route for their light manufactured and agricultural goods and modest mining wealth. Of more remote interest to the Ethiopians is trade with the interior of central Africa. Transportation linkages Addis Ababa may foster there will find it in competition for scarce financing that the Kenyans and Tanzanians are struggling to mobilize. As for West Africa, the only exciting advance appears to be a plan to upgrade land links from Abidjan on the coast of Ivory Coast northeast through Burkina Faso into Niger, where there is oil, natural gas and uranium. What infrastructure projects others have constructed in West Africa, such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone, have been extremely limited in scope and utility — to extract resources from a specific mineral concession. Nearby Nigeria, the largest country in West Africa and the most populous country in the whole of Africa, is a landscape of low-level chaos. While Abuja aims to improve infrastructure like roads, rail and power plants, these are often carried out at state or local levels, without national initiative. And none of the infrastructure really links much beyond its borders. West Africa, like the Congo, suffers from an unhealthy climate compared to that of southern and East Africa, and this has helped account for the comparatively lower levels of development. Thus, all these pathways point to an Africa where there may be exciting economic progress in the south and east — in both cases oriented toward the Indian Ocean — while, for the most part, the rest of the continent languishes in poverty, continued low-intensity conflict and occasional bouts of anarchy. Stratford/Forbes

Como os angolanos enriquecem em Cabinda

Pesquisa e análise do ÁFRICA MONITOR INTELLIGENCE 1 . Altas patentes das FA e quadros superiores do SINSE têm estado nos últimos anos a enriquecer em Cabinda por via do aproveitamento ilícito, em seu benefício pessoal, de parte das volumosas verbas que o orçamento dos sectores da Defesa e Segurança destina ao dispositivo mantido no território com o objectivo de velar pela sua estabilidade. Um memorando sobre o assunto, em que é citada uma conversa privada com um oficial do destacamento local da Casa de Segurança Militar PR (“os militares não estão interessados no fim da guerra”, diz), refere que além das verbas ordinárias, de per se volumosas, registam-se frequentes reforços de verbas justificados por distintas razões. Cabinda, devido à importância estratégica que as autoridades centrais lhe atribuem (grande fonte de petróleo) é considerada prioritária em termos de defesa e segurança. Um qualquer motivo imprevisto, razoavelmente justificado, é sempre suficiente para levar a Casa de Segurança, EMGFA ou SINSE a libertar verbas extraordinárias. O que frequentemente se verifica, conforme assinala o memorando, é que os motivos invocados, em geral necessidade/oportunidade de operações militares ou acções especiais operativas de segurança, são artificiais ou os seus custos empolados. O dinheiro mobilizado é no todo ou em parte descaminhado para fins particulares. Nos últimos meses o SINSE, que tem no território a sua principal “residentura”, prendeu ca de 30 indivíduos acusados de atentar contra a segurança do Estado. A sabotagem de aeroporto seria um dos atentados. António Francisco Macaia, assesssor do vice-governador para a área técnica e das infraestruturas foi um dos detidos. A percepção corrente é a de que as acções do SINSE correspondem em parte a excessos de zelo calculados para servir conveniências pessoais. Tendo em conta esta realidade, a lógica respectiva consiste em fomentar/acentuar aparências de ricos e instabilidade como motivo para justificar acções especiais e inerentes reforços de verbas. O SINSE dispõe em Cabinda de uma vasta rede de informadores, que inclui, p ex, estudantes de todos os níveis. Em meios apropriados há a suspeita de que muitos dos informadores são do tipo “fantasma”; da sua produção, em termos de vigilância, costumam fazer parte “invenções” em matéria de previsões/riscos de instabilidade. 2 . Os militares, considerados a título particular, são, porém, os principais beneficiários de dinheiros desviados do orçamento – por vezes contando com cumplicidades políticas no escalão local e central. As cumplicidades políticas são consideradas devidas a propósitos ocultos como o de ficar com os militares “na mão”. Como forma de facilitar acções de vigilância e controlo das fronteiras com os países vizinhos, tendo em vista prevenir/impedir a entrada no território de grupos armados rebeldes da FLEC baseados nos referidos países, as autoridades aceitaram uma proposta do comando militar tendo em vista a construção de estradas tácticas junto à fronteira. Os trabalhos serviram generosamente interesses pessoais de grandes oficiais do dispositivo local das FA, transformados em empreiteiros das obras. Através de métodos de sobrefacturação, trabalhos fictícios, recurso gracioso a militares e maquinaria das próprias FA, os “empreiteiros” obtiveram proveitos considerados apreciáveis. A actual governadora, Martinha da Lomba, deparou com dificuldades em pôr termo ao “sorvedouro” de fundos do orçamento provincial em que as estradas tácticas se converteram – numa segunda fase por alegadas necessidades de conservação das mesmas, de modo a mantê-las transitáveis. Os militares, em especial os de mais elevada patente, menos ocupados do que fazem constar, também aproveitam as influências e o poder inerentes à função para promover negócios particulares em quase todas as áreas de actividade, cuja prosperidade é normalmente garantida pelos privilégios de que dispõem. 3 . A contestação interna à governadora, conforme informações adicionais (AM 787), provém sobretudo de figuras das estruturas local e central do governo, MPLA e FA, em geral originárias da área do Maiombe que se movimentam no sentido da nomeção de um conterrâneo para o cargo. No seguimento das eleições de 2012 circulou uma carta contra a governadora cujos autores estão identificados por dedução. M da Lomba é natural de Cabinda, onde sempre viveu, mas é considerada etnicamente indefinida por ser descendente de caboverdianos que na época colonial se instalaram no território. Henrique Futi, o brigadeiro que comanda o destacamento da Casa de Segurança e Militar PR instalado no território, é vulgarmente apresentado como pretendente ao lugar de governador, constando mesmo ter ficado decepcionado por não o ter sido em 2012, quando M da Lomba foi a escolhida. É originário do Maiombe. A governadora, à qual é reconhecido um conhecimento aprofundado das realidades do território (dúvidas quanto às suas capacidades para chefiar o governo e promover mudanças), tem reagido à campanha contra si própria através de medidas drásticas, consideradas próprias do seu carácter persistente/destemido. Vicente Telica, ex-vice-governador e deputado, foi afastado por envolvimento na campanha contra a governadora. M da Lomba é membro do principal orgão de direcção do MPLA, o BP, mas não dispõe de reais influências políticas. Dino Matrosse, SG do MPLA, é apontado como seu principal apoio no regime.

