A "grande vitória no Afeganistão", por Eça de Queirós

Em 1847, os Ingleses – «por uma razão de estado, uma necessidade de fronteiras científicas, a segurança do império, uma barreira ao domínio russo da Ásia…» e outras coisas vagas que os políticos da Índia rosnam sombriamente retorcendo os bigodes – invadem o Afeganistão, e aí vão aniquilando tribos seculares, desmantelando vilas, assolando searas e vinhas: apossam-se, por fim, da santa cidade de Cabul; sacodem do serralho um velho emir apavorado; colocam lá outro de raça mais submissa, que já trazem preparado nas bagagens, com escravas e tapetes; e logo que os correspondentes dos jornais têm telegrafado a vitória, o exército, acampado à beira dos arroios e nos vergéis de Cabul, desaperta o correame e fuma o cachimbo da paz… Assim é exactamente em 1880... Os Ingleses estão experimentando, no seu atribulado império da Índia, a verdade desse humorístico lugar-comum do século XVIII: «A história é uma velhota que se repete sem cessar.» O fado ou a Providência, ou a entidade qualquer que lá de cima dirige os episódios da campanha do Afeganistão, em 1847, está fazendo simplesmente uma cópia servil, revelando assim uma imaginação exausta. Em 1847, os Ingleses – «por uma razão de estado, uma necessidade de fronteiras científicas, a segurança do império, uma barreira ao domínio russo da Ásia…» e outras coisas vagas que os políticos da Índia rosnam sombriamente retorcendo os bigodes – invadem o Afeganistão, e aí vão aniquilando tribos seculares, desmantelando vilas, assolando searas e vinhas: apossam-se, por fim, da santa cidade de Cabul; sacodem do serralho um velho emir apavorado; colocam lá outro de raça mais submissa, que já trazem preparado nas bagagens, com escravas e tapetes; e logo que os correspondentes dos jornais têm telegrafado a vitória, o exército, acampado à beira dos arroios e nos vergéis de Cabul, desaperta o correame e fuma o cachimbo da paz… Assim é exactamente em 1880. No nosso tempo, precisamente em 1847, chefes enérgicos, messias indígenas, vão percorrendo o território, e com grandes nomes de pátria, de religião, pregam a guerra santa: as tribos reúnem-se, as famílias feudais correm com os seus troços de cavalaria, príncipes rivais juntam-se no ódio hereditário contra o estrangeiro, o homem vermelho, e em pouco tempo é todo um rebrilhar de fogos de acampamento nos altos das serranias, dominando os desfiladeiros que são o caminho, a entrada da Índia… E quando por ali aparecer, enfim, o grosso do exército inglês, à volta de Cabul, atravancado de artilharia, escoando-se espessamente por entre as gargantas das serras, no leito seco das torrentes, com as suas longas caravanas de camelos, aquela massa bárbara rola-lhe em cima e aniquila-o. Foi assim em 1847, é assim em 1880. Então os restos debandados do exército refugiam-se em alguma das cidades da fronteira, que ora é Gasnat ora Candaar: os