Arrasta-se o julgamento de Hissene Habré

Le président du tribunal spécial africain à Dakar a annoncé jeudi la suspension du procès de l'ex-président tchadien Hissène Habré jusqu'au 9 novembre. À lire aussi Sénégal - Tchad : quand l'épouse de Hissène Habré menace les parties civiles Sénégal - Tchad : quand l'épouse de Hissène Habré menace les parties civiles Hissène Habré face à ses crimes « L’audience est suspendue jusqu’au 9 novembre. La Cour mettra à profit ce temps pour revoir » ses dossiers, a déclaré le Burkinabè Gberdao Gustave Kam, président des Chambres africaines extraordinaires (CAE), à l’issue de l’audience de jeudi 29 octobre. L’audience du 9 novembre doit démarrer avec le témoignage du président de l’Association des victimes des crimes du régime de Hissène Habré (AVCRHH), Clément Abaifouta, a indiqué Gberdao Gustave Kam. Jeudi, le tribunal a écouté le témoignage de Robert Hissein Gambier, né en 1954. Il a affirmé avoir été arrêté en décembre 1985 à N’Djamena par des agents de la Direction de la documentation et de la sécurité (DDS, police politique sous M. Habré) puis détenu jusqu’en décembre 1990. Pris pour un « mercenaire libyen » « Ce qui m’a sauvé (de la mort), je restais devant la porte (où) il y avait un trou et je respirais de l’air frais », a indiqué M. Gambier selon lequel les détenus s’entassaient dans la cellule où il était détenu. Il a dit avoir été arrêté parce que pris pour « un mercenaire libyen », ce qu’il a démenti. Accusé de « crimes de guerre, crimes contre l’humanité et tortures » durant sa présidence au Tchad (1988-1990), Hissène Habré comparaît depuis le 20 juillet devant les CAE, créées en vertu d’un accord entre le Sénégal et l’Union africaine (UA), que l’accusé récuse. Celui-ci refuse de s’exprimer et de se défendre devant cette juridiction. Les audiences avaient ensuite été suspendues dès le lendemain de l’ouverture du procès pour permettre à des avocats commis d’office pour la défense de prendre connaissance du dossier, puis elles ont repris le 7 septembre. Un verdict en février ? Le procès devait initialement prendre fin le 28 octobre, mais il ira « très probablement jusqu’en février », a affirmé jeudi à l’AFP le porte-parole du tribunal spécial, Marcel Mendy, confirmant une information annoncée à l’AFP par une source au sein de la juridiction le 20 octobre. « Nous avons encore une vingtaine de témoins à auditionner à Dakar et d’autres qui sont à N’Djamena » avant les plaidoiries, a ajouté M. Mendy. Hissène Habré encourt entre 30 ans de prison ferme et les travaux forcés à perpétuité. Une commission d’enquête tchadienne a estimé que la répression durant sa présidence a fait 40 000 morts. Jeune Afrique

Carlos Gomes Júnior e Angola

Ex-líder da Guiné recebeu 1,5 milhões de euros do empresário angolano Domingos Manuel Inglês, que está a ser investigado no caso da compra do BES Angola. A Polícia Judiciária e o Ministério Público querem saber porquê. ANTÓNIO JOSÉ VILELA E NUNO TIAGO PINTO O empresário angolano Domingos Manuel Inglês fez uma transferência de 1,950 milhões de dólares (cerca de 1,5 milhões de euros) para uma conta bancária de que é titular Carlos Gomes Júnior, o ex-primeiro-ministro da Guiné-Bissau que vive em Portugal. A operação foi comunicada por um banco à Polícia Judiciária e ao Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal (DCIAP), que está a investigar os movimentos financeiros do cidadão angolano no âmbito dos inquéritos que visam as denúncias do ex-diplomata e professor universitário Adriano Parreira e do negócio da venda de 24% do BES Angola (BESA). Segundo a SÁBADO apurou, as autoridades portuguesas estão há vários meses a investigar os pormenores da transacção financeira para Carlos Gomes Júnior e as eventuais relações existentes entre o político guineense, o empresário angolano e o general Manuel Vieira Dias Júnior (conhecido como Kopelipa), chefe da Casa Militar do Presidente de Angola – e um dos principais alvos dos processos que correm no DCIAP. No entanto, a PJ já sabe que o dinheiro recebido por Gomes Júnior teve origem em várias contas do BES, sediadas no Dubai, e que essas verbas chegaram a Portugal, em Julho de 2012, através de transferências internacionais que atingiram um total de 2,5 milhões de dólares (1,9 milhões de euros). Já em Portugal, os dólares entraram inicialmente em duas contas do próprio Domingos Inglês – que não respondeu às perguntas da SÁBADO até ao fecho desta edição. Para uma das contas, no banco BIG, foram enviados 400 mil dólares (305 mil euros). Mas a maior parte do dinheiro, 2,1 milhões de dólares (1,6 milhões de euros), foi depositada numa conta que o empresário abriu, nesse mesmo mês de Julho, no Montepio Geral. – Foi precisamente deste banco, onde Gomes Júnior também tem conta, que ocorreu a transferência para o ex-primeiro-ministro guineense, chegado a Portugal dois meses antes na sequência do golpe de Estado que ocorreu na Guiné-Bissau a 12 de Abril de 2012. Antes da revolta, que o chegou a deter ilegalmente durante duas semanas, Gomes Júnior tinha sido o candidato mais votado na primeira volta (à frente de Kumba Ialá) das eleições presidenciais. DURANTE A ESTADIA em Lisboa, o Governo português tem-se limitado a autorizar as renovações das autorizações de residência e a emissão de cartas de condução de Gomes Júnior e da comitiva de guineenses que fugiu dos militares golpistas. Como não pediram o estatuto de exilados – que os impediria de ter qualquer actividade política – não recebem apoios do Estado português. Além disso, Gomes Júnior também revelou que tinha meios financeiros para viver em Portugal. Segundo consta no seu currículo oficial, o ex-primeiro-ministro fundou várias empresas na Guiné-Bissau ligadas ao comércio e à distribuição de combustíveis. Em Portugal, foi sócio de duas sociedades anónimas entretanto extintas: a Trafe, Importação e Exportação, e a Soguipal, Sociedade Comercial Luso-Guineense. Tem ainda 20% da portuguesa Crustacil, Comércio de Marisco, Lda. Contactado pela SÁ- BADO, Carlos Gomes Júnior recusou-se a responder a qualquer pergunta. Já a advogada que o representa, Sofia Lelo, afirmou, por escrito, que o seu cliente “não fará qualquer comentário sobre uma possível investigação que esteja ou não a decorrer a um outro cidadão, envolvendo quaisquer transferências bancárias vindas de Angola, até porque, a existirem para a sua pessoa, tratar-se-ão de assuntos do foro pessoal e privado (…)”. No entanto, fonte próxima do antigo primeiro-ministro guineense disse à SÁBADO que o dinheiro da transferência bancária em causa poderá estar relacionado com a venda de um imóvel onde, durante vários anos, funcionou a embaixada angolana em Bissau. Depois, quando a Missang, Missão de Cooperação Técnica Militar de Angola, deixou o país, em Junho de 2012, a representação diplomática mudou-se para o edifício até aí ocupado pelas tropas e o imóvel, alegadamente de Gomes Júnior, terá passado a ser ocupado pela Bauxite Angola, Sociedade Mineira e Investimentos, SA. ESTA EMPRESA ANGOLANA de capitais públicos e privados, que a SÁBADO não conseguiu contactar até ao fecho da edição, assinou em 2007 com o governo da Guiné-Bissau um contrato de exploração de minério que tem estado envolvido em polémica. Em Março passado, o Conselho Consultivo da Procuradoria-Geral da República da Guiné-Bissau considerou, segundo o parecer a que a agência Lusa teve acesso, que o contrato assinado não respeitava a legislação do país e que podia ser rescindido unilateralmente. A SÁBADO apurou ainda que, na investigação das movimentações financeiras de Domingos Inglês, a PJ identificou a transferência de 400 mil dólares (305 mil euros), realizada em Outubro de 2012, para uma conta do BCP em Lisboa de que é titular Maria Sá Sequeira – que a SÁBADO não conseguiu contactar -, mulher do general angolano Salviano Jesus Sequeira, vice-ministro da Defesa para os Recursos Naturais e membro do gabinete do Presidente José Eduardo dos Santos. Em Janeiro de 2011, dois meses antes de a Missang chegar a Bissau, Salviano Sequeira integrou uma delegação governamental angolana que esteve na Guiné a negociar os termos da missão de cooperação técnico-militar. • Sábado | Quinta, 09 Maio 2013