23.10.13

Bissau: Polémica à volta de Ramos-Horta

PROCURA-SE este Homem VIVO ou ……VIVO.
Se o vir, pode aproximar-se dele. Não é um Homem Perigoso. Não esta armado ,é simpático e é um bom ser humano. Diga-lhe que o Movimento de Salvação Nacional da Guiné-Bissau precisa de lhe falar URGENTEMENTE. Ouvimos dizer que esse senhor se preparava para deitar fora 20 milhoes $ na Guiné-Bissau. (Parece que 20 milhoes $ é o que vai custar a próxima palhaçada também conhecida por eleições na GB) Queriamos falar ao Dr Ramos Horta para lhe dizer para não deitar fora esse dinheiro. Na Guiné-Bissau, precisamos desesperadamente de dinheiro na Saúde, Educação, Alimentação, pagar salários em atraso, ter água, luz etc…etc…etc…. Caro (a) Compatriota, se sabe onde se encontra esse homem, contacte-nos urgentemente. Uma recompensa sera entregue aquele (a) que nos ajudar a localizar o representante das NU o mais rápidamente possivel. A última vez que tivemos noticias dele, foi no e-mail que ele nos enviou em setembro . Em 2013/9/7 José Ramos-Horta escreveu "Caros Senhores, Recebi a vossa carta*/email e petição. Por esta via apenas acuso a recepção da mesma sem me debruçar sobre uma possível resposta. Dentro de dias poderei com tempo elaborar uma resposta e certamente que terão toda a liberdade de a tornar publico. Melhores cumprimentos, J Ramos-Horta Já lá vão quase dois meses. O Dr.Ramos ainda não respondeu à carta que lhe enviamos. Nessa carta diziamos a Dr.Ramos Horta qual é a UNICA solução para a Guiné-Bissau. Essa solução é a TUTELA. O Dr. Ramos Horta agora fala de « meia tutela » e privatização para a Guiné. (veja a sua entrevista aqui:http://www.gbissau.com/?p=7911) O Dr. Ramos esta completamente ERRADO. A Unica solução é a Tutela e a Guiné não precisa de privatizar o seu Porto. Dr. Ramos Horta !!!! ONDE ESTA ????????? Por Favor NAO DEITE FORA 20 MILHOES $ (O Movimento tem economistas Guineenses competentes capazes de lhe explicar como deve gastar esse dinheiro). As crianças da Guiné-Bissau Precisam desesperadamente desse Dinheiro!!! Movimento de Salvação Nacional de Guiné-Bissau *Eis a carta que enviamos ao Dr Ramos Horta : http://aziboberta.blogspot.fr/2013/09/carta-exmo-sr-dr-jose-ramos-horta.html

