Bissau: IPRIS viewpoints

The international community’s immediate condemnation of the military coup that took place in Guinea-Bissau on April 12 seemed to suggest that it was doomed to fail. Formally speaking, subsequent events appear to confirm this initial assessment. However, the same cannot be said with complete certainty if we look at the consequences of the military coup from a substantive point of view. The announcement on April 11 by the president of the National Electoral Commission, Desejado Lima da Costa, that the second round of presidential elections would take place on April 29 basically triggered the military coup. Since there was little doubt that the leader of PAIGC and former Prime Minister, Carlos Gomes Júnior, would be the winner of the electoral contest, given the results of the first round, then there was no other way to block his ascension to the presidency of Guinea-Bissau. Demands by the coup leaders that Angola withdraw its technical-military cooperation mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG) were merely a means to an end. Days before the coup the Angolan government had already announced the end of MISSANG, even though no date for the departure was stated. However, Angola’s political support to Carlos Gomes Júnior would continue in the future and his efforts to promote and support the Security Sector Reform (SSR) would continue as well. Herein lays the true source of the coup. Carlos Gomes Júnior had to be removed from power, even if it meant a resort to force. Indeed, this was not the first time that the military attempted to oust him. Two years ago to this month, in a similarly half-successful coup, then Armed Forces Deputy Chief of General Staff António Indjai (now the Chief of General Staff, and probably the current coup leader) publicly threatened to kill Carlos Gomes Júnior. (...) Paulo Gorjão e Pedro Seabra. Artigo completo em http://www.ipris.org email: ipris@ipris.org