A guerra colonial portuguesa

Al J Venter on the Portuguese Colonial War By Steven Thomas on 29 Apr 2012 | Last Updated 2 Mar 2014 I’ve just got all the books by Al J. Venter I could find … at least those related the Portuguese Colonial War. Al Venter is unique – a journalist, with military experience himself, willing to go into the combat zone with the Portuguese security forces, who then wrote about his experiences. The result is a set of books with rich descriptions of real life conditions in the field in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. These books are not general histories. For an overview of the war you’ll have to look else where. They are first hand accounts of the war from the Portuguese stand point by an informed but independent observer. I thought I’d type up my notes for all of Al’s books in one place. The books I’ve got, and their focus, are: •The Terror Fighters: A profile of Guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa (Venter, 1969) ◦War in Angola •Portugal’s Guerrilla War: The Campaign for Africa (Venter, 1973) ◦War in Portuguese Guinea •Africa at War (Venter, 1974a) ◦War in Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique and Angola. He also covers non-Portuguese wars: Biafra, Chad, Rhodesia, Sudan, and Eritrea. •The Zambesi Salient: Conflict in Southern Africa (Venter, 1974b) ◦War in Mozambique and Rhodesia. •The Chopper Boys: Helicopter Warfare in Africa (Venter, 1994) ◦The focus is, as the by-line states, helicopter warfare. However he does cover the War in Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique and Angola. Venter also covers non-Portuguese wars and countries: Somalia, Algeria, Congo, East African Mutinies, Chad, Rhodesia, Egypt, Liberia, and Namibia. Timeline 4 Feb 1961 A small group of MPLA men attacked Luanda Prison (Venter, 1969). The Portuguese had 8,000 men in Angola when the 1961 attacks occurred: 3,000 Portuguese and 5,000 African (Venter, 1969). 18 Mar 1967 18 insurgents attacked a coffee-farm late one night in the Dembos (Venter, 1969). Portuguese troops arrived quickly. Three insurgents were killed and several wounded. The Portuguese captured one of the wounded (Imbu) and he joined the Portuguese. Dembos Mountains Setting: Dembos Mountains Angola; 1969 The Dembos mountains were the focus of insurgent activity in northern Angola (Venter, 1969). The mountains start 70 km north of Luanda and are covered in heavy jungle broken by grey-blue granite peaks. The insurgents used the peaks as observation points. Road convoys had a tough time (Venter, 1969). The roads were bad and the insurgents active. It could take 24 hours to cover 100 km by road, twice that in the rainy season. An outward convoy might be attacked four or five times but the return trip was worse as the insurgents would be more prepared having seen the trucks on the outward trip. Sector A Setting: Sector A, Northern Angola; 1969 Sector A was north of Sector D (and the Dembos Mountains) and stretched to the Congo and the coast (Venter, 1969). It was a wild and difficult area. Much of it was jungle swampland. Malaria and other tropical illnesses were rife. The sector was virtually uninhabited and the few Africans that remained avoided both the Portuguese and insurgents. To reach Sector D in the Dembos any insurgents travelling from Congo-Brazzaville had to cross Sector A (Venter, 1969). It took the average insurgent six weeks to cover the 200 km long trail. They carried everything they needed on their backs – guns, ammunition, explosives, food, medical supplies, propaganda leaflets. They had also managed to bring in 500 lb aerial bombs on litters between four men (not that these make good mines as the Portuguese spotted them easily). Sector D Setting: Comsec D, Dembos Mountains, Angola; 1969 ?? Was Sector D synonymous with the Dembos ?? Comsec D (or Sector D) was the centre of the Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign in northern Angola (Venter, 1969). Sector D was about the size of Cyprus. Santa Eulalia Camp was the headquarters. There were seven other Portuguese camps in the sector, including Zala camp to the north of the sector, Zemba to the south and Nambuangongo (‘Nambu’) in the centre. Quicabo Camp was in the Dembos but I’m not sure whether was in Sector D. Sector F Setting: Sector F, Dembos Mountains, Angola; 1969 Venter (1969) mentions Terreiro, “a small coffee-producing area in Sector F, just north of here [Santa Eulalia in Sector D]”. It was apparently mountainous so was probably in the Dembos. Santa Eulalia Camp Setting: Santa Eulalia Camp, Sector D, Dembos Mountains, Angola; 1969 Santa Eulalia Camp was the headquarters of Comsec D (or Sector D) (Venter, 1969). It was constructed soon after the attacks of 1961. The camp was on a group of low-lying hills and was built within a coffee platation. Around the camp was a patch work of thousands of rows of small coffee bushes. In between the coffee patches was open grassland and beyond the plantation the jungle started. The camp had a garrison of 300 men (Venter, 1969). The commander in 1969 was Brigadier Martins Sorres. He had six staff officers to help conduct the counter-insurgency war in Sector D. The layout of Santa Eulalia was apparently typical of Portuguese camps (Venter, 1969). The perimeter was a a 8′ barbed-wire double fence. Arc lights with protective wire coverings were spaced every 12 yards or so along the fence, but at night their light could only penetrate 50 yards beyond the fence line. There were also 6 or 7 machine gun turrets spread around the perimeter. The centre of the camp had a row of low prefabricated wooden bungalows. An “elaborate” bunker and tunnel system completed the defences. The tunnels meant it was possible to move between all of the buildings, and between the buildings and the forward positions, in complete safety. Unlike other camps Santa Eulalia had a second section near the air strip for the air force personnel (Venter, 1969). The army provide security for this camp as well as the first. The garrison was highly mobile and provided support and tactical roles for other Portuguese army units in the area (Venter, 1969). Their mobility came from the two dozen trucks and helicopters at the base. Despite the presence of the camp the coffee estate was still commercially functioning (Venter, 1969). Nambuangongo (‘Nambu’) Camp Setting: Nambuangongo (‘Nambu’) Camp, Sector D, Dembos Mountains Angola; 1969 Nambuangongo (‘Nambu’) Camp was on a mountain top in Sector D (Venter, 1969). It was the insurgent headquarters in 1961. Fighting in the area had been “fierce and consistent” and Portuguese losses in the area were relatively high. Capturing the post would have been a “significant moral and military victory” so the insurgents occasionally attacked the camp. Venter (1974b) has an aerial photo of mbuangongo Camp north of Luanda in Angola – between p. 212 and 213. Quicabo Camp Setting: Quicabo Camp, Dembos Mountains Angola; 1969 Quicabo was a Portuguese camp in the Dembos mountains of northern Angola (Venter, 1969). The camp had a garrison of 200 men. Because of the difficulty of road transport Quicabo got most of its fresh supplies by air (Venter, 1969). The supply planes (Noratlas) normally flew at 500 feet but made the approach at just above tree level. Once at the camp the plan made three passes and dropped a total of seven crates (2, 2, 3). The first had the mail – considered the most important cargo. Other supplies were fresh provisions for two or three days plus medical supplies. The terrain was difficult enough but occasionally the insurgents also shot at the supply planes as they came in for a drop. Zemba Camp Setting: Zemba Camp, Sector D, Dembos Mountains Angola; 1969 Zemba was 20 km south-east of Santa Eulalia thus the closest (Venter, 1969). A large bald sugar loaf mountain overlooked the camp from the south. The insurgents used that hill or surrounding bush to shoot into the camp or at aircraft. The camp was under fire nearly every week since the start of operations. The only wall of the officer’s mess was on the windward side. The garrison were infantry and patrolled the area on foot or in trucks (Venter, 1969). The camp had about 12 trucks. The men followed a patrol rota. The insurgents referred to the Portuguese patrols as Death Walkers. One group was in camp all the time to rest while the other men were on patrol. Being in the south of the Dembos there was more grassland than jungle, which makes insurgent ambushes less likely. Portuguese aligned Civilians and Local Security in Sector D Setting: Sector D, Dembos Mountains, Angola; 1969 By 1969 the local Africans of the Dembos generally worked their fields (or on the plantations) during the day and moved closer to the Portuguese camps for protection at night (Venter, 1969). The men were armed and organised into platoons under a section leader. The section leader reported to a Portuguese officer in case of attack. Sector D had huge coffee plantations (Venter, 1969). The plantations were patch works of thousands of rows of small coffee bushes. In between the coffee patches was open grassland and beyond the plantation the jungle started. The farmers continually struggled to hold the jungle back. No soldiers were stationed on the plantations. All farm owners and workers, white and black, were responsible for their own security and went armed. Farmers could fight off small insurgent attacks without help but were also in radio contact with the nearest camp. Insurgents in Sector D Setting: Sector D, Dembos Mountains, Angola; 1969 In 1969 the Portuguese estimated there were 5 to 6,000 insurgents in Sector D (Venter, 1969). 90% of them had walked from Congo-Brazzaville. By 1969 they fought in small units of about 20 men or less. Most of the men were trained outside Angola – in Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville or further afield. Some had AK47s and Simonov carbines but others used a home-made blunderbuss firing nails, pieces of iron, and/or rock. The latter, although primitive, could cause terrible wounding damage. The two main groups in Angola were the UPA and MPLA (Venter, 1969). There was no love lost between these groups. In 1969 MPLA was trying to establish itself in within Sector D and preferred to fight the UPA than the Portuguese. The included MPLA informers telling the Portuguese the location of UPA groups and letting the Portuguese dispatch their enemy. The Portuguese saw a marked difference in ability between MPLA and UPA (Venter, 1969). The Portuguese viewed the MPLA as “resilient fighters”, “tough, wily and dangerous” (Venter, 1969, p. 31). The MPLA tried to win over the local population. MPLA men would ask villages for food and rarely touched the local women. None of which applied to the UPA. Early in the war the Portuguese viewed the UPA as an effective force but by 1969 it was weakened by lack of discipline (Venter, 1969). UPA men took food from villagers without asking and alienated the villagers by attempting to seduce their women or outright raping them. Insurgent aligned Civilians in Sector D Setting: Sector D, Dembos Mountains, Angola; 1969 The insurgents were supported by 10 to 15,000 African civilians living in the mountainous jungles of Sector D (Venter, 1969). Civilians supported the insurgents because of genuine loyalty to the cause, tribal allegiance or just plain coercion. They would feed and host the insurgents, and occasionally hide them in their villages. The villages (sanzalas in the local language) were in jungle clearings as were their food crops. Some villages were large enough to house a field hospital. The staple crop was manioc or cassava root. The root could be planted and left to mature untended. It could be harvested in two months, either by the villagers or by insurgents. They also crew maize/corn and, if time allowed, beans. Meat was rare. The location of villages The Portuguese occasionally spotted from the air but they left the villages alone (Venter, 1969). Death Walkers: Portuguese Foot Patrols Setting: Sector D, Dembos Mountains, Angola; Also Cambinda Enclave; 1969 The insurgents in the Dembos referred to the Portuguese jungle patrols as ‘The Death Walkers’ (Venter, 1969). Foot patrols had about 30 men under and officer and three sergeants. The patrols lasted 3-5 days but could be longer if the trail was “hot”. The men carried everything they needed, food for five days, and something extra (e.g. machine gun ammunition, mortar, bazooka, shells, stretcher, etc). Each group has three machine guns, and a mortar and a bazooka. The group walked in single file. Each man knew the duties of the two men immediately in front of him and the two immediately behind so he could take over if they were out of action. A machine gun was located at front, centre and rear of the file. The men were trained to know when to take cover because in the jungle under fire they wouldn’t be able to see the officers and probably not hear them. The patrols walked silently due to the Portuguese boots (canvas with rubber soles) and the rotting vegetation on the floor of the jungle. To maintain silence the troop used sign language. Even when stopping to eat in a clearing few soldiers talked. A third of the men would be on guard during these breaks. Black soldiers acted as trackers; they could follow a two day old trail through bush and jungle for another two days. A patrol could cover 100 km in heavily overgrown jungle in five days. More in the open area to the east of the Dembos. If the patrol was following an insurgent trail they preferred to follow alongside the trail to avoid booby traps but this was impossible in dense bush. Herding Civilians A UPA tactic was to move entire communities of 200 to 8,000 into the jungle; the groups were larger nearer the border with the Congo (Venter, 1969). This denied the Portuguese civilian labour but also gave the insurgents a ready source of food and recruits. The civilian men were encouraged to join the insurgent ranks and the women raised crops. This tactic was particularly effective in 1963-4 and Angola suffered a severe coffee shortage despite the fact there was a world glut. The process of moving a community would start with a 24 hour ultimatum (Venter, 1969). Failure to comply would result in 10 or 12 people – men and women – being shot each morning until the community agreed to move. Of course that didn’t enamour the villagers and the insurgents would have to control the civilians with their guns. Once on the move it took several weeks for a group to cross the border (Venter, 1969). Moving constantly the food soon ran short. A large group would have to resort to eating the grass around their campsites. Obviously people starved. In contrast the insurgent guards usually had enough to eat. And they tended to shoot stragglers. The Portuguese could often tell the location of a convoy by the circling vultures (Venter, 1969). If they dropped commandoes ahead of the convoy the insurgents would melt into the bush to look for other civilians to herd. Civilians were often moved into Congo-Kinshasa (Venter, 1969). Over half a million by 1965. Some stayed, despite the poor conditions in Congo-Kinshas, but others tried to return to Angola soon after they arrived. Self-appointed bands of armed youths (Jeunesse) patrolled the borders and shot anybody they found trying to return. None-the-less about 2/3 of those who moved to Congo-Kinshasa returned to Angola. Over time the Portuguese began to feed and house the returning refugees. Chaplain Lieutenant Jorge In one example before Jun 1968 about 400 UPA insurgents were herding over 5,000 civilians towards the Congolese border east of Matadi (Venter, 1969). Matadi, the main Congo port and often used point of entry. The guards wore no uniform making it difficult to distinguish them from the villagers. A Portuguese commando platoon, along with Chaplain Lieutenant Jorge, trailed the convoy for four days. The insurgents knew they were being followed and set a ruthless pace for the starving civilians. Many died. A small number of Bazombo tribesmen escaped the convoy and were captured by the Portuguese. Earlier in the year, in a similar position, the Portuguese had attacked but the guards just disappeared into the jungle. This time Lieutenant Jorge decided on a different approach, to avoid the insurgents disappearing and to avoid civilian casualties. Over four nights Jorge visited groups of civilians and persuaded the chiefs to return to Portuguese control. The next morning the civilians revolted against their guards. By the time the Portuguese attacked most of the insurgents were dead; only about 24 insurgents were captured. The Portuguese retained the “brighter” ones for interrogation but handed the majority back to the civilians to be tortured and killed. 1/2 of the original group of villagers had died in the trek. Insurgent accuracy The Portuguese considered the insurgent fire inaccurate; they rarely hit beyond 100 m (Venter, 1969). This applied to all areas and despite the level of training received. Insurgents in the Dembos at least were expected to collect their spent cartridges (Venter, 1969). They were not issued new cartridges unless they presented them back at camp. Empty cartridges was seen as proof they’d been in combat rather than just thrown away their unused shells. Insurgent attacks on Portuguese Camps Setting: Sector D, Dembos Mountains, Angola; 1969 Most insurgent attacks on Portuguese camps in Sector D were at night (Venter, 1969). However, by 1969 the insurgents were conducting mock attacks during the day. These were intended to bring the Portuguese officers into the open where insurgent snipers would shoot them. But apparently the “deplorable” aim of the insurgents meant the tactic wasn’t too successful. Nambuangongo (‘Nambu’) Camp in Sector D was seriously attacked several times because it had been the insurgent headquarters in 1961 so had particular significance (Venter, 1969). Insurgent Ambush in Mountains Setting: Dembos Mountains, Angola; 1969 Road convoys had a tough time in the Dembos Mountains (Venter, 1969). The roads were bad and the insurgents active. It could take 24 hours to cover 100 km by road, twice that in the rainy season. An outward convoy might be attacked four or five times but the return trip was worse as the insurgents would be more prepared having seen the trucks on the outward trip. Venter (1969, p. 19) described a typical ambush by insurgents in the mountainous Dembos: They would chose a stretch of road with clear visibility for some distance in both approach directions – in a valley or on a corner at the bottom of a dip in the road. If the area is overgrown they will attack from a position above the road, firing down on the convoy. This also gives a better opportunity of escape once the action is complete. The Portuguese standard response was to brake hard, jump out of the vehicles and dash for any cover on the side of the road (elephant grass or shurbbery) whilst firing their rifles into the closest cover. Early in the war the insurgents had often positioned men with catanas near the road and the Portuguese wanted to clear the grass before they arrived. Ambush on the Tereiro Road Setting: Few km from Terreiro, Sector F, Dembos Mountains?, Angola; 1969 Source: Venter (1969, pp. 19-21); Map on p. 20. Two Portuguese jeeps were ambushed travelling from their post at outlying village to Terreiro. The occupants were Captain de Campos and seven other men. The Captain drove the lead jeep. A insurgent group of perhaps 20 to 25 had set up an ambush positions on a rise commanding a section of road that went around the foot of the hill through a dip. Their position was 30 m above the road. This gave the attackers excellent visibility in both directions. The area had patches of jungle with elephant grass between and along the road. There was also an 8′ deep gully (donga) between the road and the insurgent positions, hidden by the long grass. The insurgents also opened an escape path through the nearby jungle. The road was good and the Portuguese driving fast to ensure they did the round trip before lunch. Captain de Campos recounts (Venter, 1969, p. 19): We came round one of the many bends in the road, fairly close to town. As we turned sharply and dropped into a dip in the road, the terrorists opened fire from a position above us to the left. They let go with everything they had. It was a good spot for an ambush. The Portuguese braked hard, jumped out of the jeeps and dashed for the elephant grass whilst firing their rifles into the nearby grass. This was a standard technique as early in the war the insurgents had often positioned men with catanas near the road. Once in the cover of the elephant grass the Portuguese returned fire on the insurgents. Unfortunately all they could see was the grass and the road behind. One of the men in the second jeep was badly wounded and the Captain decided on decisive action. The seven remaining men each threw a grenade at half-second intervals while the other men concentrated fire on the hill above them, then they charged the enemy throwing their second grenades. They were slowed by the gully but once past this obstacle the insurgent began withdrew into the jungle. they left behind one dead – killed by one of the Portuguese grenades. Ambush of a Commando Patrol A commando captain was leading a patrol of 20 men in Mozambique (Venter, 1969). The captain walked onto an anti-personnel explosive improvised from a mortar bomb and lost both legs below the knee. Then an insurgent force opened up with bazookas, mortars, grenades and machine guns. Despite blood loss, and a couple of period of unconsciousness, the captain retained control of his men until the insurgents withdrew. The Portuguese suffered 13 casualties – five killed and eight wounded, two critically. The captain subsequently won the highest military honour in Lisbon. Encountering a Sanzala in the Jungle When a Portuguese patrol discovered a sanzala in the jungle they’d have to decide what to do (Venter, 1969). If the patrol thought insurgents were in the sanzala they would go through a few steps that pretty much assured success: 1.Officer signs for the patrol to immediately freeze 2.Three “scouts”, all experts in knives, are sent forward to eliminate any sentries1 and reconnoitre2. One scout goes around each side and the third takes the direct path. They assess how big the position is, how many people are present, the best approaches, possible dangers. They also identify sites for the machine guns to form a crossfire and the “death zone”, i.e. the line beyond which the Portuguese will not proceed because it is the target zone for the machine guns. The scouts then return to the main patrol. 