Bissau: Horta recomenda acordos com BM e FMI

Bissau (Rádio Galáxia de Pindjiguiti, 21 de Outubro de 2013) - O Representante Especial do Secretário-Geral e Chefe do Gabinete Integrado das Nações Unidas de Apoio à Consolidação da Paz na Guiné-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) anunciou sexta-feira, em Bissau, que depois de realizadas das eleições gerais no país,as Nações Unidas irão colocar técnicos do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) no Ministério das Finanças, para a gestão das finanças públicas. De acordo com José Ramos-Horta, a medida será extensiva às Direcções gerais das Alfândegas e Administração dos Portos da Guiné (APGB) e citou exemplos disso que estão a ser feitos no mundo e por ser uma iniciativa de sentimento generalizado dos organismos internacionais na Guiné-Bissau. “Nas finanças públicas, ter ali seis técnicos internacionais do FMI a trabalhar com o ministro das Finanças, as alfândegas de Bissau, o Porto de Bissau a entregar a um grupo inglês chamado Crown , ele faz a gestão da alfândega e do porto, vocês vão ver, o país vai começas a fazer muito mais receitas”, precisou. “E, isso não é novo. Países maiores que a Guiné-Bissau fazem-no. Na Indonésia, o porto de Djakarta, mil vezes maior que o da Guiné-Bissau e foi mil vezes mais corrupto, o que é que fizeram? Touxeram uma empresa da Suiça para gerir o porto de Djakarta”, destacou. Foi nesse sentido que o diplomata timorense ao serviço das NU na Guiné-Bissau anunciou que a comunidade internacional disponibizará o número de técnicos necessário para negociar com o executivo que sairá das urnas. “A minha receita – recomendação para a Guiné-Bissau é esta: depois das eleições, assinar acordos com a ONU, com o Banco Mundial, o FMI, a União Africana, a CEDEAO e países amigos para colocarem técnicos internacionais em número que for necessário – negociações com o governo desde A a Z”, recomendou. Ramos-Horta avisou que, se isso não fôr feito, depois das eleições tudo continuará na mesma. “Tudo isso tem que ser pensado. Por que senão, vai haver eleições, vai haver um novo governo, nada vai mudar. Os professores continuam a não ser pagos, as alfândegas vão continuar a produzir dinheiro, mas não vai para os cofres do Estado, ficará – não sei, com o ministro ou com a esposa do ministro ou a tia do ministro, os primos. Muitos portos americanos estão nas mãos de singapurenses a gerir os portos. Mas não é uma questão de vergonha não. Faz-se assim mesmo. No meu país, em Timor-Leste, o nosso porto é dos que mais mal funciona. Não é por corrupção, é por preguiça. O pessoal entra às oito da manhã e sai às cinco da tarde, enquanto há trinta barcos à espera lá fora”, referiu. Para se sair desta situação, de forma definitiva, Ramos-Horta propôs que os guineenses abandonem práticas do passado, onde quem ganhava, ganhava tudo e aquele que perdia, perdia tudo passando a ser tratado como cidadão de segunda classe. “As vossas excelências têm uma oportunidade única – uma janela aberta para realizarmos as eleições , formar um novo governo, mas um governo abrangente. Os irmãos da Guiné-Bissau têm que abandonar aquela cultura prática do passado – quem ganha, ganha tudo e quem perde é tratado como cidadão da segunda classe”, lamentou Ramos-Horta. “O partido que ganhar, convida o segundo, o terceiro, o quarto e o Presidente da República e o primeiro-ministro têm que colaborar”, recomendou. Em relação aos militares, José Ramos-Horta disse que estes se tornam vulneráveis logo que eles estiverem metidos na política. “Militares, se é militar, ele está no quartel, trata da saúde dos seus homens e das suas mulheres nos quarteis, e não estão metidos na política ninguém os critica. Quando nós nos metemos na política, somos vulneráveis. Se as forças armadas estão mesmo neutrais, estão nos quartéis cumprindo a constituição que é a defesa das fronteiras, da soberania do país, da integridade territorial, e o povo estará todo atrás, porque o povo, o consenso que existe no povo é isso – a nossa independência é intocável, sagrada, as forças armadas estão para isso”, defendeu. O Representante Especial do Secretário-Geral da ONU falava pela ocasião da cerimónia de encerramento da segunda conferência do Instituto de Defesa Nacional decorrida à semana passada em Bissau.

22.10.13

Abyei, na confluência entre os dois Sudões

Sudanese president Omer Al Bashir plans to travel to Juba on Tuesday 22 October at the invitation of his South Sudanese counterpart Salva Kiir. The foreign minister Ali Karti said on Sunday that the two leaders , among other things, will discuss the issue of Abyei and the decisions of the African Union on Abyei, in addition to the decisions agreed by the two sides on the disputed area. The Sudanese official is referring to the formation of Abyei interim institutions agreed on 20 June 2011. But the Nogk Dinka refuse the implementation of this deal saying they are no longer ready to share the administration of their region with Misseriya. Karti, however, was keen to minimise the impact of Abyei issue on bilateral relations saying that the two presidents are capable of banishing any fears that may trouble the evolving relations between the two countries. A delegation from the African Union Peace and Security Council is expected to visit Abyei on Tuesday to inspect the situation there, Sudan Tribune, has learnt. The visiting delegation would meet the leaders of Ngok Dinka and meet with the UN mission in Abyei. Sudan Tribune