Afegãs, correm, põem o cerco, cerco lento, cerco de vagares orientais: o general sitiado, que nessas guerras asiáticas pode sempre comunicar, telegrafa para o vice-rei da Índia, reclamando com furor «reforços e chá e açúcar!» (Isto é textual; foi o general Roberts que soltou há dias este grito de gulodice britânica; o Inglês, sem chá, bate-se frouxamente.) Então o governo da Índia, gastando milhões de libras como quem gasta água, manda a toda a pressa fardos disformes de chá reparador, brancas colinas de açúcar e dez ou quinze mil homens. De Inglaterra partem esses negros e monstruosos transportes de guerra, arcas de Noé a vapor, levando acampamentos, rebanhos de cavalos, parques de artilharia, toda uma invasão temerosa… Foi assim em 47, assim é em 1880. Esta hoste desembarca no Indostão, junta-se a outras colunas de tropa hindu e é dirigida dia e noite sobre a fronteira em expressos a quarenta milhas por hora; daí começa uma marcha assoladora, com cinquenta mil camelos de bagagens, telégrafos, máquinas hidráulicas e uma cavalgada eloquente de correspondentes de jornais. Uma manhã avista-se Candaar ou Gasnat – e num momento é aniquilado, disperso no pó da planície, o pobre exército afegã com as suas cimitarras de melodrama e as suas veneráveis colubrinas de modelo das que outrora fizeram fogo em Diu. Gasnat está livre! Candaar está livre! Hurra! Faz-se imediatamente disto uma canção patriótica; e a façanha é por toda a Inglaterra popularizada numa estampa, em que se vê o general libertador e o general sitiado apertando-se a mão com veemência, no primeiro plano, entre cavalos empinados e granadeiros belos como Apoios, que expiram em atitude nobre! Foi assim em 1847; há-de ser assim em 1880… No entanto, em desfiladeiro e monte, milhares de homens, que ou defendiam a pátria ou morriam pela fronteira científica, lá ficam, pasto de corvos o que não é, no Afeganistão, uma respeitável imagem de retórica: aí, são os corvos que nas cidades fazem a limpeza das ruas, comendo as imundícies, e em campos de batalha purificam o ar, devorando os restos das derrotas. E de tanto sangue, tanta agonia, tanto luto, que resta por fim? Uma canção patriótica, uma estampa idiota, nas salas de jantar, mais tarde uma linha de prosa numa página de crónica… Consoladora filosofia das guerras! No entanto a Inglaterra goza por algum tempo a «grande vitória do Afeganistão» com a certeza de ter de recomeçar daqui a dez anos ou quinze anos; porque nem pode conquistar e anexar um vasto reino, que é grande como a França, nem pode consentir, colados à sua ilharga, uns poucos de milhões de homens fanáticos, batalhadores e hostis. A «política», portanto, é debilitá-los periodicamente, com uma invasão arruinadora. São as fortes necessidades de um grande império. Antes possuir apenas um quintalejo, com uma vaca para o leite e dois pés de alface para as merendas de Verão… --- Em Cartas de Inglaterra.

