A miragem tuaregue

Prior to the start of Libya's revolution in February, the Sahelian regions of Niger and Mali had already suffered eight years of increasing political instability and insecurity. The reasons for this are complex:
First, having partially recovered from the Tuareg rebellions of the 1990s, the rulers of both Niger and Mali became willing, pliant and corrupt partners in the global war on terror (GWOT). This transformation occured following the complicity between the US and Algeria's mukhabarat [security services] and the Departement du Renseignement et de la Securite [DRS - Department of Intelligence and Security] in fabricating terrorism in the region in order to justify the launch of the 2003 second front in the GWOT in the Sahel/Sahara. That alone brought an almost instant decimation of the predominantly Tuareg tourist industry and an annual loss of an estimated $50 million.
Another factor contributing to instability in the region occured in 2005, following the political provocation of the Tuareg by the Niger government. This led to a short-lived rebellion, while in May 2006 the US and Algeria's DRS orchestrated a Tuareg rebellion in NE Mali. This was followed, four to five months later, by two contrived "terrorist" engagements designed to facilitate the name change of Algeria's GSPC into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its "insertion" into the Sahel.


'Unsatisfactory peace process'

This duplicitous series of events led to more serious Tuareg rebellions in both Niger and Mali through 2007-2009, with an unsatisfactory peace process - brokered in large part by Gaddafi - which was accented by an upsurge in AQIM "terrorism", drug trafficking and banditry.
"Tuareg justify [their actions] as an inevitable response to food shortages ... marginalisation and the lack of both economic development and employment opportunities."
Local Tuareg justify their marginal involvement in these activities as an inevitable response to food shortages (and in Niger, famine), their marginalisation and the lack of both economic development and employment opportunities.
The uprising that began in Libya in February against the Gaddafi regime quickly exacerbated the Sahel's wretched economic situation.
By May, it had already cost Niger billions in lost trade and the stemmed flow of remittences causing President Issoufou to be forced to cut the 2011 budget by 6.55 per cent. Since then, the situation in Niger, Mali and Chad has deteriorated drastically - the governments of Mali and Niger each putting the number of returning migrants at more than 200,000 and Chad at more than 80,000.
For the first time in about 30 years, a large proportion of these countries' emigrant Tuareg population that had sought employment or refuge in Libya is coming home. Thousands of them had reportedly recently signed on as mercenaries; many more were long-serving members of Gaddafi's forces. However, not all of them fought for Gaddafi: Many supported Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC).
Either way, they are skilled fighters - armed and angry at what they see as a world that has once again turned against them. The final overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in August has turned this increasingly fragile and chaotic situation into what journalists in Niger are now calling a "powder-keg".
Amongst these returnees are several former rebel leaders: Aghaly ag Alembo (Niger), Ibrahim ag Bahanga (Mali) who was killed (some say assassinated by "the Algerians") on August 26, and assuming he is still alive, Mohamed ag Boula (Niger) - the brother of Rhissa ag Boula.
Rhissa was the leader of one of two main rebel movements in Niger in the 1990s and then the joint leader of the Armed Resistance Organisation (ORA) that signed the 1995 Ouagadougou Peace Accords. Since then, he has served as a government minister, been imprisoned on a trumped-up murder charge, headed another rebel movement (2008-2009) and is now an advisor to Niger's new president, Mohamed Issoufou.
What are the plans of these and other Tuareg leaders? There has been speculative media talk of new Tuareg rebellions and even the possible emergence of some sort of militant, pan-regional Tuareg movement.
On top of all this, arms - including Sam 7s - are now widely reported to be flooding into the region from Libya. Indications are that they are being amassed by certain Tuareg (such as the late Bahanga), AQIM and drugs traffickers.
Whichever way one looks at this part of the Sahel, its immediate future is bleak. Indeed, the fact that the EU placed it at the top of its security agenda last year and is now pumping serious funds into the region is indicative of the seriousness of the situation.

The nightmare scenario

Amid the overwhelmingly pessimistic scenarios for this part of Africa's Sahel region, the spill-over from Libya has given rise to one that the media has so far been reluctant to air. It is what I would call the "nightmare scenario".
This starts with Gaddafi loyalists being not wholly dislodged from Libya. After the assumed eventual collapse of resistance in Sirte and Bani Walid, fort systems still remain - possibly around Sebha, the Traghan oases, the Wadi al-Ajal, Oubari, Ghat and perhaps elsewhere. Such areas of resistance then become supported - or, if lost - will be recaptured by an insurgency launched out of the Sahel. This resurgence will most likely come out of Niger, but with support from Mali, and perhaps from elsewhere where Gaddafi has spread his largesse.
Such an insurgency would depend on four key factors: The willingness of the Tuareg to take up the Gaddafi cause; the inability or unwillingness, for various reasons, of the governments of the region to prevent such developments; and sufficient financial resources and the inability or unwillingness of the West to intervene to stop it. A fifth factor, the "elephant in the room", is Algeria.
One can only speculate on how the Tuareg might react to a further call to arms on Gaddafi's behalf. Media interviews with Tuareg fighters who have just returned from Libya suggest that a significant number could still be mustered - especially if cash was on the table. Certainly, many Tuareg in Niger and Mali still feel they owe him a debt of gratitude, and therefore support.

Scattered leadership

However, behind the current, slightly gung-ho air of bravado, the political reality of the situation is still very unclear.
Aside from the fact that the Tuareg populations scattered across at least five countries of the Sahara-Sahel have never been politically unified, there are many schisms between them. And the same applies to many of their leaders, whose personal agendas are at present quite unclear, perhaps even to themselves.
National politics in all five countries (Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria and Libya) are also very different, although Tuareg in all of them share a sense of political and economic marginalisation. In addition, there is much common anger and disillusionment - especially against the US, France, the EU, and the West as a whole for failing to help them in their recent predicaments.
"There is much common anger and disallusionment among [the Tuareg] ... that, in itself, may be sufficient to maintain some sense of loyalty and gratitute to Gaddafi, the only person who has come to their aid."
That, in itself, may be sufficient to maintain some sense of loyalty and gratitude to Gaddafi, the only person who has come to their aid - albeit for reasons of self-interest - since the launch of Washington's GWOT sent the region into a spiral of increasing insecurity and instability.
Another factor in the "Tuareg equation", which should not be discounted, is Gaddafi's proposition to make a Tuareg political entity of "state" that would somehow be carved out of the Sahara and Sahel. This proposition was first mooted in a speech at Oubari in 2005 and written off as "crazy" by all except Algeria.
Parallels have been drawn to France's attempt in 1957 to carve its own "Saharan state", the Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS), out of its colonial territories in defiance of Algeria's fight for Independence.
The likelihood of the Tuareg taking up arms again Gaddafi's behalf, or as part of a "post-Gaddafi" movement, is unlikely. Nevertheless, if Niger and Mali, with the financial assistance of international development aid, are unable to provide an alternative and more attractive future, it cannot be ruled out.
Whether Niger or any other Sahelian country, would accept such a "rear base" in its territory is also most unlikely. The mere presence of Gaddafi, his family or key loyalists in any of these countries will be a disruptive and potentially destabilising force.
However, the popular support for Gaddafi in these Sahelian countries, and not only from the Tuareg, will make it very difficult for any of their governments to fulfil their international obligations. Although a Niger government spokesman has made it clear that Gaddafi's supporters would not be sent back to Libya, he did say that, if any of these people were wanted by an international court with universal competence over the crimes for which they were being pursued, Niger would do its duty in terms of its commitments to international justice.

Jeremy Keenan, professor de Antropologia Social (em artigo de opinião divulgado pela AlJazeera)