A desgraça que é a Líbia pós-Khadafi

Two years after the death of Libyan President Muammar Gadhafi, political developments in Libya are still influenced by assassinations, kidnappings and other acts of politically motivated violence. Last week’s assassination of the Benghazi military police chief Ahmad al Barghathi shed light again on the consistent role of the militias in Libyan feuds. Supporters Barghathi accused the commander of one of the militias as being responsible for the assassination. They then torched his Benghazi home and threatened him with assassination on a live radio talk-show. Amid all this turmoil, Libya was still reeling under the impact of the unprecedented kidnapping, carried out by Libyan militias, of the country’s Prime Minister Ali Zaidan. Most of the militias are supposed to be under ‘state control,’ acting as surrogates of the army and the police, sometimes even charged with the security of state buildings. A tribal alliance, for instance, controls the defense ministry, while the “Libya Shield” –the country’s most powerful militia- protects the interior ministry. At times, militias can function as substitutes to government forces. In other instances, however, they serve their own agendas. The disparate nature of the more than 225,000 militiamen reflects the divisions within Libyan government and society. In recent months, militias carried out a blockade against a number of ministries and other institutions, including the interim parliament, to make sure the ‘exclusion law’ against former government officials was voted. In the wild world of the militias, the last word usually goes to those who have amassed the largest quantity of weapons after the 2011 civil war. Uncountable amounts of arms and ammunition, including thousands of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MAN-PADS), have been unaccounted for since the fall of the Gadhafi regime. Prime Minister Ali Zaidan commented on this phenomena saying, ‘Weapons are being smuggled out of and into Libya by groups which are trying to murder and assassinate people and spread terror in the country.’ The lack of structured domestic security led U.S. Special Forces to be able to intervene in broad daylight and an Al Qaeda figure, Abu Anas al Libi from the streets of Tripoli. Abu Anas had been on the U.S.’s ‘Most Wanted List’ as a suspect in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Jihadist militias were predictably upset about the kidnapping. In retaliation, Ali Zaidan was eventually kidnapped. The rising power of local militias, at the expense of the central government, has also led to the disruption of oil exports, as Cyrenaica ‘regionalists’ sought to ‘make up’ for the neglect they felt they suffered during the Gadhafi years. Geoff D. Porter, managing director of North Africa Risk Consulting, sees a paradox in Libya: ‘Instead of hydrocarbon receipts being the glue that holds the country together, they have become a tool for prying it apart.’ Autonomist trends in the Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan provinces represent a challenge not only to the central government but also to the territorial integrity of the country. In most of the Arab Spring countries, there are legitimate grievances from the long-neglected regions. However, there are also new local actors competing for the various spoils made available by the Libya’s instability. This was in recent months the reason for much of the oil production and export blockages. Exports dropped from 1.4 billion to about 300,000 barrels a day in September and down to 60,000 in early October. The loss in revenue as a result of such disruptions has been estimated at about $ 7.5 billion in just two months. The central government in Tripoli has a hard time also controlling its thousands of kilometers of land and sea borders. Despite announcements by the authorities of ‘military zones’ and ‘closed borders,’ substantial parts of the southern border areas are controlled by the Tebus, the Tuaregs and other tribes and not the state. The nearly 1,700 km maritime borders are just as porous. This situation has allowed traffickers to transport illegal emigrants -- more than 30,000 so far this year -- across the Mediterranean to Italian shores. Neighbors north of the Mediterranean are anguished about the waves of refugees departing from Libya. Neighbors to the east, the west and south are anguished about the two-way flow of weapons and terrorists across Libya’s borders. Zaidan himself admits that the movement of weapons ‘endangers neighboring countries, too.’ The forgotten war In the long run, Libya could eventually rely on its hydrocarbon riches and relatively small population to pull itself together. But to get anywhere close to cashing in its chips, it needs to stop the deteriorating security situation from further destruction. Paul R. Pillar, a former senior analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency stated, ‘Libya today exhibits some of the attributes of a failing state.’ He is not the only security expert to hold that view since the country has had four decades of an eccentric authoritarian rule. Former Amnesty International Secretary General and UN representative in Libya Ian Martin notes that “Libya has aptly been called the ‘stateless state,’” not only lacking security forces but left devoid of almost every institution of modern governance.” But there is more to Libya’s current quandary than the legacy of Gadhafi’s misrule. There are the unintended consequences of the foreign military campaign which helped topple him. The 2011 NATO-led military intervention was meant to quickly get the job done. The ‘job’ was regime-change and not maintaining the peace in Libya. NATO did not heed the warnings that once the air raids stop, the situation on the ground could unravel uncontrollably. In April 2011, U.S. retired General James Dubik, among others, called for a continued role on the ground from the international community after the departure of Gadhafi. He believed the United States and NATO should be ‘providing security to prevent liberated Libya from sinking into chaos’ while ‘the responsibility for security, reconstruction and nation-building will likely fall to the United Nations.’ In May 20011, Russia called for “activating the peacekeeping potential of the United Nations and African Union.” There were also calls for Arab and Islamic peacekeeping forces, which went unheeded. Western fear of ‘mission creep’ made the idea of international troop deployment unappealing. Budget considerations, wariness about entanglement in yet another boots-on-the-ground situation in the Middle East, and the opposition of the Libyan Transitional Council were enough reasons to discard any notion of post conflict involvement. Then, everyone simply forgot about Libya. This selective amnesia is not without precedent. Shashank Joshi, Research Fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) was right in his observations that “Wars, once won, tend to be forgotten. This was the fate of Afghanistan in the years after 2001, Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011. But Libya’s problems will not stay within its borders.” The Tripoli victory tours of French and British leaders, after the fall of Gadhafi, were not matched by any real follow up to prevent things from getting out of control in so called liberated country which they came to celebrate. Libya once again made world headlines again when U.S. ambassador J. Christopher Stephens and his staff were murdered in Benghazi, when oil exports stopped flowing and then when Abu Anas al Libi was kidnapped by the U.S. Delta Force. And while the West was not watching, Mali happened. It was a predictable blowback from Libya’s unfinished war. Weapons and fighters had been flowing out of Libya for months. Still, Western powers seemed somehow surprised when Jihadist and Tuareg fighting happened in northern Mali . A whole chain of blowbacks have unfolded since then. Even before the Mali campaign started, the In Eminas gas installations south of Algeria were struck by terrorists. Fleeing the French-led bombardment of the “Azawad” territory, Jihadists moved back north and sought safe harbor in Libya’s southern deserts and Tunisia’s western mountains. What’s the world to do? The situation in Libya has clearly become a regional and global issue. But what’s the world to do about it? Awareness about possible regional and international ramifications of the Libyan crisis has already convinced many in the international community of the need to help the fledgling Libyan state, especially in matters of security. Recent incidents encountered by Western security trainers in Libya are likely to mean that much of the training of Libyan will take place, at least initially, outside of Libya. A number of European countries are expected to host some of that training. Various programs are being considered by Libya and its Western partners. About 8,000 Libyans will be trained by a number of NATO members, including at least 2,000 who will be trained in the UK. An additional bilateral program, the Security, Justice and Defense program (SJD) will be funded by Great Britain. The SJD program will ‘cover all aspects of security to enable Libya to guarantee the security of the state from any form of threat,’ said British Minister for International Security Strategy Andrew Murrison. A border control support program has been agreed upon between Tripoli and the EU in Brussels. Another potential field of cooperation will be to advise the Libyan government on how to deal with the huge arms flow. Western security assistance will probably be inhibited by a number of considerations having to do with Libya’s domestic dynamics. Beside the safety issues, foreign trainers and advisors in Libya could face the resentment, if not the hostility, of Islamist and nationalist factions. Whatever good will and technical assistance it can get from its Western partners, Libya will have to figure out how to closely coordinate its national security requirements with those of its immediate neighbors. And despite his insistence on the pressing need of his country for foreign security assistance, Ali Zaidan is certainly aware of the caveats. ‘The last thing Libyans want is foreign soldiers on the ground,’ warned Charles Gurdon, director of the UK security and risk consultancy Menas Associates. The West is also careful not to see its technical assistance lead to a full-fledged involvement in a civil war. As with other Arab Spring countries, the West will probably remain wary about over-committing itself financially in places where political and economic prospects are not yet clear. In Libya’s case however, there is incentives of ample oil and gas revenues that should reassure the country’s foreign partners which will allow the country to pay for its needs, especially if stability and security are restored. Most importantly, what the world will do about Libya depends heavily on what Libyans are willing to do about their own country. It is them who will eventually have to do most of the heavy lifting, not the outside world. Nobody can decide in their place if they want to keep their nation together. Nobody can sit in their stead, when the time comes, around the national dialogue and reconciliation table. Nobody but them can decide what kind of future country Libya should be. ________ Oussama Romdhani (a former Tunisian minister of Communication)