Sudão do Sul: A falência de um Estado acabado de nascer

The new year opens with the very real possibility that the world’s youngest country, South Sudan, may fail at statehood without ever having acquired more than its pro forma trappings: a flag, an anthem, and a seat at the United Nations. The government and rebel forces continued to fight over the weekend and failed to begin substantive talks being mediated in neighboring Ethiopia. Only thirty months after the international community helped South Sudan to secede from Sudan and thus end decades of civil war, a collapse of the South Sudanese state would be a geopolitical catastrophe with reverberations well beyond East Africa. Avoiding that calamity will require a radical break with the conventional analysis that has undergirded the approach to the crisis so far. The conflict has spread with surprising speed since South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit rather foolishly tried to use a relatively minor December 15 mutiny as a pretext to eliminate political rivals. Nonetheless, a first key point is that it was foreseeable. The country’s political and social tensions were left unresolved at its independence, and have worsened under the dysfunction, rampant corruption, wholesale incompetence, and increasingly dictatorial tendencies of the Salva Kiir government. Second, while the South Sudanese are ultimately responsible for their own fate, people outside the country share responsibility for either condoning or excusing the bad choices and failures of leadership that led to the current situation. (Daniel Howden, who reports from Nairobi for the Guardian newspaper, noted last week the roles of Hollywood actors, including George Clooney and Matt Dillon, in promoting an overly simplistic public understanding of South Sudan’s problems in recent years. The celebrities’ script painted South Sudan as simply a victim of Sudan, and helped conceal the new country’s internal problems.) A great deal of moral culpability for the political failure, and the humanitarian disaster it has wrought, belongs to advocates and celebrity dilettantes who cavalierly treated a delicate and complex political and social ecology as little more than an exotic stage on which they could preen themselves. Third, international organizations and Western governments have exacerbated the crisis by persisting in their misread of the situation and by systematically depriving the United Nations force for South Sudan of a robust mandate and the resources to carry it out. (See Sudarsan Raghavan’s succinct analysis in the Washington Post this past weekend.) The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was originally authorized more than two years ago to have 7,000 military personnel and 900 police, in addition to a proportionate civilian component—this to cover an area roughly the size of Texas. This force probably was inadequate even under the best circumstances. After the current conflict broke out last month, the UN Security Council hurriedly authorized UNMISS to have up to 12,500 military personnel and 1,323 police, although the additional forces have yet to be recruited and deployed. The UN force’s mandate has been framed almost entirely in terms of development, rather than anything more robust, and the mission is run by a Norwegian politician who comes to UNMISS from a desk job at UNICEF—as if the problems of South Sudan were due merely due to a lack of material aid, as opposed to conflicts rooted in deeper pathologies. Fourth is the exaggeration of the conflict’s ethnic dimension. It certainly exists, with armed groups committing atrocities against civilians of the two largest tribal groups, the Dinka and Nuer. Still, much of the media coverage has erred in casting the bloodletting in purely ethnic terms. Examples abound of politics that ignore tribal lines. Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior, the widow of South Sudan’s revered founding father, John Garang de Mabior, is an ethnic Dinka like President Salva Kiir, but she also is one of his fiercest critics, and Salva Kiir clapped her under house arrest last month. Also arrested was the former secretary-general of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Pagan Amum Okiech, a member of the Shilluk, the country’s third-largest ethnic group. On the other hand, South Sudan’s foreign minister, Barnaba Marial Benjamin, who has remained loyal to his president, is a Nuer, like former Vice President Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, who at least nominally heads the forces in rebellion. A fifth issue is intervention by neighboring countries. With the United States and its European partner reducing embassy staff or evacuating citizens, those countries most likely to intervene will be pursuing their own interests, and possibly aggravating the situation. As The Economist noted, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has thrown “his diplomatic and military weight wholesale” behind Salva Kiir. Ugandan forces have been reported to have joined Salva Kiir’s men in battling rebels for control of Bor, the capital of Jonglei, South Sudan’s largest and most populous state. Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta has so far abstained from the conflict, instead joining Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in trying to mediate the crisis. Still, Kenyan companies are among the largest investors in South Sudan and Kenyan-owned businesses reportedly have been looted in Bor as well as in the state capitals of Bentiu and Malakal. Sixth, the international hopes for the peace talks, which formally opened over the weekend in Addis Ababa, may not be justified. The East African regional grouping of nations that is mediating the discussions may not even have convened the relevant parties. Riek Machar may be the opposition leader who previously held the highest governmental title, but it is not readily apparent that he actually commands the forces fighting the government. It is certainly not at all clear that the rebel “White Army”—so called because of the ash the mainly Nuer fighters smear on their bodies to ward off insect bites—even has a chain of command. The more regular units among the rebels are led by Major General Peter Gadet Yak, a former commander of South Sudan’s 8th Division and one of the country’s more effective battle leaders. He is not even a party to the talks. And at least a dozen prominent opponents of Salva Kiir, some representing not insignificant South Sudanese constituencies, also are absent, having been detained in the aftermath of the supposed putsch. To its credit, the US State Department released a strong statement late Saturday evening urging the Salva Kiir government to “to uphold its commitments and release political detainees immediately,” noting correctly that “to be meaningful and productive, discussions of political issues requires the presence of the senior SPLM members currently detained in Juba, among others.” Not surprising, but nonetheless disappointing, is the absence at the talks of South Sudan’s religious leaders. These include figures who largely have retained their credibility through the decades of struggle against the Sudanese government and the thirty months of independence. Thus, they command broad public support irrespective of ethnic divides. Just days before the violence broke out, Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul of the Episcopal Church of Sudan, and Paride Taban, retired Roman Catholic Bishop of Torit, had unveiled a detailed plan of action for dialogue, healing, and reconciliation at local and national levels. The two men lead a National Reconciliation Committee, and their initiative, supported by the Norwegian and Swiss governments, has drawn explicitly from the experience of faith-based groups in South Africa’s post-apartheid truth and reconciliation process. Since the fighting started, Archbishop Deng Bul repeatedly has emphasized that the conflict is not ethnic, writing in one pre-Christmas missive: “We condemn and correct the media statements and reports that refer to the violence as conflict between the Dinka and Nuer tribes…These are political differences among the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Party.” And yet he has no place at the negotiating table. Seventh: For any peace to have any chance of being sustainable, the negotiations must encompass a discussion of the immediate and long-term political future of South Sudan. This includes consideration of a short-term power-sharing arrangement that reflects realities on the ground. (The mismatch between notional “authority” and actual power contributed immensely to the present difficulties.) A viable peace process also must include a decentralization of resource management. (Absent a sense of national identity, is it any wonder that people resent that the wealth under their feet flows to some far-off capital?) And negotiations must move the country toward long-delayed elections. None have been held since independence and a number of observers have pointed out that the pre-independence poll was compromised by fraud in a number of important races. Also in need of a frank airing is whether Salva Kiir – having precipitated a civil war by intention, incompetence, or miscalculation – is even the right person to lead South Sudan forward. Ultimately, if the South Sudanese are to have a country of their own, it will be up to them to define a positive sense of national identity and purpose, and to construct a state that can provide all their communities with not only some semblance of order, but other vital common goods and perhaps some basic services. In this process, outsiders can and should be supportive, especially if they are realistic about what is actually happening and what they can and will do about it. J. Peter Pham, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Sudão do Sul: Uma independência precipitada?