3.Synchronise watches. 4.Two machine gun teams are given 5-10 minutes to set up a crossfire. A scout takes each machine gun team to the previously identified position on each side of the sanzala. A few other men spread out on each side. 5.At the predetermined time the three sections would attack. The flanking sections providing a crossfire into the “death zone”. The third section attacked in the centre and advancing to the line of the “death zone”. The insurgents typically surrendered wafter a few minutes. Notes: (1) The Portuguese thought the insurgent sentries were better than theirs, or at least better than the metropolitan soldiers. Africans born in the jungle, on either side of the conflict, knew the “early-warning system” of the jungle. The Africans could hear a whisper at 50 m and a cough at 800 m. The animals in the jungle could sense a larger animal like a human nearby and go quiet; this produced an eerie and unnatural silence so both sides would know something was up. (2) The insurgents didn’t just camp out in the jungle so surrounding the sanzala was often difficult or impossible. The insurgents located their camps to exploit some natural advantage, e.g. impenetrable jungle on two sides, on a bend along a river or next to a steep hill. If the patrol didn’t think insurgents were present then they might take a more casual approach (Venter, 1969). Venter cites an example where this casual approach invited an ambush. The patrol hadn’t seen any insurgents for days so thought the area was safe. They were wrong. 1.Portuguese casually scouted the area. 2.Portuguese Captain and small team entered the sanzala. 3.Insurgents surrounded the lower side of the village, avoiding the Portuguese patrol. 4.Portuguese Captain entered a hut in the sanzala to talk to four village elders. 5.Insurgents began firing after a few moments. 6.The men in the hut hit the dirt until the firing stopped. 7.Insurgents fired for 3 or 4 minutes. 8.The four villagers in the the hut with the Captain were killed. “Rehabilitating Terrorists” In the Dembos in Angola at least captured insurgents were given a simple choice: join the Portuguese or execution (Venter 1969). Joining the Portuguese meant the man was expected to tell his captors everything then lead a patrol through the jungle to the hide outs he had used. This last act commits him to the Portuguese effort as his betrayal will have been observed by his former colleagues and guarantee a fatal reunion should he attempt to rejoin the insurgents. By 1969 there were about 1,000 of these former insurgents fighting for the Portuguese in Angola (Venter 1969). The Portuguese valued them because “they know the jungle; they know the enemy and, most important of all, they know every ruse of the native” (Captain Alcada cited p. 56) Imbu is an example. He was captured by the Portuguese captured on 18 Mar 1967 when wounded in an attack on a coffee-farm. He chose to join the Portuguese and led them to his former camp where several of his comrades were killed. Imbu subsequently became a section leader. He was also nominated for decoration for his part in destroyed an insurgent supply column in which he killed two men himself. Attack on Villa Teixeira de Sousa Setting: Villa Teixeira de Sousa, Angola; 25 Dec Insurgents attacked Villa Teixeira de Sousa on the railway line in the east of Angola at lunchtime on Christmas day (Venter, 1969). The entire population and garrison had sat down for an elaborate lunch when the attack started. The insurgents attacked the native quarter first giving the Portuguese time to get their guns. For the loss of only a few defenders (black and white) they killed more than 300 attackers. Invasion of Republic of Guinea 22 Nov 1973 Setting: Conakry, Republic of Guinea; 22 Nov 1973 As described by Venter (1974b, p. 292-294) Objectives: 1.Destroy the PAIGC headquarters in Conakry 2.Free Portuguese soldiers held captive by President Toure 3.Take over Toure’s palace Base: Portuguese Guinea Assault Force: Invasion force (Lt. Joao Januario Lopes – a PAIGC defector) Dissidents from Guinea, i.e. opponents of President Toure Portuguese army personnel (White officers and African other ranks) 1 x Company of Portuguese commandos 1 x Group of African Marines 300 men in total 2 x Alfange Landing craft (60m long and 500 ton capacity) Escort 4 x Argos patrol boats (40m long and 180 tons) Lt. Lopes was a a PAIGC defector and redefected on landing. The invaders only managed to free the Portuguese prisoners. Tete Convoy 1973 Tete Highway, 16-18 Feb 1973 On 16 Feb 1973 Al. J. Venter (1974b) joined a convoy of trucks on the Tete road. The convoy was under Portuguese military escort for the 134 km from Moatize to the Malawi border. There were two passenger buses, Venter’s Land Rover, a “medium-sized English car”, and about 35 commercial trucks, from companies such as Swifts, Watson’s Transport, United Transport, and Heins. Drivers were instructed to stay between 50 and 100 metres behind the next vehicle and drive within the tracks of the vehicles ahead. The civilians were also instructed to stay in their vehicles if the convoy was stopped by enemy action – to avoid any anti-personnel mines that may have been laid. A white Portuguese sergeant led the escort of mixed black and white soldiers. The troops wore camouflage so were probably cazadores of the regular army. They had G3 rifles, grenades, mortars and bazookas. The lead vehicle was a military Berliet truck – this had the bonnet removed and the cab sandbagged to protect the driver from mines. It also had a “gun platform”. Another Berliet followed the convoy. The escort also had two unimogs, one of which had a heavy machine gun on a fixed tripod. They made only 18km on the first day. Twice they stopped to check for mines; four Picadores walked ahead to find mines with their probes. That night they camped in a clearing with the heavier trucks formed into a laager and the bus and passengers inside. On the second day the convoy detected and blew up a mine within five minutes of leaving the camp site. The column would stop every few hundred metres to allow the soldiers to check ahead for mines. They found another mine and blew it up. But progress was slow. When the convoy stopped for the third mine of the day they suffered a Flagelacao, i.e. a whipping burst of gunfire. The insurgents fired from a gully to the side of the convoy and from a position towards the rear. The heavy machine gun on the Unimog returned fire followed by the Portuguese mortars. Generally everybody stepped in tested ground to avoid mines but a squad of soldiers crossed the potentially lethal gravel at the side of the road to take up positions to protect the convoy. The convoy was halted for a considerable period to clear the mines ahead. After 10 minutes the civilians in the convoy began to move around despite earlier warnings. The insurgents continued to fire periodically but did not inflict any casualties. Each time the insurgents fired the convoy escort would reply with a volley. Eventually the soldiers cleared 14 mines from the road – two anti-vehicle and 12 anti-personnel. After clearing the mines the convoy drove on and reached the Portuguese Army “para-commando” camp at Muxoxo. Alouette helicopters from the camp escorted the convoy for the last hour of their drive in. Muxoxo was an old farmhouse surrounded by tents. The commandoes were responsible for road security and security on the railway line from Moatize to Caldas Xavier. They had six Alouette helicopters. The Portuguese mined the approaches to bridges. This was to discourage insurgents from sabotaging the bridges but it also made it difficult for civilians from passing convoys to fetch water from the rivers. Unlike the the insurgents, Portuguese minefields were signposted Zona Armadlihada (Minefield). The on-coming convoy suffered casualties. One of the Picadores was killed by a mine. His three companions were wounded. Venter contrasts the Portuguese and American attitudes to wounds. Where Americans might have been evacuated and treated, Portuguese with the same wounds would continue with their duties. On the assumption that the road ahead had been cleared by the on-coming convoy Venter’s convoy raced through the night for the border. In the heavy raid the drivers found it difficult to follow the tracks of the vehicle ahead the convoy lost two trucks to “ratchet mines” – these detonate after a pre-determined number of wheels have passed over them; sometimes 10 or 12, sometimes double that. The mines exploded under the rear wheels of the trucks and the drivers were unhurt. After each incident the convoy paused only 10 minutes before abandoning the damaged vehicle and moving on. Col. Tony “Green Beret” Herbert Col. Tony “Green Beret” Herbert commanded a battalion of the US 173rd Brigade in Vietnam (Venter, 1974b). Within the brigade Herbert’s battalion suffered among the lowest casualties but inflicted the most kills. Herbert explained his unit’s success by saying: One of the best ways to take a lot of casualties in a helicopter assault is to land your choppers 300 or 400 metres from where the enemy is dug in and move across that ground to close with him. You have to go through his automatic-weapons fire, his mortars. You get tangled up with his mines and his booby traps. you lose some arms and legs and you become disorganized before you ever get close. You give up any advantage of surprise you might have had. You get discouraged. You give the enemy a chance to get out the back door after he’s through chewing you up. I decided that this wasn’t the way to do it. I brought my choppers straight down on the enemy. I didn’t have to go through any damn minefields and have my men blown apart. And it gave the enemy two choices. He could fight and die or he could surrender. Some of them fight and die, but a lot of them surrendered. Hell, I saw a sergeant knock out a tank in the Dominican Republic with a Coca-Cola bottle. He ran up and threw a bottle of Coke at a rebel tank. The people in that tank thought the bottle was full of gasoline and they were going to be burned a live, so they got right out. You can be aggressive enough not to take casualties. In my battalion, we used basic infantry tactics that have been good since the time of Philip of Macedonia. There’s a lot of nonsense talked about the new lessons of Vietnam and that sort of thing, but war is still war. The problem is still closing with the enemy and destroying him. But in Vietnam the Army figured we could win it with technology. So we bombed everything in sight, used artillery like there was no tomorrow, defoliated and all the rest. Somebody once said that in Vietnam we would use ammunition like a millionaire and use lives like a pauper. That sounds good; it has a nice ring; like something generals tack on walls behind their desks,. But what happened was we started killing a lot of the wrong people. You don’t know who you’re killing when you fire artillery all over the place or call in a B-52 strike. When you use fire power indiscriminately, everybody gets killed – including Americans. I’d guess that about 50 per cent of our casualties over there have been a result of our own weapons. We wanted to make it easier for the grunts, but visibility was so restricted in the bush that uncontrolled men firing just flat killed a lot of our own troops. The big reason for using so much fire-power, of course – apart from giving the Air Force and the artillery a job to do – was so we could increase our body count. Theirs, not ours. We decided to measure success on the battlefield in terms of bodies. We tried to operate where the guerrillas were and to operate like them. We made sure we were killing the enemy, not just some farmer who happened to get in our way. Hardly any American units in Vietnam, for example, operated at night. But that’s when the V.C. go to work. That’s when they move, when they set up their assaults, when they make their mortar attacks. Obviously, if you want to stop them, you have to get out there at night, when they’re on the move; not go into a village in the daytime, hoping the V.C. are holed up there, and blow that village apart. So we started setting up night ambushes along the trails. I had to retrain my men in fire discipline. With all the emphasis on fire-power, everybody was in the habit of going full automatic fire any time there was a fight, and all that does is guarantee you’re going to kill everybody in the area – enemy, innocent civilians and your own troops. I told my people we would use single shots, no bursts. And I made them go out and retrain with their weapons so they could hit what they were shooting at. Then I told the troops that when we heard automatic fire from any weapons, we would return that fire, because it would be considered enemy. Any man who switched to automatic had better watch his ass or he’d be dead. I got everybody – including myself – out of the rear. You have to go over there to know just how important that is. New York Times article quoted by Venter (1974b) p. 261-263 Herbert cut down on artillery and air strike support, stopped assaults on villages, ensured his men knew who they were shooting at, went to find the enemy, and ensured everybody spent time in the front lline. Quality of Portuguese Troops Venter (1974b) had a low opinion of the Portuguese military in Mozambique. The Portuguese professional soldiers (as opposed to conscripts) and specialist troops such as GE and GEP got on with the job. However the majority of Portuguese forces in Mozambique had low morale and were apathetic (Venter, 1974b). In particular few Portuguese garrisons operated at night. For example, the 2,000 men protecting the railway from Beira to Moatize spent the night, from two hours before sunset, in their armed camps. Venter (1974b) quotes Dennis Gordon, a Rand Daily mail correspondent, when talking about the Portuguese in Mozambique: South African and Rhodesian military experts are disparaging about the way the Portuguese are fighting their war. They claim the troops are ‘camp oriented’, and that they wait to be attacked rather than going out as aggressors. They say the average Portuguese soldier is not very good at his job. That is not to doubt his courage; indeed, a man has to be brave merely to survive conditions in some of the northern sectors. The crack units – marines, commandos and paratroopers who are all volunteers – are comparable with elite fighting corps anywhere. it is they who carry out the essential search-and-destroy missions. But the average man in uniform is resolutely led, and often badly motivated. The conscripts from Portugal are not aware of the reasons for the war in this steamy, overseas possession, because of censorship. The 36 000 Blacks who make up 60 per cent of the 60 000-man force are seldom used where they have tribal affiliations. They might as well be fighting in a foreign country. Military experts say that the frequent transfer of career officers from one war zone to another is a factor that affects the war effort. Often an officer has just mastered the difficulties of the campaign in a particular area when it is time for him to move on. Dennis Gordon in Venter (1974b), p. 302-303 These criticisms did not apply to those Portuguese troops in Angola and Portuguese Guinea. Insurgent Groups MPLA MPLA received arms, ammunition and equipment was Soviet, Eastern European and Chinese (Vinter, 1969). Many brighter MPLA recruits were sent to Algeria, Cuba, Russian and China for training. However even in Africa it was Chinese, Cubans, Algerians and a few North Vietnamese that trained the MPLA men. The North Vietnamese also helped over come language challenges as they spoke French like many of the African recruits. Zambians in Mozambique 1973 In early 1973 Portuguese troops encountered a five-man Zambian patrol 30 km within Mozambique (Venter, 1974b). The Portuguese captured two of the Zambians. The prisoners claimed to have crossed the border by accident, despite the fact their patrol was led by an experienced Sergeant, they had topographical maps and compasses, and they to get to to their final position they had had to cross are large tributary of the Zambezi which is well know to be within Mozambique. The Zambians were transferred to Gago Coutinho, within sight of the Zambian border, then Tete and further south. A few nights later almost 250 insurgents attacked Gago Coutinho in an attempt to free the prisoners (Venter, 1974b). The attackers wore Czech camouflage uniforms or mufti. After a few hours of battle the insurgents retreated across the border into Zambia. The Portuguese lost no men had killed some of the insurgents. These were found to be FRELIMO men or Zambian Defence Force (they had identity cards). Rhodesians in Mozambique 1973 In Apr 1973 the commander of Portuguese forces in Mozambique, General Kaulza de Arriago, revealed a ‘gentlemans agreement’ between the Portuguese and Rhodesians allowing troops to cross the common border in pursuit of Frelimo or ZANU insurgents (Venter, 1974b). But the cooperation went further than cross border pursuits. In Jun 1973 Max Hastings, a British journalist, revealed in the London Evening Standard that Rhodesian and Portuguese forces were coordinating operations within Mozambique (Venter, 1974b). The Rhodesians were trying to seal the frontier and get at infiltration routes. The Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) and 400 men of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) were involved. They were inserted by helicopter to conduct search and destroy missions. They were in the field for two or three weeks with supplies brought in by helicopter every two or three days. The Rhodesians could cover 14 km or more per day and the put in surprise attacks on insurgent bases. The terrorists referred to the Rhodesians as ‘the ghosts’, in contrast to the noisy Portuguese. The Rhodesians said of the Portuguese that they “just crash along through the bush shouting and signing deliberately because they don’t want to make contact” (p. 139). References Venter, A. J. (1969). The Terror Fighters: A profile of Guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa. Cape Town: Purnell. Venter, A. J. (1973). Portugal’s Guerrilla War: The Campaign for Africa. John Malherbe Pty Ltd. Venter, A. J. (1974a). Africa at War. Connecticut, USA: Devin-Adair. Venter, A. J. (1974b). The Zambesi Salient: Conflict in Southern Africa. Cape Town: Howard Timmins. Venter, A. J. (1994). The Chopper Boys: Helicopter Warfare in Africa. London: Greenhill Books.