Obama decidiu: Para África, em força!

FORT RILEY, Kan. — Here on the Kansas plains, thousands of soldiers once bound for Iraq or Afghanistan are now gearing up for missions in Africa as part of a new Pentagon strategy to train and advise indigenous forces to tackle emerging terrorist threats and other security risks so that American forces do not have to. The first-of-its-kind program is drawing on troops from a 3,500-member brigade in the Army’s storied First Infantry Division, known as the Big Red One, to conduct more than 100 missions in Africa over the next year. The missions range from a two-man sniper team in Burundi to 350 soldiers conducting airborne and humanitarian exercises in South Africa. The brigade has also sent a 150-member rapid-response force to Djibouti in the Horn of Africa to protect embassies in emergencies, a direct reply to the attack on the United States Mission in Benghazi, Libya, last year, which killed four Americans. “Our goal is to help Africans solve African problems, without having a big American presence,” said Lt. Col. Robert E. Lee Magee, a West Point graduate and third-generation Army officer whose battalion has sent troops to Burundi, Niger and South Africa in the past several months, and whose unit will deploy to Djibouti in December. The American commando raids this month against terrorist operatives in Libya and Somalia underscore the spreading extremist threat in Africa, and a renewed urgency to choke off insurgent cells before they can grow, according to counterterrorism specialists. Teams from the brigade here have already helped train forces in Kenya and Tanzania, which are battling fighters from the Shabab militant group in Somalia. President Obama, at a news conference three days after the commando raids, said Africa was one of the places “that you’re seeing some of these groups gather.” “And we’re going to have to continue to go after them,” he added. For that reason, it is no surprise that the military’s Africa Command is the test case for this new Army program of regionally aligned brigades that will eventually extend to all of the Pentagon’s commands worldwide, including in Europe and Latin America next year. These forces will be told in advance that their deployments will focus on parts of the world that do not have Army troops assigned to them now — creating a system in which officers and enlisted personnel would develop regional expertise. Gen. Ray Odierno, the Army chief of staff, said in an interview that the goal was to field an Army that could be “engaged regionally in all the combatant commands to help them shape their theaters, set their theaters, in order to sustain and execute our national security strategy.” Even as soldiers prepare for tasks as far-ranging as combat casualty care in Chad or radio training in Mauritania, in a recent visit here they were also conducting target practice in their M1A2 battle tanks on a sprawling firing range, to keep their skills sharp for a future land war against an unforeseen foe. Chad and Mauritania are both combating Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, an offshoot of the main terrorist group. But with the United States military out of Iraq and pulling out of Afghanistan, the Army is looking for new missions around the world. “As we reduce the rotational requirement to combat areas, we can use these forces to great effect in Africa,” Gen. David M. Rodriguez, the head of the Africa Command, told Congress this year. Missions that were once performed largely by Special Operations forces, including the Army’s Green Berets, are now falling to regular infantry troops like members of the Second Armored Brigade Combat Team, nicknamed the Dagger Brigade, here at Fort Riley. This summer, nearly two dozen of the brigade’s soldiers deployed to Niger, in West Africa, to help train troops for United Nations peacekeeping duty in neighboring Mali. The Americans set up tents on a government-owned farm two hours north of the capital, Niamey, shooing away the goats, cows and chickens. For 10 weeks, they weathered sandstorms and temperatures that soared beyond 110 degrees to teach the Nigerien troops marksmanship, patrolling skills and medical care. The troops drilled in the morning, rested from the midday heat and then resumed classes in the evening. Among the worries in Niger is the threat posed by Boko Haram, an Islamic militant group with ties to Al Qaeda. The New York Times