John Garang, the father of South Sudan’s liberation, always argued against its existence. He didn’t want to secede from Khartoum, but to overthrow the government and create a unified Sudan for all its citizens. His successors, grasping for immediate power and bowing to international influence, chose a different path. On the brink of civil war, is South Sudan now paying the price for this lack of vision? By SIMON ALLISON. The father of South Sudanese resistance, the late Dr John Garang, never ruled out the possibility of seceding from the north to create a new, independent state. But nor did he advocate it. For him, secession was a last resort, an option to be taken only if everything else had failed. “If we cannot rise to the challenge and move to the New Sudan, it is better that the Sudan breaks up before it breaks down,” he said in speeches delivered across the continent and the world. But his vision, his dream, was always to meet that challenge; to make a New Sudan which could accommodate its wonderfully diverse peoples, and give them all a say in the running of the state. In January 2005, at the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nairobi – the deal which ended the decades-long civil war between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A rebels of which Garang was chief – he reiterated this to the 20,000 Sudanese and the 15 African heads of state who were assembled for the occasion: “This peace agreement signals the beginning of one Sudan regardless of race, religion or tribe.” Six months later, his helicopter crashed in circumstances which continue to fuel conspiracy theories. Garang was dead, and with him any hope of a unified Sudan. Garang’s vision was never particularly popular amongst his people, and understandably so. Secession seemed like (and ultimately was) an achievable goal, whereas overthrowing Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and his henchmen was an exponentially more difficult challenge; and after enduring centuries of oppression from northern rulers, southerners were entitled to feel aggrieved enough to want to cut ties completely. Even within his own party, Garang had to push hard for unity. Without the force of his personality – and under the guidance of his deputy, Salva Kiir, a committed secessionist – impetus swung swiftly and irreversibly the other way. The international community, led by activists from the United States, pushed hard in the same direction. Sure enough, by the time the referendum came around in 2011, South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly to create a new, independent state. South Sudan was born. Just three and a half short years later, the world’s newest state is on the brink of collapse. Kiir’s army, the only functional institution, is divided between his supporters and those of Vice-President Riek Machar. Fighting in the capital Juba and other areas has taken on dangerous ethnic overtones. Thousands are dead, tens of thousands have fled the country and hundreds thousands more are displaced within South Sudan’s borders. “Even before the recent fighting broke out in December, 80 percent of healthcare and basic services in South Sudan were provided by non-governmental organisations,” observed Doctors Without Borders (MSF), in their latest, urgent missive. Now many of those NGOs are gone (MSF being a notable exception), and the situation is rapidly deteriorating. “What was already a difficult situation has become even worse.” Oil, the country’s only asset of note, has stopped flowing completely; so completely that even the Chinese, notoriously reluctant to intervene in the internal affairs of African nations, have issued a stern rebuke, mindful of their significant energy interests in the country. In short, the South Sudanese state – barely there to begin with – has already failed. It’s worth pondering, at this juncture of South Sudan’s history, if perhaps John Garang was right – and southern Sudanese, not to mention northerners who have continued living under oppression, would have been better served by trying to reform Sudan in its entirety. South Sudan, on its own, doesn’t have much going for it. “The new state was born with all the makings of a crisis,” argues William Wallis in the Financial Times. “Its development had been stunted by five decades of intermittent war. Unlike other African liberation movements, the now fractured Sudan People’s Liberation Movement had few if any social programmes in areas it controlled. There were few functioning institutions beyond the army and less infrastructure than most African nations had when colonial powers began to withdraw.” This underdevelopment is further entrenched by a few geographical and infrastructural realities. It’s a landlocked country, which means it can’t ship any of its abundant oil to buyers. For that, the oil must travel via pipeline through Sudan proper, to the tankers waiting at Port Sudan. Or it must go by truck on dodgy roads to neighbours Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, because a pipeline heading south hasn’t been built yet (and won’t for some time to come). Many places in the country aren’t connected by road, and are completely cut off during the rainy season (some refugee camps, for example, are only accessible via helicopter). Besides oil, the country has almost no industry to speak of. While there’s potential for agriculture – South Sudanese officials keep talking about turning the country into the ‘breadbasket of East Africa’ – it’s a long way from happening, and the biggest factory in Juba is the local brewery (run by SABMiller). Post-secession Sudan, meanwhile, is also in trouble. Its economy has been devastated by the sudden cut-off in oil funds, which for so long were used to keep the population complacent and compensate for the economic impact of the sanctions (these were levied against Khartoum for its role in Darfur). A united Sudan, meanwhile, without sanctions, with a reliable oil income that is properly invested in national infrastructure, healthcare and education programs, has the potential to be more than the current sum of its parts – the strengths of the north complementing those of the south, and vice versa. This may be little more than a mirage, but it’s an alluring prospect nonetheless, and one for which John Garang was prepared to fight, and even sacrifice the prospect of immediate power. His successors, possessed of shorter-term vision, settled for the easy money compromise – a lack of foresight for which South Sudan might just be paying the price. DM Daily Maverick