China com falta de mulheres

One wife, many husbands. That’s the solution to China’s huge surplus of single men, says Xie Zuoshi, an economics professor at the Zhejing University of Finance and Economics, whose recent proposal to allow polyandry has gone viral. Legalizing marriage between two men would also be a good idea, Mr. Xie wrote in a post that has since been removed from his blogs. (He has at least three blogs, and his Sina blog alone has more than 2.6 million followers.) By 2020, China will have an estimated 30 million bachelors — called guanggun, or “bare branches.” Birth control policies that since 1979 have limited many families to one child, a cultural preference for boys and the widespread, if illegal, practice of sex-selective abortion have contributed to a gender imbalance that hovers around 117 boys born for every 100 girls. Though some could perhaps detect a touch of Jonathan Swift in the proposal, Mr. Xie wrote that he was approaching the problem from a purely economic point of view. Many men, especially poor ones, he noted, are unable to find a wife and have children, and are condemned to living and dying without offspring to support them in old age, as children are required to do by law in China. But he believes there is a solution. A shortage raises the price of goods — in this case, women, he explained. Rich men can afford them, but poor men are priced out. This can be solved by having two men share the same woman. “With so many guanggun, women are in short supply and their value increases,” he wrote. “But that doesn’t mean the market can’t be adjusted. The guanggun problem is actually a problem of income. High-income men can find a woman because they can pay a higher price. What about low-income men? One solution is to have several take a wife together.” He added: “That’s not just my weird idea. In some remote, poor places, brothers already marry the same woman, and they have a full and happy life.” Polyandry has been practiced before in China, particularly in impoverished areas, as a way to pool resources and avoid the breakup of property. Yet much of the online response to Mr. Xie’s proposal has been outrage. “Is this a human being speaking?” a user with the handle dihuihui wrote on Weibo. “Trash-talking professor, many single guys want to ask, ‘Where’s your wife?’ ” a user who identified as Shanyu jinxiang1887003537 wrote. Attempts to contact Mr. Xie on Monday were unsuccessful. On Sunday, he published an indignant rebuttal on one of his blogs, accusing his critics of being driven by empty notions of traditional morality that are impractical and selfish — even hypocritical. “Because I promoted the idea that we should allow poor men to marry the same woman to solve the problem of 30 million guanggun, I’ve been endlessly abused,” he wrote. “People have even telephoned my university to harass me. These people have groundlessly accused me of promoting immoral and unethical ideas. “If you can’t find a solution that doesn’t violate traditional morality,” he continued, “then why do you criticize me for violating traditional morality? You are in favor of a couple made up of one man, one woman. But your morality will lead to 30 million guanggun with no hope of finding a wife. Is that your so-called morality?” In addition to provoking guardians of traditional morality, the proposal has been pilloried by feminists and gay rights advocates. “Men are publicly debating how to allocate women, as though women were commodities like houses or cars, in order to realize some grand political ideal originating from either the patriarchal left or the patriarchal right,” Zheng Churan, one of five women’s rights activists detained in March, wrote in an essay for a WeChat group called Groundbreaking. “Behind the imbalanced sex ratio of 30 million bachelors lie 30 million baby girls who died due to sex discrimination. But somehow everyone’s still crying that some men can’t find wives.” Mr. Xie also has supporters. On his Sina blog, he posted a comment from a student at Nanchang Hangkong University. “You are standing alongside the poorest working-class people,” the student wrote. “When there’s no better way, why don’t we get rid of so-called morality and solve society’s problems? The New York Times