O Pentágono à conquista de África

The Pentagon has begun a burst of spending in Africa, expanding its main base on the continent and investing in air facilities, flight services, telecommunications and electrical upgrades as the U.S. military deepens its involvement in a region with a rising threat of Islamist terrorism. Hundreds of millions of dollars in expenditures, detailed in unclassified federal documents, demonstrate Africa's increasing importance to U.S. military and counterterrorism operations as the war in Iraq has ended and American troops withdraw from Afghanistan. By far the most significant expansion is occurring at Camp Lemonnier in the deeply impoverished nation of Djibouti, a sleepy backwater on the coast of the Gulf of Aden, just north of Somalia. The sprawling base, built out of a onetime outpost of the French Foreign Legion, has been the Pentagon's primary facility in Africa for a decade. Defense officials last month awarded $200 million in contracts to revamp the base's power plants and build a multistory operations center, aircraft hangar, living quarters, gym and other facilities on a sun-scorched 20-acre site next to the tiny country's only international airport (with which it shares a runway). The projects are part of $1.2 billion in planned improvements over the next 25 years that will accelerate Camp Lemonnier's transformation from a makeshift installation where a few hundred Marines once slept in tents into an enduring 600-acre base that now houses about 4,000 U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors. "Africa is front and center now for the Pentagon, so that means Lemonnier is front and center," said Rudolph Atallah, former counterterrorism director for Africa at the Defense Department and now chief executive of White Mountain Research, a security consulting company. The changes come as U.S. officials grapple with the threat posed by al-Qaida-linked militants in Somalia, Yemen and North Africa's impoverished Sahel region. The U.S. commando raids last month that nabbed a long-sought terrorism suspect in Libya and tried but failed to capture a senior figure in Somalia's Shabab militant organization underscore the Pentagon's growing focus on Africa, including an increasing reliance on elite special operations forces. Though most of the troops at Camp Lemonnier are conventional forces specializing in training African militaries, several hundred special operations troops also are based there, occupying a compound with its own security perimeter. Officials declined to say whether Djibouti-based troops were involved in either raid last month, but the base has quietly evolved into what Pentagon planning documents call "the backbone" of covert missions across Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and is one of the military's most important bases for drone missions in Somalia and Yemen. Military officials declined to elaborate on the role of the special forces, citing security, but their numbers at Camp Lemonnier are likely to grow. Late last year, the first special operations rapid-response team was established at the base, made up of Green Berets from the Army's 10th Special Forces Group. When the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked in September 2012, leaving four Americans dead, lawmakers criticized Pentagon officials for a lack of crisis-response capacity in Africa. But there hasn't always been consensus on the role of Camp Lemonnier, which U.S. troops began using in 2002 primarily as a base for civil affairs and humanitarian missions. Now Pentagon planners see the base as the center of a constellation of U.S. military sites across Africa, including small facilities in Manda Bay, Kenya; Entebbe, Uganda; and the West African nation of Burkina Faso. In September, the Pentagon awarded Houston-based Kellogg, Brown & Root a contract for support services at Manda Bay. Navy engineers recently extended the runway there - on a mangrove-covered island near Somalia - to allow it to handle larger aircraft, such as C-130 cargo planes. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/10/20/205923/pentagon-dollars-flow-into-africa.html#storylink=cpy

21.10.13

Moçambique retrocede duas décadas

Mozambique's opposition Renamo movement has ended a 1992 peace accord after government forces attacked the jungle base of its leader, Afonso Dhlakama. The government forces captured the Sathunjira base in central Mozambique, forcing Mr Dhlakama to flee. About a million people were killed in the civil war that raged in Mozambique after it achieved independence from Portugal in 1975. Mozambique's economy has been booming since the civil war ended. Renamo spokesman Fernando Mazanga said that government soldiers had bombarded the Sathunjira base with heavy weapons before occupying it on Monday. "Peace is over in the country... The responsibility lies with the Frelimo government because they didn't want to listen to Renamo's grievances," Mr Mazanga told Reuters news agency. Continue reading the main story “ Start Quote This irresponsible attitude of the commander-in-chief of the defence and security forces puts an end to the Rome peace deal” End Quote Renamo statement The attack was aimed at assassinating Mr Dhlakama but he had managed to escape to an undisclosed location, Mr Mazanga said. In a statement, Renamo blamed President Armando Guebuza for the attack. "This irresponsible attitude of the commander-in-chief of the defence and security forces puts an end to the Rome peace deal," it said. The BBC's Jose Tembe in the capital, Maputo, says Renamo's statement suggests that it plans to go back to war, but it has denied this in the past. Defence ministry spokesman Cristovao Chume said government forces had taken control of the base in response to an earlier attack on an army post by Renamo fighters. He confirmed that Mr Dhlakama had fled. Mr Chume and Mr Mazanga did not give any casualty figures. Force of hundreds Mozambique's Frelimo government has repeatedly accused Renamo of dragging the country back to war, an allegation it denies. In April, at least five people were killed in central Mozambique after Renamo members attacked a police post. A force of about 300 Renamo men has remained armed since the peace accord, despite efforts to integrate them into the army or police force. Mr Dhlakama has said he needs his own personal bodyguards, and the men usually stay in his bush camp in the Gorongosa mountains. After the civil war ended, Mr Dhlakama moved out of the camp to live in Maputo and later in the northern Nampula province But he returned to the mountains last year, saying he needed to be close to his men who were feeling ignored. Mozambique is due to hold local elections in November, and presidential and parliamentary elections next year. Mr Guebuza's Frelimo party has governed Mozambique since independence in 1975. Renamo, which was formed around the same time, was backed by white rulers who were then in power in neighbouring South Africa and what is now Zimbabwe. BBC