A nova exploração colonial em Moçambique

"Cerca de 70% da riqueza de Moçambique estão praticamente a ser controlados por investidores estrangeiros dos corredores de desenvolvimento de Maputo, Limpopo, Beira, Nacala, Pemba e do Vale do Zambeze, segundo a Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais (ADECRU). A agremiação diz que a situação agrava a degradação ambiental, pobreza, problemas de usurpação de terras de camponeses e conflitos sócio-ambientais. “O padrão de governação e desenvolvimento em Moçambique é explorador, colonial e imperialista por acomodar grandes projectos de exploração que provocam consequências perversas à sociedade”, realça o grupo apelando uma “visão séria e mudança de atitude” por parte dos governantes de modo a se evitar eventuais conflitos sociais no país. Nos últimos 10 anos, Moçambique tem sido vítima da “obsessão dos doadores” e de instituições financeiras internacionais devido a descobertas de recursos minerais e petrolíferos. (...)". Correio da Manhã, Maputo

Rajaonarimampianina eleito Presidente de Madagáscar

Madagascar's former finance minister, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, has won the presidential election, officials in the Indian Ocean nation have announced. Mr Rajaonarimampianina, allied to incumbent President Andry Rajoelina, won 53.5% of the vote in December's run-off, the electoral commission said. His rival, Richard Jean-Louis Robinson, has said the second round was rigged and is demanding a recount. The election is intended to end years of political unrest. Foreign election observers have urged both parties to respect the electoral process. An electoral agent holds up a ballot as votes are counted at a polling station in Antananarivo on 20 December 2013 The second round was endorsed by international election observers The vote has yet to be confirmed by the electoral court which will make the announcement within 15 days. Economic paralysis The elections were the first to be held since a 2009 military-backed takeover, when Mr Rajoelina, who backed Mr Rajaonarimampianina, overthrew the democratically elected government of Marc Ravalomanana. Electoral officials said Mr Robinson, a former health minister in Mr Ravalomanana's government, took 46.5% of the run-off vote, held on 20 December. Following the coup, the international community imposed sanctions and the country has since suffered economic paralysis. The election is an attempt to restore normality to the country and to induce foreign investment and boost anaemic growth. A relative new comer to politics, Mr Rajaonarimampianina, 55, holds a degree in economics and accounting from the University of Quebec in Canada. Amongst other election pledges, he promised to help the unemployed, build infrastructure to improve agriculture and reform the education system. More than 92% of the country's 21 million people live on less than $2 (£1.2) a day, according to the World Bank. (

África Center for Strategic Studies)

Bissau: À espera das eleições que não deverão ser em Março

by pasmalu A primeira fraude começa logo no dia do Golpe, quando a CEDEAO convence os golpistas a aceitar que o período de transição fosse de um (1) ano e não de dois (2), explicando que, depois era apenas uma questão de ir adiando. A segunda refere-se ao tal governo inclusivo, constituído por salafrários do pior calibre, incompetentes e pertencendo a partidos que nunca irão parar a nenhum governo por processos transparentes e eleitorais. Fingem que estão a preparar as eleições, mas comem à fartazana e passam a vida na ostentação. Um deles, o Nando Dódóte, até diz que os 30 milhões de CFA que lhe roubaram em casa era da empresa dele (provavelmente da companhia aérea Coca Line e Congéneres que diz para substituir a TAP). Essa tal empresa passou a dar lucro só quando ele foi para o governo. A terceira fraude é a da assessoria eleitoral dos "especialistas" timorenses, no país dos quais é a ONU que organiza as eleições, inexperiente, incompetente e completamente ausente (o seu chefe de fila Ramos Horta passa a vida em passeatas e até há dias foi celebrar o seu aniversário em Timor!). Resultado: os prazos não são cumpridos, a desorganização das mesas de recenseamento é inacreditável e ainda há regiões onde ainda não apareceu ninguém. A quarta é a manipulação das mesas das zonas que todos sabemos, onde se inscrevem grande número de crianças de 15 a 17 anos sem qualquer documentação e que quando o presidente da mesa é questionado, responde: "abô qui si papé?" A quinta fraude é que todos sabem que não haverá eleições em Março, mas fingem que anda tudo na maior, deixando correr o marfim e lastimando-se Ramos Horta de que para as Nações Unidas a Guiné-Bissau é um facto sem importância. Nesse caso, demita-se que todos agradecemos. António Indjai está nervosíssimo com estas eleições. A adesão massiva dos jovens, que são a larga maioria do eleitorado, e das mulheres decididas a acabar com esta "pouca vergonha" fazem ver que a derrota dos partidos dos militares vai ser retumbante e será mais difícil voltar a dar um novo golpe. O anúncio da chegada eminente de Cadogo ao país, a sua grande popularidade e o caos que se instalou no dia a dia (falta de gasóleo, greves de todos os sectores, falta de água, salários, até de militares, com 4 meses de atraso), põe Indjai em pânico. Ele sabe que ao regresso de Cadogo, por si só, fá-lo-á cair do poder. Tudo o fará para o evitar.