Bissau: Zamora contra Ansumane

As forças fiéis ao Presidente guineense, Kumba Yalá, anunciaram (na quarta semana de Novembro de 2000) a entrada na base aérea de Bissalanca, reduto do general rebelde Ansumane Mané, que entretanto se retirara de lá, para destino desconhecido. O chefe de Estado e os seus ministros tinham passado a noite sob a protecção das Nações Unidas. A Igreja Católica e o corpo diplomático tentam que a situação regresse à normalidade. O porta-voz das forças militares fiéis ao Presidente da República da Guiné-Bissau, comandante Zamora Induta, anunciou ontem à tarde que as mesmas tinham conseguido entrar na base aérea de Bissalanca, principal reduto do general Ansumane Mané, que na segunda-feira se autoproclamara chefe do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas e colocara sob detenção domiciliária o legítimo titular do cargo, Veríssimo Correia Seabra.O arcebispo de Bissau, D. José Camnaté Na Bissign, o embaixador de Portugal, António Dias, e uma série de outras personalidades tentaram ao longo do dia evitar confrontos de maior entre as duas facções castrenses em conflito.A capital acordara ao som de disparos, devido ao confronto entre as tropas lealistas e as que seguiam o polémico Mané, de 60 anos, vencedor da guerra travada entre Junho de 1998 e Maio de 1999 contra o então Presidente da República, João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira. Mas a meio da manhã a situação acalmara, com indícios de que a maior parte dos militares estaria a obedecer ao general Veríssimo Seabra. À tarde ainda se ouviu alguns tiros, mas quase sempre de armas ligeiras. Depois das primeiras escaramuças, na noite de quarta-feira, o Presidente e alguns dos ministros do Executivo liderado por seu primo, Caetano Intchamá, refugiaram-se na representação local das Nações Unidas, que, tal como a Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (Cedeao), entende que a principal responsabilidade da presente situação é sobretudo do general Ansumane Mané, que já por mais de uma vez no passado ocupou as funções às quais desejou agora regressar.Em 1998, Mané constituiu uma junta militar e iniciou a guerra contra o Presidente "Nino" Vieira precisamente depois de haver sido destituído de chefe do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, na sequência de recriminações mútuas sobre quem seriam os principais culpados pelo tráfico de armas para os rebeldes que lutam pela independência de Casamansa, no Sul do Senegal.Tendo "Nino" chamado em seu auxílio o exército senegalês, a maioria da população guineense, num assomo nacionalista, colocou-se ao lado da junta militar, que tinha precisamente como segundo homem o agora general Veríssimo Seabra. Terminada a guerra, realizaram-se eleições legislativas e presidenciais, a partir de Novembro do ano passado, para se regressar a uma legalidade constitucional, devendo os militares regressar aos quartéis. Mas Ansumane Mané nunca aceitou de bom grado que a junta deixasse de existir, antes tendo entendido que deveria ficar como uma espécie de co-presidente, sempre com uma palavra a dizer sobre tudo o que Yalá fizesse.O seu pretexto para a rebelião desta semana foi o facto de o Presidente da República ter alterado à última hora uma lista de promoções de oficiais que teria sido previamente aprovada pelas chefias militares. E teve a tarefa facilitada pelas profundas divergências que também existem entre as diversas formações políticas, com o PAIGC - pela primeira vez na oposição, em 26 anos de independência - a liderar uma forte contestação a Yalá e ao Governo de Intchamá.Mané perguntou como é que um país economicamente debilitado pode promover 10 oficiais à patente de general, o que acarreta uma grande despesa. E quando, numa reunião, ele os convidou a devolver as insígnias recebidas dias antes, os generais colocaram-nas, um a um, em cima de uma mesa na sala onde se encontravam reunidos. Foi neste contexto que Veríssimo Seabra conseguiu escapar quarta-feira da situação de residência fixa em que Mané o colocara e se desencadeou a troca de tiros entre as duas facções militares, tanto na zona da capital como na vila de Mansoa, a 60 quilómetros. Mas não há conhecimento de baixas especiais a assinalar, no balanço destas últimas 48 horas. E, tanto quanto parece, a artilharia pesada nem sequer chegou a entrar em acção."Ainda não é tarde para voltar atrás", sublinhou ontem o bispo católico de Bissau, em comunicado lido aos microfones da Rádio Nacional, para solicitar ao Presidente Yalá, ao general rebelde e a todos os militares que escutem "os gritos das multidões apavoradas" de novo em fuga para fora de suas casas, tal como aconteceu durante a guerra civil.De acordo com as notícias existentes ao princípio da noite, nomeadamente as veiculadas pela Lusa, Ansumane Mané teria sido interceptado e até mesmo desfardado por populares não muito longe da base aérea que funciona junto ao aeroporto de Bissalanca, a oito quilómetros da capital. Mas não havia confirmação de tais dados. O porta-voz do Estado-Maior declarou à RTP-África que o general rebelde deverá vir a ser julgado pelo poder judicial, provavelmente tal como os principais oficiais que o acompanharam, Buota Na Batcha e Lamine Sanhá. PÚBLICO, Novembro 2000

Bissau: O processo de Zamora Induta

________________________________________ O contra-almirante guineense José Zamora Induta é actualmente acusado de vários crimes, entre os quais o de terrorismo, por alegadamente ter procurado contrariar o golpe de Abril de 2012, dado pelo general António Indjai, que anteriormente o afastara do Chefe do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas. “Parece que se estava à procura de fazer uma coleção de todos os crimes que se encontram na lei penal. Infelizmente foi isso que aconteceu", disse José Paulo Semedo, advogado de defesa de Zamora Induta, que nestes último meses regressara a Bissau, ido de Portugal, onde se encontrava exilado. No dia 21 de Outubro de 2012, a cidade de Bissau foi palco de mais um acontecimento, de contornos mal definidos, apresentado como uma tentativa de golpe contra os golpistas que em Abril se haviam apossado do poder e colocado com Presidente de Transição Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo. António Indjai, o Presidente e o Governo de Transição por ele patrocinados acusaram um grupo de militares, alegadamente a soldo do contra-almirante José Zamora Induta, de haverem preparado uma intentona, possivelmente com o intuito de colocarem as coisas no ponto em que estavam antes de Abril, com o primeiro-ministro de então, Carlos Gomes Júnior, em vias de vir a ser eleito Presidente da República. O grupo de operacionais acusado pelo duo golpista Indjai-Nhamadjo era comandado pelo capitão Pansau Intchama, que estivera a frequentar um curso em Mafra e que atacou o quartel dos pára-comandos, em Bissalanca, nas imediações do aeroporto de Bissau, com o alegado intuito de recolocar as coisas no pé em que estavam uns sete meses antes. Segundo o entender de António Indjai, de Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo e do Governo golpista por eles instalado, Pansau Intchama teria sido enviado de Lisboa pelo contra-almirante Zamora Induta, com o apoio de Carlos Gomes Júnior, de Portugal e de outros países da CPLP. Em sintonia com Indjai e com o renegado Nhamadjo, também o Partido da Renovação Social (PRS) denunciou então o que seriam as manobras de Zamora Induta e dos seus amigos lusófonos para anular o golpe de estado de Abril, que tão nocivo tinha sido para a Guiné-Bissau. Uma equipa de seis advogados está a preparar a contra argumentação de Zamora Induta às acusações de que é alvo e que o tornam susceptível de mais de 20 anos de cadeia, num país onde reina a impunidade e onde ninguém tem sido condenado por tantos crimes cometidos desde os tempos da luta armada e dos primeiros anos da independência. José Zamora Induta é atualmente o único acusado no caso da alegada tentativa de golpe de estado de 21 de outubro de 2012, dado que outras pessoas, entre as quais o líder do ataque ao quartel dos "bóinas vermelhas" em Bissau, o referido capitão Pansau N'Tchama, seu antigo guarda-costas, beneficiaram o ano passado de um indulto presidencial. Ainda nunca ninguém julgou os assassinos de uma série de personalidades guineenses, mas parece que se quer julgar alguém cujo principal crime poderia ter sido acabar com o Governo colocado em funções pelos golpistas que impediram a segunda volta das eleições presidenciais de 2012, que quase de certeza iriam ser ganhas por Carlos Gomes Júnior. António Indjai e Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo estão a viver tranquilamente a sua vida, depois de todo o mal que causaram ao país, e Zamora Induta serve de arma entre o tão controverso Presidente actual, José Mário Vaz, e o líder do PAIGC, Domingos Simões Pereira, que foi afastado de primeiro-ministro, num conluio com o PRS. Vaz, visto por alguns como uma espécie de ditador na linha de João Bernardo Vieira, "Nino", deu a entender que Zamora Induta teria voltado a Bissau para ajudar Domingos Simões Pereira a reforçar-se como primeiro-ministro e a fazer-lhe sombra. Agora, o país da grande impunidade, onde ainda nem sequer se sabe com todos os pormenores as circunstâncias em que morreram Amílcar Cabral e Francisco Mendes, "Chico Té", tem nas mãos aquele que poderá ser um bode expiatório de muita coisa, um contra-almirante que não é bem visto pelo general António Indjai, que chegou a ser seu adjunto. No dia 1 de Abril de 2010, o então Chefe do Estado-Maior Adjunto, Indjai, deteve Zamora Induta e, também, o primeiro-ministro Carlos Gomes Júnior, que inclusive ameaçou de mandar fuzilar, só não o tendo feito por a reacção popular haver sido muito forte. Carlos Gomes Júnior voltou então a exercer funções, para definitivamente vir a ser derrubado dois anos depois, por esse mesmo António Indjai que deveria estar agora a responder perante os tribunais, pelo muito mal que já fez à Guiné-Bissau. No entanto, em vez de Indjai quem vai aparecer no banco dos réus é José Zamora Induta, possivelmente acusado, entre muitas outras coisas, de ter feito conluio com Carlos Gomes Júnior para matar um seu antecessor como Chefe do Estado-Maior General, Tagme Na Waie, e inclusive Nino Vieira. Alegação esta que chegou a ser feita, a dada altura, pelo antigo primeiro-ministro Francisco José Fadul. O mesmo Fadul acusou Zamora Induta de haver eliminado o general Ansumane Mané, que fora líder da Junta Militar que em 1999 derrotou Nino Vieira, obrigando-o a exilar-se em Portugal. Enfim, uma Guiné-Bissau onde tudo é possível, incluindo os crimes mais torpes e as mais violentas acusações.

