Luanda’s scope of action is not limited to the Great Lakes, Southern Africa and the Gulf
of Guinea. In fact, the MPLA has been widening alliances with a diverse array of non-African
countries. Such geopolitical interaction reflects Luanda’s intention to attain greater
international prestige, attract foreign investment and skilled workers, assert itself as
an economic gateway to the region, and enter non-African markets. In short, Luanda is
seeking to influence international engagement with the continent. The other side of the
spectrum juggles between expanding commercial ties and promoting the region’s security
environment as a means to advance their interests in the region. Angola has become
a vital partner for those international actors seeking to have a stake in the promising
African continent.
28 PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | Number 8 | SPRING/SUMMer 2014
China’s strategy to Africa is exclusively aimed at reaching new markets and opportunities.
In fact, Luanda is poised to be a major broker for China’s expansion in the Great
Lakes region. In May 2014, just three days after a US delegation left the country, a Chinese
delegation arrived in Angola to discuss cooperation agreements in the areas of infrastructure
construction, agriculture and support for more Chinese investment.30 Concerning
Brazil, the country’s interest in Angola falls mostly on strengthening economic
cooperation, while not disregarding security in the region. Recently, the opening of a sixth
credit line raised total of loans to Angola to US$7.83 billion.31 And apart from economic
goals, in 2013 Angola and Brazil signed a military cooperation agreement aimed at developing
the country’s armed forces and promote security across the South Atlantic. In
addition, six military planes were already delivered and Brazilian authorities are analyzing
the possibility of transferring technology to reduce Angola’s reliance on the exterior
in terms of weaponry and logistics.32
Portugal’s strategy regarding Angola goes in line with that of Brazil. Portuguese private
investment in Angola, in terms of small and medium enterprises, now only trails that of
China. Nevertheless, Luanda is reversing the game by taking advantage of the economic
and financial crisis in Portugal. Angola has already invested between €10 and €15 billion
in Portugal, in areas as diverse as media, banking, building and agriculture.33 As a result,
Luanda has found a gateway to the European market. Moreover, both countries maintain
technical-military cooperation that focuses on training, logistical and administrative support
to Angolan armed forces. The cooperation has allowed for the professionalization
of the Angolan army and contributed to the subordination of the Angolan armed forces
to political power.34 Both countries are in the process of expanding cooperation to areas
such as communications, information systems, and maritime and coastal control.35
Conversely, other countries are as much committed to advancing economic interests as
to promoting security. In fact, for them these are deeply interdependent. In a trip to Angola
this year, US Secretary of State John Kerry commended President José Eduardo
dos Santos on his engagement in the peace process in the Great Lakes region. Bilateral
trade, cooperation, human rights and good governance were also discussed. Kerry noted
the role that Angola – one of America’s three strategic military partners in Africa, alongside
Nigeria and South Africa – may have in promoting security in the region, in particular
regarding the potential airlift of troops to CAR.36 President José Eduardo dos Santos has
also been to France to promote Angola as a prime destination for trade and investment.
During the visit, France, which has vital strategic interests in the Great Lakes region,
recognized Angola as a regional anchor for peace and security. The two also discussed
possible joint action in conflict resolution in Africa.37 Finally, Angola is regarded by Russian
leaders as a strategic partner. Russia has provided support to modernize the Angolan
armed forces, and both countries are also discussing ways to strengthen bilateral
cooperation, including in the transport sector, staff training, and recognition of university
diplomas.38
Angola: Towards Supremacy in Sub-Saharan Africa? 29
Despite playing a small role historically in peacekeeping missions, Luanda’s potential
in mediating conflicts and promoting stability is widely recognized. As a matter of fact,
the deployment of Angola’s capable armed forces to regional crisis zones promises tangible
benefit to the international community. On the one hand, Angolan military action
would compensate for the lack of men on the ground, in theory making international
peacekeeping operations more capable, as it is often difficult to find countries willing to
make troops and other military resources swiftly available. In addition, the West – namely
France and the US – would also see a considerable share of the burden taken off its back.
On the other hand, an ‘African solution for African problems’ would be attained, making
accusations of western meddling less likely to be made. However, in a recent interview,
the Angolan Minister of Foreign Affairs rejected the idea of deployment of Angolan troops
to CAR.39 This position suggests that President José Eduardo dos Santos is unwilling to
deploy the Angolan army under foreign command.
