O Ocidente precipitou-se na questão da Líbia

Revolts and revolutions begin locally but their outcomes are often determined globally. The rebels themselves understandably are focused on bringing down the regime that oppresses them. But the course of their struggles and the ultimate fate of their revolution can be shaped by faraway forces and events.
When the Libyan rebels and Western liberals called for intervention to stop Gaddafi's forces outside Benghazi, many mistakenly imagined the war might end quickly with a rebel sweep through the desert to Tripoli. The problem is that, even with NATO air support, the rebels lacked the military ability to assault the regime's strongholds.
This is no insult to the courage of the rebels or to their dedication, but a reflection of the fact that military effectiveness requires training and organisation they simply did not have. For them, NATO intervention averted a massacre; for Western publics, the intervention appeared wholly motivated by humanitarian concerns.
It was certainly understandable in the circumstances. But by bringing in NATO the Libyan revolution not only gave the West a seat at the ruling table, they surrendered the possibility of developing their own political and military autonomy.

Passion is not enough

Frantz Fanon would have had some harsh advice for the Libyan rebels. He knew that revolutions required the kind of passion and willingness to sacrifice that the Libyan people demonstrated. He also knew that passion was not enough, that revolutions had to develop an iron discipline to have any chance of achieving their goals.
Often this lesson is taught to a revolutionary people by a massacre at the hands of the regime's security forces. The survivors learn to organise, to strategise from a position that is weak in material but strong in spirit, and to begin the long war. On a smaller scale, this is what happened in Misurata. It is a costly, often tragic path, but it holds out the possibility of a revolution that acquires the organisation and power to determine its own fate, or to at least have a chance at doing so. It might also have taught Libya's fractious clans to work together.
Instead, NATO aircraft and French arms have made up for the absence of discipline and cohesion among the rebels.
It is unclear just why a West burdened with multiple crises decided to commit itself to Libya. The media drama around Benghazi, the weakness of the Gaddafi regime, its proximity to Europe, and the desire of Sarkozy and Cameron to relive bygone days as leaders of great powers all played a role.
The initial ambivalence of the Western commitment was clear for everyone to see. Airpower is a profoundly seductive instrument, seemingly available for a romantic weekend without strings or consequences. The knights of the sky were given a suitably gallant mission, protecting civilians. They were above, so to speak, the struggle for power in Libya.
As ever with the West, it was simply assumed that when swords were unsheathed the barbarians would crumple. But Europe is not what it was, its fleets on the sea and in the air much depleted, its treasuries - and even its armouries - nearly empty.

Tarak Barkawi, na Alzajeera