Bissau: Novembro 2000

As forças fiéis ao Presidente guineense, Kumba Yalá, anunciaram em Novembro de 2000 a entrada na base aérea de Bissalanca, reduto do general rebelde Ansumane Mané, que entretanto se retirara de lá, para destino desconhecido. O chefe de Estado e os seus ministros tinham passado a noite sob a protecção das Nações Unidas. A Igreja Católica e o corpo diplomático tentam que a situação regresse à normalidade. O porta-voz das forças militares fiéis ao Presidente da República da Guiné-Bissau, comandante Zamora Induta, anunciou ontem à tarde que as mesmas tinham conseguido entrar na base aérea de Bissalanca, principal reduto do general Ansumane Mané, que na segunda-feira se autoproclamara chefe do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas e colocara sob detenção domiciliária o legítimo titular do cargo, Veríssimo Correia Seabra.O arcebispo de Bissau, D. José Camnaté Na Bissign, o embaixador de Portugal, António Dias, e uma série de outras personalidades tentaram ao longo do dia evitar confrontos de maior entre as duas facções castrenses em conflito.A capital acordara ao som de disparos, devido ao confronto entre as tropas lealistas e as que seguiam o polémico Mané, de 60 anos, vencedor da guerra travada entre Junho de 1998 e Maio de 1999 contra o então Presidente da República, João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira. Mas a meio da manhã a situação acalmara, com indícios de que a maior parte dos militares estaria a obedecer ao general Veríssimo Seabra. À tarde ainda se ouviu alguns tiros, mas quase sempre de armas ligeiras.Depois das primeiras escaramuças, na noite de quarta-feira, o Presidente e alguns dos ministros do Executivo liderado por seu primo, Caetano Intchamá, refugiaram-se na representação local das Nações Unidas, que, tal como a Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (Cedeao), entende que a principal responsabilidade da presente situação é sobretudo do general Ansumane Mané, que já por mais de uma vez no passado ocupou as funções às quais desejou agora regressar.Em 1998, Mané constituiu uma junta militar e iniciou a guerra contra o Presidente "Nino" Vieira precisamente depois de haver sido destituído de chefe do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, na sequência de recriminações mútuas sobre quem seriam os principais culpados pelo tráfico de armas para os rebeldes que lutam pela independência de Casamansa, no Sul do Senegal.Tendo "Nino" chamado em seu auxílio o exército senegalês, a maioria da população guineense, num assomo nacionalista, colocou-se ao lado da junta militar, que tinha precisamente como segundo homem o agora general Veríssimo Seabra. Terminada a guerra, realizaram-se eleições legislativas e presidenciais, a partir de Novembro do ano passado, para se regressar a uma legalidade constitucional, devendo os militares regressar aos quartéis. Mas Ansumane Mané nunca aceitou de bom grado que a junta deixasse de existir, antes tendo entendido que deveria ficar como uma espécie de co-presidente, sempre com uma palavra a dizer sobre tudo o que Yalá fizesse.O seu pretexto para a rebelião desta semana foi o facto de o Presidente da República ter alterado à última hora uma lista de promoções de oficiais que teria sido previamente aprovada pelas chefias militares. E teve a tarefa facilitada pelas profundas divergências que também existem entre as diversas formações políticas, com o PAIGC - pela primeira vez na oposição, em 26 anos de independência - a liderar uma forte contestação a Yalá e ao Governo de Intchamá.Mané perguntou como é que um país economicamente debilitado pode promover 10 oficiais à patente de general, o que acarreta uma grande despesa. E quando, numa reunião, ele os convidou a devolver as insígnias recebidas dias antes, os generais colocaram-nas, um a um, em cima de uma mesa na sala onde se encontravam reunidos. Foi neste contexto que Veríssimo Seabra conseguiu escapar quarta-feira da situação de residência fixa em que Mané o colocara e se desencadeou a troca de tiros entre as duas facções militares, tanto na zona da capital como na vila de Mansoa, a 60 quilómetros. Mas não há conhecimento de baixas especiais a assinalar, no balanço destas últimas 48 horas. E, tanto quanto parece, a artilharia pesada nem sequer chegou a entrar em acção."Ainda não é tarde para voltar atrás", sublinhou ontem o bispo católico de Bissau, em comunicado lido aos microfones da Rádio Nacional, para solicitar ao Presidente Yalá, ao general rebelde e a todos os militares que escutem "os gritos das multidões apavoradas" de novo em fuga para fora de suas casas, tal como aconteceu durante a guerra civil.De acordo com as notícias existentes ao princípio da noite, nomeadamente as veiculadas pela Lusa, Ansumane Mané teria sido interceptado e até mesmo desfardado por populares não muito longe da base aérea que funciona junto ao aeroporto de Bissalanca, a oito quilómetros da capital. Mas não havia confirmação de tais dados. O porta-voz do Estado-Maior declarou à RTP-África que o general rebelde deverá vir a ser julgado pelo poder judicial, provavelmente tal como os principais oficiais que o acompanharam, Buota Na Batcha e Lamine Sanhá. Jorge Heitor e António Soares Lopes/PÚBLICO 24 de Novembro de 2000

Ambiciosas manobras da NATO

Brunssum, the Netherlands – NATO, Partner Nations and International Organisations (IOs) will participate in Exercise Trident Juncture 2015 in Italy, Portugal and Spain, from 03 October to 06 November 2015. The event, a flagship activity for NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and the largest exercise conducted by the Alliance since 2002, will have two parts: - Command Post Exercise (CPX) for Strategic and Operational level staff training, evaluation and certification (3-16 October), which will include participants from the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU); - Live Exercise (LIVEX) for Tactical level troop engagements (21 October – 06 November). Exercise Trident Juncture 2015 will mark the climax of a series of dynamic and demanding training events designed to train and test troops and Commanders, including those from the NATO Response Force (NRF). "The purpose of the Exercise is to train and test the NATO Response Force, a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force comprising Air, Land, Maritime and Special Forces components,” said General Hans-Lothar Domröse, the Commander of Joint Force Command Brunssum. "Enhancing our response forces is a key part of NATO’s overall effort to adapt to emerging security challenges. Trident Juncture 2015 has been designed to ensure that our concepts and procedures will work in the event of a real crisis because our job is always to be prepared to defend the people, territory, and values of this Alliance,” he added. The exercise, which involves 36,000 personnel from more than 30 Allied and Partner Nations, will be hosted by Italy, Portugal, Spain. In addition to those nations the exercise will also be conducted in Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. Naval elements will participate from the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Trident Juncture 2015 will demonstrate NATO’s new increased level of ambition in joint modern warfare and will show-case a capable, forward-leaning Alliance equipped with the appropriate capability and capacity to meet present and future security challenges. More than 12 major International Organizations, aid agencies and non-governmental organisations, such as the EU and AU will also participate in the exercise, demonstrating NATO’s commitment and contribution to a comprehensive approach. As the culminating event for units, military and civilian staff belonging to more than 30 participating nations, Trident Juncture 2015 will provide an opportunity to refine operational capabilities. Air, Land, Maritime, and Special Forces will participate simultaneously in several locations and from different Headquarters to train in a complex environment to improve Alliance’s full spectrum capabilities. At the conclusion of Trident Juncture 2015, the Headquarters Staff from Joint Force Command Brunssum will be officially certified to lead the NATO Response Force, if activated, throughout 2016.

Argélia: Vigilância electrónica

Un décret présidentiel vient d’instituer la mise en place d’un dispositif de surveillance électronique généralisé, au nom de la prévention et de la lutte contre les infractions liées aux technologies de l’information. S’il est évident que la cybercriminalité pose de sérieux défis au pays en matière de sécurité, il reste à savoir, néanmoins, si la vie privée des citoyens sera systématiquement protégée contre un usage abusif. Les Algériens seront-ils mis sur écoute plus qu’ils ne l’étaient ? Un décret présidentiel portant sur une surveillance électronique généralisée vient de voir le jour ; il a été publié au Journal officiel du 8 octobre dernier. Il est vrai que le motif avancé est globalement la sécurité nationale, mais le texte qui officialise la création de l’Organe national de prévention et de lutte contre les infractions liées aux technologies de l’information et de la communication fixe sa composante et ses modalités de fonctionnement et prête réellement à confusion dans certains de ses articles. Le décret présidentiel liste, faut-il le préciser, exhaustivement tous les moyens de communication électronique, à savoir «toute transmission, émission ou réception de signes, de signaux, d’écrits, d’images, de sons ou de renseignements de toute nature, par tout moyen électronique, y compris les moyens de téléphonie fixe et mobile». Autrement dit, l’Organe en question peut accéder aux données numériques et au contenu des conversations de n’importe quel citoyen algérien. Bien que mis «sous l’autorité du magistrat compétent et à l’exclusion de tout autre organisme national», le caractère «préventif» de la surveillance électronique – confiée à une direction qui a aussi pour mission la veille électronique – suscite beaucoup d’interrogations en cela que la surveillance et l’opération de veille peuvent concerner non seulement des personnes faisant l’objet d’une enquête que ce soit dans le cadre de la lutte contre la criminalité sous toutes ses formes ou contre le terrorisme, mais également d’autres personnes. Car aussi flous et imprécis qu’ils sont, les termes «surveillance et veille électroniques» donnent à comprendre que le citoyen mis sur écoute et dont les mails et les correspondances sont épiés peut être «Monsieur Tout le monde». Donc pas forcément un supposé criminel faisant l’objet d’une enquête ou d’une information judiciaire. En effet, si l’article 4 du code de procédure pénale fixe avec précision les modalités de la surveillance électronique qui vient «pour prévenir des infractions qualifiées d’actes terroristes ou subversifs et les infractions contre la sûreté de l’Etat» et «lorsqu’il existe des informations sur une atteinte probable à un système informatique représentant une menace pour l’ordre public, la défense nationale, les institutions de l’Etat ou l’économie nationale ou pour les besoins des enquêtes et des informations judiciaires, lorsqu’il est difficile d’aboutir à des résultats intéressant les recherches en cours sans recourir à la surveillance électronique», le décret présidentiel peut aller bien au-delà. Sinon, que veut dire l’article 8 du texte publié dans le Journal officiel lorsqu’il énumère les missions du comité directeur qui arrête le programme d’action de l’Organe et en détermine les modalités d’application ? Les écoutes téléphoniques et la surveillance électronique sont une affaire très délicate et sérieuse, d’autant qu’elles relèvent de la sécurité du pays, pour l’aborder dans des notions très larges et vagues de «subversion, d’atteinte à la sûreté de l’Etat». Ces notions, dont l’interprétation peut varier selon les circonstances, peuvent bien être perverties en l’absence d’un Etat de droit. Pouvons-nous comprendre que désormais, la vie privée des Algériens est du domaine de cet Organe qui «exerce l’exclusivité en matière de surveillance des communications électroniques sous le contrôle du magistrat compétent» ? Autre interrogation qui taraude les observateurs : que vient faire un représentant de la présidence de la République dans une structure censée être complémentaire au travail de la justice et des services de sécurité en leur fournissant des informations sur les infractions susceptibles d’être une menace pour la sécurité nationale ? El Mouradia préfère-t-elle être à la source de l’information que d’attendre les rapports des différents services de l’Etat ? Autant de questionnements qui font craindre les dérives d’un pouvoir qui ne cesse de mettre en garde, par le biais de ses représentants et ses relais politiques, l’opposition accusée de vouloir «jeter le pays dans l’anarchie». Craintes légitimes que le pouvoir fasse un mauvais usage contre ceux que qualifie un de ses hauts responsables d’«ennemis de l’intérieur». El Watan