Família Museveni, Limitada

The story of the dominance of the Museveni Family Network in Ugandan politics and their monopolistic grip on the most important business sectors goes back to the "bush" days of the war that brought Yoweri Museveni to power in the mid-1980s. Already, during the 6-year old war (1980-1986), General Museveni was exhibiting tendencies of exclusive dependency on close family members for personal protection and the consolidation of his grip on power. Most favored in the emerging Family Network was Museveni’s young brother Salim Saleh, now a major general. To the chagrin of other Ugandans involved in the war, Salim Saleh quickly became the de-facto Number 2, in terms of the bush-time power hierarchy, wielding more power than the likes of the Late Eriya Kategaya, who was officially RO 002. Salim Saleh and his brother Museveni ruthlessly dispensed the power they had, and, according to a former Bush War Commander, grossly abused and misused it for personal aggrandizement. The deaths of Bush-time top Commanders, like Sam Magara, are commonly attributed to the power machinations by the Museveni-Saleh central axis. Testimonies by some Bush time fighters have also exposed the absolute control that Museveni and his brother Salim Saleh exercised in relation to the management of the war-time financial affairs. It is said that Museveni would receive huge financial donations from far away sources, like Libya, and would keep the spending process totally classified – only for his own eye and that of his brother. 27 years later, and with the Museveni Family Network firmly entrenched in Uganda’s political and economic body fabrics, justifiable questions are being raised in all sections of Ugandan society about the wisdom of allowing this Family to continue its monopolistic enjoyment and clearly visible abuse and misuse of political and economic power in a country of 37 million politically disempowered and economically emasculated citizens. To fully understand the extent to which the Museveni Family Network monopolizes political power in Uganda, one has to simply take a glimpse at the profiles of the five most powerful occupants of the highest power pyramid in the country. The Gang Of Five: 1. General Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (President/CEO) – He has been President for 27 years. His stay in power has been largely achieved through imperious authoritarianism, violent repression of any form of criticism, and the abject manipulation of constitutional order. On coming to power in 1986, Museveni consolidated his personal and family hegemony by enforcing non-competitive politics, and banning opposition political activism. This was followed in 1995 by a constitutional amendment, which removed Presidential term limits a move which was initially condemned by Johnnie Carson before he became Assistant Secretary of State for Africa during President Obama's first term. Carson, who left after Obama's first term, never brought up the matter again. By this heinous violation of constitutional order, engineered, according to a former ruling party top official, by General Museveni personally, the beginning of a journey that would lead to the timeless monopoly of Presidential power by the Museveni Family was effectively launched. In order to maintain state power, General Museveni has, according to a former senior military officer who has since fallen out with the regime "deliberately undermined and subverted state institutions and structures so as to weaken the state, so that they can advance their personal ambitions.” According to this source, Museveni’s family-cantered dictatorship manifests itself through the total control of all the most important political and economic activities in Uganda. The Museveni family's stranglehold on political power is manifestly meant to enhance the “abuse of power for personal and collective family survival.” That, essentially, is the core task of the Museveni Presidency. It is the reason why the Museveni Family Network is prepared to savagely and ruthlessly violate the freedoms and human rights of Ugandan citizens on a day-to-day basis. Simply put, it is why they cannot and will not voluntarily give up political power, unless they are forced to by the People of Uganda. 2. General Salim Saleh, whose real name is Caleb Akandwanaho, is Museveni’s brother (some say half-brother), who wields mighty influence in a way that overshadows all other military officials. Officially, General Salim Saleh is referred to as Senior Military Advisor to the President, but a source who is familiar with the workings of the Ugandan military as well as the Museveni Presidency confirmed that the General is routinely allocated the most sensitive and critical duties, far beyond what Museveni allows any other senior army officer, including the Chief of Defense Forces. According to this source, General Saleh’s mostly secretive, assignments are usually in form militarized business operations, whereby military resources are deployed to actualize specific high-profile business ventures for the benefit of the Museveni Family Network. Most of the operations are carried out within Uganda, but as has been the case in recent years, General Salim Saleh has been dispatched by his brother Museveni to make incursions into mineral-rich neighboring countries particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo for the sole purpose of extracting minerals and other natural resources, and selling them off to earn the Family money. His Congo exploits, according to the UN, dates to the late 1990s. A number of senior army officers, who know about these secretive operations, have described Salim Saleh, as an extremely ruthless and no-nonsense operator, who can kill, if need be, to achieve a business goal. Most recently he was named in a United Nation's Group of Experts report looking into the outside supporters of M23, the Rwandan proxy army which is now fighting against the UN and Congo's army. The UN report said one of the M23 leaders Bosco Ntaganda, now at the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the Hague, owned two homes in Kampala and met regularly for consultations with Gen. Saleh and with Uganda's police chief Gen. Kale Kayihura. 3. Mrs. Janet Kataaha Museveni – the all-powerful wife of General Museveni, who currently serves as Minister for Karamoja and is also an Member of Parliament in the legislature dominated by Museveni supporters, after opposition parties were emasculated through the last of several rigged elections. Beyond her functions as Minister for Mineral-rich Karamoja, Janet Museveni pulls the levers of political and economic power that sustains the Family Network. Janet Museveni is an undeclared, unofficial adviser to her husband. According to State House sources, General Museveni has secretly provided Janet Museveni with the spare keys to his Presidential power, enabling her to dictate some of the decisions that Ugandans falsely believe Museveni the president has taken. 