Bissau: Ramos-Horta está satisfeito

Posted on January 5, 2014 O Representante Especial do Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas saudou hoje a etapa vencida dos 35 por cento no recenseamento para as eleições de 16 de Março, numa reunião com o Governo e parceiros de apoio realizada no GTAPE. José Ramos-Horta participou no encontro juntamente com o Primeiro-Ministro, Rui Barros, o Ministro da Administração Territorial e Poder Local, Batista Té, e representações dos parceiros nigerianos e da Missão (de Timor-Leste) de Apoio ao Processo de Recenseamento Eleitoral na Guiné-Bissau. Este encontro, realizado no Gabinete Técnico de Apoio ao Processo Eleitoral (GTAPE), visou fazer o ponto ao recenseamento em curso desde o início de Dezembro de 2013, que agora atinge cerca de 300.000 cidadãos já na posse do cartão de eleitor, levando o Ministro Batista Té a declarar: “A previsão dos 800.000 é política, sem qualquer censo prévio que a sustente”. À saída, o Nobel da Paz e chefe do Gabinete Integrado das Nações Unidas para a Consolidação da Paz na Guiné-Bissau felicitou as autoridades guineenses, particularmente o GTAPE e a pessoa do ministro da tutela: Vi com os meus próprios olhos, em tabancas (freguesias) remotas, o que se está a fazer, num processo iniciado graças ao apoio de Timor-Leste. Os que nada ou pouco fazem, sempre encontrarão razões para criticar. Mas a verdade é que as autoridades de transição contaram com muito poucos meios financeiros e materiais. Creio que se não tivesse havido a rápida intervenção de Timor-Leste, ainda hoje – primeira semana de Janeiro – não teria começado o recenseamento. Serão necessários, porém, mais kits. O Governo guineense solicitou apoio à Nigéria, que já disponibilizou 256, adicionais aos 150 de Timor-Leste. Falta agora um ajustamento legal e técnico [na aquisição dos direitos autorais do software e compatibilização das bases dos dados recolhidos]. Do lado de Timor-Leste – e depois de tratar o assunto com o Primeiro-Ministro Xanana Gusmão e com o Secretário de Estado da Descentralização Administrativa timorense, Tomás Cabral -, prosseguirá o apoio ao GTAPE e `as autoridades, procurando todos os meios para compatibilizar o equipamento e sentindo orgulho por poder trabalhar com a maior potência africana, a Nigéria. Aliás, a Nigéria é o país que mais tem aguentado os custos financeiros neste periodo de transição na Guiné-Bissau, ajudando no Orçamento de Estado, financiando quase na totalidade as despesas da ECOMIB [Missão da Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental-CEDEAO na Guiné-Bissau]. Mas serão sempre os irmãos guineenses e o GTAPE a liderar o processo. Timor-Leste está no terreno apenas com meios financeiros e técnicos, para colaborar com soluções para os problemas. Estou satisfeito, depois de ouvir o Primeiro-Ministro Rui Barros e o Ministro Batista Té, bem como a liderança do GTAPE, na medida em que, prorrogado o prazo do registo se atingirá um número máximo razoável de recenseados. O número potencial de 800.000 eleitores não corresponde, de facto, a qualquer aferição rigorosa porque, desde 2008 [data do último censo], ninguém tem ao certo o número de votantes na Guiné-Bissau. Se o número for de 800.000, ótimo, mas admitamos que haverá cidadãos que não estarão preocupados em sair das suas aldeias, caminhar longas distâncias até às mesas de recenseamento, esperar muitas horas nas filas…Ora, se não quiserem, ninguem é obrigado. Se for alcançado o recenseamento de dois terços do número potencial de eleitores, já será muito bom. Por seu turno, o Primeiro-Ministro, Rui Barros, afirmou: Ainda há algumas dificuldades no terreno, mas estamos confiantes em que o processo é abraçado por todos, para culminar nas eleições marcadas para 16 de Março. (Numa página do próprio Ramos-Horta, que faz sempre questão de se apresentar como Nobel da Paz de 1996)