Bissau: A Justiça que não há

Bissau, 17 Out 15 (ANG) – “Em termos formais, a justiça guineense é independente, mas na prática ela enfrenta muitas limitações”, afirmou sexta-feira em Bissau, a Relatora dos Direitos Humanos das Nações Unidas. Em conferência de imprensa onde fez o balanço da sua visita de sete dias de avaliação da independência da justiça guineense, Mónica Pinto afirmou que nos encontros e auscultações feitos junto, nomeadamente dos órgãos da soberania e operadores judiciários, conseguiu diagnósticar, entre outros, que ela não abrange a todo o território é “muito cara e morosa”. Sobre as dificuldades de acesso a justiça, por parte dos cidadãos, a relatora dos Direitos Humanos afirmou que apesar da legislação guineense prever a criação de nove tribunais regionais, apenas cinco estão a funcionar. E, ainda acrescenta que não obstante existir tribunais sectoriais nas noves regiões, os mesmos não operam em duas destas circunscrições. Também, segundo ela, o mesmo acontece com a destribuiçao geográfica dos magistrados do Ministério Público. Para alterar a situação, considera de “imperativo” a instalação de todos os tribunais e delegacias do Ministério Público como está previsto na lei e que os mesmos “sejam operacionais”. No que tange ao seu “elevado custo” disse que várias pessoas não conseguem pagar as taxas judiciais e a dispensa de pagamento das mesmas é raramente concedida pelos juízes, por causa da falta de um sistema de patrocínio gratuito do Estado. “A Ordem dos Advogados facilita a nomeação dos seus membros em cada caso, mas o Estado não arca com os seus honorários”, completou. Em relação a sua morosidade, realça a demora das tramitações processuais que, nas suas palavras, o atraso dos tribunais nos processos é um passo a negação da justiça aos cidadãos. De acordo com Mónica Pinto, outros problemas da justiça na Guiné-Bissau são a impunidade devido as sucessivas amnistias, o bolqueio a acção do advogados, as faltas de instituições e meios de investigação mais sofisticados de obtençao de provas. A pouca confiança da população na justiça, as faltas de formação, de edifícios para instalar os tribunais, de meios materiais para o seu normal funcionamento, da protecção dos operadores da justiça e a problemática do “baixo” salário que auferem, completam o rol das dificuldades do sector judicial guineense. E, na óptica de Monica Pinto, a remuneração dos juízes deve ser adquada a “importante” função pública que desempenham, porque segundo as suas palavras, um magistrado é proibido de exercer qualquer outro tipo de actividade, salvo a da docência. Entretanto, informou que o Parlamento guineense prometeu estudar a questão que, numa dada altura, o seu Presidente, Cipriano Cassama assegurou que será aprovado um novo Estatuto do Magistrado com melhores condiçoes remuneratórias e de trabalho. Mónica Pinto disse que “estas mesmas” carências se encontram na Polícia Judiciária e na justiça militar guineenses. Problemas, que segundo ela, o governo deve assumir as suas respoinsabilidades de os resolver. No que concerne a componente legislativa, esta jurista especializada em Direito Internacioanl disse que não obstante o país necessitar de actualizar certas normas, o seu principal problema não se prende com a falta de leis, mas sim da sua implementação. E, como exemplo, citou os casos das leis sobre a violência doméstica e da mutilação genital feminina.E acrescenta que a mera existencia das normas, por si só, não produz resultados. Por isso, considera de importante uma campanha de consciencialização e de sensibilização destes diplomas jurídicos. Em jeito conclusão, apontou a “enorme tarefa” da Guiné-Bissau no sector judiciário e aconselha as suas autoridades para um “exercício de introspecção”, visando ter um quadro real no sector e que permita identificar as acções prioritarias. Para isso, exorta para o estabelecimento de um “compromisso” entre os actores judiciários nacionais. E disse que o país precisa duma ajuda internacional em prol duma justiça independente. Mónica Pinto irá apresentar o seu Relatório sobre o estado da justiça guineense no mês de junho do próximo ano, junto da Comissão dos Direitos Humanos da ONU em Genébra, Suíça, que devera dar ênfase situaçao da independência ou não dos seus juízes, magistrados do Ministério Público e advogados. Para além dos Juízes, procuradores e advogados, durante a sua estada no país, Mónica Pinto manteve encontros com o Presidente da República, com partidos plíticos, as ONGs no domínio dos direitos humanos, com a Faculdade de Direito de Bissau, com agências da ONU e líderes tradicionais. Mónica Pinto está no país a convite das autoridades da Guiné-Bissau, entrou em funçoes como Relatora Especial da ONU em Agosto ultimo e é professora de Direito Internacional e de Direito dos Direitos Humanos na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Buenos Aires, Argentina, da qual é Reitora.

Como salvar a Líbia?

Longtemps minoritaires au sein de la coalition au pouvoir à Tripoli, les partisans d'un accord avec les autorités de Tobrouk semblent en passe de prendre le dessus. L’un donne rendez-vous dans un petit café du centre-ville. Un autre se déplace jusqu’à l’hôtel des journalistes. Un dernier reçoit au siège de sa compagnie et exige l’anonymat. Trois lieux, trois personnages aux visées différentes, une seule préoccupation : faire profil bas dans un Tripoli à la croisée des chemins. Si un accord sur la formation d’un gouvernement d’union nationale n’est pas signé avant le 20 octobre à Skhirat, au Maroc, entre les délégués respectifs de la Chambre des représentants (CDR) de Tobrouk et du Congrès général national (CGN) basé à Tripoli, l’ONU menace de suspendre les discussions avec les deux parties. Une exigence qui divise la coalition de milices Fajr Libya (« Aube de la Libye »), au pouvoir à Tripoli. Longtemps minoritaires, les partisans d’un accord sont aujourd’hui en passe de prendre le dessus. À preuve : dix-huit chambres de l’hôtel Corinthia – qui avait été attaqué en janvier 2015 – sont en cours de rénovation en prévision d’un retour de la mission de l’ONU. Attablé à la terrasse du café, loin des oreilles indiscrètes, Salah Bakouch, conseiller de la délégation de Tripoli à Skhirat, explique pourquoi le CGN doit s’engager : « Si nous signons maintenant, nous savons avec qui nous allons gouverner. Après le 20 octobre, Haftar [Khalifa Haftar, chef des forces armées alliées au gouvernement de Tobrouk] pourrait faire un coup d’État, ou la Cyrénaïque [région Est] faire sécession. » Ces propos révèlent un changement de cap. Surtout, ils émanent d’un proche d’une figure clé du paysage libyen, Abderrahmane Sewehly, un faucon devenu, en quelques semaines, un possible candidat au poste de vice-Premier ministre. Sur le fond, Tripoli a arraché des concessions primordiales. Le texte d’accord prévoit que les 145 membres du Conseil d’État, lequel fonctionne comme une chambre haute, seront tous issus du CGN, et non les trois quarts comme prévu initialement. En outre, si la CDR reste l’assemblée principale, le Conseil d’État verra ses pouvoirs de nomination et législatifs renforcés. « Ce texte est équilibré, juge Mohamed el-Harezi, porte-parole du Parti justice et construction [PJC, proche des Frères musulmans], qui est le seul à recevoir ouvertement dans les bureaux de sa formation politique. La pression de la communauté internationale est si forte qu’il y aura un accord. » L’influence de Misrata Plus d’un an après la bataille de Tripoli, qui a provoqué la formation des deux gouvernements ennemis, favorisant ainsi l’implantation puis l’essor de l’État islamique (EI), la Libye serait donc sur le point de trouver une solution politique à la crise. Et les principaux artisans de cet accord ne sont pas à chercher dans la capitale mais à Misrata, à 200 km à l’est. La troisième ville du pays joue en effet un rôle central dans la période postrévolution. Elle est le siège des milices libyennes les plus puissantes et jouit désormais, grâce à son port, du statut de capitale économique. Misrata a ainsi joué du fusil et du dinar pour arriver à imposer le gouvernement de Fajr Libya à Tripoli à l’été 2014. À ce moment, les dirigeants voulaient éradiquer les derniers « kadhafistes » : Haftar, les groupes armés de Zintan ou de la tribu des Wershefana – devenus des soutiens de Tobrouk. Aujourd’hui, le ton a changé du tout au tout. « Nous voulons un accord, car nous voulons la paix et la sécurité », assure l’élu local Ali Abou Sitta, qui représente Misrata dans les négociations.  Si nous voulons la victoire, ce ne devrait pas être Misrata contre l’État islamique, mais l’État libyen contre l’État islamique, prévient Khaled Abou Jazia Ce revirement a une explication : l’État islamique. Implanté depuis février à Syrte, à 250 km à l’est de Misrata, le groupe terroriste a organisé plusieurs attaques au cœur de la ville. Pour se protéger, la municipalité a dû battre le rappel de nombreux bataillons misratis qui étaient stationnés dans l’Ouest. Une stratégie efficace, à condition d’obtenir un accord politique avec les ennemis d’hier pour en faire de nouveaux alliés. « Si nous voulons la victoire, ce ne devrait pas être Misrata contre l’État islamique, mais l’État libyen contre l’État islamique », prévient Khaled Abou Jazia, porte-parole de la brigade 166, première ligne de défense de Misrata contre l’EI. En ville, désormais, les partisans du « califat » effraient davantage que la figure de Haftar. Une difficile union nationale Haftar, c’est justement ce qui empêche Abdelkader Ouali, membre du CGN, d’envisager un accord : « Il doit être écrit noir sur blanc que Haftar ne peut exercer de fonction officielle. » Conscient de ne plus représenter la majorité, l’élu préfère aller directement au-devant des journalistes pour expliquer son point de vue. « En proposant des personnalités comme Jadallah el-Talhi [ancien Premier ministre sous Kadhafi] au poste de chef du gouvernement, la Chambre des représentants donne l’impression d’être composée de kadhafistes et non de révolutionnaires. » Si Ouali prône tout de même le dialogue pour arriver à un « vrai » accord, d’autres usent de méthodes plus musclées. En septembre, des hommes armés ont fait irruption au sein du CGN pour empêcher la tenue d’une réunion censée fixer la liste des candidats à soumettre à l’ONU pour former le gouvernement d’union nationale. « C’est Nouri Abou Sahmain [le président du CGN] qui a fait venir ses hommes pour retarder l’accord », assure un élu présent ce jour-là mais qui préfère garder l’anonymat et recevoir dans les bureaux de sa société pour lancer ses accusations.  Tee-shirt à l’effigie de « Buka » – chef d’Ansar al-Charia tué en mars à Benghazi – sur les épaules, Mustapha suivra Salah Badi jusqu’au bout Le chef de guerre et homme politique Salah Badi a, lui, créé le Front de fermeté, une milice qui continue de combattre dans l’ouest du pays, où les affrontements sont réguliers avec les Zintanis et les Wershefana. Tee-shirt à l’effigie de « Buka » – chef d’Ansar al-Charia tué en mars à Benghazi – sur les épaules, Mustapha suivra Salah Badi jusqu’au bout. Les Zintanis ont attaqué sa ville de Kikla, sur le mont Nefoussa, dans l’ouest du pays. Pour lui, ni l’intérêt national ni les impératifs économiques ne sont une raison suffisante pour faire la paix avec « ces voleurs ». Il fait partie de la centaine de Tripolitains qui se réunissent chaque vendredi sur la place des Martyrs à l’appel de l’aile dure du pouvoir. Sur l’un de leurs écriteaux, on peut voir une caricature de Bernardino León, représentant spécial de l’ONU pour la Libye, avec ce slogan : « Une paix trompeuse est plus nocive qu’une guerre ouverte. » Mathieu Galtier Jeune Afrique