A Prudent, but Potentially Decisive, Regional Stabilizer
Unilateral Angolan intervention in crisis areas should not be ruled out because it is in
Luanda’s strategic interests to guarantee peace and security inland and at sea. Yet, any
joint African intervention is contingent on the protracted establishment of the African
Standby Force (ASF) and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC),
the likes of which are expected to be launched by 2015 and October 2014, respectively.40
Equally relevant is cooperation within the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
(CPLP) in terms of promoting security and stability. Despite being relatively active in the
area of capacity building, the organization still lacks an institutionalized military cooperation,
i.e. peacekeeping operations, that would propel its importance in the international
arena. Although an institutionalized military cooperation within the CPLP will hardly materialize
in the short-term, its potential should not be discounted. Portuguese-speaking
countries not only have deep cultural and political ties, which in principle could ease consensus
and cooperation, but they also share strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover, the CPLP comprises some of the world’s fastest growing economies – namely
Angola, Brazil and Mozambique –, a fact that may enable the organization to play, in the
foreseeable future, an increasingly important role in the continent’s economic and political
environment. With this in mind, Angola can spearhead the development of CPLP’s
capacity to promote security and stability, especially in Guinea-Bissau and around the
Gulf of Guinea, and thus advance its national interests on another front.
Considering the likelihood that Angola will deploy troops on the ground soon is low, and
finding ‘African solutions for African problems’ is a way off, the most efficient way to address
instability in the region would be to draw on Angola’s post-war experience. Despite
a 27-year civil war, Angola managed to become an African powerhouse and place itself
among the most stable and peaceful countries in the continent. Inclusion of former opposition
fighters into the government and economic sphere drove this success, and led
30 PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | Number 8 | SPRING/SUMMer 2014
to reconciliation. Even despite some setbacks in delivering on a few promises to former
civil war fighters,41 few other African countries managed to be as effective in the armed
forces’ transition as Angola.42 Over and above, a victor’s justice43 was never applied in
Angola, in contrast to what happened in other post-war scenarios in Africa.
Angola is one of the few African countries that has managed to achieve high levels of
financial liquidity – derived from oil revenues – while maintaining internal stability. Such
an achievement provides Luanda with enough leeway to support other countries in need.
That financial liquidity can be applied along the lines of the support given to the CAR, and
also to make regional organizations more efficient and to contribute for the swift establishment
of an African intervention force. Clearly, the task to stabilize troubled countries
can be made easier if regional actors get together and actively commit to addressing
instability. Considering this, Luanda can use its growing influence in the region to try to
find a consensus that may serve all key regional actors. In fact, a consensus aimed at
improving the political and security environment in the region is likely to have greater
success if attained under the umbrella of regional organizations.
The Angolan regime may play an additional role in promoting stability. Using its growing
status as an African powerhouse, and as a major economic and security partner, Luanda
can push for the region’s interests in the international scene. That can be done without
disregarding the principle of ‘finding African solutions for African problems’. Organizations
like the World Bank, which had an important participation in Angola’s post-war reconciliation,
can interact with Africa in an active manner, but according to regional dynamics
and driven by African interests. In addition, a successful bid to join the UN Security
Council as a non-permanent member for the 2015-2016 period will certainly give Luanda
greater leverage within the international community to promote Angola’s interests, and
hence those of the region and the continent.44
Conclusion
Angola’s remarkable post-war recovery and reconciliation, coupled with an immense
oil wealth, was ingeniously transformed into an incisive and constructive foreign policy
that, above all, aims at maintaining internal stability, both among the general population
and the patronage system that has supported the regime. Internal stability is largely
contingent on socio-economic development, job creation, economic diversification and
economic expansion towards foreign markets. Still, Luanda has realized that economic
power alone will not suffice. In order to guarantee internal stability, Luanda needs to
minimize instability on its borders and in the region more broadly. Therefore, for Angola
it is essential to go beyond projecting economic and political influence abroad, and accumulate
hard power. In other words, soft power is a tool that can only yield results when
backed up by hard power – military might and economic heft.
Angola’s oil-fed military investment drive has given rise to one of the most capable armed
forces in sub-Saharan Africa, alongside Nigeria and South Africa. Having Angola’s hard
Angola: Towards Supremacy in Sub-Saharan Africa? 31
power in consideration, President José Eduardo dos Santos’ ICGLR chairmanship and
leading role in the GGC have been widely recognized by African and non-African actors as
key to the region’s peace and stability. In particular, the acknowledgement that troubled
countries in the Great Lakes can draw on Angola’s post-war experience as a model to
follow, and also that the Gulf of Guinea can benefit from having Angola’s capable armed
forces at its core, so as to assure smooth trade flows and overall security. Luanda now
has enough interest and sway in the region to promote regional joint initiatives to foster
peace, security and stability.
Such a capable country stands at the forefront of those entities with which international
actors have to interact so as to better advance and protect their own interests in the continent.
Hence, Angola has become a major partner that has to be engaged on any sort of
matter in the region of the Great Lakes, Southern Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Luanda’s
rise in the region, in Africa, and on the international scene is certain. Notwithstanding,
one should bear in mind that President José Eduardo dos Santos may be nearing the end
of his 34-year rule, a fact that will possibly originate internal power disputes and even
opposition-led social upheaval that may threaten the regime, and thus undermine the
stable path that the country has taken since the end of the civil war.
Gustavo Plácido dos Santos, in Portuguese Journal of International Affairs
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