4. Brigadier Muhoozi Kaneirugaba – Museveni’s son is now the most powerful military officer, after his father Museveni and his Uncle General Salim Saleh. As an over-privileged Commander of the Special Forces Command (SFC), he is more powerful, in real power terms, than General Katumba Wamala, the newly appointed official Chief of Defence Forces. He is responsible for the security of General Museveni, but it is also tasked to guard the vital oil and other natural resources fields across the country. Brigadier Muhoozi’s operational remit extends beyond the officially outlined responsibilities, and, more often than not, encroaches onto public policing duties, with the brief of containing, by any means necessary, any form of political opposition activism and any type of civil disobedience against the Museveni regime. Recently, when he visited Ugandan troops serving in Somalia, an enlisted man asked him how it was that he had been promoted so swiftly in the army. The enlisted man was immediately arrested and loaded onto a plane back to Uganda where he's since been incarcerated for having the temerity to pose a question to the all-powerful presidential son. It is an open secret in Uganda that Muhoozi SFC operatives, trained in extra-repressive techniques against unarmed civilians have been regularly donning regular police uniforms and taking lead roles in the brutal suppression of the increasingly regular public demonstrations against the Museveni regime. A particularly well-informed former State House security operative, who has now joined hands with other Ugandans to demand for political change in Uganda, one such Special Forces Command operative was the hooded man who, in 2011, savagely attacked and sprayed chemicals in the eyes of Dr. Kizza Besigye, the former President of Uganda’s biggest opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change FDC. Currently a major row has broken out between General Museveni and several senior army officers, including top Generals who fought with him in the 1980-1986 bush war, about the secret plan by Museveni to transfer political power to his son Muhoozi, at some point after the 2016 elections. General Museveni is not so sure that his son Muhoozi would be able to engineer and manage electoral victory against an emboldened, battle-hardened political opposition in 2016. So he has made the strategic decision of going for another term as Presidential candidate in what would be obviously rigged elections, and then mid-way in the next term of office, he would consider handing over to Muhoozi, as a conclusion of what has been dubbed "Project Muhoozi". 5. Mr. Sam Kutesa is Gen. Museveni’s brother in law. He is father to to Charlotte Kutesa, the wife of Museveni’s son Brigadier Muhoozi. He serves in government as Minister of Foreign affairs.Kutesa is believed be one of the most trusted Museveni Ministers and a close business associate. This closeness to Museveni is what has ensured that Kutesa remains at the heart of political power, in spite of numerous accusations of impropriety. The more muddled up in scandalous adventures Kutesa’s name has been, the more Museveni, the Head of the Family Network, has entrusted him with important political responsibilities. In recent times, Kutesa has been linked to some of the more pronounced financial scandals of the Museveni era – for example the accusations that were levelled against hleveledde allaged corruptionalleged the organization of the Commonwealth conference and more recently for having received bribes from global oil business companies involved in the nascent Ugandan oil sector. Sam Kutesa is believed to be among the wealthiest people in Uganda, and, according to various sources, has been a long-time front for significant business interests of the Museveni Family Network. Mafia-type operational Methods: Deaths of Prominent Business people: In the past few months, Ugandan newspapers have been full of grotesque stories of point-blank shootings of prominent business men in Buganda region, Western Uganda, and other parts of the country. The recent spike in the murders of prominent business people has raised questions as to who might be behind the crimes. There is suspicion that the murders have foot-prints emanating from State House. Gen. Kale Kayihura, the ruthless army General and Museveni confidant who commands the Ugandan Police Forces, has been accused by some high-profile opponents of General Museveni’s regime of nurturing and harnessing special killer squads and mafia-type gangs, which, in addition to assassinating and persecuting political opponents, have been busy ‘eliminating’ Ugandan business people, who are deemed financially too powerful and yet unsympathetic to the ruling regime. In most of these incidences, the police, commanded by General Kayihura, have either come too late for purpose, or have not put serious effort in finding the perpetrators. Land grabbing: The Museveni Family Network’s linkages to the centres of economicenters are as unashamedly corrupted and sullied, as are their monopolistic endearment to the political landscape. Examples of these economic-centred excesses icanteredland grabbing by Museveni and his Family associates in wide-ranging areas of Uganda - from Luwero and Kayunga in Buganda, to Bunyoro, Ankole Karamoja, and Acholiland. A source with deep insights about the goings-on in Museveni’s State House attested to the fact that even the famous Kisozi ranch in Mpigi district, which is owned by General Museveni was irregularly acquired from the Uganda People’s Defence Forces. According to the above source, the Museveni Family Network is said to have also firmly set its sights on land in Western Uganda and Northern Uganda where proven oil deposits have been discovered. Great suspicions abound that the first family have massive interests there, with a crucial piece of evidence being the decision by General Museveni to allocate guard duties at the said oil-rich land sites to his son Brigadier Muhoozi and his Special Forces Command. One Northern Ugandan politician, who has been at the heart of on-going local resistance to Museveni’s plans to forcefully acquire massive pieces of land in Amuru, Acholiland, had these questions for the Museveni Family Network – Why does Museveni keep referring to the country's oil resources as "...My oil, which I personally discovered, and I am not going to go away before it starts flowing..."? According to the source with links to the Museveni State House, the empowerment brought to the Museveni Family Network through land grabs enables them to economically disempower and emasculate Ugandan citizens, who then become less able to stand up and resist political repression. But, crucially, according to a prominent Ugandan opposition politician, the Museveni Family Network is physically re-drawing the electoral map of Uganda through the creation of a multitude of new districts, but also by dissecting the country-side land masses through land grab operations. Thousands of evicted citizens are often re-settled in other constituencies away from their traditional places of settlement. Some of the grabbed land is also allocated, as bribe and thank-you gifts, to some heads of Museveni’s coercive forces, besides bringing direct financial muscle to the his Family Network. Karuma Dam Saga: The recently-launched Karuma dam in Northern Uganda looks set to become one of the most shameful travesties of the Museveni era. The involvement of the Museveni Family network, whenever it fully surfaces, will shock Ugandans. According to impeccable sources, Museveni personally intervened to overrule the Inspector General of Government (IGG), and went on to launch the project without a contract, because of the entrenched financial interests of his Family Network in the dam project. Revelations from well-informed sources point to the Family Network’s interests, in the approximately $1.4 billion project, being driven by the following members: Geoffrey Kamuntu, who is married to Museveni’s third daughter Diana; Museveni’s son Brigadier Muhoozi, through Amon Muheirwe, who owns companies ravaging Karamoja district using the Special Forces Command; Museveni’s wife Janet’s ministerial portfolio; and, the participation of Joviah Saleh, the wife of General Salim Saleh and her sister Kellen Kayonga. http://www.blackstarnews.com/global-politics/africa/how-a-country-named-uganda-became-museveni-family-incorporated.