Dinar argelino está em queda

Le prix de la devise sur le marché parallèle flambe. L’euro passe le cap des 170 DA ; il était coté mercredi 172 DA à la vente par les cambistes du square Port Saïd, à 178 DA hier et pourrait même atteindre les 200 DA dans les prochaines semaines. Une flambée que les cambistes expliquent par une demande de plus en plus soutenue sur l’euro et le dollar, face à une offre de plus en plus limitée. Le fait est qu’aujourd’hui celui qui détient de la devise ne la vend pas ou peu. Mais qu’est-ce qui pousse les Algériens à acheter de la devise au marché noir ? Au-delà de l’évidence concernant la dépréciation du cours officiel du dinar, c’est le facteur psychologique qui pousse nos compatriotes à acheter en masse des euros et des dollars, devenus depuis quelques semaines des valeurs refuge. Pour les détenteurs de cash, le marché immobilier n’a donc plus les mêmes attraits. En cause, le contexte de crise latente qui alimente l’inquiétude des populations. Ainsi, la démarche des pouvoirs publics – consistant à imposer le chèque pour toute transaction immobilière dépassant les 5 millions de dinars et le processus de mise en conformité volontaire pour capter les fonds circulant dans l’informel – a au final engendré l’effet inverse. Il aura suffi de la rumeur de l’édition d’un nouveau dinar pour que les détenteurs de la chkara se ruent en masse sur les cambistes du marché noir. Il faut cependant admettre que l’élément qui déclenche la panique auprès des acheteurs potentiels est l’inquiétude que suscite le contexte de crise qui prévaut dans le pays. Au-delà des difficultés économiques auxquelles l’Algérie devra face durant les prochains mois, c’est le contexte politique qui «tétanise» plus d’un. C’est dans ce sens justement que l’économiste et expert M’hamed Hamidouche nous explique que pour les Algériens qui ont accès aux devises, «il n’est plus intéressant de détenir des dinars, au-delà de ce dont ils ont besoin pour couvrir les nécessités quotidiennes». L’économiste évoque en premier lieu la défiance de nos compatriotes envers le dinar, devenu au fil des années une «monnaie de singe». C’est ainsi que M. Hamidouche explique que «par l’effet combiné de l’inflation réelle et de la dépréciation du cours du dinar qui a perdu, en une année, un quart de sa valeur face au dollar, il devient contreproductif de détenir des dinars qui perdront encore de la valeur dans quelques mois». A ce facteur, M. Hamidouche ajoute le sentiment de crise générale latente qui prévaut chez nos concitoyens et qui «pousse certains à thésauriser en devises pour avoir de l’argent sous la main» au cas où. L’économiste reconnaît également l’impact des transferts de devises effectués par les Algériens pour l’acquisition de biens à l’étranger, même s’il estime que le marché a absorbé ce facteur et que pour l’heure les seuls à alimenter ce flux spécifiques sont des Algériens disposant d’assez de moyens pour acquérir des biens sur des marchés immobiliers dépressifs, dans un objectif de spéculation. Le poids des importateurs Bien que le facteur psychologique soit déterminant dans le comportement des acheteurs et des vendeurs, certains éléments sous-jacents expliquent aussi en partie la flambée sur le marché des devises. C’est à ce titre que M. Hamidouche évoque deux éléments. Il s’agit, en premier lieu, de celui relatif aux «écarts constatés entre la ligne de cotation des billets et chèques de voyage publiée par la Banque d’Algérie et les taux de change au niveau banques commerciales», qui s’expliquerait par les marges prélevées sur les transactions de change. Mais l’élément prédominant reste le comportement des importateurs et des trabendistes qui alimente la demande ces derniers jours. C’est ainsi que l’économiste explique que «certains importateurs qui activent depuis la plateforme de Dubaï recourent massivement, ces derniers jours, au marché parallèle des devises pour alimenter leurs comptes aux Emirats». En cause, «les transactions commerciales avec la Chine devraient s’arrêter pour une trêve annuelle en décembre et janvier induite par les inventaires que les opérateurs chinois doivent opérer à cette période de l’année. D’où la densification des transactions commerciales avec la Chine en octobre et novembre, expliquant ainsi l’augmentation de la demande en devises». Dans ce sens l’économiste explique que bien que la Chine soit en zone dollar, la situation pousse ces importateurs à l’achat d’euros «car permettant de plus grosses coupures avec des billets à 500 euros, plus faciles à faire transiter par-delà les frontières». Il va sans dire que les dernières mesures prises par les autorités consistant à limiter les importations en réduisant les engagements extérieurs des banques, en imposant les licences d’importation et en renforçant les contrôles afin de limiter la surfacturation poussent les détenteurs de fonds à se réorienter vers les circuits informels pour transférer du liquide. Autrement dit, les mesures devant limiter la saignée ne font au final que l’alimenter. Autant de facteurs qui consolident l’idée que le meilleur contrôle des changes est la confiance que les citoyens, les opérateurs et les investisseurs ont dans l’environnement d’un pays. Melissa Roumadi Roumadi Melissa/ El Watan

Editorial do Luta Popular

A Classe Operária e o Momento Político Actual Passou hoje uma semana sobre a realização do último sufrágio para a Assembleia da República. Com excepção dos dois círculos eleitorais do estrangeiro, cujos votos, quaisquer que eles sejam, nunca alterarão o quadro final das relações entre os partidos já conhecido, toda a gente sabe que a coligação fascista da direita e da extrema-direita – PSD/CDS – perdeu a maioria absoluta em número de votos e de deputados eleitos, que o segundo partido mais votado é o derrotado PS de António Costa, que em terceiro lugar ficou o Bloco da classe média urbana e da esquerda caviar e, por derradeiro, o partido revisionista e social-fascista de Jerónimo de Sousa, já que não se deve dar qualquer crédito ao partido que, num país de fome e de miséria, logrou eleger um deputado para representar, em São Bento, os hipocondríacos proprietários citadinos de gatos e de cachorros. O mentecapto presidente da república, que nos calhou ter em sorte nesta altura, bloqueia a norma do nº 1 do artº 187º da Constituição da República e está a sabotar a formação do governo que haverá de sair da assembleia eleita. Assim, já se passaram oito dias, e o palonso que temos em Belém nem sequer começou ainda a ouvir os partidos representados na Assembleia da República, nem nomeou ainda o primeiro-ministro, tendo em conta, como o reclama a norma constitucional, os resultados eleitorais. Cavaco vai para a rua, com a condecoração popular de indecente e má figura, dentro de cinco meses, precisamente no dia 9 de Março de 2016, e, se calhar, julga poder passar estes cinco meses que lhe faltam para ir pentear macacos a inventar pretextos para impor ao país um governo de maioria absoluta, juntando na mesma cama Passos, Portas e Costa, o que, diga-se de passagem e sem réstia de homofobia, é pouca mulher para tanto homem. Não há pois governo, porque o presidente da república quer um governo de iniciativa presidencial impossível e anticonstitucional, que aliás não tem suporte nos resultados eleitorais da semana passada. E em vez de ouvir imediatamente, e como lhe cumpre, os partidos com representação parlamentar e de imediatamente, como também lhe cabe, nomear um primeiro-ministro dedutível dos resultados eleitorais, deixando depois ao normal jogo de forças parlamentares a questão de saber se o primeiro-ministro nomeado tem ou não apoio na assembleia, Cavaco chama a Belém o traidor Passos Coelho e manda-o andar por aí às voltas, a ver se caça um parceiro político que acrescente uma maioria absoluta à maioria relativa dos partidos da coligação da direita e da extrema-direita, isto é, do PSD com o CDS. Aterrorizado com a manobra cavaquista da formação de um governo de bloco central, reunindo os três partidos que os teóricos do capitalismo doméstico designam como os partidos do arco do poder – PSD, CDS e PS – e que são os partidos responsáveis pelo governo do país nos últimos quarenta anos, e portanto responsáveis pelo estado de calamidade e de miséria em que vivemos, o revisionista e social-fascista Jerónimo, com a canalha dirigente do PCP, atracam-se a António Costa e empurram-no para a formação de um governo do PS, garantindo-lhe o apoio parlamentar do PCP e do Bloco dito de Esquerda. Vejam, estimados leitores, as cabriolas e as cambalhotas de que são capazes os revisionistas, oportunistas e social-fascistas de Jerónimo e do PCP em menos de oito dias… O seu objectivo político essencial, nos últimos quatro anos, que culminaram com o acto eleitoral de 4 de Outubro, foi a constituição de governo patriótico e de esquerda, no qual manifestamente não cabia o chamado Partido Socialista de António Costa, isto segundo eles diziam. Costa e o PS, aliás, foram o bombo da festa de Jerónimo e seus oportunistas durante os últimos quarenta dias e quarenta noites da campanha eleitoral. Bem denunciámos nós aos operários e a todo o povo trabalhador que o conceito de governo patriótico e de esquerda, salivado na boca de Jerónimo, além de ser uma contradição nos termos, se destinava apenas a enganar papalvos. Na verdade, não tinham ainda arrefecido nas urnas os votos obtidos para um governo patriótico e de esquerda, depois de uma campanha em que Jerónimo atacou forte e feio António Costa e o PS como um baluarte da Tróica em Portugal, e eis que o caudilho social-fascista do PCP, esquecendo tudo o que havia imputado ao PS e a António Costa, enquanto "líder de um partido de direita", se prostra de joelhos diante do até agora reaccionário Costa e do PS de direita, implorando-lhes, pelas alminhas, que aceitem formar um governo do PS, com eles, revisionistas do PCP, e com elas, as meninas oportunistas do Bloco, venham eles e elas a ser ministros do Governo de Costa ou não venham a ser mais nada do que bengalas parlamentares do reaccionário António Costa e do PS, partido de direita. E eis como, em menos de oito dias, a ideologia política oportunista do PCP e do BE consegue transformar o objectivo de luta por um governo patriótico e de esquerda num governo patriótico e de direita. Ora um governo do PS e de António Costa não pode ser outra coisa senão um governo da Tróica e do capital alemão. Basta ler o programa político com que o PS de António Costa se apresentou ao eleitorado há oito dias. Como é que o PCP e o Bloco podem apoiar um governo desta natureza? E que diferença existe entre o governo da Tróica, conduzido por Costa ou pela coligação de direita e de extrema-direita? Que política de esquerda é esta que se propõem o PCP e o Bloco, ao apoiarem o governo de António Costa e do PS? Política de esquerda esta? Isto não é política de esquerda. Isto é tudo um putedo! E é contra este putedo todo que se têm de erguer o povo trabalhador, a classe dos operários e os verdadeiros comunistas. Qualquer que seja o governo que saia da Assembleia da República eleita no sufrágio do último domingo, seja da coligação Coelho/Portas, seja o do arco governativo Coelho/Portas e Costa, seja o governo de Costa com o apoio directo ou apenas parlamentar dos revisionistas do PCP ou das meninas oportunistas do Bloco, qualquer desses três governos é um governo da Europa Alemã, do capital germânico, da Tróica, de Ângel Merkel e de Schäuble, mas nunca um governo do povo português, nunca um governo ao serviço da classe operária e dos trabalhadores. E fiquem sabendo: qualquer desses governos terá sempre, apesar da miséria que impõe aos portugueses, o grande mérito de abrir os olhos aos proletários e ao povo: só a revolução proletária, só o comunismo acabará com a exploração do homem pelo homem. Notem porém os operários portugueses que o apoio parlamentar dos revisionistas do PCP e dos oportunistas do Bloco a um governo do PS e de António Costa significa que não haverá aumento de salários nem de pensões ou de reformas nos próximos quatro anos, o que vai significar também mil e seiscentos e sessenta milhões de euros no corte das reformas e pensões e do capital acumulado da segurança social. Quanto à luta sindical, com as duas centrais (UGT e CGTP) a apoiar a política de austeridade e terrorismo do mesmo governo, terão os trabalhadores de travar contra todos os sindicatos oportunistas uma luta de morte. O apoio do PCP e do Bloco a um governo do PS e de Costa vai significar a política da Tróica com apoio do PCP e do Bloco. Uma coisa que os leitores julgariam impossível. Mas não é… Preparemo-nos, pois, para a luta. Qualquer que seja o próximo governo, teremos de lutar contra ele. Essa é a nossa missão de proletários e de comunistas. Não nos deixemos iludir pelos cânticos da sereia, seja ela dos lacaios do PCP ou dos lacaios do Bloco. 11.10.2015 Arnaldo Matos